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ABSTRACT
This study is about a hypothesis in the theory of international rela­
tions, a search, and what was found. It consists of eight chapters di­
vided into three parts.
Part One, containing one chapter, presents the hypothesis of Otto 
von Gierke, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull that midway between the real­
ist (also referred to as the Machiavellian or Hobbesian) tradition and 
the universalist (or Kantian or revolutionist) tradition there is the 
Grotian (or rationalist or internationalist) tradition - here called 
the via media. It originated in Europe in the late fifteenth/early six­
teenth century and, together with the other two, has existed since that 
time. It has its own distinctive pattern of ideas, although some of 
these ideas are also present in the other two. The term which best des­
cribes and identifies this pattern is international society.
Part Two records the search and its findings. It comprises five 
chapters. Chapter Two discovers evidence for the existence of the idea 
of international society well before 1500. Chapters Three to Six ex­
plore the writings of four thinkers associated with the early phase of 
this tradition and find the idea of international society in three of 
them - Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili - but not in the fourth, Grotius.
Part Three evaluates the findings of Part Two. It consists of two 
chapters addressed to the idea and the thinkers respectively. Chapter 
Seven concludes that the pattern of ideas found in Erasmus, Vitoria and 
Gentili, while not identical in the three thinkers, has all the elements 
of the hypothesis of Gierke, Wight and Bull as well as certain addition­
al elements. Chapter Eight finds that thinkers of the via media may be 
no less "realistic” observers of events than realists; it further finds 
that that which links the former across time is not so much "a tradition 
of thought" as "a way of thinking".
iv
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements iii
Abstract iv
Introduction vi
PART ONE: THE HYPOTHESIS
I Three Ways of Thinking about International 1 
Relations
PART TWO: THE SEARCH AND THE FINDINGS
II The Idea of International Society before 20
1500
III Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam 36
IV Francisco de Vitoria 75
V Alberico Gentili 117
VI Hugo Grotius 160
PART THREE: AN EVALUATION
VII A Pattern of Ideas 238
VIII A Way of Thinking 263
Appendix: A Word about Words 270
Notes 278
Bibliography 381
v
INTRODUCTION
The theory of international relations is host to the significant but lit­
tle explored hypothesis that, midway between realism and idealism, there 
is a third tradition of thought - here called the via media - which orig­
inated in Europe in the late fifteenth/early sixteenth century and which, 
along with the other two, has existed since that time. It displays a pat­
tern of ideas which, while having some elements in common with the other 
two, is distinct from both of them. The term which best describes and 
identifies this pattern is international society.
The hypothesis is significant. It challenges the view that thinking 
about international relations is typified by two modes of thought, real­
ism and idealism. It promises to account for phenomena which the other 
two dismiss as either unimportant or anomalous. It holds out a set of 
values which may appeal to those who are not persuaded by what is offered 
by either of the other two.
Yet, no serious attempt has been made to test this hypothesis, to 
add to or subtract from its claims by carefully examining it. It is no 
more certain now than when it first appeared in the literature of inter­
national relations that thinkers regarded as representatives of the via 
media actually have the pattern of ideas ascribed to them, or that they 
are linked in what has been called a tradition.
Hence, it seems worth investigating the hypothesis, thereby contrib­
uting to a branch of international relations which has enjoyed little 
growth: the historical study of its ideas. The few general histories 
that have appeared, along with the small number of more specialized stud­
ies of individual thinkers and of topics such as the law of nations, 
peace proposals, the just war, the balance of power, reason of state and 
natural law do not occupy much space on a book-shelf.
The present study, which is best described as attempting to discover 
a pattern of ideas in the past, rather than writing its history, is ar­
ranged in eight chapters.
Chapter One presents and discusses the idea of the three traditions 
of thought found in the writings of Otto von Gierke, Martin Wight and 
Hedley Bull, sets out the hypothesis, and formulates questions which are
vi
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suggested by it.
Chapter Two describes the search for the beginnings of the idea of 
international society.
Chapters Three to Six explore the writings of four of the earliest 
thinkers suggested by the hypothesis - Erasmus, Vitoria, Gentili and 
Grotius - and present the findings under a varying number of headings, 
reflecting the attempt not only to offer answers to the initial ques­
tions, but also to give expression to differences in thought encountered 
in the four thinkers. Two steps are thus involved. The first may be 
called analytical: the close reading of the sources and the identifica­
tion of ideas that are relevant, and also supported by their authors’ 
thought as a whole. The second step entails synthezising, assembling the 
ideas thus identified in a new order, under headings suggested by the 
hypothesis. The idea of international society is a composite product of 
the mind, and its ingredients appear in a different order and different 
language in these thinkers of the past. It is not offered as a complete, 
familiar whole, but needs to be discovered.
Quotations are used extensively in all four chapters, as they per­
mit contemporary readers to judge for themselves that the ideas ascribed 
to these thinkers are actually present in their writings. The quotations 
also convey impressions about the personality and style of their au­
thors, and hence may be seen as bringing them to life for today’s read­
er.
Because of its complex nature, the inquiry does not extend beyond 
Grotius.
Chapters Seven and Eight assemble and compare the findings of the 
search, and relate them to the initial hypothesis. Chapter Seven addres­
ses itself to the pattern of ideas, whereas Chapter Eight is concerned 
with the thinkers, commenting on their relationship to the political 
events of their times, and to one another. An Appendix has been added 
to compare the vocabulary of the early thinkers with that of their twen­
tieth-century counterparts.
The study is based mainly on primary sources, and of these the 
writings of Erasmus, Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius - books, treatises, 
letters, lecture notes, commentaries and prefaces - constitute by far
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the greatest part.
Meeting these four thinkers and their writings means encountering 
four different situations.
Erasmus, scholar and propagandist for "the new learning", wrote and 
published prolifically. His languages were Latin, Greek, and possibly 
Hebrew. Numerous editions of his writings, translated into many lan­
guages, have appeared in the course of time, and continue to appear. The 
number of studies on almost all aspects of his thought seems infinite.
A noticeable lacuna, however, is the near absence of scholarly analysis 
of the ideas on international relations which are dispersed throughout 
his writings. Their discovery and assessment thus require time and care.
Vitoria, professor of theology and jurisconsult, published nothing 
during his life-time except four prologues, and his original manuscripts 
are said to have disappeared about the time of his death. He wrote in 
Latin and Spanish. What exists of his writings today is attributed to 
manuscript copies and the spoken word. It is incomplete, and it is not 
vast. It has gone through a number of editions and translations. The 
ideas which are of interest in the context of this study are easily 
found, appearing in a limited number of writings, but they are not 
equally easily read and interpreted. Vitoria’s method of argument, his 
language and the imperfect nature of the record combine to work against 
a quick conquest. Commentaries exist, but they are often enthusiastic 
rather than searching.
Gentili, professor of law and jurisconsult, wrote a great deal - 
his language was Latin - but did not publish everything. Most of what 
was published did not go through further editions after his death, and 
remained untranslated. No comprehensive study exists of his work as a 
whole. Exempted from this total disregard have been three of his writ­
ings - his ideas on international relations - which were kept alive by 
new editions and translations, but even they have met with widespread 
disregard by the scholarly community. As a result there exist only a 
few studies with which to compare notes. Gentili’s ideas are not quick­
ly apprehended: although his method of presenting them differs from Vi­
toria's, it is no less complex.
Grotius, author and man of affairs, has many writings to his cred-
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it - in Latin and Dutch, and in numerous editions and translations - 
but his fame, at least in the field of international relations, rests 
almost entirely on one book, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, although his ideas 
on the subject are not confined to it. An extensive literature, impres­
sive for its mainly concordant views, has built up around it. However, 
it projects an image of Grotius which is not in harmony with the origi­
nal, whether one looks at just the one book, or extends the search to 
include his other writings on the subject. Hence, the difficult task 
arises of identifying the Grotius of the original sources against the 
Grotius of most of the commentators. It is a task which is not facili­
tated by the way Grotius presents his ideas.
Of great value in this search for the idea of international socie­
ty are the general histories of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
as they provide the wider context within which to place the four think­
ers and their ideas.
Wherever possibly in this study, references are to English trans­
lations of the original languages, and, in their absence, to French, 
Spanish and German translations. Only where there are no translations, 
or where these need to be clarified, are the original languages referred 
to. The reason for this approach is that, on the whole, scholars in in­
ternational relations, while expert in more than one discipline and lan­
guage, are not specialists in old languages. All quotations in this 
study are in English - my own translations where non-English texts have 
been used.
PART ONE
THE HYPOTHESIS
CHAPTER I
THREE WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
There is a chain of thought which links Martin Wight to Otto von Gierke, 
and Hedley Bull to Martin Wight. Inscribed in it is the idea that since 
the beginning of modern times there have been three ways of thinking 
about international relations: one which denies the existence of inter­
national society, another which sees it as insubstantial and transitory, 
and a third which asserts its existence and validity.
Gierke, the jurist, identified the three ways of thinking when 
studying the history of the German Genossenschaft'*'. Whether he was the 
first to do so remains a question to be answered by scholarship; he him­
self does not say. Wight, the historian of ideas, describes them as a
2
"familiar aspect" of the intellectual history of modern Europe , al-
3
though his only reference is to Gierke. Bull, the international rela­
tions scholar, refers to them as a matter of fact: "Throughout the his­
tory of the modern states system there have been three competing tradi­
tions of thought".^ The intellectual lineage which he establishes is to 
Wight and Gierke.^
Gierke did not incorporate his findings into his theory of corpo­
rations. His reason was simple: "Excluded from consideration are all as­
sociations ... which do not succeed in attaining an independent legal 
personality above their members". Wight moved the three ways of think­
ing to the centre of his theory and made them the framework within which 
he investigated the history of thought and practice in international re­
lations. Bull’s reaction was more ambivalent. "Is it true?" he asked 
when confronted with what he called Wight’s "great structure of ideas". 
"Can one really categorize the history of thought about international 
politics in this way?" His answer was: "Much that has been said about 
International Relations in the past cannot be related significantly to
Q
these traditions at all". "But", he went on to say, relenting a little, 
"there is no doubt that it has a firm basis in reality".^ If one can 
arrange the history of thought about international politics in this way, 
he resumed the question, "does an account of the debate among the three 
traditions really advance our understanding of international politics in 
the twentieth century?"'*''*' His reply was: "That (Wight’s) account of
1
2these past traditions of thought contributes directly to our understand-
12ing of contemporary international politics there can be no doubt". To 
reject or to accept Wight's structure of ideas - this was Bull's ques­
tion, and a final answer will no longer come from his pen.
This chapter presents the accounts of the three ways of thinking by 
Gierke, Wight and Bull (Sections One to Three); offers a comparison of 
these accounts (Section Four); sets forth the hypothesis which the the­
sis will investigate (Section Five); and formulates the questions which 
will guide research in Part Two of this study (Section Six).
1. Gierke's Account
, 13The idea that there are three ways in which men have thought about in­
ternational relations since the beginning of modern times was first men­
tioned by Gierke in his monograph Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung 
der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien^, published in 1880. The idea reap­
peared in 1913 when the fourth volume of his monumental work Das 
Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht^  was published, and it is the second ac­
count of the idea, rather than the first, which is presented here, main­
ly because it is more detailed.
In the fourth volume of his Genossenschaftsrecht, entitled Die 
Staats- und Korporationslehre der Neuzeit^, Gierke writes in the first 
chapter covering the period to the middle of the seventeenth century:
The medieval idea of a world monarchy was foreign 
to the natural-law theorists. They left it to the 
Imperial publicists to conjure up, on reams of^a- 
per, the lifeless shadow of the imperium mundi , 
while they themselves developed out of the inde­
structible core of that dying idea the new and ^g 
fruitful idea of voelkerrechtliche Gemeinschaft. 
Beginning with the sixteenth century, it became 
customajj“^  to base the binding f^gce of the j us 
gentium on a societas gentium in which the 
original and indestructible unity of mankind was 
held to continue to exist, while ^vereignty had 
passed to the individual nations.
Gierke mentions thinkers such as Omphalus, Connanus, Gregorius, Suarez, 
Winkler, Gryphiander and Grotius as representatives of this view.
After noting that the nature of this society of states remained un­
clear because no distinction was made between the concept of partnership
3
22and that of corporation , Gierke continues: "And it happened that, on
the one hand, the inclination to compress this society into a world
state with a world government organized along republican lines appeared
23again and again" - he thinks of theorists such as Vitoria, Gentili, 
Boxhornius and Junius Brutus - "while, on the other hand, the stricter 
adherents of the theory of sovereignty altogether rejected the idea of2 A
a natural community binding the states". The two examples which he 
gives are Bodin and Hobbes.
After this brief outline of the three ways of thinking about inter­
national relations, Gierke returns to "the dominant theory, decisive for
the future of the law of nations 
maintained that:
„25 , to point out that its exponents
(T)here did exist an association based on natural 
law amongst nations, and that this association, 
while it did not produce any power of the whole 
over its parts, did generate mutual rights and 
obligations of a social kind. The law of nations 
was interpreted as natural law binding the states 
- which as a result of their sovereignty remained 
in the state of nature - just as the pre-state 
natural la^had bound human beings in the state 
of nature.
In the second chapter, which covers the period from the middle of
the seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century,
Gierke observes that the question relating to the existence and nature
of voelkerrechtliche Gemeinschaft continued to be answered in different
ways. On the one hand, there were those who altogether rejected the idea
of a general society of states. Their reasoning was that "if the state
of nature was a state without a social life, and if the law of nations
was nothing more than pure natural law which continued to be valid be-
27tween states, who as personae morales lived in a state of liberty and
28equality, then there could be no general society of states". His re­
search showed Gierke that, because of the esteem in which Samuel Pufen- 
dorf was held, it looked for a time as if such a view would carry the 
victory. Apart from Pufendorf, it was people such as Hornius, Spinoza, 
Hertius, Boehmer and Justi, who expounded this view. However, in the 
long run, as he observed, the opposite view prevailed:
It was argued that in as far as an original com­
munity amongst human beings was assumed, the state 
of nature which existed among states was also that
4of a natural society. Yet, even if one proceeded 
from the assumption of individualization, but 
saw in the creation of the social condition a de­
velopment of natural law itself, one arrived at 
the idea of a society among nations established 
by natural law or at least postulated by natural 
law. The representatives of this view usually 
recognized a positive law of nations which was 
produced within this society by extending the na­
tural law of nations through a process of express 
or tacit consent. In this way, the concept of a 
general^society of states was successfully de­
fended .
Gierke mentions Johann a Felde, Mevius, Praschius, Bossuet, Placcius,
Leibniz and Thomasius as representatives of this view. "Yet every so of-
30ten", the account concludes, "the idea of a civitas maxima , whose cit­
izens, the states, were subject to a true universal government, reap- 
31peared". Its advocates, Gierke notes, were thinkers such as Vico, 
Wolff, Achenwall, Kant and Fichte.
2. Wight's Account
Martin Wight's first published account of the three ways of thinking 
about international relations - in "Western Values in International Re­
lations", a contribution to Diplomatic Investigations published in 
321966 - is also the most detailed, and hence the one presented here.
The same account, in a much condensed version, is included in Systems of
33States which was published in 1977. An early formulation of it, dating
back to 1960, became available in 1987 with the publication of the paper
"An Anatomy of International Thought". And according to Hedley Bull's
and Brian Porter's writings another, possibly much more elaborate
version is contained in Wight's as yet unpublished lectures on the the-
35ory of international relations.
return to "Western Values", Wight's "single most important pa-
"Ever since Machiavelli and Hobbes", the account begins,
(T)here have been those who take the view that 
there is no such thing as international society: 
that international relations constitute an anar­
chy whose social elements are negligible. The 
doctrine that the state is the ultimate unit of 
political society entails the doctrine that
5there is no wider society to embrace states.
According to the exponents of this view, Wight goes on to say, the dip­
lomatic system, the network of functional international organizations, 
the League of Nations and the United Nations furnish no evidence of an 
international society, and international law "is only the sum of the 
principles and rules which states ... have agreed to regard as obliga­
tory; and the basis of international obligation is purely contractu- 
38al". Apart from Machiavelli and Hobbes, Wight holds, it was, for ex­
ample, Hegel, the Social Darwinists, the legal positivists and many a 
diplomat of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who represented this 
line of thinking.
"At the opposite extreme", Wight continues, there are those who be­
lieve that:
(T)he society of states is the unreal thing - a 
complex of legal fictions and obsolescent diplo­
matic forms which conceals, obstructs and op­
presses the real society individual men and 
women, the civitas maxima . On this view, inter­
national society is none other than the community 
of mankind. If the community of mankind is not 
yet manifested, yet it is latent, half gl^gpsed 
and groping for its necessary fulfilment.
The Huguenots, Kant and Turgot, according to Wight, represent this view, 
and so do the Jacobins, Mazzini, President Wilson and the Communists.
The road to a world state may be peaceful or it may be marked by war, 
but whatever its nature, it is believed that, as Wight puts it, "the 
community of mankind, like the kingdom of God, is the glory that shall 
be revealed .
Having outlined the two extreme ways of thinking about internation­
al relations, Wight introduces the third tradition of thought which has
/ 2
the "quality of a via media" :
Between the belief that the society of states is 
non-existent or at best a polite fiction, and 
the belief that it is the chrysalis for the com­
munity of mankind, lies a^ore complex conception 
of international society.
It is a conception, Wight holds, which is expressed in a language which 
is imprecise and full of qualifications. It does not deny the sovereign-
6
ty of states, but maintains that this sovereignty is relative and not 
absolute. It sees the states not as dissolving and merging into a world 
community, but rather as parts of a greater whole, and this greater 
whole, international society, exercises restraints upon its parts, the 
states.
Given "such tension between opposites" an understanding of this 
conception of international society, Wight argues, can be arrived at on­
ly by extensive historical and sociological study. International socie­
ty, on this view,
(I)s the habitual intercourse of independent com­
munities, beginning in the Christendom of Western 
Europe and gradually extending throughout the 
world. It is manifest in the diplomatic system; in 
the conscious maintenance of the balance of power 
to preserve the independence of the member-communi­
ties; in the regular operations of international 
law, whose binding force is accepted over a wide 
though politically unimportant range of subjects; 
in economic, social and technical interdependence 
and the functional international institutions es­
tablished latterly to regulate it. All these pre­
suppose an international social^^onsciousness, a 
world-wide community-sentiment.
As representatives of this way of thinking, Wight mentions Vitoria, Sua­
rez, Gentili, Grotius, Locke, Callieres, Halifax, Montesquieu, Burke, 
Gentz, Castlereagh, Coleridge, Tocqueville, Lincoln, Gladstone, Cecil of 
Chelwood, Ferrero, Churchill, Brierly, Harold Nicolson and Spaak.
3. Bull’s Account
"The Grotian Conception of International Society" and "Society and Anar­
chy in International Relations", Hedley Bull’s two contributions to Dip­
lomatic Investigations, both mention the three ways of thinking about
international relations - the former very briefly; the latter in greater 
45detail. His most comprehensive account, and the one discussed here, is
46contained in The Anarchical Society , Bull’s inquiry into the nature of 
order in world politics, where it is used as one of the elements to con­
struct an answer to the question, "Does Order Exist in World Politics?":
Throughout the history of the modern states sys­
tem there have been three competing traditions of 
thought: the Hobbesian or realist tradition ...;
the Kantian or universalist tradition ...; an^ 
the Grotian or internationalist tradition ...
According to the Hobbesian tradition - Bull mentions Machiavelli, 
Bacon, and Hegel and his successors in addition to Hobbes - internation­
al relations:
7
(R)epresent pure conflict between states and re­
semble a game that is wholly distributive or 
zero-sum: the interests of each state exclude the 
interests of any other. The particular interna­
tional activity that ... is most typical of in­
ternational activity as a whole, or best provides 
the clue to it, is war itself. Thus peace, on the 
Hobbesian view, is a period of recuperatio^gfrom 
the last war and preparation for the next.
To this Hobbesian description of the nature of international rela­
tions, Bull adds the Hobbesian prescription for international conduct:
(T)he state is free to pursue its goals in rela­
tion to other states without moral or legal re­
strictions of any kind ... If any moral or legal 
goals are to be pursued in international politics, 
these can only be the moral or legal goals of the 
state itself ... The only rules or principles 
which ... may be said to limit or circumscribe the 
behaviour of states in their relations with ^ e  
another are rules of prudence or expediency.
At the other extreme, there is the Kantian or universalist way of 
thinking about international relations. As Bull presents it, the Kantian 
view is that:
The dominant theme of international relations ... 
is only apparently the relationship among states, 
and is really the relationship among all men in 
the community of mankind - which exists potential­
ly, even if it does not exist actually, and which 
when it comes into^eing will sweep the system of 
states into limbo.
The Kantians hold that:
Within the community of all mankind ... the inter­
ests of all men are one and the same; internation­
al politics ... is ... a purely co-operative or 
non-zero-sum game. Conflicts of interest exist 
among the ruling cliques of states, but this is on­
ly at the superficial or transient level of the ex­
isting system of states ... The particular interna-
8
tional activity which ... most typifies interna­
tional activity as a whole is the horizontal con­
flict of ideology that cuts across the boundaries 
of states and divides human society into two camps 
- the trustees of the immanent communit^of man­
kind and those who stand in its way ...
For the Kantians, Bull claims, there do exist moral rules in inter­
national relations, but these rules do not enjoin the preservation of 
the system, but rather its overthrow and replacement by a universal so­
ciety . ^
Between the realist and the universalist traditions there is the 
Grotian or internationalist tradition. As Bull puts it:
The Grotian tradition describes international pol­
itics in terms of a society of states or interna­
tional society. (This tradition contends) that 
states are not engaged in simple struggle ... but 
are limited in their conflicts with one another by 
common rules and institutions. (It accepts) the 
Hobbesian premise that sovereigns or states are 
the principal reality in international politics; 
the immediate members of international soci^y are 
states rather than individual human beings.
Neither complete conflict of interests between states nor complete iden­
tity of interests reflects international reality. Neither war between 
states nor horizontal conflict cutting across the boundaries of states 
is the most typical international activity, but rather "trade - or, more 
generally, economic and social intercourse between one country and an­
other" .
As far as their prescription for international conduct is con­
cerned, the Grotians hold that:
(A)ll states, in their dealings with one another, 
are bound by the rules and institutions of the so­
ciety they form ... States ... are bound not only 
by rules of prudence or expediency but also by im­
peratives of morality and law. But ... what these 
imperatives enjoin is not the overthrow of the 
system of states and its replacement by a univer­
sal community of mankind, but rather acceptance of 
the requirements of coexistence and co-operation 
in a society of states.
Bull’s list of representatives of this tradition of thought is long. It 
includes, for example, Vitoria, Suarez, Gentili, Grotius, Pufendorf,
9
Callieres, Bynkershoek, Wolff, J.M. Moser, Vattel, Burke, G.F. von Mar­
tens, Heeren, Gentz, Ancillon, Castlereagh, Ranke, Gladstone, Philli- 
more and Salisbury.
4. Comparing the Three Accounts
The idea that thinking about international relations can be arranged in 
three distinctive patterns forming traditions of thought is central to 
the three accounts discussed above, just as the idea of international 
society is central to one of these traditions: the Grotian or rational­
ist or internationalist - the via media.
Gierke, in contrast with Wight and Bull, does not use the word "in­
ternational” to describe the society of states. Instead, he uses the
word voelkerrechtlieh, a word for which there is no entirely satisfacto-
56ry translation into English. Gierke does not make clear whether he 
avoids the word "international" because he feels it is inappropriate to 
apply a word, first used according to the Oxford Dictionary in 1780~^, 
to an entity which he sees appearing nearly three centuries earlier; 
whether he uses voelkerrechtlieh in order to emphasize its legal aspect; 
or whether he thinks there is nothing but the legal aspect to it.
There is a second definitional question. It relates to the word 
"society". Gierke does not distinguish between Gemeinschaft (community) 
and Gesellschaft (society), nor does he use the word "system". Wight, 
like Gierke, uses "society" and "community" interchangeably: "Sociolo­
gists", he explains, "have not agreed on a satisfactory distinction in 
usage between the words "society" and "community", and in this paper,
as in most of the literature of international law, they will be used in- 
58terchangeably". But Wight also uses the word "system" and, for the 
most part, does not distinguish between "system" and "society" or "com­
munity". There is a sentence which suggests that "society" and "system" 
may not be identical, but this occurs only once: "It can scarcely be 
denied that there is a system of states, and to admit that there is a 
system comes half way to admitting that there is a society; for a soci­
ety is a number of individuals joined in a system of relationships for 
certain common purposes". For the rest, Wight moves with ease between 
"society", "community" and "system": "(International society) has been
variously called the family of nations, the states-system, the society
60of states, the international community".
10
Like Gierke and Wight, Bull does not distinguish between "society" 
and "community", but he does draw an important distinction between "so­
ciety" and "system". He defines the latter thus:
(W)here states are in regular contact with one 
another, and where in addition there is interac­
tion between them sufficient to make the behav­
iour of each a necessary element in the calcula­
tions of the otheg^ then we may speak of their 
forming a system.
"Society", in contrast, is defined in the following way:
A society of states (or international society) 
exists when a group of states, conscious of cer­
tain common interests and common values, form a 
society in the sense that they conceive them­
selves to be bound by a common set of rules in 
their relations with one another, ag^ share in 
the working of common institutions.
Is it, in the interest of clarity of thought, advisable to distinguish
between "society", "community" and "system", or does it, as Geoffrey
63Berridge suggests, add confusion to the discussion? The answer seems 
to lie between these two positions. As none of the three thinkers dis­
tinguishes between "society" and "community", as Gierke does not use the 
word "system", and as Bull draws an important distinction between "so­
ciety" and "system", it seems best, for the purposes of this inquiry, 
to regard "society" and "community" as interchangeable, but to accept 
Bull’s distinction between "society" (or "community") and "system".^
The question then remains whether the findings of this study will sup­
port the proposed usage of these three words.
A third definitional question involves the word "tradition". Gierke 
does not use it when presenting the successive exponents of the three 
patterns of thought; Wight and Bull do not hesitate to employ it. Is it 
an appropriate term, or does it suggest connections and continuities 
which, on closer inspection, do not hold? The findings will help to an­
swer this question. In the meantime, the word "tradition" will not be 
avoided, but will be used to reflect Wight's and Bull's usage of it.
Gierke places at the origin of the three ways of thinking about in­
ternational relations different views about the nature of sovereignty. 
For Wight and Bull, they arose from disagreement about the nature of the 
relationship between states. Gierke sees the different views appearing
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in the sixteenth century, his representative thinkers being Bodin, Con- 
nanus and Vitoria. Wight does likewise, mentioning Machiavelli and Vi­
toria. Bull speaks of a first phase of the three traditions of thought, 
which he attaches to the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Machiavelli and Vitoria are his first spokesmen; like Wight, he does not 
name a universalist.
In Gierke’s account the three ways of thinking about international
relations remain nameless. They were christened by Wight, who initially
called them the realist, rationalist and revolutionist traditions, and
later the Machiavellian, Grotian and Kantian traditions respectively.
Yet this naming process became known only through Hedley Bull’s and Bri-
65an Porter’s writings. Wight’s published work does not mention any of
these names in connection with the three traditions. The only time he
refers to a tradition by name is in "Western Values" where he calls the
~IGrotian tradition the "constitutional tradition" , adding that it has 
the quality of a via media. Bull, pondering Wight’s thoughts, expressed 
a preference for the second set of names, that is, the terms Machiavel­
lian, Grotian and Kantian, but himself chose a slight variation; the 
Hobbesian or realist tradition, the Kantian or universalist tradition 
and the Grotian or internationalist tradition.^
The three accounts include the names of many thinkers. Yet neither 
Gierke, Wight nor Bull claims completeness for his lists. It is there­
fore not surprising to find that, while some names recur in each account 
in the same tradition (for example, Suarez, Hobbes, Grotius and Kant), 
other names recur in only two accounts in the same tradition (for exam­
ple, Callieres, Burke, Gentz and Hegel), and some other names again oc­
cur in only one account (for example, Leibniz, Halifax, Vattel and 
Fichte). However, there are some names which appear in different tradi­
tions in the three accounts. Vitoria and Gentili, for example, figure 
in Gierke’s account amongst the universalists, whereas Wight and Bull 
mention them among the internationalists. Pufendorf is allocated to the 
realists by Gierke, and to the internationalists by Bull. Do these dif­
ferences reflect changing views on the part of those thinkers? Or do 
they result from different criteria of selection on the part of Gierke, 
Wight and Bull - criteria which they do not explain? There is a third 
question: are there thinkers in the history of international relations 
who do not fit into any one of the three traditions? And a fourth ques­
tion; the three traditions are presented as having appeared and devel-
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oped in Europe, and all of the thinkers mentioned by Gierke, Wight and 
Bull are European or American. Does this mean that the experience re­
flected in the three traditions is exclusively Western, or have there 
been other sources as well?
The three accounts not only agree that thinking about internation­
al relations in the past can be arranged in three distinctive patterns 
forming traditions of thought. They also agree that these traditions 
present themselves in a certain way: the middle position is taken up by 
the Grotian, rationalist or internationalist tradition; one side is oc­
cupied by the Machiavellian, Hobbesian or realist tradition, and the 
other side is held by the Kantian, revolutionist or universalist tradi­
tion. And the three accounts agree that this coexistence has not been 
entirely peaceful. The language which Gierke uses to describe the inter­
action of the three traditions - to be victorious and to die, to be dom­
inant and to defend - reflects his general belief that: "Just as all 
life, so all history is a struggle; and the struggle does not lead to 
harmony in the short run; more often it results in suppression of the 
vanquished and in tyranny of the victor ... Only in the long run, the
growing intelligence, the growing consciousness of nations ... will
69achieve the longed-for harmony".
Wight shares Gierke's view that the three traditions have not lived 
quietly side by side. His language, however, is less dramatic. When 
thinking of the Grotian tradition, he says: "This pattern of ideas is 
persistent and recurrent. Sometimes eclipsed and distorted, it has con­
stantly reappeared and reasserted its authority ..." , and later he
adds: "(T)here are other patterns of ideas in international history for 
which persistence, recurrence and coherence can be claimed". But in 
contrast with Gierke, Wight sees no end to the struggle or debate, ei­
ther in the short or in the long run.
Bull prefers the term "competition" when describing the relation­
ship between the three traditions of thought:
Throughout the history of the modern states sys­
tem there h ^ e  been three competing traditions of 
thought ...
In the twentieth century as in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the idea of international 
society has been on the defensive. On the one 
hand, the Hobbesian or realist interpretation of
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international politics has been fed by the two 
World Wars, and by the expansion of international 
society beyond its originally European confines.
On the other hand, Kantian or universalist inter­
pretations have been fed by a striving to tran­
scend the states system so as to escape the con­
flict and disorder that have accompanied it in 
this century, and by the Russian and Chinese rev­
olutions, which have given a new currency to doc­
trines of global transnation^ solidarity, both 
communist and anticommunist.
Bull neither suggests a harmonious solution like Gierke nor no solution 
like Wight. There may be one or there may be none. And if there is one, 
it may be quite different from all previous experience.^
Whether one sees the relationship between the three traditions as 
a struggle, or a debate, or a competition, there is a question which re­
mains. The three accounts make it clear that the Hobbesian and Grotian 
traditions are incompatible with one another. They are less clear wheth­
er the universalist tradition is incompatible with the other traditions, 
or rather is addressed to different concerns, that is to say, is less 
concerned with the character of the international system or society as 
it exists, and more concerned to transcend it. For the purposes of this 
inquiry, thinkers who put forward ideas of a world state and/or world 
government will be regarded as representing the universalist tradition 
of thought.
The context within which the accounts are placed differs from Gier­
ke to Wight, and from Wight to Bull. In both of Gierke's works, Johan­
nes Althusius and Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, the account of the 
three ways of thinking about international relations is part of the dis­
cussion of natural-law theories of state and society. To use Gierke's 
own words: "The contradictions we find at work in the natural-law theo­
ry of corporations are reflected in the way it treats associations above 
the state".^ For Gierke, the link between the three ways of thinking 
about international relations and the natural-law theories of state and 
society is direct. He also holds that in its core the natural-law con­
ception of state and society is a juristic conception - he even thinks
76of it as "a rather one-sided conception". Machiavelli thus cannot be 
made a representative of the same tradition as Hobbes, for his concep­
tion of state and society is "purely political", which means that it be­
comes "the rival of the natural-law construction of state" J  The idea
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of a rival theory is not further developed by Gierke. Nor does he put
the three ways of thinking about international relations to any further
use. The reason was given above: "Excluded from consideration are all
associations ... which do not succeed in attaining an independent legal
79personality above their members".
Wight, in contrast with Gierke, made the three traditions central 
to his thinking about international relations.
In "Western Values" it is the suggestion that the values of a soci­
ety express themselves in its ideas rather than in the record of its 
practice which provides the context within which he presents his account 
of the three traditions, and he advances the proposition that, while the 
existence of these three traditions is a characteristic feature of the 
history of thought about international relations in modern Europe, the
"constitutional tradition" is "specially representative of Western val- 
80ues". And he investigates this proposition by relating it to questions 
such as order and how to maintain it, intervention and international mo­
rality .
In Systems of States Wight places his account of the three tradi­
tions in the context of cultural questions which he raises in the intro­
ductory chapter entitled "De Systematibus Civitatum" or "On Systems of 
States". After noting that "(w)e must assume that a states-system will
not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its mem- 
81bers" , he points out that:
A characteristic feature of the European states- 
system has been its tendency to internal fracture 
... The Religious Wars marked the first fracture 
in the states-system; the French Revolutionary 
Wars marked a second; the totalitarian revolu­
tions and wars the twentieth century have 
marked a third.
There follows a question: "Has any other states-system shown an inter­
nal cultural differentiation leading to ideological schism and crusad-
oo
ing attitudes?" , immediately after which he introduces the three tra­
ditions of thought: "A familiar aspect of the intellectual history of 
the modern European states-system has been the way in which its theory 
has fallen into three main traditions".®^
The other four papers on states systems contained in the volume
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Systems of States represent an application by Wight of his proposition
that international society, on the Grotian view, can be "properly de-
scribed only in historical and sociological depth". Thus we find him
exploring the chronological and geographical boundaries of the states
systems he is concerned with, and what he calls their "internal marks",
by which he means the members of the system (sovereign states), their
mutual recognition, great powers, the diplomatic system, international
86law, and the balance of power.
In "An Anatomy of International Thought" Wight gives an account of 
the three ways of thinking about international relations without provid­
ing a specific context. As he presents it, analyzing international
87thought means discerning three patterns of thought.
Regarding his as yet unpublished lectures on international theory,
it is impossible to say, from what has been written about them, whether
or not there was a specific context within which he discussed the three
88traditions. The uses to which Wight put his account have, however, 
been pointed out. Thus Hedley Bull writes:
Having identified these three patterns of thought 
Wight went on to trace the distinctive doctrines 
that each of them put forward concerning war, 
diplomacy, power, national interest, the obliga­
tion of treaties, the obligation of an individual 
to bear arms, the conduct of foreign policy and 
the relations betwg^n civilized states and so- 
called barbarians.
And, as an after-thought, Bull adds:
Wight was, I believe, too ambitious in attribut­
ing to the Machiavellians, the Grotians and the 
Kantians distinctive views not only about war, 
peace, diplomacy, intervention and other matters 
of International Relations but about human psy­
chology, about irony ^gd tragedy, about methodol­
ogy and epistemology.
Bull, in contrast with Gierke and Wight, was not so much concerned 
with showing the three traditions to be a historical experience of the 
Western mind, but rather to explore their role and significance in the 
context of present day thinking and action in international relations.
In "Society and Anarchy in International Relations" Bull’s account 
of the three traditions of thought is preceded by the observation that
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"(i)t might be thought that the opinions I propose to consider are to
be found at the present time only among the small group of people who
advocate the establishment of a world government. This is far from be~
ing the case". And the sentence which concludes the discussion of the
three traditions and their underlying assumptions reads: "Formidable
though the classic dangers are of a plurality of sovereign states, these
have to be reckoned against those inherent in the attempt to contain
92disparate communities within the framework of a single government" ,
adding that "(i)t is an entirely reasonable view of world order at the
present time that it is best served by living with the former dangers
93rather than by attempting to face the latter".
The experience of this century is again very much in the foreground 
of Bull’s mind when he discusses "The Grotian Conception of Internation­
al Society" which contains a very brief mention of the three traditions. 
"Underlying a great deal of the theory and practice of international re­
lations since the First World War there is a certain conception of in­
ternational society, whose imprint may be traced in the Covenant of the
League of Nations, the Paris Act, the United Nations Charter and the
94Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg". After 
stating the essence of the Grotian conception and evaluating the ade­
quacy of its prescriptions, Bull leaves the reader with the following 
thought: "And although the solidarity exhibited by international society 
may increase in the future, just as it may decrease, it can still be ar­
gued that in the twentieth century the Grotian conception has proved
, „ 95premature .
The third time we meet Bull's account of the three traditions is in
The Anarchical Society. This "inquiry into the nature of order in world
politics, and in particular into the society of sovereign states,
through which such order as exists in world politics is now main- 
96tained" , poses in the second chapter the question, "Does Order Exist 
in World Politics?". It is within this context that the account appears 
and Bull uses it as one of the means to arrive at an affirmative answer 
to his question. International order, he argues, is part of the histor­
ical record, because international society is part of the historical 
record. At the level of ideas, it is the Grotian tradition of thought 
which shows this to be the case, and at the practical level, it is in­
stitutions such as the balance of power, international law, diplomacy,
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and war which "serve to symbolize the existence of an international so-
97ciety that is more than the sum of its members". Bull examines these 
institutions of international society and their contemporary relation­
ship to international order and concludes: "International society today 
is in decline . ..".^
The foregoing discussion of the accounts by Gierke, Wight and Bull 
provides form and substance to the statement with which this chapter be­
gins, and points to the place which the three traditions of thought oc­
cupy in the writings of the three scholars. The whole of this "structure 
of ideas" will, however, not be made the subject of this inquiry. Thus 
questions such as "Does all past thought about international relations 
fit into the three traditions?" or "How much of international politics 
can be explained by these traditions of thought?" will remain unan­
swered. It is only one of its component parts that is of interest here 
- the part which figures most prominently in the writings of Wight and 
Bull: the Grotian or rationalist or internationalist way of thinking - 
the via media.
5. The Hypothesis
There is, it is claimed, a way of thinking about international relations 
which is to be found midway between the realist (or Machiavellian or 
Hobbesian) tradition and the universalist (or Kantian or revolutionist) 
tradition. This is the Grotian (or rationalist or internationalist) tra­
dition - here called the via media. It originated in the Europe of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and, together with the other two, has 
existed since that time. The list of its exponents is long, and includes 
among its first representatives thinkers such as Vitoria, Connanus, Sua­
rez, Gentili and Grotius.
The via media, it is further claimed, displays a pattern which, 
while sharing some ideas with the other two, is distinct from both of 
them. In contrast with the universalist pattern, it presents the idea 
of a plurality of political entities - entities which Gierke, Wight and 
Bull identify as sovereign states - and, in contrast with the realist, 
it includes the further idea that there is a tie that binds the sover­
eign states. Gierke gives it the form of a natural law of nations,
Wight describes it as an "international social consciousness", a "com­
munity-sentiment", and Bull speaks of common interests and common val-
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ues. According to Gierke, the tie that binds is universal: mankind con­
stitutes an indestructible unity. For Wight and Bull, it is initially 
limited to Christendom, in the case of Wight even only to Western Chris­
tendom, and becomes universal only gradually. Wight and Bull extend the 
pattern of ideas further by submitting that the tie that binds expresses 
itself in common rules and common institutions among the sovereign 
states, such as, for example, the diplomatic system, the maintenance of 
the balance of power, the regular workings of international law, the 
special role of the great powers, and economic, social and technical 
collaboration.
The term which best identifies this pattern of ideas is interna­
tional society.
6. Questions Suggested by the Hypothesis
The hypothesis derived from Gierke, Wight and Bull suggests a number of 
questions which relate partly to the pattern of ideas, and partly to the 
thinkers.
1. Do the thinkers said to represent the via media have the idea of 
a plurality of political entities and, if so, what do they say about 
these entities?
- Do they have the idea of that which links these entities and, if 
so, what content do they give to it?
- Do they have the idea of rules and institutions shared by these 
entities and, if so, how do they present these?
- How do they reconcile war with the idea of international socie­
ty?
- Are there other relevant ideas, not suggested by the hypothesis, 
but present in the writings of these thinkers?
2. Do the thinkers said to represent the via media see themselves 
as taking up a position which differentiates them from both realism and 
universalism?
- Are they familiar with one another’s writings and, if so, what 
is their reaction to them? Do they regard themselves as forming a tra-
dition of thought and, if so, when or with whom do they see it begin­
ning?
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These questions will guide the search for the idea of international 
society in Part Two of this study, and the attempt to answer them will 
provide the structure of four of its five chapters - those on Erasmus, 
Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius. Chapter Two will follow a different order 
of presentation, as it is not concerned with a particular thinker but 
inquires into the beginnings of the idea of international society.
PART TWO
THE SEARCH AND THE FINDINGS
CHAPTER II
THE IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY BEFORE 1500
The search for the beginning of the idea of international society, its 
first formulation so to say, would not involve a long journey back in 
time. This, at least, was the expectation raised by the hypothesis: Otto 
von Gierke, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull had been at one in claiming that 
it originated in Europe in the late fifteenth/early sixteenth century^, 
and the wider community of international relations scholars had not ques­
tioned their claim: the Middle Ages were seen as the time of the ideas of 
unity, of hierarchy, and of universal empire, which came to an end with
the fifteenth century when the Modern Age, with new sets of ideas, be-
2gan.
This expectation turned out to be mistaken. The search led through 
the fifteenth century, the fourteenth, and the thirteenth, without find­
ing what it had sought: the beginning of the idea of international soci­
ety. Instead, it uncovered evidence for the continuation of this idea 
back in time, negating the claim that the medieval view of the world was 
to be equated with universalism. And the search was not pursued into the 
twelfth century because there was no indication that it would bring the 
much wanted discovery. There was Justus Hashagen saying:
One used to be inclined to put the emergence of 
the European states system at the end of the 
Middle Ages, when the French King Charles VIII 
opened the fight for Italy in 1494 ... But this 
date has proved to be by far too late, for it 
disregards a lot of evidence which clearly 
points to the beginnings of the European states 
system in the preceding centuries.
There was Walther Kienast referring to "the leading position which Fred-
4erick I (1152 - 1190) occupied in the European world of states ... . 
There was Otto Hintze writing about the decay of the universal empire, 
which, in his opinion, began in the second half of the ninth century 
and which made it possible for the Church to emancipate itself from the 
temporal power, and noting:
With the discord between emperor and pope, a dis-
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cord which characterizes the whole of the Middle 
Ages, the possibility for the formation of a Eu­
ropean states system was given ... Neither power, 
either the temporal or the spiritual, was able 
to realize the idea of a Christian universal em­
pire, because the one always prevented the other 
from achieving this. In this way, between emperor 
and pope, a group of co-ordinated, independent 
states was able to develop.
And there was Geoffrey Barraclough making the additional point that "at 
the very same time (as this "interlocking system" came into existence)"
- his reference is to the early twelfth century - "philosophers and his­
torians and propagandists began to build up the ideological foundations 
of the new national states".
Quite clearly, an inquiry into the idea of international society 
before 1500 was not something to be compressed into one chapter, the 
overture so to say to the main work. What could be done, however, in a 
chapter, was to give an account of the search by presenting examples of 
aspects of the idea of international society which impressed the mind 
when travelling back in time - aspects which would be met with again in 
the writings of Erasmus, Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius - thereby anchor­
ing this study in its own past.
Reflecting the experience of the journey, the examples are present­
ed in inverse chronological order. They emphasize the ideas of political 
plurality and equality, the unexpected findings, without, however, omit­
ting the idea of that which links - all three important elements of the 
idea of international society. In fact, it will be interesting to see 
how often, in these examples, the three ideas occur in close proximity.
A comment on language concludes the chapter.
The Fifteenth Century
The fifteenth century was traversed quickly with the aim of reaching 
that event which Ernest Nys had called "those imposing meetings of Chris­
tendom"'7, and to which Adda Bozeman had attached the subtitle "The Be-g
ginnings of Congressional Diplomacy" : the Council of Constance. For if 
no trace of the idea of international society could be found there, one 
would not need to continue the journey, but should turn back and go over 
the ground more slowly in order to discover where that idea might first 
be perceived.
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The Council of Constance met from 1414 to 1418 with the purpose
of accomplishing "first, the perfect pacification and union of the9Church, second, the reformation of the ecclesiastical state" , and a 
reading of the three Chronicles, composed during or shortly after the 
event quickly dispelled all uncertainty: they contained more than a 
trace of the ideas of plurality and equality, and these were found to 
be accompanied by ideas of law and what is right and just.
To give three examples:
(a) There is the memorandum composed by the Cardinal of Cambrai 
proposing an answer to the question of who should be admitted to vote 
on measures in the Council. "The following considerations", he begins, 
"are presented to oppose the pride and ignorance of those who maintain 
that in this holy Council of Constance, through all its sessions, only 
the greater prelates, bishops, and abbots should vote in the final 
verdict on the problems before us".^ The Cardinal then draws a dis­
tinction between subjects which relate to the Catholic faith about 
which his memorandum has nothing to say, and the subjects which con­
cern the ending of the schism and to which his memorandum does address 
itself, and goes on to argue for a widening of the electoral base by
including, not only "priors and the doctors of sacred theology and
12canon and civil law" , but also "kings and princes and their ambassa­
dors" :
With regard to the question of putting an end to 
the present Schism and restoring peace to the 
Church, it would seem neither just, right, nor 
rational to attempt to exclude kings, princes, 
or their ambassadors from a vote or share in the 
final decision, since they make up a large and 
honorable part of the Council and the establish­
ment of peace intimately concerns them and the 
people under them, and without their advice, as­
sistance and favor the decisi^s of the Council 
cannot be put into execution.
As the Chronicles show, kings, princes, or their ambassadors were in­
cluded in the decision-making process.
(b) There is the long speech by the ambassador of the "most serene 
King of France" against the English, contending that, by law, the lat­
ter do not constitute a nation with "the voice or representative author­
ity of one fourth or one fifth of Christendom or of the entire obedi-
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ence of the Roman Pontiff", which should and could, by law, be consid­
ered equal to "the voice and authority of all Italy or all Gaul or all 
Spain or all Germany".^
The English spokesman replies with as many reasons why the French 
protest should not be valid:
They dare call it inconsistent with justice and 
reason to treat the English nation as equal to 
the whole Gallic nation ... Do not law, reason, 
and letters put the two nations on an equality?
As regards all the requirements for being a na­
tion like the Gallic nation ... - whether a na­
tion be understood as a race, relationship, and 
habit of unity, separate from others, or as a 
difference of language, ... or ... as an equal­
ity of territory with for instance, the Gallic 
nation - in all these respects the renowned na­
tion of England or Britain is one of the four or 
five nations that comprise the papal obedience ...
The Englishman goes on to condemn that "odious discrimination" which 
results from calling the nomenclature of nations after particular king­
doms. It simply is "prejudicial and arrogant", he insists, "to call men 
who are neither French nor Gauls, nor subject to them, Frenchmen or 
Gauls".^
The French petition was unacceptable to the English, and they de­
manded its rejection by the Council:
An equal has no authority over an equal nor one 
great power over another ... (T)he renowned na­
tion of England or Britain ... deserves to repre­
sent and exercise a voice of as much authority 
in a general council as any other nation ...
Therefore, all and each who protest ... against^ 
it ... should without exception be punished ...
As the Chronicles show, the English nation remained a nation.
(c) There is the question of the rights of non-Christians "solemn-
18ly placed" before these imposing meetings of Christendom. The relevant 
entries in the Chronicles are rather brief and cryptic such as: (Febru­
ary 1416) - "King Ladislas of Poland, Duke Alexander Withold, Grand Duke
of Lithuania, ... presented by envoys and letters their complaints and
19accusations against the Teutonic Knights of Prussia" ; (June 1416) - 
"(A)ll the nations assembled together and the envoys who had gone to the
24
heathen appeared before them. They complained of the Teutonic lords,
20the brothers of Prussia, who had opposed them __" ; (April 1418) -
"As the clamor and altercation on either side increased around the am­
bassadors of the King of Poland and Duke Withold, lord Paul of Ladimir
21(sic), one of the said ambassadors, suddenly rose
An illumination of these passages is provided by Stanislaus
Belch’s two—volume work Paulus Vladimiri and His Doctrine Concerning
22International Law and Politics. Here one meets with numerous refer­
ences to the Council of Constance and the question that concerned the 
Polish ambassadors. Thus one learns that in July 1415 Paulus Vladimiri 
(ca. 1370 - 1436), rector of the university of Cracow, read his trea­
tises on the powers of the pope and emperor in relation to non-Chris-
23tians, censuring the Teutonic Order and its defenders , and proposing 
two resolutions for adoption: the rejection of the doctrine denying non- 
Christinas the rights which they have by natural law; and the enforce­
ment, as a law binding all Christians, of the teaching of Thomas of
24Aquinas on the rights of non-Christians ; or one learns that in Novem­
ber 1415 Vladimiri acted as the spokesman for a delegation from the non- 
Christian Samogitians who arrived at Constance to plead for "the resti­
tution of what had been taken away from them by Christian powers, the 
freedom from the Order’s tyrannic rule, the right to be converted to 
(the) Christian religion by missionaries respecting their rights, and 
the right to offer and owe their allegiance to whichever superior power 
they chose".^
The question of the equality of rights between Christians and non- 
Christians was debated at Constance, and it is tempting to stay for a 
moment with the thoughts of Paulus Vladimiri. The Polish scholar and 
diplomat argues that there is a natural equality between Christians and 
non-Christians, resting on the fact that both are human beings created 
by God. Being human beings, they are alike, and likeness makes for 
friendship. This natural friendship is the source of justice. According 
to this natural justice, Christians and non-Christians have the same 
rights to possess material goods, and these rights are given legal ex­
pression by the same law - the jus gentium. It is a law which is dis­
tributive and regulative, that is, it is concerned with the division of 
material goods among men, and it is concerned with procuring justice.26 
"(T)he pagans", Vladimiri insists, "possess their dominions justly by 
the natural law of nations; therefore their dominions cannot be lawful-
25
ly seized by others".
As Belch indicates, the Council was unable to decide the question 
of the rights of non-Christian peoples.
The idea that conflict ought to be resolved with the help of dip­
lomacy, an important instance of which was the Council of Constance, 
was not new. According to Christian Lange’s study Histoire de l'lnter-
nationalisme, the period of 1147 to 1495 witnessed on the average one
28case of mediation or arbitration every second year. And the role of 
mediator or arbitrator was not the reserve of a particular office - 
emperors and popes, kings and princes and cities assumed it at one time 
or another.
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The Fourteenth Century
Leaving Constance behind, the search continued into the fourteenth cen­
tury where, in 1387, it met with the writings of the famous prior from 
Provence, Honore Bonet (ca. 1340 - 1405), a man of whom it is said that 
his knowledge of "the intricate politics of Anjou and of Avignon, of 
Aragon, of Cyprus and Genoa, was at first hand", and that "(o)n Spain
in general, on Portugal, on Hungary and the Turkish menace, he was, at
29least, unusually well informed".
In the second chapter of the fourth part of his book The Tree of 
Battles, Bonet raises and answers the question: "By what law or on what 
ground can war be made against the Saracens?", and it is worth accom­
panying his thoughts for a moment.
There are two reasons mainly, Bonet argues, why war should not be 
made against non-Christians.
Firstly,
(0)ur Lord God has created all the good things 
of the earth for human creatures, for the evil 
as well as for the good ... And He makes good 
corn and all other kinds of good fruits to grow 
on the lands of the unbelievers as on the lands 
of the Christians, and sometimes more fruitful­
ly; and also gives them science and natural sense 
and discretion to lead them in justice; and has 
given them kingdoms, duchies, counties and em­
pires, and their faith ... And so, since God has 
given them so many blessings, why should Chris-
26
tians take these from them?30
Secondly,
(A)ccording to the Holy Scripture we cannot, and 
ought not to constrain or force unbelievers to 
receive either Holy Baptism or the Holy Faith, 
but must leave l^em in their free will that God 
has given them.
War may only be declared, Bonet holds, if the non-Christians act against 
the law of nature; if the non-Christians take lands which belong to the 
Christians; and if the non-Christians oppress Christians living amongst 
them.
As Frederick Russell's study The Just War in the Middle Ages shows,
attempts at presenting a just law of war did not originate with Bonet,
32but had a long history going back to Antiquity.
In chapter one hundred and six, to give another example from The
Tree of Battles, Bonet asks: "What Christian people ought to respect a
safe-conduct given by a Christian king to a Saracen king?". Prima facie,
he argues, there is no reason why it should be respected. The pope and
the emperor are not subject to the king; other kings are not bound by
it, because "no man has power over his peers"; also the king’s subjects
are under no obligation to obey, for "the Scripture says that in things
33involving sin the subject is not required to obey his lord". But then, 
Bonet continues:
(W)e must understand clearly for what reason the 
safe-conduct has been given. If it were for the 
purpose of treating of the ransom of the king's 
own brother, a prisoner in Saracen lands, or to 
consider the baptism of Saracens, or for any other 
reasonable cause, I would say that in such a case 
in good equity all Christians would be bound to 
be favourable to the safe-cond^t, and allow the 
Saracen to pass peacefully ...
Bonet suggests, in other words, that there may be a "reasonable cause" 
why Christians and non-Christians should wish to communicate with one 
another, and this should be acceptable to all, irrespective of other 
considerations.
Moving from Provence to Paris, one finds Nicole Oresme (ca. 1320 - 
1382), a distinguished churchman and scholar, thinking about the bene­
fits of commerce. As he puts it in his Traictie de la Premiere Inven- 
tion des Monnoies:
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(I)n the course of time men multiplied over the 
earth, and their possessions were divided and 
shared among men ... (0)ne man had more of one 
thing ... than his needs required, while another 
had little or none of the same thing, but on the 
contrary had a plenty of something else, of which 
another was greatly in need. For this reason, 
therefore, men began to tragic and exchange their 
riches with one another ...
Oresme was not the first to give expression to the idea that com­
merce is a link benefitting those who participate in it. As is evident 
from M.L. de Mas Latrie’s two-volume work Traites de Paix et de Commerce, 
it was present in treaties which Christian and non-Christian states of 
the Mediterranean had concluded with one another since the twelfth cen­
tury, and, in these treaties, it was accompanied by the further idea 
that custom provides the norms by which the contracting parties agree to 
abide.^
Via Spain, where a Franciscan composes his Book of the Knowledge of
all the Kingdoms, Lands, and Lordships That Are in the World, which he
37adorns with ninety-four flags , the way leads to Italy where, about mid­
century, Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1314 - 1357) wrote and taught - the
"Light of Law" or "Father of Law" as he was called by his contempora- 
38ries. He formulated in theory what had been the case in practice for a 
hundred years and longer: the independence of the city.
Gierke had - in the second volume of Das Deutsche Genossenschafts­
recht - offered a detailed description of the actual position of the 
cities in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. According to him it 
was "the cities as such" which concluded all kinds of political treaties 
- alliances, peace treaties, treaties of legal protection and commercial 
treaties - and, when doing this, they acted independently of their over- 
lords, and even if the latter were a party to these treaties, the cities 
nevertheless appeared as independent powers, side by side with their 
overlords. It was "the cities as such" which were the partners in the
many leagues, above all in "the great south German city leagues" and in
39"the nordic associations which contained the germ of the Hanse". And 
he had concluded his long account of the external activities of these 
cities by saying:
Hence, in actual fact, the city is a voelkerrecht- 
liche4U entity ... It is as much a unitary politi­
cal power as princes and lords ... In the fullness 
of its political power, it represents its territory
and its citizens in the same way as princes and  ^
lords represent their territory and their people.
The same was true of the cities of north Italy, of Tuscany and Lombar­
dy.
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Bartolus brought thought into line with practice by developing a 
theory of the independent city - the city which recognized no superior 
and which, within its territory, had the same power as the emperor 
within his empire. It assured the independent city rights and privi­
leges which made it the equal of other independent political entities,
42such as king and emperor. Political plurality was not Bartolus’ ide­
al, but the empire was weak and could no longer be appealed to in deal­
ing with injustices.
The idea of political plurality as the ideal was, however, put for­
ward by a man who was influential in the early years of the fourteenth 
century: the Dominican John Quidort of Paris (ca. 1240 - 1306), who 
taught that:
(F)rom the (inner) unity of mankind, there does 
not follow the necessity of the external unity 
of its political being; but rather that the na­
ture of man as well as the nature of tem^ral 
power accord with a plurality of states.
This idea, around which he built a theory of the laws according to which
the world is structured, is contained in his work De Potestate Regia et 
44Papali which appeared at Paris in 1303.
Quidort, to stay with his treatise for a moment, argues that, 
while it is divine prescription which lays down the hierarchical struc­
ture of the ministers of the Church, divine law does not determine that 
in temporal matters the faithful are subject to one supreme universal 
ruler. Natural, God-given inclination leads to a life in political com­
munities and hence to a choosing of rulers, and these rulers are differ­
ent according to the different communities over which they rule. A sin­
gle supreme authority in temporal matters is not required by either na­
tural disposition or by divine law, nor has it here the same usefulness 
as with the ministers of the Church; firstly, because human beings dif­
fer in their body, whereas the human soul which concerns the Church is 
everywhere the same; secondly, because in temporal matters one person
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is not sufficient to rule the whole world, whereas in spiritual matters
one head does suffice. The reason is this: the word, the weapon of the
spiritual power, reaches everywhere, whereas the sword, the weapon of
the temporal power, cannot, if wielded by one person only, penetrate
everywhere. For these reasons, it is better that several kings rule in
several kingdoms rather than one emperor over the whole world. It also
follows from the fact that, at the time when there were emperors, the
45world never enjoyed such peace as before and after their rule.
Political plurality rather than political oneness is the desirable
structure of political life, and Quidort addresses this idea to the
pope as much as to the emperor: "(K)ingly power is not from the pope
either in itself or in respect to exercise", he declares, "it is from
4-6God and from the people ...".
To the idea of political plurality, the learned abbot Engelbert of 
Volkersdorf (1250 - 1331) joins the idea of that which links. As he 
formulates it early in the fourteenth century:
47There is the jus naturale which is common to all 
peoples and kingdoms, and side by side with it 
there are the norms which derive from Roman law 
and which, from the point of view of justice and 
usefulness, are applicable to all peoples and 
kingdoms, and which all peoples and kingdoms are 
required to observe within their own boundaries ^g 
and in relations with neighbours and foreigners.
The Thirteenth Century
The thirteenth century, no less than the fourteenth, proved to be of 
interest for those pursuing the idea of international society.
To mention some of the findings:
Towards the end of the century, there was the learned Spanish 
Franciscan Ramon Lull (1235 - 1316), famous for his work as a mission­
ary, politician, philosopher, and poet, writing:
Humanity is linked in such a way that it would be 
appropriate if there were only one emperor who 
stood above the many kings and free princes, just 
as there is one pope and many prelates. But today 
there is no emperor with the power which people 
were used to when the Roman Caesars ruled, and
30
there now ... is an equality of power ... between 
one prince and the next, between one city and the 
next, and the empire has broken up into many parts ...
Between 1270 and 1280, while the young Marco Polo accompanied his 
father to the Court of Kublay Khan, who entrusted him with public of­
fices, Marino da Caramanico, a judge with King Charles I of Sicily and 
possibly a professor at the university of Naples, argued for the com­
plete equality of kings with the emperor. The title of princeps"^, he 
held, is appropriate for both the emperor and the king, and for every 
other monarch, for the royal authority is not inferior to the imperial 
authority. Kings exercise complete and full power. "It is without 
hesitation, he writes, that:
(W)e call the King of Sicily a free monarch and 
princeps of his kingdom, and everything that is 
due to the emperor, is due to him in his kingdom.
We boldly assert that he has the right to enact 
laws for his subjects, including such laws that 
contradict the general Roman law. He is also en­
titled to exercise the other imperial rights: 
to resist him is lese-majest£; he legitimizes 
bastards; there is no appeal to his judgments. He 
has his own fiscus. All this is because the for­
mer Roman emp^e has gone, just as the Roman peo­
ple has gone.
And he adds a sentence which places his argument into historical per­
spective. "Long before the times of both", he submits, "there already 
existed, in accordance with the jus gentium which emerged with the hu­
man race, established and recognized kingdoms. Hence, an old injustice
53is being made good".
In 1268 Henry de Bracton, who had served Henry III of England as a 
high judge, died leaving an uncompleted work De Legibus et Consuetudi- 
nibus Angliae.^^ Famous for its contribution to English constitutional 
thinking, this treatise also makes a case against a universal emperor. 
It argues that, as vicar of Christ, the king has no superior on earth, 
and places the princeps or king and whoever is not subject to anybody 
but God on the same level. Just as in spiritual matters the pope is su­
preme, in temporal matters the king possesses the highest jurisdiction 
in his realm. The king has all the power which is necessary for him to 
rule. The English king has the same rights as the Roman emperor.^5
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During the journey through the early seventies, along the sixties 
and into the fifties, it was impossible not to hear of the great man 
from Aquino (1225 - 1274). Wherever one went, his name was on the lips 
of the learned and not-so-learned, and his words, spoken or written, 
provided food for their minds. Questions relating to God’s existence 
and nature, to creation, free will and immortality, to the process of 
knowledge, to good and bad, to natural law and government - they all 
found a place in Thomas Aquinas’ synthesis of Christianity and Aristo- 
telianism.
This is not the place to attempt to outline his philosophical sys­
tem, not even his political theory, which has been described as "char­
acterized by moderation, balance and common sense"~^, but it is the oc­
casion to note what he had to say about the relationship of Christians 
to non-Christians. As Heydte puts it:
Not for the first time, but with the whole author­
ity of his name, the Aquinate said: The Church does 
not prohibit its faithful communication and communi­
ty with unbelievers- who have never accepted the 
religion of Christ.
Taking up this position meant lending support to those who held that a 
legally binding relationship between Christians and non-Christians was 
possible.
From 1243 to 1254 Pope Innocent IV was at the helm of the Catholic
59Church. In his comments on the Decretals he makes it clear that 
’’(p)roperty and possession, power and dominion may legitimately and 
without sin exist with infidels’’, for, as he sees it, "all this is not 
only for Christians but for every creature endowed with reason, and
60Christians, for this reason, have no right to rob and take it away".
About the same time, possibly slightly earlier, Raymond of Pena- 
fort, one of the great missionaries of the age, also makes it known 
that it is his view that the property of non-Christians is real proper­
ty in the legal meaning of the word, so that he who in peace acquires 
it by force is a robber in the legal sense; that the non-Christian state 
is a real state which is entitled to demand levies from Christians who 
live within its boundaries, and the laws of which are binding on Chris­
tians who find themselves within its territory; and that the non-Chris-
61tian state is the equal partner in treaties with a Christian state.
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Approaching the beginning of the century, one finds the English 
canonist Alanus teaching at Bologna in 1208, and saying:
What is being said of the emperor may be interpret­
ed in such a way as if it were said of every king 
or prince who is not subject to a superior: for any 
king or prince has as much right in his kingdom as 
the emperor in his empire. The partition (of the 
world) into kingdoms, which has its legal basis in^ 
the jus gentium, has been approved by the pope ...
And Pope Innocent III (1198 - 1216) opens the thirteenth century 
by according the French king the right to recognize no superior in tem­
poral matters. This right is contained in the famous Bull Per Venera- 
63bilem issued in 1202. Kienast, who discusses this event, puts it this 
way:
A word from Innocent III ..., a subordinate clause^ 
which, however, in no time became a locus communis 
of the juridical literature, causing much ponder­
ing, fell like manna from heaven on the French ...
The pope had written: the king of France i^ges not 
recognize a superior in temporal matters.
With this, the chronicle of examples of aspects of the idea of in­
ternational society before 1500 closes. It testifies to the existence 
of the ideas of political plurality and equality in the thirteenth, 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, thereby offering evidence that the
universalist pattern of ideas may be insufficient to capture medieval
66thinking about the world. And the presence, in the record, of the 
idea of that which links, in its various forms, may be taken as an in­
dication that plurality and equality were seen, at least by some, to be 
inseparable from the idea of that which circumscribes.
A Word about Words
On the journey to the thirteenth century, the following question arose 
more than once: How is one to write about this period, when some of the 
key words at one’s disposal either did not exist or, if they did exist, 
had a different meaning?
To take the word ’’state", for example. The Oxford Dictionary says 
that the word "state" in the meaning of "the body politic as organized 
for supreme civil rule and government; the political organization which 
is the basis of civil government; hence the supreme civil power and
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6 7government vested in a country or nation" was not used before 1538. 
Heydte, to mention a second opinion, argues that it would be anachro­
nistic to apply the word "state" to the political associations of the 
tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries; but he advocates its use from 
the turn of the thirteenth to the fourteenth century onward, since it 
was not only at that time that the state in our meaning of the word
came into existence, but it also was that period which gave this new
68political phenomenon the name status, state, etat. A third opinion is 
held by Heinrich Mitteis who submits that one might look at the Middle 
Ages as having no state only if one thought of the state as an institu­
tion based on the concept of an abstract supreme power severed from the 
personal. If one adopted such a view,
(0)ne would, however, block the path to an under­
standing of the historical forms of the state. For 
history, the state is any organization of a people 
for the purpose of attaining its political ends ... 
The Middle Ages knew such an organization. It was 
represented by a system of authoritative personal 
relations, a structured sequence of authorig^ and 
subordination, of leadership and followers.
Consequently, Mitteis does not hesitate to use the word "state" at any 
time during the Middle Ages. The differences in the three opinions, it 
may be observed, are partly over definition and partly over historical 
interpretation.
Another word which poses difficulties is "nation". The Oxford Dic­
tionary gives a definition which stems from the nineteenth century, 
namely "a distinct race or people, characterized by common descent, 
language, or history, usually organized as a separate political state 
and occupying a definite territory".^
The early fifteenth century, as the Chronicles of the Council of 
Constance show, knew of two meanings of the word. One was presented by 
Ulrich Richental, the author of one of the Chronicles, when he said:
Now that you may understand the matters that are 
to follow, you must know that all Christendom is 
divided into five parts, which are called in Latin 
naciones. The first are Italici ... The next part 
are Germani ... The third are Frantzoni ... The
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fourth are Yspani ... The fifth are Anglici.^
Adding, a few pages later: "Now you must hear what lands and kingdoms
72belong to each nation". The list that follows is long, too long to be 
reproduced here, but to give just one example. Of the Italian nation 
Richental writes:
To their nation belong Rome and its territory,
Lombardy, Tuscany, Liguria, Florence, Venice, the 
kingdom of Naples ..., the kingdom of Cyprus ..., 
the empire of Constantinople and the Christian 
lands belonging to it, the kingdom of Bosnia ..., 
the kingdom of Sicily and of Candia ...» the king­
doms of Greater and Lesser Turkey or the Christians 
there, those also that live in Tartary, wherein are 
included seven empires. All who live thei^ and are 
Christians belong to the Italian nation.
The second meaning of the word "nation", akin to the nineteenth- 
century understanding, was given by the representative of the English 
nation when he said that a nation may be understood as "a race, rela­
tionship, and habit of unity, separate from others, or as a difference 
of language ...".^
Sources relating to the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries con­
tinue to mention both meanings. Thus, one of the editors of the Chron­
icles of the Council of Constance points out that the division of the 
members of a Council into nations had been heard of as early as 1274, 
on the occasion of the Council of Lyons, and was formalized at Vienne 
in 1311.^ Bozeman notes that the credit for using the word "nation" in
this way does not go to the Church Councils but to the medieval univer- 
76sities. And Heydte, more interested in the second meaning of the
word, makes the point that "nation" in the sense of "community linked
by common descent" and "characterized by a common language" was employed
throughout the Middle A g e s H o w  frequently it was used in this sense
is another question. Bonet, for example, does not include it in his
book The Tree of Battles. When referring to the subjects of particular
kings or of the emperor, he uses the word "people" or "peoples" which,
in Latin, may be gens (gentes) or populus (populi), and these two words,
79in turn, have different connotations. And, to give another example, 
the Latin for "law of nations", appearing a number of times on the pre­
ceding pages, is not jus nationum but jus gentium, which the French
have preserved in their rendering of it: le droit des gens.
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The list of words posing difficulties for the twentieth-century
mind could be extended. "International" would be next, and even the
word "Europe" would have to be included, for, as Denys Hay points out:
"Throughout the centuries up to and including the thirteenth the word
'Europe' itself is ... rarely met with in passages other than those
80descriptive of geographical situation". But perhaps the examples dis­
cussed above suffice to indicate the nature of the problem and the need 
to observe care when applying today's vocabulary to the past - be it 
the Middle Ages or the times of Erasmus, Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius.
CHAPTER III
DESIDERIUS ERASMUS OF ROTTERDAM
The findings of the journey back in time, presented in the preceding 
chapter, made it difficult not to think that the late fifteenth/early 
sixteenth century should have had more thinkers representative of the 
via media than the hypothesis suggests. Otto von Gierke, Martin Wight 
and Hedley Bull, it is true, do not claim completeness for the list of 
names accompanying their respective accounts of the idea of interna­
tional society, but there are very few entries earlier than the seven­
teenth-century thinker Hugo Grotius.'*' A further thought was quick to 
join the first: if it were possible to find another name to add to the 
existing list, this would strengthen not only the hypothesis but also 
the findings of the foregoing chapter.
It did not take long to find a name: there is hardly a general
history of the Europe of that time which does not accord a place to De-
2siderius Erasmus of Rotterdam. It took a little longer to discover
whether the name stood for a thinker of the via media. Histories of
thought about international relations say little about Erasmus, and
3what they say is inconclusive in relation to this question. The deci­
sion to include Erasmus in this study resulted from a reading of his 
writings, and the decision to read him was prompted by James Brown4Scott's discussion of The Education of a Christian Prince.
If the findings of the preceding chapter led to Erasmus, the re­
verse does not hold true: Erasmus seldom refers to authors of the Mid­
dle Ages - that thousand-year period reaching back to the fifth century 
A.D. - and when he does, he usually expresses disapprobation. The au­
thors to whom he feels attracted belong mainly to classical and Chris­
tian Antiquity - that other thousand-year period going back to 500 B.C. 
he translates, edits and annotates them, and uses them as sources in 
his own writings.
If Erasmus distanced himself from the Middle Ages, his own age was 
anxious to make his acquaintance, and the wish to meet him has persist­
ed over time. Evidence for this are not only the numerous editions and 
translations of his works which have appeared, and continue to appear,
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but also the many studies of his life and works which accompany them. 
For a ready appreciation of this immense intellectual activity, his 
own and that of others, it suffices to look at one of the more compre- 
hensive bibliographies. And these same sources also reveal that his 
ideas about international matters have met with little interest on the 
part of the international relations community.
For purposes of introduction, some details about his life and pub­
lications may be useful at this point.^
Erasmus was born of an "unlawful" and as he called it "sacrile-
o
gious union" - his year of birth is variously given as 1466, 1467 or 
1469 - in Rotterdam, Holland, then part of the Burgundian Low Countries 
which came under Habsburg rule in 1477. His schooling took place main­
ly at Deventer where he studied with the Brethren of the Common Life, a 
group of teachers regarded as the leading educators of the time. In 
1487 he entered the Augustinian monastery at Steyn and stayed there for 
approximately six years. From this period date letters, and also Anti- 
barbarorum Liber (The Book of the Antibarbarians), a treatise in which 
he sets out his position in support of the use of classical learning - 
a position which he never abandoned, as is evident from his editions of 
authors such as Aristotle, Cicero, Euripides, Galen, Isocrates, Ovid, 
Plutarch, Seneca, Suetonius and Terence, which he published in the 
course of his life. In 1493 he was appointed secretary to Henry of Ber­
gen, Bishop of Cambrai.
In 1495 Erasmus took leave of absence from the Bishop to study 
theology at the university of Paris for four years. In 1499 he accepted 
an invitation to England and stayed for a year, studying Greek, the an­
cient Church Fathers and the Scriptures. He returned to Paris in 1500 
and published the first edition of the Adagia (Adages), a collection of 
proverbs from classical Antiquity, which he kept expanding throughout 
his life.
From 1501 to 1505 he was in the Low Countries, mainly in the uni­
versity city of Louvain where, in 1503, he published his composition En­
chiridion Militis Christiani (The Handbook of a Christian Soldier), a 
guide to Christian living. In 1504 he gave an oration, Panegyricus (The 
Panegyric), at Brussels, capital of Burgundy, on the safe return from 
Spain of Prince Philip, Duke of Burgundy and father of the future empe-
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ror Charles V. In 1505 he visited England again.
The years 1506 to 1509 saw him in Italy, travelling and studying. 
From this period also dates his doctorate in theology from the univer­
sity of Turin. In 1509 he returned to England and spent the next five 
years there - a sojourn interspersed with journeys to the Continent. 
During this time he wrote what came to be one of his best known works, 
Moriae Encomium (The Praise of Folly), published in Paris in 1511. Al­
so credited to his account is the dialogue Julius Exclusus e Coelis 
(Julius Excluded from Heaven), a satire on the late Pope Julius II, 
which appeared anonymously in 1514 in Paris. The attempt, that year, by 
the Augustinian canons to regain Erasmus for the monastic life at Steyn 
was unsuccessful.
Between 1514 and 1521 he stayed at various places in the Low Coun­
tries, visited England three more times, and travelled in Germany and 
Switzerland. In 1516 he was appointed Councillor to Prince Charles. His 
response was the treatise Institutio Principis Christiani (The Educa­
tion of a Christian Prince), which he dedicated to Charles. The same 
year also saw the publication of his editions of the Greek New Testa­
ment, with his translation into Latin, and of Jerome, an ancient Church 
Father. In 1517 he organized the Collegium Trilingue for the study of 
Hebrew, Greek and Latin at Louvain, and published his "great denuncia­
tion of war", Querela Pacis (The Complaint of Peace). In 1519/1520 he 
helped to formulate a policy of protection sought by the Duke of Saxony 
for Martin Luther. His advice is contained in letters to various rulers 
and in what has come to be known as Axiomata pro Causa Lutheri (Propo­
sitions in Support of Luther).
In 1521 Erasmus left the Low Countries, as his reaction to Luther 
was viewed with suspicion at Louvain, and moved to Basel where he stayed 
until 1529. Publications during these years include editions of further 
Church Fathers, for example, Arnobius, Hilary, Irenaeus, Ambrose, and 
Augustine; some of his "most piquant" Colloquia (Colloquies), dialogues 
or conversations; a tract against Luther entitled De Libero Arbitrio 
(On Free Will); and his Opus Epistolarum - not the first but the largest 
edition of his letters during his lifetime.
Because of religious turbulence Erasmus left Basel in 1529 and 
moved to Freiburg, which was then under the rule of the Austrian branch
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of the House of Habsburg. He stayed for six years, continuing to write 
and publish: for example, in 1530 the essay Utilissima Consultatio de 
Bello Turcis Inferendo (A Valued Discussion on War against the Turks); 
in 1533 De Sarcienda Ecclesiae Concordia (On Mending the Peace of the 
Church); and in 1535 Ecclesiastes (On Preaching).
In 1535 Erasmus returned to now reformed and tranquil Basel. He 
declined Pope Paul's III invitation to Rome, and died at Basel in 1536.
What Erasmus, often seen as the greatest scholar and writer of his 
age, offers to those who pursue the idea of international society is 
not confined to a particular book or treatise, or to a particular phase 
of his working life, but is dispersed throughout his writings. For the 
purposes of this study, his ideas may be presented in ten sections:
Section One, Erasmus and the Events of His Time, is a response to 
the numerous references found in his writings to the events of his time 
rather than to a specific question suggested by the hypothesis. These 
references are instructive for the light which they throw on the histo­
rical context within which he lived and worked; they also invite the 
question whether thinkers other than "realists" may be credited with 
the distinction of being realistic observers.
Sections Two, Erasmus in Opposition to Realism, and Three, Erasmus 
in Opposition to Universalism, offer an answer to the question: Do the 
thinkers said to represent the via media see themselves as taking up a 
position which differentiates them from both realism and universalism?
Sections Four, Erasmus Presents a Model of the Perfect Temporal 
Christian Prince, and Five, Erasmus Presents a Model of the Perfect 
Spiritual Christian Prince, formulate two ideas discovered in his writ­
ings in response to the question: Do the thinkers said to represent the 
via media have the idea of a plurality of political entities and, if 
so, what do they say about them?
The question, Do the thinkers said to represent the via media have 
the idea of that which links the entities constituting political plu­
rality and, if so, what content do they give to it, leads to findings 
in Erasmus' writings which are presented in Sections Six to Ten - Six, 
The World as It Ought to Be: The Idea of Harmonious Discord; Seven, Law 
as a Link; Eight, Learning as a Link; Nine, Moderation as a Link; and
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Ten, The Question of War.
1. Erasmus and the Events of His Time
Erasmus lived in a Europe which knew political plurality and conflict.
The former expressed itself not only in the variety of forms of govern­
ment which existed - according to the historian J.R. Hale there were
9monarchies, republics, confederations, cities, an emperor and a pope 
it was also reflected in the number of political units which constituted 
Europe. A list drawn up by Hale of Europe in about 1500 may be repro­
duced as follows:
Russia - Moldavia - Lithuania (ruled from and in conjunc­
tion with) Poland - Hungary - Bohemia - Germany (as chief 
component of the Holy Roman Empire theoretically under the 
authority of the emperor-elect, Maximilian of Habsburg, he­
reditary ruler of the duchies of Austria, Styria, Carin- 
thia, Carniola and Tyrol; in practice a congeries of inde­
pendent units comprising some thirty principates, fifty ec­
clesiastical territories, about one hundred counties and 
sixty self-governing cities) - The Netherlands (tradition­
ally part of the Holy Roman Empire, now ruled jointly with 
Luxembourg and Franche~Comt6 by Prince Philip of Habsburg, 
son of Maximilian) - Switzerland - Denmark - Sweden - Nor­
way - Italy shared by (to name the chief independent powers 
of the peninsula) Venice, Milan, Florence, the Papal States 
and Naples - Sicily - Spain comprising Aragon and Castile 
- Portugal - Navarre - France - England.^
And this was not all. As Hale points out, there were further political 
units functioning as "independent states either by right ... or because 
their nominal superiors were unable to control them ...". His ex­
amples include Scotland and Savoy, Luebeck and the area controlled by 
the Teutonic Knights. And there was one state, he reminds his readers, 
"which was not of, but was half in Europe, the empire of the Ottoman 
Turks ...".^
The political plurality which Europe then knew was accompanied by 
conflict, and references to conflict run like a red thread through the 
writings of Erasmus. Studying these references means meeting a well-
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informed, discerning and sober observer, and not, as one commentator
13has suggested, a man who did not understand his time. To convey this 
impression by means of a few examples is difficult, but this is all 
that can be offered in the context of this inquiry.
The Italian wars, which had begun in 1494 when Charles VIII, King 
of France, entered Italy with the intention of taking up a claim to 
Naples, were still continuing when Erasmus visited Italy from 1506 to 
1509. In a letter of 1506 to Servatius Rogerus, Prior of Steyn, the 
Augustinian monastery where he had spent the years 1487 to 1493, Eras­
mus writes:
I came to Italy mainly in order to learn Greek; 
but studies are dormant here at present, whereas 
war is hotly pursued ... Bentivoglio has left 
Bologna; the French ... were driven back ... On 
St Martin’s Day Julius, the supreme pontiff, en­
tered Bologna ... The emperor’s arrival is await­
ed. Preparations are afoot for a war against the 
Venetians ...
The League of Cambrai concluded in 1508 by Louis XII, King of 
France, Ferdinand, King of Aragon and Regent of Castile, the Emperor 
Maximilian, Pope Julius II and the Duke of Mantua, with the purpose of 
partitioning Venice, was followed three years later by the Holy League 
which joined Julius II with Ferdinand, Maximilian, Venice and Henry 
VIII. The adversary now was Louis XII. Erasmus, writing in 1511 from 
Cambridge to Andrea Ammonio, Latin secretary to Henry VIII, comments:
As to the war that has been set on foot, I am 
afraid that the Greek proverb about the moth in 
the candle-flame will soon be appropriate. For 
if anything happens to the Roman church, then 
who, I ask you, could more properly be blamed 
for it than the all-too-mighty Julius? But pray 
suppose the French are driven out of Italy, and 
then reflect, please, whether you prefer to have 
the Spaniards as your masters, or the Venetians, 
whose rule is intolerable even to their own coun­
trymen ... I fear Italy is to have a change of 
masters and, because she cannot endure the French^ 
may have to endure French rule multiplied by two.
The conflicts in Italy generated conflicts in other parts of Eu­
rope. In 1512 the Netherlands saw Henry VIII at war with the French, 
whom he defeated near Saint-Omer in 1513. In 1514 it seemed that the 
war would be resumed. Erasmus observes from London in a letter to An-
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toon van Bergen, Abbot of St Bertin, a man of influence with the Court 
at Brussels:
But the war that is being prepared for has brought 
about a sudden change in the character of this 
island. Here the price of everything is going up 
every day, while liberality declines ... Besides, 
while it is a kind of exile to live on any island, 
our confinement is closer still at present by rea­
son of the Y0rs’ so that one cannot even get a 
letter out.
In September 1517, nearly two months before Luther’s theses be­
came public knowledge, Erasmus writes from Antwerp, communicating his 
apprehensions to Thomas Wolsey, Cardinal of York:
In this part of the world I am afraid a great rev­
olution is impending, unless the favour of Heav­
en and the piety and wisdom of ourRulers pro­
vide for the interests of humanity.
The Diet of Worms took place in 1521. Luther refused to retract his 
writings, was condemned, and disappeared behind the walls of the Wart- 
burg. In the same year the Emperor, now Charles V, and the French King, 
now Francis I, resumed the war in Italy, which came to a temporary end 
in 1525 when Francis was taken prisoner at Pavia. In the same year, 
1521, the Turks moved to conquer Belgrade; in the following year, 
Rhodes; and, in 1525, they won a decisive victory at Mohacs against the 
Hungarians. Erasmus’ Colloquy of 1526, "The New Mother", contains ad­
vice on the care of babies, instructions on the nature of the soul, and 
a brief survey of the political situation in Europe:
King Christian of Denmark, a devout partisan of 
the gospel, is in exile. Francis, King of France, 
is a ’guest’ of the Spaniards ... Charles is jj)ge- 
paring to extend the boundaries of his realm. 
Ferdinand has his hands full in Germany. Bank­
ruptcy threatens every court. The peasants raise 
dangerous riots ... The commons are bent on an­
archy; the Church is shaken to its very founda­
tions by menacing factions ...^he Turks conquer 
and threaten all the while ...
Upon signing the peace treaty of Madrid in 1526, which brought his 
release from imprisonment, Francis I formed a league with Milan, Venice, 
Florence and the Pope, now Clement VII, against Charles V. The ensuing 
campaigns led in 1527 to the sacking of Rome by the imperial forces.
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Erasmus expresses the significance of this event in one sentence con­
tained in a long letter which he addresses in 1528 to Jacobus Sadole-
tus, Bishop of Carpentras, Avignon, regarding "this calamitous event":
20"This surely was the destruction of a world rather than a city".
In 1530 the Diet of Augsburg met, leaving both the Lutherans and 
the Catholics even more intransigent than previously. And no change in 
their respective attitudes took place during the remaining years of 
Erasmus' life. In a letter from Basel in 1535 to Bartholomeus Latomus, 
the first professor of Latin in the College de France at Paris, Erasmus 
observes:
It seems that the pope is seriously thinking of 
a council here. But I do not see how it is to 
meet in the midst such dissension between 
princes and lands.
The red thread is nearing its end. As one leaves it behind, the im­
pression stays that Erasmus was a realistic observer of events - an im­
pression which is confirmed by historians who compare his observations 
with those of his contemporaries. James Froude concludes his series of 
lectures in 1893 - 94 by saying to his students:
I believe that you will best see what it (the 
most exciting period of modern history) really 
was if y ^  will look at it through the eyes of 
Erasmus.
More recently, James Tracy credits Erasmus with being "a reliable 
source", "well-informed", and with understanding of "what was happening 
before his eyes". Erasmus himself, it is also worth noting, regards 
no books as having "more to offer" than "the works of those who have 2 A
transmitted to posterity a true account of events public and private".
2. Erasmus in Opposition to Realism
Erasmus perceives the conflicts of his time realistically, but he re­
jects a response which, according to Gierke, Wight and Bull, the real­
ists (or Machiavellians or Hobbesians) would have given. While his 
whole work testifies to this refusal, one of his writings provides an
especially good example both of his familiarity with the realist way of
25thinking and his rejection of it. The writing in question is Julius
Exclusus e Coelis, a satire which appeared anonymously in 1514, about a
44
2 6year after the death of Pope Julius II. It is presented in the form 
of a dialogue between Julius knocking at the gate of heaven, demanding 
to be admitted, and Saint Peter refusing to admit him.
In the course of the dialogue Julius reminds Peter of his deeds 
on earth. Had he not restored Bologna, after it had been occupied by 
the Bentivogli, to the Roman See? Had he not defeated the Venetians, 
previously not conquered by anyone? Had he not nearly succeeded in 
"trapping" the Duke of Ferrara after harrying him in war for a long 
time? He also drove the French out of Italy, and intended to do the 
same with the Spaniards "if death had not snatched" him from the earth. 
And he disposed of a schismatic council by "faking a counter-council". 
In brief, his "authority", or perhaps his "cunning", had been such 
that:
(T)oday there are no Christian kings whom I have 
not provoked to arms, rending, tearing, and shat­
tering all the treaties2^y which they had been 
closely bound together.
And when he died, he made sure that the wars which he had "stirred up"
everywhere would not come to an end, and that the money put aside for
that purpose would be secure. Without money, Julius submits, "nothing
28goes well, either sacred or profane".
Saint Peter takes up each point in turn. Why, he demands to know, 
did Julius occupy Bologna? Had it broken away from the faith? Was Ben- 
tivoglio a bad administrator? Had he taken over the administration with­
out the consent of the citizens? Did the citizens dislike him as a 
prince? Julius answers each question in the negative. His reasons had 
been different: Bentivoglio administered Bologna in such a way that 
"from the immense sum he collected from the citizens, only a few thou­
sand found their way to our treasury". Furthermore, the occupation of
29that city was "expedient" for his plans at that time.
Saint Peter next inquires about the Venetians. Julius does not hes­
itate with his reply: They behaved "like Greeks", they "made sport" of 
him. They bestowed priesthoods without consulting anybody; they referred 
none of their trials to the appropriate courts; they purchased no dis­
pensations. In brief, they caused the Roman See an "intolerable loss".^
Next, Saint Peter wishes to know why the Pope had been hostile to
45
the Duke of Ferrara. Julius’ main reason was that the Duke’s realm
O  1should be joined to his own, because of its ’’strategic location”.
But why, Saint Peter asks a little later, did you turn against the 
French and their King? Julius replies that it would take a long time 
to tell the whole story, but the crux of it is that:
I never really loved th^French ... No Italian 
really loves barbarians ... But I ... used them 
as friends for just so long as I needed their 
services, since up to ths^ point one may take 
advantage of barbarians.
Saint Peter moves on to the next point. How did Julius manage to
provoke the greatest kings to grave wars, especially when, as a means
34-to that end, he had to break so many alliances? Julius has no problem 
in answering this question:
This was my major concern, to become thoroughly 
acquainted with the animating spirit, character, 
emotions, wealth, and strivings of all nations, 
and especially of all princes: who was at peace 
with whom, who had fallen out with whom; and then 
to mak^use of all these things for our own pur­
poses .
Having revealed his general approach, Julius goes into the details. It
was easy to rouse the French against the Venetians; he then made ’’com-
mon cause" with them, and the Emperor also joined. At the same time
he began to incite the Spanish against the French, as it was not desir-
37able that the latter should become too strong ; he also made it look
as if the Venetians were "back in favor"; then he alienated the Emperor
from the French; and he made use of his knowledge that the English have
an "instinctive hatred" of the French, as well as of the Scots. In
this way he managed to involve these princes in "the gravest war of
all". In addition, he approached all the other kings as well, for he
knew that, if they were parties to the conflict, too, "no one else
39would be at peace".
There is another point about which Saint Peter wishes to know 
more, and that is the Council which Julius had managed to evade. Had he 
not been bound by oath to convoke a general council? Had he not been 
elected Pope on that condition? Julius agrees: that is correct, but he 
released himself from that oath when it seemed best. "Who would hesi­
tate to swear to anything at all, when it is a question of a king-
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dom?"^ Julius then was the kind of person people said he was? Saint 
Peter asked. The response came without hesitation: "What does that mat­
ter? I was Pope". And the Pope, God's representative on earth, cannot 
be criticized by any human being, not even a general council.^ Saint
Peter pursues the question further: A "criminal and pestilent Pope" can
A 2then not be removed at all? "Who's to remove the man at the top?"
Julius does not doubt his absolute power. But why did he then try to 
avoid a general council? Julius replies:
Why don't you ask monarchs why they hate a sen­
ate and general assemblies? The fact is, when so 
many outstanding men gather together, the royal 
dignity is overshadowed to a certain extent ...
(H)ardly any council has ever turned out so well 
that the supreme Pontiff has not experienced 
some l^s to his majesty, and departed less su­
preme .
So, all that matters then is that "the royal majesty" of the Pope 
should be secure, rather than "the general interest" of Christendom? 
Julius is in no doubt: "Each man looks out for his own interest; we
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take care of our businessf. 45
Julius' values were not those of Saint Peter - nor are they the 
values held by Erasmus.^
3. Erasmus in Opposition to Universalism
Erasmus sees the conflicts of his time realistically, but his response
does not consist in advocating the abolition of the existing political
plurality and the establishment, in its place, of a universal state or
ruler as a way of overcoming them - a response which, as Gierke, Wight
and Bull see it, the universalists would have given. Erasmus, as his
writings amply demonstrate, rejects universalism and what he perceives
as so many steps in its direction: territorial expansionism or what has
47come to be referred to, since the nineteenth century, as imperialism.
As early as 1495, when he was a student of theology in Paris and 
invited by the well-known French historian Robert Gaguin to fill a blank 
page at the end of his history of France, Erasmus voices opposition to 
policies of agrandissement:
Our early forbears used to pay godlike honours
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to those of their countrymen who had either won 
imperial power or increased the boundaries of the 
commonwealth ... Yet it is a much nobler act to 
spread the fame of one's ancestors from the rising 
to the setting sun tha^gto extend the boundaries 
of one's territory ...
In 1502 he contributed a preface to "one of the most strident con­
temporary statements of universal monarchy": De Precellentia Potestatis
Imperatorie (On the Excellence of Imperial Power) by Jacobus Anthonisz,
49the vicar general of the Bishop of Cambrai. While not withholding all 
praise from this "compendium of legal and theological opinions", Eras­
mus does not hesitate to liken the author to a "busy-bee" which flies 
everywhere and collects honey wherever it can find it. "I would", he
writes, "that you had exercised more choice and also a little re-
_ . .„ 50straint .
Two years later, in 1504, Erasmus delivered "The Panegyric" at 
Brussels on the safe return from Spain of the Duke of Burgundy. In the 
course of his public address he says:
The best form of political government is not the 
one which extends the boundaries of its empire 
by war-like actions, but the one which come^ 
closest to the image of the celestial city.
52The letter addressed to Antoon van Bergen in 1514 also includes a 
passage against the building up of empires:
If we would find something to call glorious, it 
is far more glorious to found states than to de­
stroy them ... What expenditure of blood it cost 
to build the^oman empire, and how soon its col­
lapse began!
Three years later, in 1517, Erasmus dedicated to the Dukes of 
Saxony his edition of De Vita Caesarum (The Lives of the Caesars), his­
torical biographies of the Roman emperors from Julius Caesar to Domi­
tian, by Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, the Roman historian who lived 
from ca. 69 - 140 A.D. In his preface Erasmus asks whether the Roman
empire, "that ancient empire" whose authority was "founded and conse-
54crated by impiety, murder, parricide, incest and tyranny" , should be 
restored as it once was? "For my part", he answers:
I do not think any intelligent man would desire
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this, even if wishes could put it back; so far 
is it from seeming right to defend and revive 
an institution which for many centuries now has 
been largely outdated and non-existent, at the 
price of a great upheaval in human ^fairs and 
very great loss of Christian lives.
Monarchy, Erasmus elaborates, is the best form of government if he who 
exercises it surpasses every other human being by as much goodness and 
wisdom as he does in power, but he doubts that one could be so fortu­
nate to get such a ruler; and if one were, he does not think it likely 
that any mortal’s mind would be capable of such extensive rule. But 
suppose it were. When would such a ruler find out what was happening 
among far distant subjects? But suppose he discovered. When would he
be in a position to help? A "great emperor", Erasmus concludes, who
56does no more than levying taxes, is not a "true emperor".
In the same year, 1517, Erasmus dedicated a revised edition of the 
history of Alexander the Great by Quintus Curtius Rufus to the Duke of 
Bavaria. In the letter accompanying the gift he expresses his views 
against the ideal of a ruler which the author sets before his readers 
in the person of Alexander the Great:
For my own part, I have no more liking for the 
Alexander of the Greek historians, than I have 
for Homer ’ s Achilles. Both the one and the other 
present the worst example of what a sovereign 
should be, even if some good qualities may seem 
to be mingled with so many faults. It was for­
sooth well worth while, that Africa, Europe and 
Asia should be thrown into confusion, and so 
many thousands of human beings slaughtered, to 
please one young madman, whose ambition t ^ s  
solid globe would have failed to satisfy!
In March 1527, when the imperial forces were fighting a winning 
battle against the allied forces of Francis I and the Pope in Italy, 
the chancellor of Charles V, Mercurino Gattinara, wrote from Valladolid 
in Spain to Erasmus:
I have recently discovered Dante's De Monarchia , 
a suppressed book as I am told by t ^ s e  who as­
pire unduly to a universal monarchy ... As it 
may serve the cause of the Emperor, I would like 
to see it published ... Nobody in our time is 
better suited to be entrusted with this work. It 
is up to you to decide whether it is convenient
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to publish the work or to leave it unpublished.
As P.S. Allen and H.M. Allen, editors of Erasmus' letters in Latin com­
ment: "The proposal here made is interesting, as marking an attempt to
61commit Erasmus definitely to the Imperial side He decided not
62to publish De Monarchia. Two months later he wrote to the Polish King
Sigismund I: "Just as certain ships are too big to be navigated, in the
same way it is extremely difficult to successfully administer an empire
63which is too extended".
About two years later, in March 1529, Erasmus responded in a let­
ter to Alfonso Valdes, Gattinara’s "loyal secretary", to "the stupid 
argument" put forward by the Spanish Franciscan Luis de Carvajal in a 
tract entitled Apologia Monasticae Religionis Diluens Nugas Erasmi (A 
Defence of Monasticism in Refutation of the Nonsense Written by Eras­
mus). The whole "chicanery" of these people, Erasmus writes, is direct­
ed at the word "new": "The Emperor wants a new, universal monarchy" ... 
"(A)s if there ever had been, apart from God, a universal monarch". Even 
today, part of the world continues to be unknown, and the known part 
has never obeyed one ruler.^ But listen to "that good man", he invites 
Valdes: Proposition One, "What the sun is in the heaven, the Emperor is 
on earth". This comparison would be justifiable only if one man were 
capable of giving his attention to every nation on earth. Two, "Aris­
totle places monarchy ahead of aristocracy". Yes, if it were possible 
to find a man who excelled every other in virtue and wisdom; but when 
Aristotle speaks of monarchy, he does not have in mind the world, but 
independent states such as Crete, Sparta, and Athens. Three, Carvajal 
quotes Homer saying that one leader is better than many. True, but Ho­
mer refers to a military leader, and even then, he accords him absolute 
power only in combat. Finally, Carvajal holds that Christ himself ap­
proves the imperial authority: "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's ...".
Yes, but "(i)f Christ had taught in Savoy ... he would have said: Give
65to the Duke what is the Duke's ...".
Not long afterwards Johann Rinck, a lawyer from Cologne, requested 
Erasmus’ opinion on the question of whether or not to make war against 
the Turks. Erasmus’ response was the Consultatio of March 1530. The 
passage which is of interest in the context of this section reads as 
follows:
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Most of us ... dread the name of World Empire 
... a title at which others seem to be aim­
ing ... A unified empire would be best if we 
could have a sovereign made in the image of God, 
but, men being what they are, there is more 
safety in kingdoms moderate power united in 
a Christian League.
Erasmus, as his writings reveal, is a constant and consistent op­
ponent of universalism: neither the road to it nor the destination it­
self hold any promise of generating less conflict than the existing
67political plurality.
4. Erasmus Presents a Model of the Perfect Temporal Christian Prince
In opposition to both realism and universalism Erasmus puts forward
the idea of Christian princes being linked in concord to one another.
References to this idea can be found in many of his writings, for ex-
68ample, in the Adage "War Is Sweet to Those Who Do not Know It" , in
69the treatise The Education of a Christian Prince , in letters to the 
Dukes of Saxony and the French King Francis 1^, and, slightly differ­
ently worded, in the conclusion to his discussion of the question of 
war against the Turks. ^  It is an idea which includes both political 
plurality and that which links. This section and the next will focus on 
the former, presenting Erasmus' ideas of the temporal Christian prince 
and of the spiritual Christian prince respectively, while Sections Six 
to Ten will be concerned with that which makes for concord among Chris­
tian princes.
Erasmus gives expression to his idea of the temporal Christian
prince by means of a model of the perfect temporal Christian prince to
remind "good rulers" of what they are doing, and "bad rulers" of what 
72they ought to do. The inspiration for adopting such a course comes 
from classical Antiquity. The ancients, Erasmus explains, did not 
praise their rulers in order to flatter them; they praised them because 
they understood that, proud and impatient as they often were, they 
would not "tolerate either the authority of a mentor or the censure of 
a critic":
So, out of regard for the nation's well-being, 
they altered course, and reached the same goal 
by a less obvious route. In the guise of a pan­
egyric they presented the prince with a kind of
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model of the perfect ruler, depicted in a paint­
ing as it were, in order that he might measure 
himself upon the pattern thus offered and private­
ly acknowledge how far he ^ 1 1  below the standard 
of the prince they lauded.
The three prime qualities of the Christian prince are wisdom, good- 
74ness, and power. Wisdom, according to Erasmus, is an attribute in it­
self, and it tells a prince how to rule "beneficently".7  ^ "But there 
is only one means of deliberating on a question, and that is wisdom".7  ^
Of goodness, Erasmus says: "Nothing is really ’good' unless associated 
with moral integrity".77 A prince's goodness makes him want "to help 
all" , "to fill as many needs as possible for everyone".7^ Wisdom and 
goodness are closely linked in the Christian prince, "(f)or true wisdom
consists not only in the knowledge of truth, but in the love and eager
80striving for what is good". Power is the quality which makes the 
prince the supreme ruler of his realm. Supreme, however, does not mean 
absolute. Above him, there is the law:
In meetings of the council, one shall listen to 
the most noble and the old; but in such a way 
that the decision is with the king ... who cannot 
be compelled or passed over by anyone. The king 
obeys only the law, gijid the law corresponds to 
the idea of honesty.
The power of the Christian prince is limited in a second way. His sub­
jects are not only free men, they also are Christians, that is "people
82who are twice free". "(A)mong Christians", Erasmus insists, "supreme
83rule means administration of the state, and not dominion". Wisdom,
goodness and power belong together, for "power, unless it is allied to
wisdom and goodness, is tyranny and not power ...". "Power without
goodness", the idea recurs, "is unmitigated tyranny; without wisdom it
85brings chaos, not domain".
The Christian prince employs wisdom, goodness and power for the
good of his country. "The cardinal principle of a good prince", Erasmus
is in no doubt, "should be not only to preserve the present prosperity
of the state but to pass it on more prosperous than when he received 
86it". And prosperity, he is equally certain, does not only mean materi­
al wealth; it also includes physical health and, most importantly, spir­
itual well-being.®^
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In order to attain these ends, the Christian prince has to see not
only how "things that are evil can be avoided or removed", but also how
88"good conditions can be gained, developed, and strengthened". The 
guiding ideas in this endeavour are justice and co-operation, and the 
Christian prince follows their inspiration, within his own realm and be­
yond it.
As far as his own realm is concerned, the Christian prince knows
that:
The most felicitous condition exists when (he) 
is obeyed by everyone, (he) himself obeys the 
laws, and the laws go back to the fundamental 
principles of equity and honesty, with no othg 
aim than the advancement of the commonwealth.
And equity, as Erasmus explains, does not consist in bestowing upon ev­
erybody "the same reward, the same rights, the same honor"; this, he de-
90dares, is sometimes "a mark of the greatest unfairness".
The Christian prince also knows, and this is a second, more complex 
image inspired by the ideas of justice and co-operation, that it is for 
the good of his country if the various elements of society can be made 
to check and balance one another in such a way as to achieve an "eternal 
truce":
(E)ach part of the body politic would retain its 
rightful authority, the people would be given 
their due, the councillors and magistrates would 
be paid the respect proper to their learning, to 
law and to justice; the bishops and priests would 
receive the honour due to them. Nor would the 
monks be denied what is due to them. The harmoni­
ous discord of all these, this variety tending to 
one and the same end, would serve the commonwealth ...
More specifically, the Christian prince knows and loves his coun­
try and its people, and seeks to win its love in turn - a task made
easier if it is his fatherland, too, for "friendship is created and
92confirmed most when the source of good will is nature itself". He 
makes it his concern that his country's young people are given a prop­
er education, for citizens who have been acquainted with "the best 
principles" will follow "the right course" of their own accord, and
93there will be less need for either many laws or punishment. He bur­
dens his people with as few taxes as possible, and least of all the
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poor. Thrift, Erasmus notes, "is a great source of revenue". The 
Christian prince's laws are not only equitable, but also written in a 
"clear language", with as few "complexities" as possible, and familiar
to the people. 
ible.96
His magistrates are not only wise but also incorrupt-
The ideas of justice and co-operation are the Christian prince's
guide not only within his realm, but also beyond it - for purposes of
analysis, however, it seems best to present the latter aspect not at
97this point, but to leave it for inclusion in Section Six.
Erasmus' Christian prince is an idea. It is also a reality, as his 
letter of 1527 to King Sigismund of Poland shows, and this reality, for 
purposes of instruction, may be transmitted without separating the ex­
ternal from the internal aspect:
(T)hree qualities seem to me to be especially nec­
essary for the man who mean^gto appease human 
movements of such magnitude : piety, an elevated 
soul, and wisdom. The term 'piety' embraces two 
virtues, love of one's country and religious ar­
dour ... Have you not deployed all your vigilance, 
all your zeal and all your care to look after the 
interests of your kingdom, to preserve them, to 
make them fruitful, to enhance them and to consol­
idate them ... Besides, the integrity of your 
whole being manifests the fact that the Christian 
religion is not a minor concern for you ...
In the inevitable wars which you have often 
fought with as much success as with valour, against 
the Vlachs, the Tatars, the Muscovites and the 
Prussians, you have testified to a really royal 
elevation of soul. But the signs of a still rarer 
sublimity were there when you preferred to conclude 
a truce with the Muscovites who so often have made 
war on you, rather than to subject by (force of) 
arms to your rule an area of an extreme affluence, 
when this would have been easy for you, and the 
unanimous pressure of the notables urged you to do 
so ...
However, I think that the same f^ts reveal the 
exceptional wisdom which you possess.
To use Erasmus' own classificatory system, the letter to the King of Po­
land is a panegyric reminding a good ruler of what he is doing.
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5. Erasmus Presents a Model of the Perfect Spiritual Christian Prince
The prince of the Christian church possesses the same three cardinal 
qualities as the temporal Christian prince, that is, wisdom, goodness, 
and power. M(Y)our goodness", Erasmus writes to Pope Leo X in 1515, 
"makes you wish to be of service, your singular wisdom shows you how to 
aid humanity, and your supreme position as pontiff makes this pos- 
sible".100
While the prime attributes are the same, the aims in the pursuit 
of which they are employed are different. For the temporal Christian 
prince, as the preceding section has shown, there is nothing more im­
portant than to enhance his country’s prosperity, whereas the spiritual 
Christian prince delights "in upholding the rule, the glory and the
justice of Christ"^'*'; he longs "for nothing other than the glory of
102Christ and the salvation of all mankind".
In the pursuit of his aims, the spiritual Christian prince travels 
along a road which is different from that followed by the temporal 
Christian prince. The great importance which Erasmus attaches to this 
point is reflected in many of his works, for example, in the Adage "The 
Sileni of Alcibiades":
I wish the Popes to have the greatest riches - 
but let it be the pearl of the Gospel, the heav­
enly treasure ... I wish them to be fully armed, 
but with the arms of the Apostle ... I wish them 
to be fierce warriors, but against the real ene­
mies of the Church, simony, pride, lust, ambi­
tion, anger, irreligion ... Which models are more 
suitable for imitation by the vicar of Christ - 
the Juliuses, Alexanders, Croesus, and Xerxes, 
nothing but robbers on the grand scale, or Christ 
himself ...?
Again, when he addresses the French King Francis I:
(T)he evangelical pastors possess the evangelical 
sword which has been given to them by Christ, in 
order to eliminate human vices, and to remove hu­
man passions. The kings possess their proper 
sword, which Christ, too, has given to them in or­
der to frighten the wicked and to honour the good 
... There are two kinds of swords, just as^there 
are two ways of exercising sovereignty ...
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A king, Erasmus submits, does not possess "greater majesty" than when 
he sits in the courts of justice, administering justice, or when he 
attends the meetings of council, looking after the interests of the 
state. A bishop, on the other hand, manifests the "dignity of his of­
fice" no more truly than when he teaches the philosophy of Christ from 
the height of a pulpit.
The spiritual Christian prince uses his wisdom, goodness and power 
as prescribed by his aims, and does not get "immersed in the kingdom of 
this world". ^  Leaving "worldly things to the world"^^, he is in a 
position to meet the demands made by the office of arbitrator and medi­
ator. It is appropriate for the pope, for cardinals, bishops, and ab­
bots, Erasmus writes in 1514 to Antoon van Bergen, Abbot of St Bertin, 
to work for the settlement of disputes among princes. This is, he in­
sists, how "they should wield their authority and reveal the power they 
108possess But let the world experience the power of the pope -
his addressee this time is the French King Francis I, and the year is
1523 - "as being beneficial for the reconciliation of kings and the
109maintenance of their concord".
Erasmus' prescription is clear: the spiritual Christian prince is 
in charge of one form of administration, and the temporal Christian 
prince of another; and the two ought to be kept separate. Where they 
intersect, as happens in cases of arbitration and mediation on the part 
of the spiritual Christian prince, the latter does not threaten politi­
cal plurality, but acts as its defender.
6. The World as It Ought to Be: The Idea of Harmonious Discord
Concord or harmony, it is Erasmus' view, is discernible in the world as 
a whole. "In this universe, composed of such different elements", he 
writes in "War Is Sweet to Those Who Do not Know It", "there is a har­
mony". He finds it, as was shown above, in the state in which "the 
various elements of society" so balance and control one another that 
they achieve an "eternal truce".^^ Why should it not be operative 
among Christian princes and the peoples committed to their care?
Wise and good Christian princes, Erasmus suggests, follow the idea 
of justice not only within their respective realms, but also beyond 
them - in their relations with one another and with non-Christian
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princes. "(I)t is the part of a Christian prince to regard no one as 
an outsider unless he is a nonbeliever, and even on them he should in­
flict no harm".^^
"Inflicting no harm", in relation to non-Christians, means that
113Christian princes do not attack them ; they do not take their
riches'*"^; they do not subject them to their political rule^^; they
116do not force them to become Christians ; and they keep promises made 
to them.^^ It means, in other words, that they respect their separate­
ness and independence. "Inflicting no harm", in relation to one another, 
has the same meaning. As Erasmus formulates it: "Let us not do anything 
by force, and certainly do unto others what we would wish them to do un-USto us". Irrespective of whether it concerns non-Christians or Chris­
tians, "(a) good prince should never go to war at all unless, after try­
ing every other means, he cannot possibly avoid it". In such a case, 
Erasmus adds, the good prince endeavours to wage the war "with as lit­
tle calamity to his own people" as possible, and to conclude it as soon 
as possible.'*’'*'^
While the idea of justice applies equally to Christians and non-
Christians, the idea of co-operation does not. Good and wise Christian
princes, Erasmus submits, are not "too closely allied" to those who
120have a different religion. These they neither attack nor do they 
have them as allies.
The idea of co-operation which guides Christian princes prescribes 
that they preserve peace with one another:
A good and wise prince will make an effort to 
preserve peace with everyone but especially with 
his neighbors; for if they are wrought up they 
can do a great deal of harm, while if they are 
friendly they are a big help, and without their 
mutual busiiji^s relations the state could not 
even exist.
It invites them, in times of peace, to collaborate in strengthening and 
beautifying their realms:
To make beneficial arrangements together for 
these things, and to compare all their plans for 
these ends is the <j>i^ thing really worthy of 
Christian princes.
It urges them, when war has broken out, to "take counsel together" in 
order to re-establish peace:
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I will only urge princes of Christian faith to 
put aside all feigned excuses and all false pre­
texts ... to work for the ending of that madness 
for war ... that among those whom so many ties 
unite there may arise a peace and concord ... 
(I)f, after common counsel, we should carry out 
our Connys task .. . each one would be more pros­
perous .
It encourages them to offer help if one of them is "in distress":
(I)t is not sufficient that all those who sup­
port the Christian cause heave lamentations; it 
is also necessary to help fellow-peoples in dis­
tress: for, unless we consider these misfortunes 
as being common to all of us ... it is to be 
feared that in reality they will become our com­
mon lot.
While justice supports separateness and independence, co-operation cir­
cumscribes both.
The aim which wise and good princes set for themselves - securing
the good of their country - is an end in itself, and it serves another
end. "If each (prince) does his best to embellish his own possessions",
Erasmus writes, "then all will be flourishing everywhere". "(I)f one
of them does wrong, it is to the detriment not of one family but of the
126whole world". The idea that whatever happens in one Christian coun­
try is of significance to the whole of Christendom is persistent in
Erasmus' writings. For example, it reappears in The Education of a
127Christian Prince ; it occurs in his preface to "Of How to Write Let-
128ters" ; and it is included in his discussion of the question of war
129against the Turks.
That which links one Christian to another also links one Christian
prince to another Christian prince. "Among all Christian princes",
130Erasmus writes, "there is at once a very firm and holy bond ...".
"(A)mong good and wise princes", it comes back like an echo, " ... there
131is an established friendship ...". The concord which unites Chris­
tian princes among themselves is not based on "many painstaking con­
tracts"; and certainly not on marriage alliances, for even though "com­
mon opinion" regards such alliances as the "adamantine bonds of public
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harmony", they are, as a matter of fact, the cause of "the greatest up-
132heavals (in) human affairs". The concord which is operative among 
wise and good Christian princes is traceable to one source, and Erasmus 
places this source at the centre of three circles:
Christ ... is the centre surrounded by various 
circles. The centre must not be removed from its 
position. For, in accordance with it, all human 
actions are to be judged. Those who are nearest 
to Christ, the priests, bishops, cardinals and 
popes whose duty it is to follow Him wherever He 
goes, are to uphold that purest sphere and, as 
much as possible, transmit it to those next to 
them. The second circle is formed by the tempo­
ral princes whose arms and laws serve Christ in 
their own way, be it that defeat the enemy
in necessary and just wars and protect public 
tranquillity, be it that by lawful punishments 
they keep evil-doers within bounds ... In the 
third circle finally ... there are the ordinary 
people; although they form the gros^^t part ... 
they nevertheless belong to Christ.
The image of the three circles is Erasmus’ illustration of how divine 
law as expressed in the teachings and life of Christ is transmitted 
from the centre of the "community which is our religion" to the periph­
ery, becoming less pure as it travels outward. It also shows that di­
vine law is the source from which the Christian princes derive the 
principles informing their actions. Divine law, and Erasmus makes it
clear that it is a law which "neither ought to be judged nor can it be
135abolished" , is the Christian princes’ standard and guide.
The three circles are a description of Christianity. They leave 
out all those who do not share its spirit; that is, the non-Christians 
are excluded. These outsiders, however, are potential insiders:
I have no doubt whatever that Christianity, now 
confined within narrow limits, would happily 
spread if the barbarous nations realized they 
were called not to human servitude but to gos­
pel freedom; sought out not for the purpose of 
plunder but for the fellowship of happiness and 
holiness. When they have united with us and 
found in us truly Christian behaviour, they will 
contribute voluntarily more than any force could 
wring from them.
Sharing the philosophy of Christ removes the boundary which separates 
outsiders from insiders.
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7. Law as a Link
Erasmus’ writings contain a number of ideas suggesting ways of bring­
ing the world as it was more into accord with his vision of the world 
as it ought to be, which has been outlined in the preceding section.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of these ideas.
One way of narrowing the gap, Erasmus thinks, consists in reform­
ing existing laws. Two measures in particular seem to be indicated. One
is that the philosophy of Christ, that is, the law of Christ, needs to
137be restored to its original purity and simplicity. The second in­
volves human laws: these should be revised and emended according to the 
idea of justice as derived from the philosophy of Christ.
(a) The philosophy of Christ, Erasmus holds, is no longer as pure
and simple as when it subdued "both the pride of the philosophers and
138the unconquered scepters of the princes". With the passage of time, 
it has become corrupted not only through mistakes committed by "un­
skilled" or "inattentive" copyists, and "ignorant" or "lazy" transla-
139tors, but also through the inclusion of many a human decree. As a re­
sult, it no longer provides the standard by which everything else is 
judged, or, as he puts it: "(M)atters of the greatest importance depend 
not on the law of Christ but on the definitions of scholastics and the 
power of some b i s h o p " . I f  the philosophy of Christ is to be "true", 
"authentic" and "efficacious" again, it is necessary to return to its 
sources, to read and compare the early manuscripts, to re-edit them, 
and to make them accessible by translating them into "all the lan­
guages", Latin as well as the vernaculars.^^ Furthermore, it is neces-142sary that the Church refrain from issuing a new decree "every day".
The attempt to regulate too many aspects of human life is responsible 
for much of the dissension within Christendom, and it deters non-Chris­
tians from joining the community of the Christian religion. As he 
writes in the Colloquy "A Fish Diet":
Nowadays we see the whole world shaken by reason 
of these deadly disputes. If these and ones like 
them were got rid of, we could both live in great­
er peace, not bothering about ceremonies, but 
straining only after those things Christ taught, 
and other races would more readily embrace a re­
ligion joined with freedom.
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And he meets the argument that "(i)t is easy to prescribe in general" 
when what is needed is advice on "specific matters", and "particular 
cases", with the following counter-argument: human affairs are so nu­
merous and varied that it is impossible to respond with certainty re­
garding each one of them; there is such "a variety of circumstances" 
that, unless one knows them all, one cannot even respond with certain­
ty; finally, even if one thinks that one has certainty on one’s side, 
there are others who think likewise, but their answer is not necessari­
ly in agreement with one’s own. Hence, those who are "the more sen­
sible" will not say; "Do this", "avoid that", but rather: "In my opin­
ion this is the safer course, this I think is tolerable".
(b) It is Erasmus’ view that many human laws, and practices sanc­
tioned by these laws, fall far short of the standard set by divine law
145- they are not equitable , and he submits a number of examples in 
support of his view. One concerns the effects of deceased foreigners. 
These effects, he notes, are usually taken over by the prefect in the 
king’s name - a practice which goes back to a good intention: "To pre­
vent those who had no right to the stranger’s property from claiming 
it", and to keep it safely "until the rightful heirs appeared". Now, 
however, it is the case that "the property of a foreigner reverts to 
the treasury whether there be heirs or not".
Another example relates to the imposition of import and export du­
ties. It all began, Erasmus tells his readers, as an excellent plan. 
Officials, whose task it was to supervise imports and exports with the 
particular purpose of guaranteeing safe passage, were stationed along 
the boundaries of the various kingdoms. If anything was stolen, the 
prince in whose territory the theft occurred saw to it that the merchant 
suffered no loss, and the thief was punished. As "a matter of courtesy" 
perhaps, "merchants started to give a small fee". Now, however, "every­
where the traveler is stopped for his custom fee, the stranger is 
bothered by it, the merchants are fleeced", and there is no suggestion
of offering any protection to anybody, even though "the tax mounts from„ 147day to day .
A third example concerns goods surviving from a shipwreck. Erasmus 
notes that originally the law prescribed that only goods which were not 
properly claimed by anyone became the property of the state where they 
were found. Now, however, "the prefect, more unrelenting than the sea
61
itself, seizes upon whatever is lost by any cause at sea as if it were 
his own":
There are many provisions like these among many 
nations which are no less unjust than injustice 
itself. It is not the purpose of this treatise 
to change any particular state. These practices 
are common to substantially all states, and they 
have been condemned by the judgment of everyone. 
I hav^j^rought them up for purposes of instruc­
tion .
It is for princes to change them. 149
In suggesting to princes that they improve the laws that obtain 
among them, Erasmus takes up a position which accords with what Richard 
Tuck says of humanists in general, and of humanist lawyers in particu­
lar. "What was important to them", he observes, "was not natural law 
but humanly constructed law; not natural rights but civil remedies". 
Erasmus, as one finds when one reads his writings searchingly, has the 
idea of the law of n a t u r e b u t  he does not put it to any use. Pierre 
Mesnard, however, misses the point when he writes in his study L ’Essor 
de la Philosophie Politique au XVIe Sietle:
Erasmus’ failure occurs in relation to the notion 
of law ... Between principle and action he needs 
an appointed intermediary which is like the prac­
tical equivalent of the principle while at the 
same time representing its moral constraint ... 
the notion of law ... In limiting the rights (o|^ 2 
princes) the idea of Right (Law) has succumbed.
Erasmus, as this section has shown, does not formulate new laws, but he 
points to the need for a reform of existing ones.
8. Learning as a Link
Erasmus’ writings draw attention to a second way of achieving greater 
correspondence between the world as it was and the world as it ought to 
be - the advancement of learning. Christian princes, in his view, are 
not as wise and good as they ought to be. Greater learning will make 
them wiser and better.
One meets with this idea on numerous occasions, for example, in the 
Adage "Make Haste Slowly" (1508):
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(W)e spend our time on the rubbish written by all 
and sundry, and in the meantime the noble old 
systems of thought are lying neglected with the 
authors who expounded them, and ruin threatens 
the authority of senate, council, school, legal 
expert or theologian. If things go on as they have 
begun, the result will be that supreme power will 
be concentrated in the hands of a few, and we 
shall have as barba^^ a tyranny among us as there 
is among the Turks.
Or, to give another example, in the Adage "Kings and Fools Are Born, 
not Made" (1515):
(I)f we may not choose a suitable person to be 
our ruler, it is important to try to make that 
person suitable whom fate has given us ... It 
seems to me that he should have attached to him, 
while still an infant, some skilful educator ...
Let him instil into this childish mind, as yet 
blank and malleable, opinions worthy of a prince; 
arm it with the best principles of conduct, show 
it the d^|erence between a true prince and a ty­
rant ...
The two passages just quoted hint at the kind of learning that 
Erasmus wants to see propagated: "the noble old systems of thought",
"the best principles of conduct", both refer to the same product - the 
ideas contained in the literature of Antiquity, sacred and profane, un­
contaminated by the passage of time. He revives these ideas partly by 
incorporating them as sources in his own writings, partly by publish­
ing them in their original versions. In this way, Ambrose and Aristotle, 
Chrysostom and Cicero, Jerome and Origen, Plato and Plutarch, Seneca 
and Vergil, and the New Testament - to name just a few - come to life 
again; and for him there is no inherent conflict between the Christian 
and non-Christian writings of Antiquity. As he puts it in the Colloquy 
"The Godly Feast" (1522):
Sacred Scripture is of course the basic author­
ity in everything; yet I sometimes run across 
ancient sayings or pagan writings ... so purely 
and reverently and admirably expressed that I 
can't help believing their authors' hearts were 
moved by some divine power. And perhaps the spirit 
of Christ is more widespread than we understand, 
and the c^^any of saints includes many not in our 
calendar.
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The ideas contained in the literature inherited from Antiquity are
the subject-matter destined to narrow the gap between practice and prin
ciple; and Erasmus not only publishes as much of it as he is able to,
but he also directs most of it to the attention of the princes of his
day, and those near them, by dedicating each writing to one of them.
The list of dedications compiled by the editors of Opus Epistolarum is 
156long ; a few examples must suffice to make the point:
Philip of Burgundy, Bishop of Utrecht and ’’one of the pil­
lars of Margaret's government in the Netherlands"^^: The 
Complaint of Peace (1517);
Prince Charles (Charles V): The Education of a Christian 
Prince (1516);
Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria and brother of Charles V: 
Paraphrase on the Gospel of St John (1523);
Alonso Fonseca, Archbishop of Toledo, who "took a leading 
part in the government of Spain during the absence of
I c: o
Charles V" : The Works of Augustine (1529);
Francis I, King of France: Paraphrase on St Mark (1523);
Henry VIII, King of England: Plutarch’s On Distinguishing 
between a Flatterer and a Friend (1517);
Pope Leo X: The New Testament (1516);
Christopher of Schydlowyetz, a Polish statesman whose "en-
159ergies were devoted to the maintenance of peace" :
Lingua (1525), a treatise on the power of the human tongue 
for good and for evil.
The dedications usually include a message in accord with the gift 
For example, he writes to Henry VIII in 1517:
Another chief merit is this, that among so many 
affairs in which your kingdom, and indeed the 
whole world, is concerned, you scarcely let a 
day pass but you bestow some time upon reading, 
and delight in converse with those ancient 
sages, who are anything but flatterers; while 
you choose especially those books, from which 
you may rise a better aiji^ lga wiser man, and more 
useful to your country.
And to Francis I in 1523:
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Indeed, I had dedicated Matthew to Charles, my 
Prince; John, whom I interpreted immediately af­
ter Matthew, to Ferdinand, Charles' brother; and 
Luke, whom I tackled in the third place, to the 
King of England; Mark seemed rightly left to you 
so that the four volumes of the gospel were con­
secrated to the four most important monarchs of 
the world. May it please Heaven that the text of 
the gospel unite your names in a harmony similar 
to that which the^gjirit of the gospel ought to 
bind your hearts.
The ideas of Antiquity, chosen to promote harmony in discord, are 
not only distributed within Christendom, but also beyond it. Erasmus of­
fers this information in 1508 when he writes in the Adage "Make Haste 
Slowly" that the symbol of the anchor and dolphin cannot have enjoyed 
greater prestige, when it passed from hand to hand on the imperial coin­
age, than now when it is dispatched into the world beyond Christendom
"on all kinds of books, in both languages, recognized, owned and praised
162by all to whom liberal studies are holy ...". And in 1520 he presents
Columbus' son Ferdinand with an autographed copy of his Antibarbari
which argues, amongst other things, against all those who condemn some-
163thing simply because it was invented by pagans.
The world needed learning in order to become more as it ought to
be; but learning also needed the world in order to survive and prosper.
As Erasmus sees it, and notes in a letter to a friend in 1500, it is a
question of obtaining "from whatever source" what is necessary in order
to be able to live a scholar's life, or else having to abandon stud- 
164ies. A letter written thirty years later testifies to the success
he has had in gaining patrons not only for himself - he now has a "room
full of letters from men of learning, nobles, princes and cardinals"
and a "chest full of gold and silver plate, cups, clocks, and rings 
165..." - but also for learning in general. "Compare the world as it was
thirty years ago ...", he writes, and look at it now. "Then, not a prince 
would spend a farthing on his son's education; now every one of them has 
a paid tutor in his family".
In his study Triumph und Tragik des Erasmus von Rotterdam Stefan 
Zweig describes the success of learning in winning social and financial 
support in the following way:
Every one wanted to become a citizen, a cosmopol­
itan, in this realm of learning; emperors and popes,
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princes and priests, artists and statesmen, young 
men and women comp^g^d to be educated in the arts 
and Wissenschaften ;^gtin became their common 
brotherly language .. .
When Erasmus refers to this realm of learning” he sometimes uses the 
term res publica literaria, the Republic of Letters. He is even cred­
ited with having coined the term.^^ He speaks of "our commerce" when he 
refers to the exchange of ideas which takes place amongst the members of
the Republic of Letters. He comments on its fortunes in peace and
172war, noting that peace is favourable to the advancement of learning
173while war obstructs it , although he also observes that it is possible
for princes to be at war, while scholars are at peace and communicate 
174with one another ; and vice-versa that, while princes are at peace, 
there may be discord amongst scholars. The Republic of Letters has 
the aim of advancing "the cause of enlightenment" ; it has its own 
language and its own values. It has fewer members than the res publica 
christiana^ ^ , but it is more or less coextensive with it. One finds 
all this in his writings, but he does not say, as Zweig does, that:
The humanists are as determined to rule the world 
in the name of reason, as the princes are in the 
name of authority, and the Church in the name of 
Christ. Their dream aims at an oligarchy, ^y§ov_ 
ernment of the aristocracy of learning ...
According to Erasmus it is the product of the Republic of Letters which 
is the element providing for more harmony in discord, not its practi­
tioners .
9. Moderation as a Link
Avoiding extremes or, to put it positively, observing moderation is an­
other suggestion on the part of Erasmus to move practice in the direc­
tion of principle, and he advocates this idea - J.A.K. Thomson speaks
179of Erasmus’ passion for moderation - whenever he meets with its op­
posite. "It is amazing", he writes in a letter of 1515, "how there is
. „ 180 no middle course ... .
This finding may be documented with the help of a few examples re­
lating to religion and politics, within Christendom and beyond it.
One set of examples consists of Erasmus’ advice to the princes
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within Christendom to resolve their conflicts by arbitration and media­
tion. "(W)hat need is there”, he asks in 1515, "to fly to arms at once?"
The world has so many earnest and learned bishops, 
so many venerable abbots, so many aged peers with 
the wisdom of long experience, so many councils, 
so many conclaves set up by our ancestors, not 
without reason. Why do we not use their arbitration^ 
to settle these childish disputes between princes?
He includes the advice in almost identical wording in The Education of
182a Christian Prince dedicated to Prince Charles in 1516. He submits 
it to the French King in 1523:
As far as I am concerned, Excellent King, I like 
to persuade myself that, given your character, 
that of the Emperor Charles, and of the King of 
England, you all would have, without any doubt, 
followed good advice for a long time if a coun­
sellor could have been found, who was free in his 
moderati^g^at the same time as moderate in his 
freedom.
And he praises the Polish King in 1527 for supporting the cause of mod­
eration by intervening, with the help of diplomacy, in a dispute be­
tween two neighbouring princes "in an attempt to avoid war until all 
other means susceptible to prevent it had been tried" 2 ^
A second set of examples concerns the conflict which developed 
within Christendom with the appearance of Luther. Erasmus prescribes 
moderation as an approach to the solution of this conflict, as many of 
his writings bear witness. To quote from a letter written prior to the 
Diet of Worms (1521) called together to decide on Luther's fate:
The question is not what Luther deserves, but what 
is best for the peace of the world. The persons 
who are to prosecute, the remedies which are to be 
applied, must be carefully chosen ... Force never 
answers in such cases, and other means must be 
found ... Luther was advised to be more moderate 
... His prosecutors were cautioned too ... The 
fear is that, if Luther's books are burnt and Lu­
ther executed, things will only grow worse ... 
Luther’s conduct and the causes which led to it 
ought to be referred to a small committe^ggf good 
learned men who will be above suspicion.
To quote from another letter written nine years later, when the Diet of 
Augsburg was meeting and news emanating from there did not sound favour-
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able to the cause of moderation: Pope and Emperor were reported to be
"urging extremities", and "the reforming leaders" made it no secret that
186"they were in earnest on their side" :
If the Emperor is only putting on a brag, well and 
good; if he means war in earnest, I am sorry to be 
a bird of ill omen, but I am in consternation at 
the thought of it ... The question is not what the 
sectarians deserve, but what course with them is 
expedient for Europe. Toleration may be a m:j.g^ or- 
tune, yet a less (sic) misfortune than war.
And in the treatise "On Mending the Peace of the Church", published in
1881533, Erasmus reminds those on whom the affairs of men depend that
"(p)ower that is lacking in discretion falls to the ground with its own
weight", adding that the "gods carry tempered power to greater heights",
and suggesting that "with moderate advice and calm minds" the task of
189establishing peace in the Church may be accomplished.
A third set of examples is given by Erasmus’ advocacy of moderation 
on the part of Christendom in its approach to the non-Christian world. 
The case which concerns him in particular is the Turkish question.
In 1515, at a time when there was peace between Christendom and the
Turkish empire, the latter having renewed its treaties with Hungary and 
190Venice , Erasmus writes in his Adage "War Is Sweet to Those Who Do not 
Know It":
To me it does not even seem recommendable (sic) 
that we should now be preparing war against the 
Turks ... What is taken by the sword is lost by 
the sword. Are you anxious to win the Turks for 
Christ? Let us not display our wealth, our armies, 
our strength. Let them see in us not only the 
name, but the unmistakable marks of a Christian 
... Why do we not rather acknowledge them, give 
them encouragement and gently try to reform them?
Fifteen years later Christendom and the Turkish empire were no longer 
at peace, and Turkish troops were moving in the direction of Vienna, 
but Erasmus’ Consultatio of 1530 on the question of war against the 
Turks still argues for moderation, even though it does not reject war: 
"It would be highly desirable", he writes, to win the territories of the 
Turkish empire in the same way in which the Apostles won "the nations of 
the earth" for Christ; to overcome the enemy with "a behaviour and a 
soul worthy of the Gospel"; to send "heralds of integrity" who seek all
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advantage for Christ, and none for themselves; and to permit those who
do not immediately accept the Christian religion "to live for some time
under their own laws, until they slowly become one with us". This is
how Christian rulers "progressively abolished paganism" in former 
192times.
Whether within Christendom or beyond it, moderation is more easily 
exercised if a distinction is drawn between essentials and non-essen­
tials. Erasmus expresses this idea on numerous occasions. For example, 
concerning the world within Christendom he observes in a letter of 1523 
to John Carondelet, Councillor to Margaret of Austria:
The perfection of our religion consists in peace 
and harmony. And this can hardly be established 
unless we define as few things as possible and 
leave each man |{^e to form his own decisions on 
many questions.
And he chooses almost the same wording when he presents the idea in re-
194lation to the world beyond Christendom.
It is mainly in the context of religion that Erasmus advances the 
idea that a distinction ought to be made between essentials and non-es­
sentials. The following passage from The Education of a Christian Prince, 
however, concerning the question of treaties between Christian princes, 
expresses the same idea in the context of politics:
If any portion of a treaty appears to have been 
broken, we should not at once conclude that the 
whole pact is invalidated, lest we seem to have 
pounced upon an excuse for breaking off friendly 
relations. On the contrary, we should rather strive 
to patch up the breach with the least trouble pos­
sible. It is advantageous sometimes even to over­
look some points, since not even among private in­
dividuals do agreements long remain in effect, if 
they carryout everything to the letter, as the say­
ing goes.
The foregoing examples reflect Erasmus’ belief that moderation, 
whether it finds expression in arbitration and mediation, toleration, 
persuasion or restraint in general, reduces not only the incidence of 
conflict but also its severity, thus making the world as it was more 
like the world as it ought to be.
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10. The Question of War
It is mainly in the context of the question of war that Erasmus has 
been mentioned in the literature of international relations, and per­
haps because his position has not been closely studied, a tradition 
has evolved which makes him the pacifist par excellence. Two of the 
more recent exponents of this view are F.H. Hinsley, who writes in 
Power and the Pursuit of Peace;
Pacifists like Erasmus in the early sixteenth cen­
tury and like the Quakers in the seventeenth cen­
tury were untypical of the age in abandoning the 
medieval distinction between just and unjust wars 
on the ground that a^^war was incompatible with 
reason and morality.
And Michael Howard, who says in War and the Liberal Conscience:
Erasmus did not concede, indeed, that there could 
be any circumstances under which war would be jus­
tified . . .
However, a careful reading of Erasmus’ writings suggests that his 
attitude toward war may rather be identified as: not to approve of war 
but to accept it in case of necessity. Such an attitude directs atten­
tion to the existence in his thought of another way of bringing prac­
tice more into accord with principle, and this section will therefore 
be concerned with discussing it.
Erasmus expresses his ideas about war against a climate of opin­
ion which accepts war readily. As he observes in "War Is Sweet to Those 
Who Do not Know It":
War is now such an accepted thing that people are 
astonished to find anyone who does not like it; 
and such a respectable thing that it is wicked 
(I nearly^gid heretical) to disapprove of the 
thing ...
Erasmus does not approve of war. "(E)ven when it is waged with perfect
199justification", he writes, "no man who is truly good approves it".
His reasons for not approving it include moral as well as practical con­
siderations. War, he holds, is immensely destructive, both physically 
and morally^^; it inflicts the greatest suffering on those who least 
deserve it, the common people^^; it is always costly^^; and its out-
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come is never certain 203
For Erasmus, not to approve of war means to avoid it if possible:
If there is anything in mortal affairs which should 
be approached with hesitancy, or rather which ought 
to be avoided in every possible wa^*^guarded against 
and shunned, that thing is war ...
There are better ways of trying to resolve a conflict, for example, ar­
bitration and mediation. "The pagan warriors, before they took to arms, 
205took to parley". A wise and good prince, he insists, never goes to 
war "unless, after trying every other means, he cannot possibly avoid
Erasmus, then, does not approve of war; he advises that it ought
to be avoided if possible; but, as two of the above passages already
imply, he does not rule it out altogether. The sword was taken away
from Peter, he writes to Francis I in 1523, but it was not taken away 
207from the princes. "What is the significance of the sword", he asks 
in 1516, if it does not mean that a country ought to be safe under its
prince’s protection - "safe both from outside enemies and those with-
208 209in?" "I do not condemn war absolutely", he affirms in 1526 ; and
in 1530 he says in his discussion of the question of war against the
Turks:
There are in fact people who think that the right 
to make war is forbidden to Christians in an abso­
lute way - an opinion which ^gonsider to be too 
absurd to have to refute it.
There is a case, he holds, when war may have to be resorted to, and
that case is necessity: "(N)o war should surely be engaged in, in any
211manner, unless necessity compels it".
It is possible that a good prince will, one day, 
go to war, but then an extreme necessity will have 
pushed him into thi^gosition, after he has tried 
everything in vain.
"(A) war against the Turks", he affirms, "is not to my liking, unless
213an inevitable necessity forces it upon us".
What, in Erasmus’ eyes, is necessity, and what is it not? The ans­
wer, contained in many statements scattered over his writings, is clear
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ambition, anger, greed for riches, thirst for glory, desire for power, 
hatred, envy, an old title, or some selfish treaty - none of these con­
stitutes necessity, even though most wars, both within Christendom and 
with non-Christians, have arisen from one of these "trivial, stupid or 
wicked reasons". Necessity, however, does present itself when it is
a question of having to defend one's country and religion against an 
215aggressor. There is a suggestion, both in Julius Exclusus and in 
"War Is Sweet to Those Who Do not Know It", that a war which is fought 
in order to remove a tyrant may be regarded as having necessity on its 
side , but this idea does not recur and is not elaborated in any way.
Necessity is also the first ingredient of Erasmus’ idea of a just
war:
War is not to be condemned entirely, if it is un­
dertaken for a just reason, which means in de­
fence of public tranquillity, under circumstances 
which make it unavoidable; if it is undertaken by 
piously thinking princes and with the consent of 
those for whom it is waged; if it is announced in 
the generally recognized way and is conducted in 
a just and moderate manner, which means as few 
bloody losses and sacrifices as possible for those 
who have not caused the war, ar}<jlyif the war is 
concluded as soon as possible.
To him, just war does not mean what it means to many of his contempora­
ries. As he comments critically:
'Just' indeed - this means any war declared in any 
way against anybody by an^grince ... Who does not 
think his own cause just?
And:
(Roman law) regards war as praiseworthy if it is 
just. 'Just' is defined as what has been ordere^g 
by the prince, even if he be a child or a fool.
A war is just only if it is necessary; if it is undertaken by a prince, 
that is, a ruler possessing goodness, wisdom and supreme power; if it 
has the consent of the people, that is to say, the estates; and if it is 
declared, conducted and concluded in a just way.
Erasmus' writings suggest a further condition which ought to be met 
if a war is to be just - a condition which he does not include explicit-
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ly in the statement above, but which he expresses elsewhere:
If you cannot defend your realm without violating 
justice, without wanton loss of human life, with­
out great loss to religion, gi,^ up and yield to 
the importunities of the age!
In other words, it is his view that a war ceases to be just if it risks
221destroying the society in whose defence it is fought.
Not only does Erasmus distinguish between just and unjust wars but, 
as his theory of the three circles reveals, the former has a well de­
fined place in his thought:
The second circle is formed by the temporal prin­
ces whose arms and laws serve Christ in their own 
way, be it that they defeat the enemy in just wars 
and protect public tranquillity, be it that by 
lawful g^ishments they keep evil-doers within 
bounds.
In not ruling out war altogether, he takes up a position which differen­
tiates him from those who "deny that Christians should wage any war"
and those who "blow the trumpet to summon men to war for any and every
223cause", as he himself points out.
Some Reflections in Conclusion
Erasmus wrote and published nearly five hundred years ago, yet his works 
continue to be readily available - in old editions and in new ones, in 
their original language and in translation.
Scholars in international relations, unlike their counterparts in 
other disciplines, have displayed little curiosity for them. Part of the 
reason may be that they have not shown much interest in the history of 
their discipline's ideas in general; part of it may be that the few his­
tories that mention him do so in words that are likely to act as a de­
terrent to further inquiry rather than encourage it: labels such as 
"idealist", "pacifist", and "humanist" seem to place him outside the 
scope of most of the discipline's concerns - be they theory or policy. 
And histories of political theory, as they began to be written this cen­
tury, would not have challenged this impression: they either mention him 
225only in passing , or suggest that he should not be mentioned because
226he was not a party to any of the great religious movements of his age
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or, if they do discuss him, choose words which again are unlikely to
attract interest: a man of "moderation, of compromise and arbitration",
227as one scholar puts it , seems to have little to offer to either real­
ists or universalists. This century, it is probably correct to say, has
228been more interested in the "extreme man" than in his opponent.
Erasmus needs space when writing; he uses many words where others 
limit themselves to a few. He attempts to persuade with the help of 
eloquence rather than dialectics. Ideas relating to different spheres 
of human experience - religion, philosophy, morality, law, government, 
society, national and international politics, to mention a few - are 
closely interwoven, and difficult to separate; only the emphasis 
changes, highlighting different ideas at different times and in dif­
ferent contexts.
Erasmus' way of presenting his ideas may be unpalatable to the 
twentieth-century specialist - it certainly does not invite the formu­
lation of theory - and it is easy to miss a particular idea in a partic­
ular work. However, as one continues to explore his writings, definite 
impressions begin to form: for his ideas return, in different configu­
rations, but consistently and continuously, and in the end one is tempt­
ed to compare his method with that of a printmaker who uses many plates, 
each one by itself partial, perhaps unimpressive, to create a print - a 
picture which is complete, and perhaps telling.
As this chapter has shown, Erasmus rejects realism, even though 
his disagreement with that way of thinking cannot be said to begin at 
the level of observation. At this level, he has been found to be realis­
tic. He also rejects universalism, and what he perceives as a road to 
it, territorial expansionism; and he does so in words which are unequiv­
ocal .
In opposition to both realism and universalism Erasmus puts for­
ward a third way. Central to it is the idea of political plurality, and 
he joins to it the idea of that which links and circumscribes. Politi­
cal plurality, in his case, means a plurality of Christian princes; but
it also means a plurality of Christian peoples or states, for "a prince
229cannot exist without a state ...". He places the emphasis on princes 
rather than peoples, not because the latter are unimportant, but be­
cause princes are responsible for their peoples. Princes, with their
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peoples, are the "discordant elements" within Christendom, but he does
230not focus on that which differentiates them but rather on that which 
they have, or ought to have, in equal measure - the former wisdom, 
goodness, and power, the latter checks and balances in their internal 
affairs at as many levels as possible. And the spiritual Christian 
prince does not aim at overthrowing political plurality, but acts in 
its support.
That which links and keeps within bounds Christian princes and 
their peoples, or, to use the language of this chapter, that which pro­
motes harmony in discord, is the Christian religion or philosophy of 
Christ, reinforced and complemented by learning and a positive law of 
nations, moderation, and an attitude towards war which avoids it unless 
it is just, and justice includes above all the idea of necessity.
Erasmus’ third way incorporates ideas from the distant rather than 
the immediate past, and the question presents itself, although it is 
not the task of this inquiry to answer it, whether it is possible that 
his negative attitude towards the centuries immediately preceding him 
may have contributed to the decision, taken by a later age, to divide 
history into medieval and modern at this point in time, and also to the 
view, prevalent until well into this century, that "medieval" is synon­
ymous with "dark". Erasmus himself, it is worth noting, refers to
thinkers such as Thomas of Aquinas not as medieval but as modern, and
231contrasts him with the ancients.
Erasmus’ idea of international society, the idea of a society of 
Christian princes, is central to his way of thinking about the world: 
the third way, the via media.
CHAPTER IV
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA
The second thinker to be included in this study is the Spanish Domini­
can Francisco de Vitoria (1480? - 1546).
Otto von Gierke as well as Martin Wight and Hedley Bull mention 
him in their respective accounts of the three ways of thinking about in­
ternational relations but list him under different headings. Gierke at­
taches him to the universalists and gives a source upon which he bases
his decision'*'; Wight and Bull group him with the representatives of the
2 3via media, Wight offering a source and Bull omitting to do so.
The reference given by Gierke turns out, on closer examination, to 
be rather unilluminating. It reads: "Rel. Ill, nos. 12 and 15", followed 
by the sentence that Vitoria speaks "of a human respublica^ which com­
prises all states as members, and in which majority decisions hold".^ 
Without the title of Vitoria’s treatise it is difficult to identify this 
source, as not all the editions of Vitoria’s relectiones^ follow the 
same order of presentation. For example, the edition of 1694 which is 
the basis for the well-known publication of 1917 in The Classics of In­
ternational Law gives as the third relectio "Concerning Civil Power".^ 
Its items 12 and 15, however, do not relate to the point in question. In 
fact, a perusal of all thirteen relectiones as published by the Domini-g
can Teofilo Urdanoz in 1960 leads to the conclusion that items 12 and 
15, wherever they appear, are not relevant to the question. And the sen­
tence which Gierke adds in his footnote does not explain his decision. 
Wight offers a reference to the relectiones "Concerning Civil Power" and 
"On the Indians", but the ideas which they identify - "the world as a 
whole, being in a way one single State" and "natural society and fellow­
ship" - could also belong to the universalist pattern of thought. Rather 
than giving evidence to justify their respective decisions, Gierke,
Wight and Bull may be said to withhold it.
The problem-free interpretation offered by James Brown Scott and 
others of Vitoria’s life and work contains no suggestion that the en­
deavour to come to grips with this sixteenth-century thinker may be ac-gcompanied by difficulties ; and yet, as the inquiry proceeds, it becomes
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clear that to many questions, there are no certain answers.
One set of unresolved questions relates to dates and places. There
is no agreement amongst scholars as to when Vitoria was born. Some have
suggested the year 1480; others 1483, 1486 and 1492.^ The disagreement
about his year of birth gives rise to questions about his place of
birth , and these, in turn, lead to further questions. For example,
while it is agreed that Vitoria entered the Dominican convent of San
Pablo at Burgos, it is not clear when he did so; and, while it is agreed
that he spent a good many years in Paris, studying and teaching, there
is no agreement regarding the number of years he was there nor when he
12obtained his doctorate in theology from the Sorbonne.
The date of his return to Spain does not appear in the sources, 
but it is agreed that from 1523 to 1526 he taught at the Dominican con­
vent of San Gregorio, established shortly after the discovery of Ameri-
13ca at Valladolid; that in 1525 his Order promoted him to Maestro of
Sacred Theology, the highest teaching degree conferred by the Domini-
14cans; that from 1526 to 1546 he occupied the Prima Chair of Theology 
at the university of Salamanca, the most important chair of theology in 
Spain, and that, during those twenty years, he lived at San Esteban, 
the convent from where, in 1510, the first Dominicans had left for Amer­
ica.^ Less certain are the dates to be assigned to the products of his 
mind: the lectiones^, relectiones and other writings such as opinions 
and letters.^ The numerous pages of small print which Urdänoz devotes
to discussing the chronology established by the Dominican Beltran de
18Heredia do not succeed in assuring the reader of its reliability, es­
pecially since Urdanoz himself is prepared to tinker with it.^
Vitoria’s year of death is usually given as 1546. It is not 
known where he is buried, and there exists no portrait of him, of whom 
a learned Belgian, Joannes Vasaeus, wrote: "His erudition was incredi­
ble, his reading almost unlimited, his memory ready; he was like a mir­
acle of nature", adding that "(i)n the whole of Spain there was no one
21so wise, so simple, and, I make bold to add, so saintly". And a 
chronicler of the convent of San Esteban recorded:
From all the kingdoms and remotest provinces, theol- 
ogists, jurists, knights, merchants, royal council­
lors, consulted t^m, and all depended on his verdict 
as on an oracle.
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A second set of unresolved questions concerns the fate of his
ideas. Scholars agree that he published nothing during his life-time
23except four prologues written during his years in Paris. They also
agree that his manuscripts were not published posthumously, and subse-
24quently disappeared. How did his ideas survive, given that his manu­
scripts never saw the press? There is no agreed answer to this ques­
tion. One theory is that Vitoria's texts stem from oral transmission, 
that is, from notes taken by his students in the course of his lecti-
ones and relectiones. The most prominent exponent of this view seems to25be the Dominican Luis Getino. Beltran de Heredia and Urdänoz sub­
scribe to this theory only in so far as it concerns the lectiones.^  
They reject it for the relectiones. These, they hold, were copied as 
from 1538 onwards, and manuscript copies were used for the first edi­
tion of relectiones which appeared at Lyons, France, in 1557; and manu­
script copies plus the Lyons edition went into the making of the second 
edition which was published at Salamanca, Spain, in 1565. Subsequent 
editions no longer used manuscript copies but followed the first two 
printed versions.^
The theory of the written transmission does not eliminate the ques­
tion of authenticiy. The editor of the Lyons edition, Jacques Boyer, is 
said to have expressed himself in the following way:
(0)ne person had mutilated (Vitoria’s writings) 
by making an unhappy transcript, another had read 
them incorrectly ... and many had placed the com­
ments of their foolish mind (sic) in the midst of 
his scrupulous doctrine and singular erudition ...
Alonso Munoz, the Dominican editor of the Salamanca edition, is report­
ed to have reacted to the Lyons edition with these words:
(T)here appeared a little book with a most impos­
ing title, but containing countless horrible mis­
prints, absurdities which were disgraceful and 
insulting to th^^uthor as well as the whole the­
ological school.
To the unknown editor of the third edition, published at Ingolstadt, 
Germany, in 1580, the following comment is attributed:
But I do not know by what ill-chance (sic) it has 
happened that into this Salamanca edition, so 
clean, so clear, so gilded, have crept blunders
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and faults neither few nor trivial.
Making a long step from the sixteenth century to the present, one finds 
Urdanoz writing towards the end of his long introduction:
Given that the original of the text is missing 
and that it is not possible to restore the same 
with absolute precision by way of the first cop­
ies, which are also unknown, and because the 
meagre written tradition does not permit the ex­
act reconstruction of the derivation of families 
and dependencies which go back to the first cop­
ies or the original, one can aim at no more than 
a critical text which comes vei^ close to the 
original laid down by Vitoria.
Thus, whether one accepts the theory of the oral transmission or that of 
the written transmission, there is no way of knowing by just how much or 
how little the text as we read it today differs from the original.
How does one, for example, react to the fact that Vitoria's relec-
32 ,,tiones are incomplete? Does one agree with Urdanoz, who debits this
defect entirely to Vitoria's account? "The anomaly of leaving unfinished
the theme of his compositions and solemn lectures", he writes, was "the
33usual way of proceeding on the part of Vitoria". Or does one base an 
explanation on the mode of transmission or on yet some other cause?
A third set of unresolved questions concerns the context within 
which Vitoria lived and worked. What was his relationship with the in­
stitutions of which he was a member - the Dominican Order, the univer­
sity, the Catholic church? There is no answer. What was the rapport be­
tween Vitoria and the Spanish Crown? The answer is inconclusive: Getino 
maintains that the King, Charles I, who at the same time was the Empe­
ror, Charles V, became increasingly ill-disposed towards Vitoria and,
34 /in the end, ordered the confiscation of his writings ; Urdanoz rejects 
this view.
Turning from institutions to individuals, the available informa­
tion does not become much more enlightening. The records reveal the 
names of two men - the Constable of Castile, Don Pedro Fernandez de Ve­
lasco, and the Dominican Provincial of Andalusia, Father Miguel de Ar- 
cos - who, scholars agree, were friends of Vitoria-^; but, for the rest, 
there is uncertainty. What, for example, was Vitoria's relationship to
30
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his brother Diego, also a Dominican? There is no answer. Or, to take 
another example, what was his relationship to Erasmus of Rotterdam? The 
answer is uncertain.
On Erasmus' side, the story sounds rather simple: Vitoria and Eras­
mus never met. Erasmus heard of Vitoria through the Spanish humanist
Luis Vives, on whose advice he wrote to Vitoria in 1527 to request the
37latter's support at the junta which was taking place that year at
Valladolid to discuss the orthodoxy of Erasmus' writings. No reply is
38known to have been received.
The story is more complex on Vitoria's side. It starts the same
way: Erasmus and Vitoria never met; but then it develops differently.
One source reports that, during his years in Paris, Vitoria expressed
"admiration" and "adoration" for Erasmus, and "defended" him more than
39once before numerous theologians. Another source, when referring to 
his stay in Paris, qualifies his "affection" and "admiration" for Eras­
mus by saying that he followed "the new trends" with "moderation and a 
critical spirit".^ Of Vitoria's participation in the j unta of Vallado­
lid in 1527 one source writes:
(Vitoria's) opinion was moderate; he disapproved 
of Erasmus' dogmatic affirmations concerning the 
Trinity and the divinity of the Word, but he con­
tinued nevertheless to consider him a good Catho­
lic.
Another source puts it this way:
His judgment is one of the most severe. In all of 
Erasmus' propositions, he finds the affirmation 
scandalous, temerarious and erroneous; distortions 
and calumnies, which favour heresy ... Neverthe­
less he tries to save ... the orthodox sense and 
intention of E^smus whom he regards in any case 
as a Catholic.
It is not known whether Vitoria received Erasmus' letter, and there 
seems to be no further reference to Erasmus on his part except for a 
comment contained in a lectio on St Thomas, to which the year 1534 has 
been assigned.^ It expresses disagreement with Erasmus.
The existing sources make it impossible to give any meaningful 
shape to the particular context within which Vitoria lived and worked - 
hence to use it as an explanatory tool, a device for throwing light on
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his life and the fate of his ideas. It is only when one looks at a more
general setting such as that, for example, provided by J.H. Elliott's
history of Imperial Spain: 1469 - 1716, that one finds clues which may
44point to an understanding. These lead one to ask: Were Vitoria and his 
ideas the victims of the Spanish Inquisition? - a question which has not 
been raised in the existing literature, and the sources do not provide 
an answer; yet it might explain why "(t)he men of his time permitted his 
writings to perish and forgot his tomb and his remains".^
Given the number and nature of questions that remain unresolved, it 
is possible to doubt that the twentieth century meets the same Vitoria 
as the sixteenth century - but the thinker whom this century encounters, 
even if he is no more than an imperfect copy of the original, has much 
to offer to those who pursue the idea of international society.
For the purposes of this inquiry, his ideas are presented in seven 
sections. These follow a similar order to those given in the preceding 
chapter, and they are based on the same reasons. Their number differs, 
as does the wording of some of the headings, reflecting the presence of 
differences in the two thinkers.
Section One, Vitoria and the Events of His Time, records some polit­
ical events of the first half of the sixteenth century and examines Vi­
toria's reaction to them; Section Two, Vitoria's Position within the 
Three Traditions of Thought, gives a preliminary delimitation of Vito­
ria's position in relation to realism and universalism; Section Three,
The Perfect Temporal Community, responds to the question of political 
plurality; the idea of that which links and circumscribes is given ex­
pression in Section Four, The Perfect Spiritual Community, and in Sec­
tion Five, The World as a Community of Perfect Communities; Section Six, 
The Question of War, presents Vitoria's idea of the just war; and Sec­
tion Seven, Moderation, captures another aspect of the idea of that 
which links and circumscribes.
1. Vitoria and the Events of His Time
This section, like its counterpart in the preceding chapter, notes some 
of the political events of the time - the emphasis is again on conflict 
rather than co-operation - and explores the question whether Vitoria, 
like Erasmus before him, may be regarded as a realistic observer.
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During the first half of the sixteenth century, the conflicts which 
engaged Spain’s material and intellectual resources abroad occurred 
mainly in three areas: Europe, North Africa and America. Of these, North 
Africa ranked least high on the list of priorities.
46After the completion of the reconquista of Spain in 1492, the
Spanish under Queen Isabella of Castile and her husband Ferdinand, King
of Aragon, did not pursue the Moors across the Straits into Africa, in
spite of the encouragement which they received from Pope Alexander VI,
a Spaniard. America and Italy engaged their attention. Only in 1509,
after the conclusion of the League of Cambrai^, did Spanish troops
cross the Mediterranean. They captured Oran, and occupied part of the
coast for about a year. The next twenty years were again characterized
by inactivity on the part of the Spanish, despite increasingly frequent
48raids of the Spanish coast by North African pirates. It required the 
seizure by pirates of Tunis, one of Spain’s Moorish vassalages, in 1534, 
for Charles I (V) to become active. In 1535 he recaptured Tunis, but 
did not stay to consolidate his position. The Duchy of Milan required 
his presence. A new expedition undertaken in 1541 against Algiers ended 
in failure and, during the remainder of the period under consideration, 
the Spanish made no further attempt to gain a firm hold over North Afri­
ca. As Elliott notes, first Ferdinand, and then Charles were "too pre­
occupied with other pressing problems to devote more than fitful atten-
49tion to the African front".
Spain’s involvement in European affairs is very much the story as 
told in the preceding chapter, with slight differences in emphasis.
The initiative for the conclusion of the alliance of Italian powers 
against the French in 1495 came from Ferdinand, King of Aragon. The 
French attempt to take up their claim to Naples was unsuccessful, and 
Naples became Spanish in 1504. In 1508 Ferdinand joined the side of the 
French in the League of Cambrai against Venice. The Holy League of 1511 
re-established the old adversaryship between the Spanish and the French, 
and in 1512 Ferdinand helped Pope Julius II to return the Medici to Flo­
rence .
The French throne changed its occupant in 1515, the Spanish thrones 
in 1516, and the Imperial throne followed in 1519. The new rulers con­
tinued the Italian policies of their predecessors, and war resumed in
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1521. The general who fought Charles' winning battles at Pavia (1525) 
and Landriano (1529) was a Spaniard, Antonio de Leiva. In 1530 Pope Cle­
ment VII crowned Charles with the Imperial crown and the crown of Italy 
at Bologna. R. Trevor Davies observes: "Charles, mainly by the help of 
his Spanish kingdoms, had now reached the height of his power".50 The 
meeting at Bologna of emperor and pope is also seen as the moment when 
"Spain definitely became antagonistic to the humanists".5^
In 1532 Charles I (V) led six thousand Spanish soldiers to Central 
Europe to fight the Turks. In 1536 Francis I and the emperor were at 
war over the Duchy of Milan. It ended in a truce mediated by Pope Paul 
III, but hostilities resumed in 1541. Henry VIII became Charles' ally, 
and Francis I was supported by Suleiman the Magnificent. A peace was 
signed in 1544. Two years later, Francis I died and Charles V, accompa­
nied by Spanish troops, met the Lutherans at Landshut in South Germany. 
It was the year when Vitoria is said to have died.
The discovery of America and the first fifty years of its conquest 
by Spain represent a story rich in conflict. For the purposes of this 
chapter, a few excerpts must suffice.
The discovery of the New World in 1492 by the Genoese Christopher
Columbus was followed, in 1493, by Pope Alexander Vi's famous donation:
52the Bull Inter Cetera appointed the Spanish kings and their succes­
sors "the lords of the islands and mainland discovered or to be dis- 
53covered". The papal grant did not mention coercion or war but, as 
Benno Biermann points out, "everywhere the advancing Spaniard employed 
force, subjugated the Indians, and treated them as rebels if they of­
fered resistance".5^
According to Lewis Hanke, the first discussion of "the basis for 
Spanish rule in America and the right of Spaniards to profit from Indi­
an labor" took place in Spain in 1503.55 It resulted in the decision 
that "the Indians should serve the Spaniards and that this was in ac­
cordance with law, human and divine".50 The Dominican Antonio de Monte- 
sinos is credited with raising the first public protest in America. In 
1511 he asked on the island of Hispaniola:
Tell me, by what right or justice do you keep 
these Indians in such a cruel and horrible ser­
vitude? On what authority have you waged a de-
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testable war against these people, who dw^t 
quietly and peacefully on their own land?
One answer consisted in the Laws of Burgos, promulgated in Spain in 
581512/1513 ; another came by way of two treatises - Concerning the Rule
of the King of Spain over the Indies by Matias de Paz (1512) and On the 
Ocean Isles by Juan Lopez de Palacios Rubios (1512) - both of which 
agreed that the just title of Spain to the Indies rested on Pope Alexan­
der Vi’s grant^^; a third answer was the requerimiento, a document com­
posed by Palacios Rubios in 1513, which required the Indians to acknowl­
edge the Church as the ruler of the world and in its place the Spanish
60kings, and to allow the Christian religion to be preached.
The conquest spread and the debate about its justice continued. In 
1519 Bartolome de Las Casas confronted Charles, King and Emperor, at an 
audience in Barcelona with the following words: ”1 am one of the first 
who passed over to the Indies, and I have been there many years. In 
those years I have seen with my own eyes the greatest cruelties done
/: I A O
...". The Council of the Indies was established in 1524 , but the na-
63ture of the conquest did not change.
The papal Bull Sublimis Deus^ appeared in 1537. Pope Paul III de­
creed that "the said Indians ..., though they be outside the faith of 
Christ, must not be deprived of their liberty or ownership of their pos­
sessions". He further ruled that the Indians "must be invited to receive
the said faith of Christ with the preaching of the word of God and with
65the examples of a good life". In 1542 the New Laws were promulgated, 
to be partly revoked three years later.^
In subsequent years there was no change in either Spanish conduct 
67in America or the intensity with which it was debated. The junta sum­
moned by Charles I (V) met at Valladolid in 1550 - 51 "to inquire into 
and establish the manner and the laws by which our Holy Catholic faith 
can be preached and promulgated in that New World"; and to examine "in 
what form those peoples may remain subject to His Majesty the Emperor
without injury to his royal conscience, according to the Bull of Pope
68 *Alexander". The protagonists were Las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepulve-
69da. The debate ended inconclusively.
Vitoria's formal writings, his lectiones and relectiones, refer to 
the conflicts of his time, but they do not often reveal how realistic an
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observer he is.
Regarding Spain's relationship with North Africa, for example, he
says:
(I)f great spiritual injury to Africa should re­
sult from the civil administration of the Spanish 
State, the Spanish prince would b^bound to cor­
rect that form of administration.
References to Spanish involvement in European affairs take the follow­
ing form:
If, for example, the Spanish should undertake 
against the French a war which, in other respects, 
was just, and which was, besides, advantageous to 
the Spanish kingdom, but which involved Christen­
dom as a whole in still greater harm and loss 
(suppose, for instance, that the Turks in the 
meantime take possession of Christian provinces), ^  
then the Spanish should cease from waging that war.
The conquest of America figures prominently in his formal writings, but 
again the argument often takes the formula 'if ... then'. For example:
If any of the native converts to Christianity be 
subjected to force or fear by their princes in 
order to make them return to idolatry, this would 
justify the Spani^ds, should other methods fail, 
in making war ...
Vitoria's conditional arguments do not reveal the extent of his knowl­
edge and understanding of what is the case. Their truth or falsity de­
pend on their internal logic and not on the assumptions underlying them. 
These may be true or false. In his famous debate with Sepulveda in 1550 
- 51 Las Casas made the following statement:
Sepulveda, as c^arly appears from the Latin text 
of his Apologia , cited the most learned Francis­
co de Vitoria in support of his doctrine, saying 
that Vitoria approved of wa^against the Indians. 
The leader of the two parts of the first Relec- 
cion can easily satisfy himself that Vitoria 
(1) proposed in the first part seven titles which 
might appear to justify war against the Indians 
and roundly refuted them; (2) cited in the second 
part titles all or part of which might justify the 
transfer of jurisdiction over the Indians to the 
Spaniards. Now, as concerns the Indians he makes 
certain assumptions that for the most part are com-
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pletely false ...
It is true that Vitoria’s assumptions in the "second" part of the relec- 
tio do not reflect reality, but this does not necessarily mean, nor 
does Las Casas say that it means, that Vitoria does not know better.
However, there are instances in Vitoria’s formal writings, includ­
ing the relectio "On the Indians", which may be read as realistic ap­
praisals of what is the case. To give two examples:
(T)he true state of the case is that (the Indian 
aborigines) are not of unsound mind, but have, 
according to their kind, the use of reason ... 
(T)here is a certain method in their affairs, for 
they have polities which are orderly arranged and 
they have definite marriage and magistrates, over- 
lords, laws, and workshops, and a system of ex­
change, all of which call for the i^e of reason; 
they also have a kind of religion.
Or:
It is not sufficiently clear to me that the Chris­
tian faith has yet been so put before the aborigi­
nes and announced to them that they are bound to 
believe it ... I hear of mai^ g scandals and cruel 
crimes and acts of impiety.
A much clearer picture emerges when one turns to Vitoria’s informal 
writings, his letters. Not many have survived, and not all of these are 
intact, but they project a man who is in touch with events and discern­
ing when assessing a situation.
There are, for example, his two letters to the Constable of Cas­
tile, probably written in 1536. Vitoria begins the first by saying: "We 
were already informed of the fact that Your Excellency had departed for
the Queen’s Court, since the Count of Siruela had written to me to that 
79effect" ; and later he mentions: "I saw a letter, written from the
80 81field of battle, and declaring that Antonio Leiva met his death".
The second letter has the opening paragraph: "The news I send your Ex­
cellency from Salamanca must needs by slight, since you yourself are at
82the source of all news" ; and a comment on the situation in Europe:
I realize that conditions are unfavourable ..., 
but if it were possible to find some means of ef­
fecting a compromise between His Majesty ... and 
the King of France, that achievement would seem
86
to me even more auspicious than the conquest of 
Tunis ... (L)et honest men say whether our wars 
promote the well-being of Spain, France, Italy, or 
Germany, or whether such wars tend to destroy all 
these nations^and so swell the numbers of Moors 
and heretics.
Regarding the situation in America, there exists a letter, probably of 
1534, to the Dominican Provincial of Andalusia, which discloses Vitori­
a ’s knowledge and understanding:
(I) am no longer startled or shocked by any of the 
questions which come to my attention with tbe ex­
ception of benefices held through trickery, and 
events in the Indies, at the mention of which my 
blood runs cold ...
First of all, I do not understand the justice of 
that war; I do not indeed dispute the fact that the 
Emperor can conquer the Indies which, strictly 
speaking, I suppose he can do. But, according to 
what I have heard from the very persons who took 
part in the recent battle with Tabalipa, never had 
either Tabalipa or his people done any injury to the 
Christians, or other thing on account of which war 
should be made ... And I believe that the other con­
quests since then have been more despicable ...
And although the Emperor may have just titles to 
conquer them, the Indians do not know it nor can 
they know it; and therefore they mostg^ruly are in­
nocent as far as it concerns the war.
The available evidence, then, permits two conclusions: (i) the 
events of his time figure in Vitoria’s writings and sometimes prominent­
ly; (ii) his statements concerning them, at times, reveal his position; 
at other times, they do not. When his position is disclosed, it appears 
as that of a realistic observer - a finding with which the words of his 
contemporary, the chronicler of the convent of San Esteban, may be read 
to agree ; when his position remains hidden, the speculative mind is 
tempted to search for reasons why he opts for this form of argument.
2. Vitoria’s Position within the Three Traditions of Thought
The study of Vitoria's writings indicates that it is his thought as a 
whole rather than any particular work or idea which excludes him from 
universalism and realism, and identifies him as a thinker of the via 
media. For this reason, it seems preferable not to try to delimit his 
position in this section but to permit it to crystallize in the course 
of the chapter as a whole and, at this stage, to offer no more than a
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few introductory observations.
As far as the realist way of thinking is concerned, there is no 
sign in his formal and informal writings that Vitoria has heard of or 
read his near-contemporary Machiavelli, and these same writings, unlike 
those of Eramus, contain no evidence that an explicit rejection or dis­
section of realist thinking is one of his concerns.
The same cannot be said of universalism and, by way of introduc­
tion, this section presents one of his ideas on the subject, namely the 
proposition that there is no universal temporal ruler now, nor was 
there in the past. Vitoria advances it in the context of his relectio 
M0n the Indians" against those who claim that the Spaniards, when they 
first travelled to the New World, "took with them a right" to occupy 
the lands of the Indians; and he uses it in the relectio "Concerning 
the Power of the Church" (One), as part of his attempt to define the
extent of spiritual power. In the former, he develops his ideas in re-
86lation to emperor and pope ; in the latter, he limits himself to dis-
87cussing papal claims.
To abstract from a complex argument:
Vitoria sets out with the statement that "(t)he Emperor is not the
88lord of the whole earth" , and the proofs which he offers come from na­
tural law, divine law, and human law. His main authority regarding na­
tural law is St Thomas:
(B)y natural law mankind is free save from pater­
nal and marital dominion ...; therefore g^ one by 
natural law has dominion over the world.
Regarding divine law, he looks back into history and, supported by nume­
rous references to the Scriptures, concludes that "before the coming of
Christ no one was vested with world-wide sway by divine law" and the
90same is true of the time which followed "our Lord’s coming". He dismis­
ses the relevance of human law in the following way:
(I)t is manifest that the Emperor is not the lord 
of the world, because either this would be by the 
sole authority of some law, and there is none such; 
or, if there were, it would be void of ^|fect, in­
asmuch as law presupposes jurisdiction.
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And, without appealing to any specific authorities, he concludes this 
line of reasoning by saying:
Nor ... had the Emperor this position by lawful 
succession or by gift or by exchange or by pur­
chase or by just war or by election or by any 
other legal title, as is admitted. Therefore the 
Emperor never was the lord of the whole world.
At the other level of discourse, Vitoria argues that it Mis indu­
bitably and manifestly false" to say, as many jurisconsults do, that:
(T)he Pope is lord of the world in the strictly 
temporal sense; and that he possesses a temporal 
authority and power of jurisdiction throughout 
the world and over all princes.
This, he believes, is "merely a fabrication intended as flattery and
94adulation for the Popes . In support of his opinion, he names several
authorities: the Scriptures, St Bernard and St Thomas; the jurisconsults
95Joannes Andreae and Hugo. He mentions historical "facts" such as "do­
minion over certain lands" had been granted to the pope by the emperor;
96the pope has never had temporal power over the lands of the infidels ;
and "the Pope himself has never recognized the existence of the power in 
97question". Had not Innocent clearly said that he had "no power over
98the Kingdom of France in temporal matters"? And he points to the three 
systems of law:
(N)o lordship can come to (the Pope) save either 
by natural law or by divine law or by human law.
Now, it is certain that none comes to him by na­
tural or by human law^and none is shown to come 
to him by divine law.
The pope, Vitoria is certain, is not lord of the world in temporal mat­
ters; nor is he lord of the world in spiritual matters, and Vitoria 
knows that even his opponents agree with him on this point, for the 
pope has "no spiritual jurisdiction over unbelievers".^^ His authority 
is the Scriptures.
According to Vitoria, then, the past has known of no universal 
ruler nor does the present. Whether there ought to be one in the future, 
he does not say.
With these preliminary points in mind, it is time to meet one of
89
Vitoria's key concepts: the perfect temporal community.
3. The Perfect Temporal Community
Vitoria offers two approaches to the idea of the perfect temporal com­
munity. One is direct and swift, inspired by Aristotle:
(A) State^"*- is properly called a perfect commu­
nity ... A perfect State or community ... is one 
which is complete in itself, that is, which is 
not a part of another community, but has its own 
lawsnand its own council and its own magistrates
As examples, he cites the kingdom of Castile, the kingdom of Aragon and
the Republic of Venice, adding that "there is no obstacle to many prin-
103cipalities and perfect States being under one prince". A similar def­
inition is given when he quotes Tommaso de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan:
(0)ne applies the term state (to a given group), 
not because it has one head, but because it is a 
perfect state, not part of another state; and be­
cause it does not conduct its affairs^^ conjunc­
tion with any other state whatsoever.
The above definition is accompanied by his remark that "(t)his holds 
true, moreover, regardless whether or not (that group) has a superi­
or". The example he gives is the Duke of Milan who is subject to the
emperor. "(N)evertheless, (the state of Milan is) perfect and does not
106share its being with any other state".
The other approach is more winding, and awkward, consisting of sev­
eral steps, but is also more instructive of Vitoria's t h i n k i n g . I t  
follows authorities such as Aristotle, the Scriptures, Cicero, St Augus­
tine and St Thomas.
The first step consists in proving that:
States and commonwealths had not their fount and 
origin in the invention of man, nor in any arti­
ficial manner, but sprang, as it were, from Nature, 
who (sic) produced IjiJ^ s method of protecting and 
preserving mortals.
Vitoria arrives there by arguing that man needs society, not only be­
cause nature has made him "frail, weak and needy", but also because it has
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given him "reason and virtue":
And truly the will, whose chief ornaments are jus­
tice and friendship, would of necessity be entire­
ly deformed and ... crippled, if it were separated 
from human society: justice, indeed, cannot be 
practiced except by th^^ultitude; and the same is 
true of friendship ...
Agreeing with his sources, he holds that of all societies, civil socie­
ty best meets man's needs and hence it is "an exceedingly natural form 
of intercommunication".'*'^
In the second part of his argument, he is concerned to show that
112society for its continued existence needs a force or power to main­
tain and direct it. As he puts it:
(I)f all were equal, and subject to no power, each 
individual would draw away from the others in ac­
cordance with his own opinions and will; the common­
wealth would of necessity be^tj^rn apart; and the 
State would be dissolved ...
Given that society has its origin in natural law, of which God is 
the author, it follows that the power without which society cannot con­
tinue to exist must also derive from that source. This is the proposi­
tion which he advances as the third step in his argument:
If, then, God created for men such a necessity and 
inclination that they cannot subsist except in a 
social state and under some ruling power, it must 
be true that these very conditions are also derived 
from God.
In the fourth part, Vitoria gives the power which is necessary for 
the continued existence of society its home. It resides, he says, in so­
ciety itself. His proof runs as follows:
(S)ince by natural and divine law there must be a 
power for the government of the State, and since 
- if common, positive, and human laws are laid a- 
side - there is no reason for depositing that 
power in one person rather than in another; it 
necessarily follows that the community is self- 
suffi^^g and that it has the power to govern it­
self .
Here, then, the idea of the perfect community is met with again. This 
time it means that a community or state is perfect if the force or power
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which directs it inheres in the community or state itself.
Thinking about the two definitions, one readily finds a correspond­
ence between them: the quality of being self-sufficient or perfect at 
one level - the community's power, authority or right to govern itself 
- expresses or reflects itself in the same quality at the other level - 
the community's laws and institutions. Also, the needs which a particu­
lar community experiences express or reflect themselves in its laws and 
institutions.
To stay with the concept of the perfect temporal community for a 
little longer:
According to Vitoria, the perfect community does not itself exer­
cise the power inherent in itself, but entrusts it to "some person or 
persons" and "it matters not whether (it) is entrusted to one or to 
many". It means that the perfect community can adopt the form of 
government "it desires, even if this be not the best form".117 It can 
choose between the rule of one, of a few, or of many; it also can opt 
for a combination of these. "The best rule" is the rule of one ; "the 
safest rule", however, is a mixture of the t h r e e . A n d  there is no 
need for the community to be unanimous, "the act of the greater part" 
being "the act of the whole". However, it does not have the authority
to dispense with government altogether: "(T)he agreement would be null
121and void, being contrary to natural law".
He who is entrusted with the administration of a perfect community 
"is obliged to procure the temporal good of the community". Vitoria 
offers no definition or description of the temporal good, but his writ­
ings leave no doubt that the most basic value or purpose to be secured 
by the prince is the life or survival of the community. In Vitoria's 
words, the state must be guarded "against injury from its own citizens 
or from aliens". This means that, in the internal context, the prince 
is entitled to punish transgressors of the law and, as far as external 
relations are concerned, he has the right to go to war - to defend the 
community and to avenge a wrong received.1^  The explanation which Vi­
toria gives is this: "It is ... imperative for the due ordering of human
125affairs that this authority be allowed to States".
There is equally no doubt that the most elevated value or purpose
of the perfect community is "natural felicity" or "human well-being". 126
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For the prince, this goal means that, within his own realm, the exer-
127cise of virtue must be made possible ; and, beyond his community, the 
prince is entitled to intervene in other communities if innocent people 
suffer there.
Between life and survival on the one hand, and natural felicity or 
human well-being on the other, there exist other values. Vitoria espe­
cially mentions peace and unity. It is important for the prince to en­
sure harmony amongst the citizens and if conflict cannot be avoided,
that it be resolved peacefully. As he observes: "(U)nity is such a great
129good that, without it, the community cannot subsist". Yet there are
limits to peace and unity. "Sometimes, it is necessary to disturb the
130tranquillity of the state". When it is faced with the rule of a ty-
131rant, "the concord of its citizens may be fatal". Another example 
mentioned by Vitoria at this level of values is the imposition of reli­
gious uniformity. The coexistence of different religions within one corn-
132munity, he holds, may cause less strain than enforced unanimity. Re­
garding the world beyond his realm the prince should strive to "live in
peace with all men ... (0)nly under compulsion and reluctantly should he
* . _ „  133come to the necessity of war .
The prince’s obligation to pursue the temporal good of the commu­
nity is no other than his obligation to be just in the exercise of power, 
and just means to be mindful not only of what is lawful but also of what 
creates and conserves f e l i c i t y . I n  less abstract language, Vitoria
holds that the prince must rule in accordance with existing laws, for
135"(t)he law must consider the common good". It is for this reason that
a prince who has been entrusted with the administration of more than one
perfect temporal community is obliged to rule each one according to its
own laws. G.R. Elton’s comment is relevant here, namely: "The point
about the rule of law was not that it made puppets of kings but that it
137prevented strong kingship from deteriorating into despotism".
The perfect temporal community is not only an old institution -
according to Vitoria "the world was certainly divided after Noah into
different provinces and kingdoms ... (T)hrough the descendants of Noah
... sovereignty and lordship began in the world ..." ; it also is
ubiquitous. Using St Paul as his authority, he asserts: "(A)mongst the
139unbelievers there is complete temporal and civil authority ...’’. 
"Indeed, it should not be a matter of any doubt", the idea returns,
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"that legitimate princes and lords exist among the heathen . For
him, there is no doubt. A plurality of political entities is not only a 
fact, but, as the following statement reveals, it is also an extremely 
pleasing fact, for, reminding his audience of Cicero's reference to Sci~ 
pio's words, he says: "(N)othing is more acceptable in the sight of God 
... than are those groups called States .
In addition to its temporal power the perfect community has spir-
142itual power over itself, and this by natural law. It is an aspect 
which Vitoria does not discuss in a general way, perhaps because he be­
lieves that, although spiritual power has been possessed by all perfect 
communities at all times, perfect spiritual power has come into exist­
ence only with Christ and now exists only where there are Christians - 
an idea which underlies his thinking about another perfect community, 
the perfect spiritual community, to be presented in the next section.
4. The Perfect Spiritual Community
All those perfect temporal communities which have adopted the Christian
religion and all Christians who live in non-Christian perfect temporal
communities form a community in their turn. Vitoria variously refers to
this community as the Christian church, the Christian community, the 
14-3Christian state. "(T)he Church as a whole is, so to speak, a State 
and one body . It is perfect because it is complete in itself.
It is spiritual because the end which it pursues - ultimate or eternal 
felicity - is spiritual. He posits its existence when he discusses 
Christian spiritual power and its relation to Christian temporal power. 
His argument, which he sees as following a middle course - "(b)ut we", 
he says, "tempering the force of the two conflicting opinions"'*'^ - en­
lists support mainly from the Scriptures, Aristotle, Pope Innocent III, 
St Thomas, Torquemada and Cajetan.
Spiritual power, Vitoria declares in his relectio "On the Power of 
the Church" (One), is as old as temporal power and has existed since the 
beginning. Proof of this is man's nature: man consists of body and soul; 
therefore it is natural for him to worship God "not only with his soul 
and insight, but also with material and external acts Given
that natural inclination on the part of man, it is necessary to give it 
direction:
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But just as it is necessary in the state that the 
acts of men strive after a human end and that 
there be someone who orders and (someone) who 
obeys, so it is necessary that there be somebody 
who ... takes it upon himself to direct men to a 
supernatural end in order that his acts be guided 
to this same end. And as precisely in this con­
sists spiritual power, it follows^^at it must 
have existed since the beginning.
Vitoria pursues the fortunes of spiritual power through the ages of na­
tural law and written (old) law^^ to arrive at the conclusion:
(T)he proper and perfect spiritual power which 
consists in the keys to the kingdom of the heav­
ens neverQexisted ... before the coming of ... 
Christ.
The power to open or close the heavens, to give or refuse to give eter­
nal life, is "more excellent" than any other spiritual power. It is 
true, he says, that the Indians have priests, but they are "certainly 
false ones"^^; it also is true that the Turks have a religion - he 
calls it a sect - but it consists of no more than "tales and mere tri- 
fles".151
Not only is Christian spiritual power "more excellent" than the 
spiritual power which resides in non-Christian perfect communities, it 
also is "more eminent" than the temporal power which exists in Christi­
an perfect temporal communities. This latter idea appears mainly in two 
of his relectiones, "On the Power of the Church" (One) and "On the Indi-
To begin with, Vitoria does not doubt either that "temporal power
152existed before "the advent of Christ" or that it would continue to
153exist even "if there were no state of supernatural blessedness" , for 
"civil power is complete and perfect in itself But he is cer­
tain that ultimate felicity does exist and also that temporal power is 
not equipped to secure it:
Civil government is not sufficient to elevate men 
to eternal salvation; neither are civil virtue 
nor goodness sufficient for eternal life^^or a- 
part from other things, faith is needed.
It requires a separate power to administer spiritual things. Of the many 
opinions which he cites in support of this view, one is St Gregory’s:
"(T)he government over souls is the art of all the arts", 
which is reminiscent of Erasmus, he writes:
In a way
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As divine law is the norm of ecclesiastical pow­
er, and the temporal princes do not have divine 
law as their law ... it must be the pontiffs and 
other prelates ... who govern sacred things. This 
is confirmed by considering that one man could 
not administer those two offices nor acquire two 
branches of knowledge necessary to rule tem­
poral and ecclesiastical communities ...
He accords no equality to the two powers in question:
(T)he purpose of spiritual power excels that of 
temporal power to the same extent that perfect 
blessedness and ultimate felicity excel human or 
earthly felicity.
The inferior, temporal power is separate from the superior, spiritual
power, and yet the former is in a certain way linked to the latter. It
would be wrong to assume, he holds, that "civil and spiritual power are
like two distinct and separate States" such as, for example, the French 
, 159and the English. The truth rather is that:
(I)n the Christian State, all offices, ends, and 
powers are properly subordinated and connected 
... (T)he tem^g^al members serve those which are 
spiritual .. .
161The relationship is one of "dependence and subordination" , and it
162holds even if it proves detrimental to temporal power.
According to Vitoria, spiritual power does not reside in the whole 
community in the way in which temporal power does, but "in certain per­
sons 163 His writings make it difficult to say anything with certainty
about his position in "that hateful comparison between pope and coun­
cil„164 but they do permit the conclusion that it is his view that
"the Pope is sovereign with respect to all ecclesiastical power ...". 165
Not being a temporal prince, the pope has "no power which tends to 
166a temporal end". It means, for example, that he is not entitled to 
set up or depose temporal princes, to judge in disputes between tempo­
ral princes or to intervene in questions of law relating to temporal 
167matters. However, if spiritual interests are at stake, the pope has 
"the most ample temporal power" over all Christian princes, kings, and
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«, 168 the emperor.
(T)he spiritual State - like the temporal State - 
must be perfect and, consequently, self-suffi­
cient; and a temporal State has this right, name­
ly, that when it cannot in any other way preserve 
itself from injury and harm, it may exercise juris­
diction and authority over a foreign province ... 
and therefore, if spiritual power were not in any 
other way able to preserve the spiritual State from 
harm, it could, on its own authority, perform all 
the acts ... that might be necessary to its safety; 
otherwise, spiritual power would be a cripple, and^^ 
insufficiently prepared to attain its natural end.
That is, in case of necessity - Vitoria insists on this condition, for
''otherwise the office of prince would cease to exist - the pope has,
by virtue of his spiritual power, the temporal power to do all the
things which temporal princes do and more. He could, for example, oblige
Christians to elect one monarch, should "the existence of one monarch be
"expedient to the defence and propagation of the Christian faith"^S
entrust the spreading of the Christian religion to one Christian ruler
rather than to another; permit trade with a non-Christian country to one
172Christian people rather than to another ; or give a Christian prince
173to a pagan people converted to Christianity. The temporal power of 
the pope in case of necessity is extensive; but it does not include the 
right to dissolve Christian perfect temporal communities.
Vitoria raises the question whether the temporal power of the 
Church "to preserve and protect itself"*^ should be exercised directly 
or only indirectly, and his reply is that the pope "should first avail 
himself of his spiritual power" , that is to say, he should use per­
suasion and command before resorting to the direct exercise of temporal 
power, for he "should not and cannot usurp civil power, except in cases 
of necessity";
(I)n order that a given act may fittingly be per­
formed by the Pope, it does not suffice that the 
act in question should be necessary, in a general 
sense, to the attainment of spiritual ends; on the 
contrary, the particular case involved should also 
be one of necessity; that is, a^gse in which civ­
il power ceases to function ...
Thus, the perfect spiritual community which he delimits by describ-
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ing Christian spiritual power and its relation to Christian temporal 
power is based on a dual obligation: on the part of Christian temporal 
power to further and, if necessary, to serve the interests of Christian 
spiritual power; on the part of Christian spiritual power to respect 
the separateness of Christian temporal power and to limit interference 
with it to cases of necessity.
5. The World as a Community of Perfect Communities
Vitoria’s writings contain the idea of a third community, that of the
whole world. It does not become clearly visible when one looks at the
general statements he makes about it. These indeed tend to mystify
rather than explain it. For example, in "Concerning Civil Power" he
says: "(T)he world as a whole, being in a way one single State
in "On the Law of War" he refers to its "end and aim and good" and iden-
178tifies it as "a condition of happiness". Again, in "Concerning Civil
Power" the world as a whole is accredited with the power "to create laws
that are just and fitting for all" ; in "On the Law of War" it is
given the power "to deter wrongdoers and prevent them from injuring the
180good and innocent", and this through the instrumentality of princes. 
Vitoria’s third community, upon which he never confers the attribute of 
being perfect, rather takes on shape when one examines his thought on 
(a) the laws which direct relations within it and (b) the rights and ob­
ligations which derive from these laws.
(a) According to Vitoria the world as a whole is made up of perfect
temporal communities or, as he puts it, "one nation is a part of the
181whole world" , and intercommunication within it, that is amongst its 
component parts, in peace and in war, is based on two laws: natural law 
and the law of nations. He offers a definition for both, but the dis­
tinction remains blurred.
As for natural law, Vitoria, following St Thomas, postulates that
"in general, natural law is well defined when one says that it is neces-
182sary law". By necessary he means a law which is independent of the
human will: God is its author; hence it is just and binding. Although it
183is of divine origin, it does not reach beyond the natural order.
He further postulates that the necessary has degrees and, in agree­
ment with St Thomas, he distinguishes three such degrees:
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i. All that which by natural light is evident­
ly known to all as just and in accordance 
with right reason, and its opposite as un­
just, is called natural law.
ii. All that which one infers and deduces with 
sound logic from naturally evident princi­
ples, is also natural law.
iii. All that which one deduces by means of a 
moral conclusion, mor^^y known, is very 
probably natural law.
Urdanoz illuminates Vitoria’s rather cryptic language by referring to
the first level or degree as "first principles" of natural law; to the
second level as "precepts derived from these principles by direct and
evident conclusion"; and to the third level as "indirect conclusions
185from the natural principles by way of a more distant sequence".
As Vitoria points out under (i) above, natural law is known to man 
through "natural light", that is, natural reason; and his threefold di­
vision suggests that not all of natural law may be equally easily know- 
able. In fact, as the following excerpts show, he allows for the possi­
bility that not all know it and that, when it is not known, it may be 
difficult to prove.
From "On Temperance":
(F)urthermore, one ... cannot demonstrate with 
evidence all the things wh^ gji belong to natural 
law at least to every one.
From "On the Indians":
(I)t is not every sin against the law of nature 
that can be c^g^rly shown to be such, at any rate 
to every one.
Further, what is it that the writers in question 
call a profession of the law of nature? If it is 
mere knowledge, they do not know it all ... Fur­
ther, we certainly possess clearer proofs where­
by to demonstrate that the law of Christ is from 
God and is true than to demonstrate that ... 
things which aygg... forbidden by natural law are 
to be shunned.
It is possible, Vitoria submits in "On the Indians", that ignorance of 
the law of nature is invincible; consequently, it also is possible that
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a war may be just on both sides. His reasoning is this: on one side
189there may be "right" and on the other "invincible ignorance".
Turning to his definition of the law of nations, one meets with 
ambiguity.
In a lectio, part of which is entitled "On the Law of Nations and 
Natural Law", Vitoria asks whether the law of nations is positive or na­
tural law, drawing attention to the ongoing debate between theologians 
and jurisconsults regarding this: the former, including St Isidore of
Seville and St Thomas, he points out, tend to argue that the law of na-
190tions "is more contained under positive than under natural law" ,
whereas the latter hold that "the ius gentium falls under natural 
191law". In this lectio, he sides with the theologians. The law of na­
tions, he says, unlike the law of nature, is "only relatively good". It
does not have "equity of itself, from its own nature, but was estab-
192lished as inviolable, from agreement among men". He distinguishes be­
tween a law of nations resulting from "private agreement" and one from 
"public agreement", and identifies the latter as being "from the common 
consensus of all peoples and nations". He does not raise the question 
whether it is possible that a people or nation does not know the law of 
nations; what he asks is whether it is a sin to violate the law of na­
tions, given that "it is of the positive law", and his answer is that 
"it is always illicit to violate the ius gentium, because it is contrary 
to the common consensus". He also asks whether the law of nations can
be abrogated, and his reply is: never the whole of it, for "it is impos­
sible that the consensus of the whole world could be obtained for the
195abrogation of the law of nations" ; only in part may it be abrogated.
Vitoria's possibly most famous statement on the law of nations as
positive law - James Brown Scott devotes a paper to it in the course of
196which he quotes it three times - is contained in "Concerning Civil 
Power" (unfortunately the term jus gentium is translated as "interna­
tional law"):
(I)nternational law has not only the force of a 
pact and agreement among men, but also the force 
of a law; for the world as a whole, being in a 
way one single State, has the power to create laws 
that are just and fitting for all^ -97^  as are the 
rules of international law. Consequently, it is 
clear that they who violate these international
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rules, whether in peace or in war, commit a mortal 
sin; moreover, in the gravest matters, such as the 
inviolability of ambassadors, it is not permissi­
ble for one country to refuse to be bound by inter­
national law, the latter having b ^ g  established by 
the authority of the whole world.
In his later relectio M0n the Indians" Vitoria seems to be on the
side of the jurisconsults, for he offers a very different definition of
the law of nations. Here he says: "(T)he law of nations ... either is
199natural law or is derived from natural law". And he adds the sen­
tence which, for Nys and others, is the main reason for crediting him 
with the distinction of being "the founder of the modern science of in­
ternational law"^^, namely: "What natural reason has established among 
all nations is called the ius gentium". Two pages further on, he af­
firms the link between the law of nations and natural law when he states 
that the law of nations, "because it has a sufficient derivation from
natural law, is clearly capable of conferring rights and creating obli-„ 202 gations .
Vitoria offers no explanation why he should have changed from view­
ing the law of nations as positive law to presenting it as identical 
with, or derived from, natural law. And a doubt remains where he ulti­
mately stands in the debate, for, in the same relectio, when referring 
to the binding force of the law of nations, he says:
(E)ven if we grant that it is not always derived 
from natural law, yet there exists clearly enough 
a consensus of the greater part of the whole 
worlc^2esPecial-ly in behalf of the common good of 
all.
Perhaps there is no need for an explanation. In "On the Law of Na­
tions and Natural Law", he dismisses the dispute between theologians 
and jurisconsults as one "of words", concerning "the name rather than
the thing", and expresses the view that "one may speak as a theologian
204or as a jurisconsult", the important point being a moral one , and in 
relation to this, as all his writings show, he never changes his posi­
tion, which is that it is always illicit to violate a law - be it of 
divine or human origin.
(b) The law of nations - whether it be positive or natural law - 
is the source of the rights and obligations which Vitoria ascribes to
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all perfect temporal communities, Christian and non-Christian alike, in 
their relations with one another. His ideas on this subject are con­
tained mainly in two of his relectiones, "On the Indians" and "On the 
Law of War", but they are not confined to these. In the former, to be 
discussed in this section, he formulates his argument in relation to the 
encounter of a Christian people, the Spaniards, with non-Christian peo­
ples, the Indians of the New World, but he makes it clear that it ap­
plies equally to Christian perfect temporal communities in relation to 
one another; in "On the Law of War", to be discussed in the next sec­
tion, the setting for his ideas is the world of Christian perfect tem­
poral communities, but again it is evident from his argument that the 
world beyond it is included on equal terms.
In "On the Indians" Vitoria presents some of the rights in question 
in the negative form, and enlists for support of his argument sources 
such as the Scriptures, St Thomas, Torquemada and Cajetan.
To mention a few of these rights;
(i) He argues that, since the Indians have true dominion both pub­
licly and privately, just like Christians, the Spaniards have no right 
to deprive them of it on the grounds that the emperor, their king, is 
lord of the world, for the emperor never had lordship over the whole 
world and does not have it now.^^
(ii) Since the Indians have true dominion, the pope has no right to
declare the king of Spain sovereign over them on the grounds that he is
temporal lord of the world. The pope has no temporal power over the In-
206dians or other unbelievers, for he has no spiritual power over them.
(iii) Since the lands of the New World have true owners, there is no
right of discovery on the part of the Spaniards. "This title", Vitoria
holds, "gives no support to a seizure of the aborigines any more than
207if it had been they who had discovered us".
(iv) The Indians may refuse to accept the Christian religion; the
208Spaniards have no right to compel them to accept it.
(v) Although the Indians commit many sins "against nature", some 
"very heinous", the Spaniards have no right, even with the authorization 
of the pope, to compel them to desist from these or to punish them.
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"There are many sinners in every realm", and in these matters it is not 
for one prince or people to sit in judgment of another, Christian or 
non-Christian.
The above negative rights which he ascribes to Christian and non- 
Christian perfect communities alike correspond to the obligation, on 
the part of these same communities, to respect one another’s separate­
ness and independence. As he sees it, the division of the world, inher­
ited from a distant past, is by the mutual agreement of peoples, and it
210is proper that it should be defended.
Vitoria also identifies positive rights, and in support of his 
reading of the laws in question he cites mainly the Scriptures.
(i) He argues that the Spaniards have a right "to travel into the
lands in question and to sojourn there"; the obligation on their part
is "to do no harm" to the Indians; the latter’s obligation, in turn, is
211to honour the Spaniards' right :
(I)t would not be lawful for the French to prevent 
the Spanish from travelling ... in France, or vice 
versa-^2• • Therefore it is not lawful for the Indi­
ans .
(R)unning water and the sea are common to all, so 
are rivers and harbours, and by the law o^^ations 
ships from all parts may be moored there.
(ii) The Spaniards have a right to trade with the Indians; their 
obligation is to do no harm; and the Indians must accept the Spaniards’
right214
(I)t is certain that the aborigines can no more 
keep off the Spaniards from tr^ <jl^  than Christians 
can keep off other Christians.
(iii) The children born to Spaniards in a country of the New World
have a right to acquire the citizenship of that country; and the Indi-
. . . . 216ans cannot deny this right :
(A)s man is a civil animal, whoever is born in 
any one State is not a citizen of another State. 
Therefore, if he were not a citizen of the State 
referred to, he would not be a citizen of any 
State, to the prejudice of his righgj^under both 
natural law and the law of nations.
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(iv) The Spaniards have a right "to preach and declare" the Chris-
218tian religion to the Indians, and the latter may not hinder them , 
for:
(I)f the Spaniards have a right to travel and 
trade among the Indians, they teach the truth
to those willing to hear them.
(v) The Spaniards have a right to defend innocent people from ty­
rannical rulers and tyrannical laws; but the Indians sacrifice innocent 
people for cannibalistic purposes; hence the latter can be compelled 
to abstain from such "nefarious usage", and it is of no relevance that
"all the Indians assent to rules and sacrifices of this kind", for
220"herein they are not of such legal independence".
To the principle of separateness and independence, the principle
221of "natural society and fellowship" has been joined. Their coexist­
ence makes for the plurality, equality, and community which Vitoria as­
cribes to the world as a whole. As he understands it, it is not the in­
tention of peoples, by that division, to do away with mutual communica- 
222tion.
Evidence for this is the existence of a further positive right
which he mentions in a number of his writings, to wit: ambassadors have
223a right to be admitted, and are inviolable among all nations. He 
mentions it in preference to any other right when making the point that 
it is illicit to violate the law of nations. It is illicit because it 
creates inequality and injustice. As he formulates it in "On the Law of 
Nations and Natural Law":
(I )f one party sends ambassadors to make a peace 
and they are not violated, and the other party 
sends ambassadors too, and they are violated, 1^24 
follows that there is inequality and injustice.
Vitoria's idea of the world as a whole may be summed up as fol­
lows :
The world as a whole is mankind. It has been given a law - natural 
law, and it itself is the source of a law - the law of nations as posi­
tive (private) law.
Mankind is divided into perfect temporal communities. They, too, 
have been given a law - the law of nations as natural law, and they
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themselves are the source of a law - the law of nations as positive 
(public) law.
These laws are just and fitting, hence binding, for all.
The right to enforce them and punish violations of them is held by 
perfect temporal communities and their rulers - and this is by natural 
law, the law of nations, and the authority of the world as a whole.
There is no universal ruler or government, and there is no sugges­
tion that there should be one.
6. The Question of War
For Vitoria the question of war is the question of the just war, and he 
devotes much attention to it.
There are two kinds of war, he states at the opening of his relec- 
tio "On the Law of War", and also of his lectio "On War", and both of 
these may be just.
One is defensive war. As he sees it, any defensive war is just -
225by defensive he means "force employed to repel force" - and any com­
munity, irrespective of whether or not it enjoys the attribute of being
226perfect, may resort to it. For him, the right of self-defence is ob­
vious - natural law attests to its justice and so do "the written law" 
and "the Gospel law", St Augustine and St Thomas - and he allocates but 
little room to it.
The other is offensive war, and it is this second kind which ab­
sorbs his attention, for it is his view that the avoidance of "disorder
227in the world" may require a more effective means than defensive war.
"The peace and security" of the individual community and "the happiness
of the world" may not be secured if "all that a State (can) do when
enemies attack it unjustly (is) to ward off the attack ...**.228 ^  cites
St Augustine: "Those wars are described as just wars which are waged in
229order to avenge a wrong done ..." ; and he quotes St Thomas: "(F)or a
just war there must be a just cause, namely, they who are attacked ... 
must deserve the attack". He explicitly rejects as a just cause "dif­
ference of religion", "extension of empire", "the prince’s personal glo-
231ry or some other advantage to him" - terms which may be seen as
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232covering the negative rights mentioned above - and identifies his 
own position as:
There is a single and only just cause2^r commen­
cing a war, namely, a wrong received.
The right to declare and make war, that is, the right to commence 
a war, is reserved to the perfect temporal community or its ruler, for, 
as Vitoria sees it, if everybody had the right to be "the judge of his 
own cause", the world would be ungovernable. In fact, he considers 
this right to be one of the basic elements of the state's self-suffi­
ciency. As he puts it: "(A) State ought to be self-sufficient, and this
235it would not be, if it had not the faculty in question". He also 
sees it as a right conferred by the world as a whole:
(I)f a State can (inflict pains and penalties on 
its citizens who are dangerous to it), society at 
large no doubt can do it to all wicked and danger­
ous folk, and this can only be through the instru­
mentality of princes. It is, therefore, certain 
that prin^g can punish enemies who have done a 
wrong ...
Vitoria subjects the exercise of this right to a number of consid­
erations. The prince must be certain that that, which looks like a 
wrong, really is a wrong. This is not easily achieved:
For truth and justice in moral questions are hard 
of attainment and so any careless treatment of 
them easily leads to error, an error which will be 
inexcusable, especially in a concern of great mo­
ment, involving danger and calamity to many, and 
they our neighbour^-,*100» whom we are bound to 
love as ourselves.
Even if it is certain that a wrong has been committed, it is possible
that, at its source, there is "invincible ignorance"; or its nature may
be such that it does not justify the resort to war. There are kinds and
degrees of wrong, he holds, and the prince should not forget that "the
degree of the punishment ought to correspond to the measure of the of-
fence". Yet, even if the wrong is such that it would be lawful to go
to war, he advises the prince to avoid it if possible: "A wise man must
239make trial of everything by words before resorting to force ...".
Last but not least, he offers the following thought:
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(N)o war is just the conduct of which is manifest­
ly more harmful to the State than it is good and 
advantageous; and this is true regardless of any 
other claims or reasons that may be advanced to 
make of it a just war ... Nay more, since one na­
tion is a part of the whole world, and since the 
Christian province is a part of the whole Chris­
tian State, if any war should be advantageous to 
one province or nation but injurious to the world 
or to Christendom, it is my beli^^that, for this 
very reason, that war is unjust.
Thus, it is his view that a war which is just in itself ceases to be 
just if it is to the detriment of the prince’s own community or to that 
of Christendom or the world - contingencies which he also refers to as 
"collateral circumstances". If these apply, he has no doubt, the prince24i
is bound "to give up his own rights and abstain from war".
Vitoria distinguishes between (a) a wrong done to the prince’s own 
community and (b) a wrong done to others.
(a) When thinking about the kinds of wrong which entitle a prince 
to go to war when inflicted upon his own community, Vitoria sometimes 
expresses himself in a general way. Thus, he mentions "unjust at-
; or he refers to a situation where a community has failed "totack"242-
exact punishment for an offence committed by its citizens ... or to re-243
turn what has been wrongfully taken away". At other times, he is 
quite specific. Thus, the violation of the right to travel, the right 
to trade or the right to use that which is common to all, entails the 
right to go to war. As he puts it in "On the Indians":
(W)hen the Indians deny the Spaniards their rights 
under the law of nations they do them a wrong. 
Therefore, if it be necessary, in order to pre­
serve their right (sic), that2^ey should go to 
war, they may lawfully do so.
The right of ambassadors to be admitted is another specific example,
245the denial of which confers the right to go to war.
(b) When it concerns a wrong done to others, Vitoria distinguishes 
between (i) the cause of "allies and friends" and (ii) the cause of in­
nocent people.
(i) In agreement with Cajetan, he asserts that:
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(T)he cause of allies and friends is a just cause 
of war, a State being quite properly able, as 
against foreign wrongd^gs, to summon foreigners 
to punish its enemies.
Following this principle, he notes, it would be permissible for the 
Portuguese to help the Spaniards; for the Spaniards to defend the Duke 
of Milan against the French and for the Tlaxcaltecs to align themselves 
with the Spaniards against the Mexicans.
The same cause applies when Christians in non-Christian communi­
ties or under non-Christian rulers suffer on account of their religion. 
The right to render assistance in such circumstances is
(B)ased not only on religion, but on human friend­
ship and alliance, inasmuch as the native converts 
to Christianity have become friends and allies of 
Christians and we are under an obligation to do 
good unto all men, especially unto such as are of 
the household of faith.
Intervention in the above case may, if necessary, go as far as changing 
the ruler.
(ii) The right to go to war in response to a wrong done to others 
applies also in the absence of a link such as friendship or alliance. 
Vitoria permits intervention in a number of cases, provided there is no 
doubt regarding the wrong done and injustices greater than the one to 
be rectified do not result. For example:
A prince has the right to intervene in another community if that 
community is ruled by a tyrant - a prince who does not rule in accord­
ance with the existing laws - and the community as a result is "suffer­
ing unjustly".
(T)he people in question are an innocent people, 
and ... princes may and can defenc^^.. the world, 
lest injury be inflicted upon it.
Also, if the laws of a community are tyrannical, that is, if they "work
250wrong to innocent folk" , he allows intervention by an outside prince. 
Examples refer to the Turks whose laws permit exposing unwanted chil- 
dren251 and to some Indian peoples who act in accordance with their own 
laws when innocent human beings are killed for cannibalistic purposes:
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(A)ny one may defend (innocent people) from such 
tyrannical and oppressive acts, and ^ 2 is esPecial- 
ly the business of princes to do so.
He raises the question of intervention in the case where a people does
not seem to be able to "administer a lawful State up to the standard
253required by human and civil claims" , but his answer is uncertain. As 
he formulates it: "(T)he sovereigns of Spain might undertake the admin­
istration of their country so long as this was clearly for their (the 
Indians') benefit".
Vitoria's examples of intervention have one criterion upon which 
their justification rests: the suffering of innocent people(s), and it 
does not matter whether this suffering is caused by physical or spirit­
ual distress.
There is one further point which he includes in his discussion of
the just war, and he introduces it in the form of the question: "What
255kind and degree of stress is lawful in a just war?"
In his answer he develops the idea that what is lawful in war de­
pends on "the end and aim" of war, and this in turn depends on the wrong 
done and the circumstances accompanying it, so that that is lawful which
"observes proportion as regards the nature of the circumstances and of
256the wrongs done" - an idea which will be given further attention in 
the next section: moderation.
Assembling Vitoria's thought on the just war one discerns the idea 
that a just war is a last but lawful means of safeguarding justice in 
the world - the justice as embodied in the law of nations and of nature.
7. Moderation
The idea of moderation, not postulated by the initial hypothesis derived 
from Gierke, Wight and Bull, but consistent with it, is ever present in 
Vitoria's writings, especially when he thinks about (a) administering a 
perfect temporal community; (b) spreading the Christian religion; and 
(c) waging a just war.
(a) Administering a perfect temporal community. Vitoria does not in 
a general way link moderation to the internal context, except to condemn
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the rule of a tyrant or tyrannical laws ; his concern, as his writ­
ings suggest, is rather with a particular situation, that of a Chris­
tian prince ruling over a non-Christian community.
In the fragment of his relectio "On Temperance" he argues that, 
when a Christian prince acquires the rule over a non-Christian communi­
ty, he must not burden it more heavily than his Christian community, for
example, by imposing higher taxes, taking away liberty or subjecting it
258to other oppressive measures. The reason he gives is this: the non- 
Christian community is not part of the Christian community; neither 
does it subordinate itself to it. Hence, in order to avoid acting "un­
faithfully", the prince must have regard for what is good for his new
259community rather than what is good for his Christian community.
He also argues that the Christian religion is to be introduced on­
ly gradually into the newly acquired community. As he explains:
It would not be a tolerable law if immediately an 
edict were passed which required that nobody, on 
penalty of death, must worship Mohamed or the 
idols, or that all adore Christ; or that the same 
be ordered under penaltj^gf exile or confiscation 
of their belongings ...
Rather, the first step should consist in persuading the non-Christian
community by teaching and instruction of the truth of the Christian re-
261ligion and the falsehood of the old laws and rites. A law ordering
the destruction of idols or of the Moslem religion should be considered
only at a later stage, and even then it should not threaten death or
262exile but choose "a much milder approach".
In a lectio which discusses the question "Whether one can force 
the infidels to convert (to Christianity)", Vitoria presents the case 
of Christians and non-Christians living together in one community under 
the rule of a Christian prince. He opens the argument by asserting that 
"in itself it is ... lawful to oblige the non-Christians by way of sanc­
tions, threats and punishments to receive the Christian faith, to con-
263serve it and to defend it". Next, he takes up the statement by St
264Thomas that infidels must not be forced. The apparent contradiction 
is resolved by citing St Paul according to whom "there are many things 
which are lawful but not advisable". By way of explanation, Vitoria 
offers three reasons:
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(i) The prince who has used force will never know for certain 
whether the Christian faith has "really been received";
(ii) a wrong impression will be created, for infidels and Chris­
tians will believe that in the conversion to Christianity force has al­
ways been used, "which is false";
(iii) experience speaks against it: "I doubt that we did well in our
times to force the Moslems to become Christians in the way we did: to
tell them to convert or to leave the country". He knows that many chose
26 6to become Christians but he thinks that they are bad Christians.
In the same tract he also raises the question whether the prince
may treat his non-Christian subjects more harshly than his Christian
subjects by imposing higher burdens, and the answer is that, while it
may be lawful, it may not be advisable. It would mean coercion to con-
267vert.
(b) Spreading the Christian religion. Preaching the Christian re­
ligion in realms that are not under the rule of Christian princes is, 
according to Vitoria, a right on the part of Christians, but it is 
linked to the obligation not to use force when exercising it.
His most extensive example in support of his view is the conver­
sion of the Indians in America. The Indians, he argues, are not bound to
believe immediately and "merely because it has been declared and an-
268nounced to them" that the Christian religion is the true religion. 
Following Cajetan, he writes:
(I)t would be rash and impudent for any one to 
believe anything, especially in matters which con­
cern salvation, unless he knows that t^ jl^  is as­
serted by a man worthy of credence ...
270"Persuasive demonstration" is the way to attract the Indians , and yet 
it is not impossible that this approach will not work. The Indians may 
continue to refuse to accept the Christian religion - a response, Vito­
ria insists, which does not justify the Christians to resort to war for
271"war is no argument for the truth of the Christian faith".
The resort to war becomes lawful if the Indians deny the Chris­
tians their right to preach. In such a case, the latter may do "in right 
of war everything which is permitted in other just wars", yet "always
Ill
272with a regard for moderation and proportion . ..". However, he again 
draws attention to the possibility that what is lawful may not be ad­
visable :
(I)t may be that these wars and massacres and 
spoliations will hinder rather than procure and 
further the conversion of the Indians. According­
ly, the prime consideration is that no obstacle 
be placed in the way of the Gospel, and if any 
such be so placed, t h ^ 2method of evangelization 
must be abandoned .. .
(c) Waging a just war. Vitoria's two writings, his lectio "On War"
and his relectio "On the Law of War", devote numerous pages to the idea
of moderation in war. In the words of Ernest Nys: "In treating of the
cruel topic of the law of war, he asserted principles which bore the
274-imprint of moderation and humanity".
Vitoria states his general position as follows:
When war for a just cause has broken out, it must 
not be waged so as to ruin the people against whom 
it is directed, but only so as to obtain one's 
rights and the defence of one's country and in or­
der that frooj-^hat war peace and security may in 
time result.
Peace and security is one consideration; the possibility of error is an­
other. It is always possible, he holds, to be wrong about justice being 
on one's side and therefore:
(T)he victor ought not to make seizures or exac­
tions in temporal mat^gs beyond the limits of 
just satisfaction ...
He arrives at his general position after examining a number of par­
ticular questions. For example, he asks whether it is lawful to kill the 
innocent, that is, those presumed to be innocent, children, women, peas­
ants, clerics, members of religious orders, foreigners who happen to be 
in the country of the enemy. His answer is that "in itself" it never is 
lawful. It may become lawful through the force of circumstances, that 
is "when there is no other means of carrying on the operation of a just 
war ...", but the obligation is to see to it that "greater evils do not 
arise out of the war than the war would avert".^77
Another question which he raises is whether it is lawful to kill
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all the guilty. His reply is: "In the actual heat of battle" - yes; af­
ter the war - yes in principle, but when the nature of the wrong done 
by the enemy is taken into account, it may be found that it would not
be right to do so. His authority is Cicero: "(T)he punishment which we
278inflict on the guilty must be such as equity and humanity allow".
To give a third example: Vitoria inquires into the lawfulness of
deposing the princes of the enemy and installing new ones or of placing
the foreign community under one's own rule. His findings are that it
"is not unqualifiedly permissible", for in general such measures are
279"utterly savage and inhumane" , and he restricts it to cases where:
(T)here may ... arise sufficient and lawful causes 
for effecting a change of princes ... and this may 
be either because of the number and aggravated 
quality of the damages and wrongs which have been 
wrought or, especially, whe^g0ecurity and peace 
cannot otherwise be had ...
For most of the time, his advice concerning moderation in war does 
not differentiate between Christian and non-Christian adversaries.
There are, however, some instances where he does suggest a different 
response depending on whether or not the enemy is Christian. For exam­
ple, in his relectio "On the Law of War", he says:
(I)t is indubitably lawful to carry off both the 
children and the women of the Saracens into cap­
tivity and slavery.
Whereas:
(T)his ensl^g^ng is not lawful in a war between 
Christians.
And:
(T)here are times when security cannot be got save 
by destroying all one's enemies: and this is espe­
cially the case against unbelievers, from whom it 
is useless ever to hope for a just peace on any 
terms.
However:
(I)n a war with Christians ... I do not think this 
would be allowable.
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Vitoria's instances of differential treatment are, on the whole, limit­
ed to the Old World; however, there is a passage in the relectio "On 
the Indians", in the form of a conditional statement, which reads that 
if the Indians act like "forsworn enemies" all the rights of war may be 
enforced against them, and they may be made slaves, following the law
of nations that "whatever is captured in war becomes the property of
.i „ 283the conqueror ....
Thinking about moderation, then, Vitoria invites his audience to 
consider what is lawful but also to take account of what is advisable. 
The advisable, when linked to the lawful, for most of the time makes 
for more moderation; only in cases of persistent enmity, it makes for 
less.
Conclusion
Vitoria's thought as it can be reconstructed today may not be a faith­
ful reproduction of the sixteenth-century original; and, unless care is 
taken when analysing and abstracting from his complex arguments, new 
mutations may be introduced which remove his ideas even further from 
their original conception.
An example of such a mutation is Lange’s statement that Vitoria
when thinking about the problem of "international organization" is
284"frankly unitary". The evidence which he offers in support of his 
view consists of three passages quoted from Vitoria’s relectio "Concern­
ing Civil Power". For the purposes of this argument it suffices to re­
produce two of them;
(i) The best government is the one exercised by 
one sole person, as if the whole world weijg^  
ruled by one very wise prince and master.
Apart from differences in the wording between the above text and the
286one given by Scott , it is important to note that Vitoria advances 
the proposition, not when speaking about "international organization", 
but when discussing "national organization". It is part of his discus­
sion of the question whether there is "less liberty in a monarchy than 
in an aristocracy, or a democracy", and, as mentioned above, it keeps 
company with another proposition, namely, the "safest" form of govern­
ment is that which combines elements of all three - monarchy, aristocra-
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cy and democracy.
(ii) As the greatest part of a state may set up a
king over the whole of the state, even against 
the wish of the others, so the majority of 
Christians, even if the others are against 
them, may lawfully create a monarch whom al^gg 
the princes and provinces will have to obey.
289Again, apart from textual differences , it is necessary to point out 
that the above example is not an expression of Vitoria’s "ideal” of 
"the unity of the world" - as Lange likes his readers to believe - but, 
as the context makes it clear, a conditional statement relating to the 
Christian world, and one which does not imply the abolition of political 
plurality within it.
It is possible that Gierke chose the same approach: disregarding 
the general context provided by Vitoria’s writings and considering iso­
lated statements abstracted from their particular context, thereby ar­
riving at the conclusion that Vitoria belonged to the universalists - 
a conclusion which this inquiry is unable to support. To summarize its 
findings: Vitoria, in opposition to the universalist claims of both em­
peror and pope, imperialists and theocrats, puts forward the principle 
of plurality and by linking it to the ideas of natural society and of 
justice, he avoids moving to the other extreme, that of realism.
A point upon which this inquiry is not in a position to comment
concerns the originality of Vitoria’s ideas. While it is clear that he
is inspired by a great many different sources ranging from Antiquity
through the Middle Ages to his more immediate past and present, there is
also no doubt that he belongs to what came to be called the scholastic
tradition. Nevertheless, he may be as original as Adda Bozeman claims 
290he is , but it seems hazardous to agree with her unless one has famil­
iarized oneself with the writings of at least St Thomas, Torquemada and 
Cajetan - a task which Bozeman does not seem to have undertaken and 
which this inquiry is not meant to perform. His inclusion in this study 
follows from the initial hypothesis, and not from any claims to origi­
nality .
Vitoria’s writings do not suggest that he ever tried to build his 
three communities - the perfect temporal community or state, the perfect 
spiritual community or Christianity, and the community of perfect com-
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munities or world - into one, logically consistent theory of interna­
tional society. An attempt to do so now proves unsuccessful. Let us see 
why.
There is no problem in identifying three levels of description of 
increasing generality and decreasing concreteness.
At the first level there is the perfect temporal community. It is 
composed of individual human beings. The code of rules which binds them 
consists in the laws which they create for themselves. These differ 
from the laws which the other temporal communities existing at this lev­
el devise in response to their specific needs.
The second level is home to the perfect spiritual community. Its 
members are Christian perfect temporal communities and Christians who 
live in non-Christian perfect temporal communities. The specific law 
which they share and obey is the law of Christ. The same level of de­
scription would have to accommodate other spiritual communities follow­
ing their own divine laws, such as the Moslem community, had Vitoria 
been concerned to show that they existed.
The third level of description is constituted by the world as a 
whole. Its members are perfect temporal communities. Individuals - cit­
izens and princes - appear as representatives of their communities 
rather than in their own right. Intercommunication at this level is 
based on the law of nations and of nature.
The problem is encountered when trying to establish linkages be­
tween the three levels of description.
Levels One and Three are linked easily. The perfect temporal com­
munity, while complete in itself, is a part of the world. The greater 
whole provides ideas of justice in the form of the law of nations and 
of nature to its constituent parts which, in their turn, defend and 
protect what is just in the world as a whole.
Also part of Level One and Level Two present no problems of link­
age. Each Christian temporal community is complete in itself; yet, at 
the same time, it is also a part of the Christian spiritual community. 
The latter provides for the spiritual needs of the former, whereas the 
former helps if the latter requires temporal support.
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However, problems of linkage are found and not overcome when at­
tempts are made at linking Level Two to Level Three and to that part of 
Level One which is non-Christian. The perfect spiritual community at 
Level Two is complete in itself but it is independent of the greater 
whole at Level Three - the world. The non-Christian perfect temporal 
community at Level One is complete in itself but it is independent of 
the greater whole at Level Two - the perfect spiritual community. In 
both cases the absence of dependence makes for unrelatedness - a condi­
tion which is incompatible with theory construction.
CHAPTER V
ALBERICO GENTILI
The Italian jurist Alberico Gentili, who lived from 1552 to 1608, is
the third thinker to be included in this inquiry. Otto von Gierke as
well as Martin Wight and Hedley Bull cite him in their respective lists
of thinkers but, as in the case of Francisco de Vitoria, disagree about
the place to be accorded to him: Gierke claims him as a universalist^,
, 2whereas Wight and Bull consider him a man of the via media.
Gierke offers his reason in the form of a footnote, half in German 
and half in Latin, which reads:
Thus Albericus Gentilis, de jure belli (1588), 
pages 11 - 13, explains the binding force of the 
jus gentium by saying that, indeed, all the na­
tions never came together, but that which over 
time has seemed acceptable to all, is to be re­
garded as having been decreed by the whole world; 
and he adds: as the rule of a state and the mak­
ing of its laws are in the hands of a majority of 
its citizens, just so is the^rule of the world in 
the hands of ^he aggregation of the greater part 
of the world.
Turning to Gentili?s text for a better understanding of the above pas­
sage, the assumption being that contexts impart meaning to words and 
sentences, one finds that the first half appears on page eleven as 
part of an argument of how the law of nations was established^; and the 
second half - the sentence following the three words "and he adds" -goccurs on page thirteen where it is embedded between two statements: 
one, if all known nations have used a certain code of laws, it may be 
inferred that all nations have used it, for the reason that from "the 
known" one learns "the unknown"; and, two, an unwritten law or custom 
of a state binds every one of its members, even if not every one has 
agreed to it.^
The additional information does not strengthen Gierke’s case. Wight 
refers the reader to Chapter Six of Book One of De Jure Belli, entitled 
"That War May Be Waged Justly on Both Sides", in support of his argument 
that Gentili contributed to the theory of international legitimacy 
through his ideas about the just war^ - which may be interpreted to
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mean that he accepts Gentili as a thinker of the via media but does not 
explain why he does so, except perhaps indirectly. Bull offers no ref­
erence. The reasons, then, which led Gierke, Wight and Bull to adopt 
their respective positions remain rather unclear.
On first meeting Gentili, one fact crystallizes quickly: the two 
earlier thinkers, Erasmus and Vitoria, are not unknown to him. He refers 
to them on numerous occasions^, sometimes using them simply as sources, 
at other times expressing opinions. And it is not difficult to detect 
that they produce different reactions. Erasmus causes displeasure. When 
inquiring into the question of the justice of war, for example, Gentili 
says:
In fact, some cite Erasmus in our favour, others 
on the opposite side. Perhaps a third view will 
be nearer the truth, that the^lighty dilettante 
did not know what he thought.
Vitoria, on the other hand, is awarded the distinction of being "learn­
ed”. "But the learned Victoria (sic)", Gentili writes a few pages fol­
lowing his pronouncement on Erasmus, "declares that (the) principle of
not making war from religious motives is approved by all without excep- 
m 13tion ... .
Another point which becomes clear quickly is that Gentili is nei­
ther as resistant to exploration as Vitoria nor does he possess the same 
ability to attract thinkers and writers as Erasmus. He has neither Vito­
ria’s mysteriousness nor Erasmus’ lustre. The main facts of Gentili's 
life are known and agreed upon, and his writings, while at times ob­
scure^, have survived intact; yet few scholars have studied them close­
ly. For example, the only substantial investigation of his life and 
works to be published this century is Gesina van der Molen’s Alberico 
Gentili and the Development of International Law, which appeared in 
1937.15
For purposes of introduction it may be useful at this point to sub-
16mit a few details regarding his life and writings.
Gentili was born in 1552 at San Ginesio in Northern Italy. At the 
age of twenty-one he obtained his doctorate in civil law from the uni­
versity of Perugia, and for the following three years was praetor^  at
Ascoli. In 1575 he returned to San Ginesio to take up the position of
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municipal lawyer. He did not seek reappointment to this office in 1577, 
but devoted himself to private study. The threat of persecution from 
the Inquisition for heretical views forced thim to leave Italy in 1579.
In 1580 Gentili arrived in England and began to teach civil law at
Oxford the following year. In 1587 he was appointed Regius Professor of
18Civil Law at that university, and retained this position until his 
death in 1608, although after 1590 he increasingly left the teaching to 
two deputies, Francis James and John Budden, moved to London, estab­
lished a forensic practice there, and visited Oxford only on special 
occasions. In 1600 he became a member of Gray's Inn - the same Inn to 
which Francis Bacon belonged - and in 1605 was appointed to the office
of Advocate to the Spanish Embassy, a position which required him to
19represent Spanish interests in the London Court of Admiralty. He held
it until his death in 1608 at London. The historian of Oxford Anthony
20Wood is recorded to have described him as "the most noted and famous
21civilian and the grand ornament of the university of his time".
If Gentili's professional life knew diversity, so did the products 
of his mind. In the words of Thomas Erskine Holland, his nineteenth-cen­
tury rediscoverer, Gentili's numerous writings, all of which were in­
cluded in the Index of Prohibited Books in 1603:
(T)ouched upon an extraordinary variety of top­
ics, dealing not only with questions of civil 
and international law, but also with witchcraft, 
casuistry, canon law, biblical exegesis, classi­
cal philology, the Vulgate, Engli^tj politics, 
and the prerogative of the crown.
Not all of them have been published, and those which have - they amount
23to something like thirty books or treatises - are all in their origi­
nal language - Latin - with the exception of three works which, in Hol­
land's opinion, constitute Gentili's "principal contributions to the
24-science (of the law of nations)". These three works appeared in Eng­
lish in The Classics of International Law earlier this century under 
their Latin titles: De Legationibus Libri Tres, De Jure Belli Libri 
Tres and Hispanicae Advocationis Libri Duo, originally published in 
1585, 1598 and 1613 respectively, and the present inquiry is based upon 
them.
Nine sections have been chosen to present Gentili's ideas. Six of
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these have counterparts in the previous two chapters and need no fur­
ther justification, although some of their headings are differently- 
worded, reflecting differences in thought - to wit: Section One, Genti- 
li and the Events of His Time; Two, Gentili and the Three Traditions of 
Thought; Four, The State, a Public Part of the World; Five, The World, 
a Lofty Structure; Eight, The Question of War; and Nine, Moderation. 
Sections Three, Six and Seven occur for the first time: Section Three, 
The Perfect Ambassador, delineates an idea which is not suggested by 
the initial hypothesis but is present in his writings, and relevant to 
this inquiry, as it represents an aspect of his more general idea of 
the world as a "lofty structure"; Six, Commerce as a Link, and Seven, 
Diplomacy as a Link, depict two activities which are further expressions 
of the idea of that which links and circumscribes, discussed in Section 
Five.
The order in which the nine sections are presented is similar to 
that adopted in the two preceding chapters.
1. Gentili and the Events of His Time
Gentilifs years in England (1580 - 1608) were a time rich in events for
25his adopted country , and this section seeks to ascertain whether his 
observations, like those of Erasmus and Vitoria before him, may be de­
scribed as realistic. For analytical purposes, the emphasis is again on 
conflict rather than on co-operation.
The four main areas of conflict which engaged English attention at
that time were: conspiracy at home; rebellion in the Netherlands; war at
26sea with Spain; and rebellion in Ireland. All of these find their way 
into Gentili's writings, not only acting as the initial spark, but also 
serving as examples or cases in his argumentation.
(a) The Initial Spark. De Legationibus Libri Tres grew out of an
incident which to this date finds a mention in books on English history
27concerned with that period: the Mendoza affair. The story has all the
qualities of a Shakespearean drama centring on a plot to assassinate the
Queen. The essential point in the context of this inquiry is that in
1583 Don Bernardino de Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador to the English
Court, was discovered to be "irrevocably implicated" in the conspira- 
28 29cy. Gentili and Jean Hotman were invited by the English government
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to advise on what ought to be done. Mendoza was expelled in early 1584. 
Later in the same year, Gentili made the rights and duties of ambassa­
dors the subject of a disputation which he presented at the annual co~
30mitia at Oxford and subsequently published. Further elaboration led 
to the work as it is known today: De Legationibus Libri Tres, which ap­
peared in 1585.
For the comitia of 1588 Gentili chose as his topic the law of war. 
England had been at war with Spain since 1585, supported the rebellion 
in the Netherlands and was ready to fight the approaching armada. Noth­
ing is known about the reception of his discourse, but it appeared 
shortly afterwards in the form of a series of three commentaries 
(1588 - 9). De Jure Belli Libri Tres, the work which is known today, 
was published nine years later in 1598.
Hispanicae Advocationis Libri Duo appeared posthumously in 1613, 
published by Gentili’s brother Scipio who gave it a subtitle, the Eng­
lish rendering of which is: In which treatise different famous maritime
questions according to the Law of Nations and the practice of today are
31explained and settled as clearly as possible. In fact, a perusal of 
the work reveals that it consists of more than what is indicated by the 
title and subtitle: it not only contains notes prepared by Gentili in 
connection with the cases which came his way in his capacity as Spanish 
advocate in the Court of Admiralty between 1605 and 1608, when England 
and Spain were at peace again but not yet Spain and the Netherlands; it 
also includes records of cases in which he represented English inter­
ests; and there are opinions concerned with private law rather than with
32maritime and prize law.
Thus, events of his time are at the origin of all three of his 
writings on the law of nations.
(b) Examples and Cases. Turning to the contents of these writings, 
one meets with references to events of his time in all three of them, 
but with varying frequency.
De Legationibus contains few references to the contemporary scene. 
Gentili has a reason for this: examples relating to Antiquity are pref­
erable to those of recent origin, because they give embassies "that 
degree of prestige which we assert they have, and which age so easily
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33adds to all things”. An important exception is the Mendoza case, 
which he mentions in the course of his chapter "If an Ambassador Should 
Conspire against the Sovereign to Whom He Is Accredited". His conclu­
sion :
There was justice ... in England's recent treat­
ment of the Spanish ambassador, who was dismissed 
for conspiring against the lif^of the sovereign 
and the safety of the kingdom.
In De Jure Belli Gentili demonstrates his familiarity with the 
events of his time on numerous occasions. For example:
- He refers to the refusal by the king of Spain to submit to arbi­
tration his claim to the crown of Portugal and remarks: "(H)e who tries
35to avoid a legal process distrusts the justice of his cause".
- He mentions the complaint by the Hanseatic cities about the pil­
lage of their ships by the English fleet and comments: "One must be re-
36garded as an enemy who does what is pleasing to the enemy". The com­
ment is based on his knowledge that the Hanseatic ships supplied the 
Spaniards, the enemy of the English, with "provisions and munitions of
- He takes up "what is just now a burning question, namely, wheth-
38er the English did right in aiding the Belgians against the Spaniards" 
and, in the course of his argument, observes:
(T)he Belgians, if vanquished in the war, would 
wholly change their condition, as we see in the 
conquered part of their country, which has now 
utterly fallen from its former state of liberty, 
and is grievously oppressed with garr^ons and 
ruled by the mere nod of a sovereign.
- The rebellion in Ireland appears when Gentili, for example, re­
fers to "certain Irish territory, from which the English rule has now 
been driven by a rebellious slave . ..".^
Hispanicae Advocationis Libri Duo derives exclusively from inci­
dents which occurred in Gentili's own time - they are so-to-say its rai­
son d'etre - and one therefore approaches it with the expectation that 
it will be a rich mine easy to exploit. However, Gentili's last work 
constitutes anything but a simple source. For most of the time the notes
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refer only obscurely to the cases in question, emphasizing the arguments 
or pleas to be made rather than the incidents upon which they rest.^1 
Every so often, however, cases are set out clearly, as, for example, in 
the following instance:
There was an English ship off the Tuscan shore, 
already loaded and about to sail here to England, 
when it was seized on the orders of the Tuscan, 
unloaded, and sent to war and lost on the return 
trip. Two counts are made against our shipowners, 
who now demand that they j?e compensated by the 
Tuscan for their loss ...
Reviewing the evidence which Gentili supplies, one can safely con­
clude that he saw the events of his time: both the origin and the con­
tents of his works testify to this. More difficult to answer is the 
question whether he saw them realistically. Some of his examples and 
cases indicate that he did; but many of them do not offer this kind of 
information. What they offer are juridical evaluations, not political 
assessments, and the former do not necessarily depend on a correct read­
ing of what is the case. The existing evidence, then, can be summed up 
in no more certain a statement than that Gentili sometimes saw the 
events of his time realistically and that, at other times, it cannot be 
ruled out that he did.
2. Gentili and the Three Traditions of Thought
Gentili discloses his position as a thinker of the via media in the 
course of his writings on the law of nations, and no synoptic preview is 
intended. However, there are a few findings, instructive for what they 
reveal about his attitude towards the other two traditions, which may 
usefully be presented at this point.
Gentili, the realist or probable realist at the level of observa­
tion, is familiar with Machiavelli’s writings, quotes from them on a
A3number of occasions , and admits his admiration for the Florentine’s 
"remarkable insight".^ Machiavelli and his "precious" Observations on 
Livy, he writes, should be looked at as a model and imitated; yet "the 
most distinguished of his class" is slandered, because his purpose is 
misunderstood. The truth is that:
He was a eulogist of democracy, and its most spir­
ited champion. Born, educated, and attaining to
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honors under a democratic form of government, he 
was the supreme foe of tyranny ... It was not his 
purpose to instruct the tyrant, but by revealing 
his secret counsels to strip him bare, and expose 
him to the suffering nations ... The purpose of 
this shrewdest of men was to instruct the n^ions 
under pretext of instructing the prince ...
Yet neither his admiration for Machiavelli’s "remarkable insight" 
nor his understanding of the Florentine’s purpose make Gentili take up 
the position which Wight and Bull identify as realist. He sometimes re­
fers to adherents of this position as "the unscrupulous". For example, 
when making his case for the existence of the law of nature and of na­
tions, he says: (T)he unscrupulous will deny its existence ...".^ At 
other times he denotes their approach as "Greek cunning and Punic craft".
The "treacherous envoy" belongs to this category^, and so does he who
48deceives the enemy. As this chapter will show, Gentili puts his in­
sights into reality to a use which differs from Machiavelli’s, whether 
understood according to Gentili or differently.
Gentili’s opposition to universalism or, as he himself formulates
49it, "universal control and power to fall into the hands of one people" 
or "one man”"^ , is implicit in his whole work and will become apparent 
as this chapter proceeds. It is made explicit on a number of occasions, 
two of which are especially noteworthy.
In his chapter "Of the Overthrow of Kingdoms" he argues that it is 
not true to say that "the Roman emperor does not now exist and the Roman 
Empire has vanished", for "an empire does not come to an end if it sur­
vives even in some tiny part"~^; but this does not mean that "the Roman 
emperor could claim sway over the whole world". The Roman emperor is not 
only not "lord of the whole world", he also has "no right of action" 
against those territories which formerly belonged to the empire, to wit, 
territories which are now being held by the Turks and other barbarians;
the French, the English and the Spaniards; Venice, Florence and other
52cities of Tuscany; and the pope of Rome.
The other occasion is provided by his discussion of the question
whether it is legitimate to make war when the only reason we have is
53fear that we ourselves may be attacked. In the course of his lengthy 
answer Gentili draws attention to a "powerful argument" which, in his 
view, has proved acceptable to all ages, namely the idea that one ought
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to oppose those who "are content with no bounds, and end by attacking
,, 54the fortunes of all . Is it not just, he inquires, that we oppose 
those who, like the Turks and the Spaniards, are "planning and plotting 
universal dominion"?^ Is not this our aim, he reiterates a little la­
ter, "that one man may not have supreme power and that all Europe may
56not submit to the domination of a single man"? A just response to 
such a threat consists in preventive action, and he makes use of an 
analogy which is usually ascribed to a later age:
So, too, the maintenance of union among the ele­
ments is dependent upon their equal distribution; 
and on the fact tha^one is not surpassed in any 
respect by another.
This link of politics to science is reinforced by a reference to histo­
ry. It was Lorenzo de Medici’s unremitting concern, Gentili reminds his 
audience, that:
(T)he balance of power should be maintained a- 
mong the princes of Italy. This he believed would 
give peace toqItaly, as indeed it did so long as 
he lived ...
The peace which results from an equal distribution of power, and 
the war which is fought in order to oppose the reach for universal po­
litical rule are expressions of the same concern on the part of Genti­
li: the preservation of that which is "right and just". As he puts it 
at the end of his argument against universalism:
No one's sovereignty must ever on any account be 
allowed to grow so great, that it is not permit­
ted to cg^l in question even his manifest injus­
tice ...
Gentili’s explicit rejection of universalism as expressed above 
constitutes a first and serious challenge to Gierke's view of Gentili 
as a universalist.
613. The Perfect Ambassador
Gentili's imagination is not caught by either Erasmus’ perfect temporal
Christian prince or by Vitoria's perfect temporal community. His mind
is inspired by the idea of the perfect ambassador, and he presents a
62portrait of it in De Legationibus. As it represents an important as-
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pect of his more general idea of the world as a "lofty structure", per­
haps even its distinguishing mark, its inclusion in this chapter under 
a separate heading is indicated.
Gentili attaches a twofold purpose to his creation:
(a) It is to instruct ambassadors how they "ought to be" and how
63they "ought to behave". Such knowledge is important in view of the
function which they fulfil: "(A)n ambassador is one ... sent ... by the
state, ... in the name of the state, ... as the representative of the
state" ; "the ambassador is a statesman and is invested with the per-
65sonality of his prince" ; "a bearer of messages, ... a judge of af- 
66fairs ..." ; "(ambassadors) represent one sovereign, and approach the
other with the intention of negotiating with him on a basis of equali- 
6 7ty". More formally he defines the ambassador as:
(0)ne who iggthe name of the state or person still 
more sacred has been sent without the right of 
supreme command to a state or person still more 
sacred to say or do something in the interest of 
the sg^te or sacred person by whom he has been 
sent.
(b) It is to correct an image of the ambassador with which he does 
not agree: the ambassador as the spy. Gentili mentions this view on a 
number of occasions^, but does not say how prevalent it was at his time 
or for how long it had existed. His source is the French statesman and 
historian Philippe de Comines^, who is said to have met Machiavelli in 
1494 but does not attribute to him such a "degrading view". A relevant 
passage in Comines’ Memoires relating to the year 1471 reads:
Were it my Case, for one Ambassador they sent me, 
I would be sure to send them two; nay, though 
they were weary, and desir’d to have no more, I 
would not fail to send when I had Opportunity and 
Convenience; for there is no Spy so good, and so 
safe, nor can have such Liberty to pry and inform 
himself ...
The assigned task is indeed not small, and one way to acquaint one­
self with the object - the portrait of the perfect ambassador - is to 
watch Gentili create it.
Two categories of "essential qualities" are involved:
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(a) "Graces and Refinements". Perhaps because he is interested in 
73stage-plays and acting , Gentili begins his portrait by delineating 
the "external circumstances". The stage has to be set properly or, as 
he puts it:
(The Ambassador's) equipment and suite should be 
marked by a splendor commensurate with the digni­
ty of him who has sent him ...
Next comes the actor. The perfect ambassador is endowed with "bles­
sings of nature" and "blessings of fortune". The former include "a come­
ly appearance", beauty based on dignity, and vigour linked to courtesy.
A "good personal appearance", Gentili remarks, is especially important 
with barbarians.^  "Blessings of fortune" comprise a distinguished ori­
gin and position, for "a man of ignoble station" can hardly assume the 
personality of a prince.^
With the next stroke of his brush Gentili adds talents which are 
partly inborn and partly acquired and developed: ready wit and eloquence 
- two characteristics which help to win friends, "the greatest art of 
ambassadors".^
Purely acquired qualities come next.
There is a knowledge of languages. The perfect ambassador knows his 
own language, a universal language - Gentili suggests Latin for his day 
and age in preference to Greek - and the language of the state or sover­
eign to whom he is sent. The reason is this: "(T)he wise ambassador will
78never have (an interpreter)".
There is a knowledge of history - past and contemporary. The study 
of the past generates learning, helps to arrive at a norm for one's own 
conduct, and enables one to understand the present and to foresee the 
future. However, the perfect ambassador does not reach an understanding 
of the present merely by engaging in speculations based on the past; he 
studies the contemporary scene itself.
And there is a knowledge of philosophy, that branch of it which is 
concerned with morals and politics. As Gentili comments:
This is in a sense the soul of history, for it in­
cludes and explains the causes of all words, deeds
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and issues, and so does not suffer historical 
knowledge to be a bare and empty thing, but brings 
it within the field o^well-defined and useful 
practical experience.
The group "Graces and Refinements" is now complete except for a 
few finishing touches, and he applies them without delay. The perfect 
ambassador walks in the "sunlight" rather than buries himself in books, 
that is, his knowledge of languages, history, and philosophy is not ac­
quired at the cost of practical experience. He is familiar with "prac-
80tical politics and ... the administration of high offices" , and he is 
experienced in foreign travel. The perfect ambassador is more than thir­
ty years of age.
(b) The second group of qualities comprises "virtues". Gentili en­
dows the perfect ambassador with four virtues - fidelity, fortitude, 
temperance, and prudence - and he attributes their parentage to nature 
and to diligence.
Fidelity is important because "(h)e who shows good faith ... has a
claim on good faith"; courage enables one to perform one’s duty "in
spite of violence of any kind"; temperance places "a seemly limit on
81things", and prudence permits "a shrewd analysis of the truth ...".
When prudence, which according to Gentili "directs and regulates 
82all the virtues" , is linked to fidelity, the perfect ambassador knows
how to behave in a situation where there is a conflict between duties to
his state or prince and duties to his religion, his integrity, and the 
83situation ; when prudence accompanies courage, he discerns when to be
84persevering and when to defer to circumstances ; and when prudence 
joins temperance, he understands in which circumstances a word or deed 
is appropriate.^
Prudence has its own regulatory device. In order to avoid deception 
the perfect ambassador studies the person who says or does something 
(the adviser) and that which is being said or done (the situation). If 
both agree in what they convey, there is no problem. If they disagree, 
the perfect ambassador chooses the situation rather than the adviser as 
the basis for his decision: "A conclusion ... based on the situation is 
more reliable ...".^
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All the virtues which Gentili considers essential in the perfect 
ambassador are now present, and he completes the portrait by adding the 
following detail: those who accompany the perfect ambassador are "of 
such character that every one of them could perform the duties of the 
embassy ...".^
The finished product is dedicated to Philip Sidney, "a living
88image and example of the perfect ambassador". It fits neither the re­
alist way of thinking about the world nor that of the universalists.
4. The State, a Public Part of the World
Unlike his near-contemporary Thomas Smith, whose work De Republica An~ 
89glorum of 1565 contains a complete statement of what he understands 
the state to be, namely:
A common wealth is called a society or common do­
ing of a multitude of free men collected together 
and united by common accord and convenauntes among 
themselves, for the conservation of themselves as- 
well in peace as in warre ... ,
Gentili himself does not offer any such ready insight into his thinking 
91about the state. The absence of a definition, atypical for his ap-
92proach more generally , may be seen as an indication of his concern to 
differentiate himself from the political philosophers, who since the 
time of Plato and Aristotle have devoted themselves to theorizing about 
the state and what happens within it. As he puts it in his introductory 
chapter to De Jure Belli:
For the moralist, whether he treats of the pri­
vate customs of individuals or aims at the high­
est good in some other way^always confines him­
self within the city-state , and rather limits 
himself to the foundations of the virtues than 
rears lofty structures.
And when a political thinker has looked beyond his own state, so Gentili 
finds, it was for the purpose of establishing its own needs. An example 
comes readily to his mind:
And although (our own Justinian) discussed the law 
of nature and of nations ... as well as the cause 
of wars, prisoners, slaves, and some other topics 
relating to the subject: he nevertheless considered
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them all from the standpoint of his own state and 
explained them with reference to its requirements ...
Gentili’s writings on the law of nations do not provide a defini­
tion of the state nor do they contain the ingredients which, when col­
lected and put together, would permit a conclusion regarding his con­
ception of the state other than that it is a community "joined together 
96by common laws". His writings on the law of nations take the state as 
something given, and observations about it are no more than side-pro­
ducts of his larger concern - those "lofty structures" neglected by the 
political philosophers: they throw light on one or the other aspect of 
the state and, in turn, reflect on the larger enterprise. For the pur­
poses of this chapter, it is worth mentioning three of these aspects.
(a) The formal position of the state. The state with which Gentili 
is concerned may be Christian or non-Christian, Catholic or Protestant, 
as long as it is represented by a princeps or is constituted by a prin- 
ceps populus - a prince or people who has no "earthly judge" or ac­
knowledges no "judge or superior"^, a "free prince" or "free people".^ 
And he includes in this category those princes or peoples who have re­
ligious, feudal or treaty ties to pope, emperor, or some other ruler,
provided that jurisdiction in and dominion over their realms or terri-
v . 99 , . 100tones are theirs.
To the princeps - prince or people - Gentili accords the title of
"public citizen", whose realm is a "public part of the w o r l d " . T o  the
princeps he attaches the right and duty to act externally, that is, to
maintain the law of nations. This includes actions such as going to war;
making peace^^; sending and receiving ambassadors^^; entering into
public a g r e e m e n t s h e l p i n g  another prince^^; and redressing a wrong
committed by another prince or, as he expresses it, acting as "the mag-
106istrate of the law of nations".
(b) The use and abuse of power by those who rule. Gentili mentions 
that states can have different "forms" - they may appear as kingdoms, 
republics or empires - and a particular state can change from one form 
to a n o t h e r b u t  he abstains from discussing the differences between 
them or indicating his preferred "form". Equally, he speaks of "absolute 
or modified sovereignty"^® and 0f what he calls the "magistrate" or
prince of a "free state t? 109 without telling his audience what he under-
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stands by these terms or hinting at any preference on his part.
This disinterest may have its origin in the position he has taken
up: he is not a political philosopher. It also may stem from his con­
ception of power. Gentili identifies "power" as "that which we can do 
legitimately and without injustice". "Fullness of power" he explains as 
"that which is good and praiseworthy ...", adding that, however "abso­
lute" power may be, "nothing unseemly is admitted".'*'^
Given this view of power, it may not matter who wields it - an ab­
solute ruler of a kingdom or a magistrate of a free republic. It may not
even matter whether the ruler is legitimate or illegitimate. As he puts 
it:
Each of them is master, and law perhaps is the 
basis of each one’s sovereignty. A king rules over 
his subjects because they want him to do so, a ty­
rant in spite of ijitjujim. Yet a tyrant is none the 
less a prince ...
For Gentili the important point does not seem to be, who exercises
power, but to what end it is exercised. "(Power) is not for purposes of
112tyranny, but of administration". He offers no detailed explanation as 
to where the one begins and the other ends, but points to the existence 
of a general criterion - the common good. As he formulates it variously:
(A) good ruler ... will always bear in mind that 
kingdoms were not f°r kings, but kings for
their kingdoms ...
Or:
(G)overnments are constituted, not for the advan­
tage of^^y individual, but for that of the com­
munity.
There is no definition of the common good or advantage, but it may be 
close to what he calls "reason of state", namely peace, security, and 
justice'*'^, as the following propositions suggest: a prince desires to 
be "the father of his people ... fountain head of peace and love 
...„116, "a principality"^^ is meant to be "a protection for man­
kind". 118
Thus, when thinking about the use or abuse of power, Gentili con-
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siders the final cause of power (the end) rather than its formal cause
(the extent) - to use sixteenth-century language - although he does not
leave the topic without admitting that "(p)ower is always under suspi- 
119cion ..." and positing the following rule, borrowed mainly from Bal- 
dus de Ubaldis, the Italian legal scholar of the fourteenth century:
A prince who makes a contract with his subjects 
is bound to them by natural law, by the law of 
nations, and by the civil law ... (T)he prince 
is indeed superior to every positive law, but 
... he can subject himself to reason and is sub­
jected to reason, because he is a reasonable be­
ing; therefore his acts cannot prevail against 
reason and therefore he is bound by a compact ...
(c) The third aspect relates to the "participant in the burdens
and honours of the state" 1 2 1 m the subject or citizen.
In terms of allocated space this aspect figures more prominently 
in Gentili’s writings than either princeps or "power". Yet, when indi­
vidual statements and whole chapters are put together, the resultant 
picture shows no more than a pale entity, imperfectly outlined.
Consistent with what has been said before, Gentili's subject or
122citizen is not on a footing of equality with his ruler. What else he
is, or has, is more difficult to ascertain. Gentili seems to prefer to
adopt a vague stance, for he suggests that the position of the subject
123depends on the nature of his subjection , but does not illuminate 
this idea by discussing it more fully. All that he is prepared to dis­
close is that the rights and duties of a public subject may differ from
124those of a private individual. Clarity, however, appears to reign
when it comes to the binding force of any agreements that exist between
125ruler and ruled: they are mutually binding.
Whatever the nature of subjection or compact between ruler and 
ruled, the subject is entitled to just rule and protection by the rul­
er in return, he is obliged "to render loyal obedience". Gen­
tili does not explain the concept of loyal obedience, but, at one level, 
it seems to include the idea that the subject "owes it to his prince 
and country to fight for them" ; and, at another level, it appears to 
extend to the principle that the subject has no right to revolt against 
his ruler, even if the latter breaks his compact or treats him "badly", 
although Gentili does not put it this way. What he says is that "(r)eb-
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els are enemies , for they "secede from those under whose authority
129they are". The absence of clarity in his picture of the subject and
his unjust or cruel ruler does not mean that Gentili does not have an
answer to the problem. In fact, he refers to such a prince as a tyrant
and permits his punishment by another prince; that is, he places the
130force to secure internal justice and security outside the state. As 
he puts it in the context of his chapter "On Defending the Subjects of 
Another Against Their Sovereign":
And unless we wish to make sovereigns exempt from 
the law and bound by no statutes and no precedents, 
there must also of necessity be some one to reiji^ijid 
them of their duty and hold them in restraint.
And the context makes it clear that that "some one" is a "sovereign".
The links which the above discussion establishes between the inside 
of the state and its outside may be summarized as follows: he who has 
jurisdiction and dominion internally, the princeps, is public citizen 
externally; administration rather than tyranny is appropriate for the 
state which is a public part of the world; if tyranny exists inside, the 
outside is entitled to intervene.
5. The World, a Lofty Structure
Gentili’s "lofty structure" may be seen as projecting itself as a rather 
modern composition presenting (a) an indefinite number of vertical di­
visions, four horizontal partitions and (b) three distinct yet related 
materials which give cohesion to the whole. Gentili left his creation
nameless; some commentators assert or imply that he attached the words
132 133societas gentium to it.
(a) The Frame. Identical at each of the four horizontal levels, the
vertical divisions are constituted by the states or public parts of the
world. They are basic to Gentili’s construct: they have existed since
the early age of mankind"*-^ ,  and they will continue to exist until its
135end. Individual states may be born or die, but states in a sense are 
immortal.
The four horizontal partitions reflect different features of their 
component parts, the states, resulting in different patterns or group­
ings of the basic units at each level:
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The first level presents the idea of formal equality. States may
137differ in many ways - Gentili especially mentions size, power ,
138 139rank , and religion - but from a legal point of view they are iden­
tical, having the same rights and the same obligations. As he puts it:
„140There is "no supervision of one sovereign by another 
eign is said to be on an equality with another .
but one sover-
At the second level the idea of foreignness appears. It makes for 
a pattern which distinguishes between "one’s own state" and all the oth­
er states. Gentili’s interest in "examin(ing) this very matter of a for- 
1A2eign nation" is expressed in a lengthy discussion which may be ab­
breviated in the following way:
(T)he law says ... that independent allies are 
foreign to us ... (T)he ... old grammarians teach 
that a foreigner is one whom we speak of as be­
longing to a foreign nation, to an alien land, as 
coming from another people ... Virgil (says) ... 
that every land which is free and not beneath our 
sceptre is foreign ... Those who are not subjects 
are foreigners ... A f^^igner is a resident al­
ien, not a citizen ...
The distinction between "the self" and "the others" cannot be blurred, 
neither by an individual moving from one country to another nor by two 
states concluding an alliance.
The third level shows the idea of foreignness from a different 
angle. Foreign states in relation to one’s own state may be enemies, 
friends or neither of the two.
Gentili defines the enemy as one "who (has) officially declared 
war upon us, or upon whom we have officially declared war ..." and 
adds: "(An enemy) is the equal of his opponent".
"If friendship is contracted", he writes at the beginning of his 
chapter "Of Friendship and Alliance", "by this term something of no 
slight importance is designated".And he explains what he means by 
this statement: states which agree to be friends do not thereby agree 
"to become one body" and "to regard all (their) possessions ... as com­
mon property" - they thereby agree to aid one another in case of neces­
sity, whether they make this commitment explicit, as in an alliance 
providing for mutual aid in the event of one of them being "wronged", 
or whether they leave it unspecified, for "(i)f this is not so, what is
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gained by that agreement and that title of friendship?"^7
It is at this level and in this context that his lofty structure
displays an irregularity, for he argues that "it is lawful neither to
lend aid to infidels nor to accept aid from them __".1^  There may be
war with infidels and there may be peace, but no treaty of friendship 
149or alliance. This is a restriction which he does not explain further, 
and one which Vitoria does not impose.
For those states which are neither enemies nor friends in relation 
to one’s own state, Gentili does not have a name. They may act like ene­
mies, friends, or neutrals, although he does not use the latter term.^~^
At the fourth level states group themselves according to their re­
ligious beliefs, and Gentili finds that there is no state which has no 
religion. "Name me one such nation, if you can". The resultant pat­
tern is characterized by diversity - all religions are present, having 
followings of various sizes - but this does not establish a relationship 
of dependence between groupings and their constituent parts. As he puts 
it:
Religion is a relationship with God. Its laws are 
divine, that is between God and man^^hey are not 
human, namely, between man and man.
Religion may form a link amongst states’*-^ ,  but it does not affect their 
status of being princeps.
With the fourth level, Gentili's structure has reached its upper 
extension. It stands for the idea of a plurality of states.
(b) The Cohesive Materials. The first to be noted is the idea of 
human society. Gentili also calls it the "assocation of the human 
race" ^  or "that great community"^^ and he draws attention to the 
fact that all along the ages there have been men who believed that:
(T)he whole world was, as it were, one common­
wealth ... all men were one people and fellow cit­
izens, being, so to speak, 1^.^ a single herd 
grazing in a common pasture.
Did not Aristotle call the world "a greater city"? Was not Cicero the 
one who said that "(s)ociety ... in its broadest sense is between men 
and men ..."? Philo, the Jewish-Hellenistic philosopher, held the view
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that "(the world) is a great state, having the form of one commonwealth 
and Seneca, the Roman orator, statesman and philosopher, asserted 
that man "looks upon the world as one home". Did not Tertullian, the 
theologian, see the world as "the one commonwealth of all, and the com­
mon city of all"? Without commenting on the variety of concepts used by 
these authors as descriptions of the entity called "the world", and 
without attempting to explain their meaning, Gentili affirms as true 
that there is "a bond of fellowship among men", and that "the world 
forms one body".^^
The cause for mankind’s oneness is nature. As he explains it:
(N)ature has made us all kindred, since we have 
the same origin and the same abode. She has im­
planted in us love^^r one another and made us 
inclined to union.
Thus, by nature, men are not enemies of one another, and he agrees with
St Augustine that "the nations of the earth are united through this hu-
• „ „ 160 man society .
Most societies have their outsiders and human society is no excep­
tion. Excluded from it, according to Gentili, are two categories of men:
pirates and rebels. "Pirates", he writes, "are the common enemies of all 
„ 161mankind_ „ 162 ty . "To pirates and wild beasts no territory offers safe-
How can men who have withdrawn from all inter­
course with society and who ... have broken the 
compact of the human race, retain any privileges 
of law, which it^g^f is nothing else than a com­
pact of society?
As for rebels, a subject on which he remains uncommunicative^^,
Gentili does not mean those "who have proved false to friendship, to a
treaty, or even to voluntary dependence ..."; he has in mind those "who
were subject to authority" and rejected it.^~* These men are "enemies
to the extent of losing their citizenship", and they are not given "the
166benefit of a new law, to wit, the law of nations ...".
The second material to bind together Gentili*s structure is the 
law of nature and of nations.
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There are statements in his writings which, when taken out of con­
text, suggest that he neatly differentiates between the law of nature
and the law of nations. To give a few examples: "Natural law ... is
167more powerful than any law of princes" or "(the law) of nature ...
168cannot be annulled ..." as against "our subject is the law of na~
169tions , which controls relations with foreigners, not with one’s own 
people"'*'^ or "(the law of war) is derived from the law of nations 
. The following proposition seems to be especially appealing 
both for its clarity and its suggestiveness in terms of theory-build­
ing:
(N)ot only is the civil law an agreement and a 
bond of union among citizens, but the same is true 
of the law of nations as regards iji^ ions, and the 
law of nature as regards mankind.
However, no such impression remains if one looks at his writings 
as a whole. In fact, on closer examination, it appears as if he did not 
even wish to draw a distinction between the law of nature and the law 
of nations. The following two passages which he offers as definitions 
of the law of nations make this point rather well:
i. (The authors and founders of our laws) say that 
the law of nations is that which is in use among 
all the nations of men, which native reason has 
established among all human beings, and which is 
equally observed by all mankind. Such a law is 
natural law. The agreement of all nations abo^^ 
a matter must be regarded as a law of nature.
ii. But there is another more elegant definition of 
the law of nations ... namely, that there are ev­
erywhere certain unwritten laws, not enacted by 
men ... but given to them by God ... (W)e have^^ 
gained them, not by training, but by instinct.
While the above two definitions, to which, in 1601, he adds a 
third, namely, "(t)he law of nations is that which natural reason has 
established among all peoples; that which is common to men among them­
selves"^^, make their point, they give rise to a new question, for in 
spite of, or perhaps because of, all the information they contain, they 
leave the reader puzzled as to what exactly Gentili considers this law 
of nature and of nations to be.
One possible way of arriving at an answer consists in taking the
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key ideas from the above definitions and relating them to other state­
ments found either in the same chapter or elsewhere in his writings; as 
this produces a kind of genesis of the law of nature and of nations at 
the same time, it seems a fruitful approach.
Men did not receive this law from men but from God, and God gave
176it to men when they were in need of it , which was at an early stage
in their history: "(T)he law of nations^^ is a portion of the divine
178law, which God left with us after our sin
Men received God's gift in the form of natural law, or natural rea­
son, or natural instinct. Not that they were ever able to demonstrate 
it, but those who were neither "dull" nor "unscrupulous" knew that it 
existed. They knew from themselves because they knew when they trans­
gressed it; and they knew from others: from their words because "it is
the habit of philosophers and other wise men to speak according to the
179promptings of nature" ; and from their deeds because "the actions of
180great and good men" are in accordance with nature.
Good and wise men were not the property of any particular people,
but the inclination to do what ought to be done according to natural
181reason - to make "use of a certain code of laws" - existed in all
peoples. Hence, the observance of this law everywhere was not the result
of a single decision, "not ... that all nations actually came together 
182..." , but it was the manifestation of natural reason over time and
space or, as Gentili puts it, the law of nations should be regarded as
183"that which has successively seemed acceptable to all ...".
The law of nations established itself like a custom"*-^  and, as 
such, it is binding upon all, even if not every one has agreed to it. 185
For Gentili, then, the law of nations is all of these things: natu-
186ral law, natural reason, natural instinct, agreement, custom ; but
whatever the name under which it travels - one which is consistently ab-
187sent is "positive law" - it encloses the same subject-matter. As he 
sees it, there is a "first" law of nature and of nations which is con­
cerned with "the worship of God; the honouring of father and mother; the 
differentiation of peoples; the separation of dominions". And there
is a "secondary or derived" law of nature and of nations. It deals with
189"wars, treaties, obligations, and other things of this kind" , and it
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owes its status of being secondary or derived to the fact that "from
190that separation of dominions have followed wars, treaties, etc.".
The third material to give cohesion to Gentili's creation is the 
principle of good faith, which stands in opposition to "treachery",
"trickery", and "deception". It permeates all dealings between princes,
191 192states, and their representatives , in times of peace and in war.
193Good faith constitutes "the essence of the law of nations ...".
The presence of these three cohesive materials means that the nor­
mal or natural state or condition of Gentili's lofty structure is peace 
which, as he agrees with St Augustine, is "ordered harmony": "(0)rder 
is the proper distribution of things, which ... is the nature of jus-
With this observation, Gentili's "world", so far as it concerns 
its form or appearance, is complete. The activities to which it gives 
rise - Gentili singles out commerce, diplomacy and war - will be dis­
cussed in the next three sections of this chapter.
6. Commerce as a Link
Regarding the origin of commerce Gentili is not very communicative. All
that he is prepared to say is that it happened before the institution of
embassies arose and after the formation of states or what he describes
as "the separation of the nations, the foundation of kingdoms, the par-
195tition of dominions ..." ; and he does not hint at which came first -
commerce or war. His indefiniteness in relation to time is offset by his 
certainty regarding purpose - a certainty which he shares with, or de­
rives from, other thinkers. Their argument may be presented in the fol­
lowing way:
God made the earth one, for men to see. Gentili’s source is William 
Camden's Britannia:
(T)here is no land so remote, no island so se­
cluded, that the sight does not reach it from some 
other land ... (T)his was so planned by God, in 
order that men might have this unity lj)^ £ore their 
eyes and mutual access on every hand.
Although God made the earth one, he did not distribute its products 
equally. Gentili quotes: "Here the crops of grain are richest, there
140
197grapes grow best". A reason for this natural inequality is offered 
by Seneca, the Roman statesman and philosopher:
Commodities are distributed over different re­
gions, in order that it may be necessar^^or mor­
tals to have commerce with one another.
This suggests that one purpose of commerce is seen to consist in bring­
ing about a more even distribution of the riches of the earth amongst 
the peoples of the earth. And it implies another, higher, purpose which 
Gregoras, the Byzantine historian, states more fully:
But if nature had given everything equally to all 
men, the reasons for loving one another would 
readily be destroyed; for it is through this in­
equality that we ask and give in turn without 
ceasing. This i^^he law of friendship and its 
strongest bond.
Thus, the end and aim of commerce lies not only in making the world more 
"complete" or, to use today's language, more equal, but also in linking 
it more closely. "(C)ommerce", Gentili writes, "is in accordance with 
the law of nations ..."^^ which was devised "to bring men together".
For commerce to attain its purpose it is necessary that nobody ex­
clude himself from participation in the interchange of things. Gentili 
quotes Gregoras again:
If any one is so greedy that he does not wish the 
good things of life to be distributed, he will 
have to take heed that he does not ... establish 
a law upon the earth which sanctions every kind of 
wickedness and does away wholly with all inter­
course and commerce. Every one must realize that 
no blessing has been bestowed by div^g^ Providence 
upon any one for his sole enjoyment.
It is equally necessary that nobody be excluded from taking part. Genti-
203li mentions the case of the ancient Megarians who were "forbidden all
intercourse and commerce and kept from the harbours of the Athenians 
204-...". Their complaint, in his view, was just. The Athenians acted
205"contrary to the law of nations ...". He also refers to the non- 
Christians of his own day and states his position unequivocally: "Com­
merce with infidels is not forbidden".206
The right and duty of all peoples to participate in the inter-
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207change which "makes the completeness of the universe" becomes, at a
different level of the argument, the "right of way" or the duty not to
close the lines of communication. Gentili insists: "All routes are free 
208by nature" and by nature the use of harbours and the sea is open to 
209all. His source is Hermes Trismegistus, the ancient Egyptian god of
wisdom: "(I)n harbours, navigation, communication, and accommodation is
210the strongest bond of human interdependence ...".
There is one constraint which he places on commerce: it must not do
harm to the state, for "the principle on which states are governed" is
211to avoid suffering harm. Reason of state may take precedence over 
reason of commerce in cases such as these:
In times of peace, a state may prohibit the importation of certain
goods, if they present a risk to the physical or mental or moral health
of its members; it may forbid the exportation of a commodity, if it
needs it itself; for reasons of security it may refuse access to certain
212parts of its territory. In times of war, a state which is engaged in
213a just war may prevent commerce from aiding its enemies.
Apart from these and similar instances - limited in time and/or ex­
tent - the interference with commerce constitutes a denial of a "privi­
lege of nature", a violation of the law of nature and of nations, and 
furnishes a just cause for war.
Gentili leaves no doubt on the part of his audience: commerce is an 
essential activity within his lofty structure - the world.
7. Diplomacy as a Link
The term "diplomacy" had not yet been coined when Gentili wrote about 
that branch of politics which subsequently came to be defined as:
The management of international relations by ne­
gotiation; the method by which these relations 
are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and en­
voys; the business or art of the diplomatist; 
skill or address in the condu^^of international 
intercourse and negotiations.
Gentili uses the term legatio, which the Latin dictionary and his trans­
lators render as "embassy", and he does not always assign the same mean­
ing to it. When, for example, he speaks of sending or receiving an em-
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bassy, undertaking or being on an embassy, the word "mission" comes
readily to one's mind; when he writes "(t)he term embassy, though
strictly connoting a public function, is used both of public and pri-
217vate negotiations" , he denotes the substance of the enterprise; and
218when he says "embassies assembled from all parts ..." , one thinks
first and foremost of the people engaged in the enterprise. So, the 
point which Harold Nicolson makes about the term "diplomacy" can also 
be made about its predecessor, the term "embassy", to wit: it denotes 
"several quite different things".
In terms of the purpose of the institution, Gentili distinguishes 
the following five "types" of embassy:
(a) "The embassy for the transaction of business". It arose, he
has no doubt, after the formation of states and the establishment of 
220commerce. He is even prepared to be slightly more precise about the
age of this embassy: "(W)e certainly shall not ... abandon the view of
221those who set it down to the credit of Belus". Belus, as Latin dic­
tionaries reveal, was the founder of Babylon, in 4000 B.C.
If Belus was the "visible reason", necessity was its underlying 
cause. As Gentili persuasively argues:
But since it was inevitable that obligations and 
negotiations should arise between organizations 
having such reciprocity of rights as exists be­
tween nations, commonwealths and kings, and since 
those organizations are either unwilling or, as 
often happens, unable to meet (certainly states 
can not meet), it was absolutely necessary ... 
that others should be appointed, who by represent­
ing the organizations would be able to transact 
the necessary business. These representatives, more­
over, had to be persons ... not subject to him to 
whom they are sent. Otherwise the distii^ion of 
sovereignties would not be kept intact.
The business with which this embassy is charged consists of "peaceful
223negotiations" and "negotiations pertaining to war".
(b) Possibly less ancient than the embassy for the transaction of
business is the "embassy of courtesy". Gentili is not sure. He easily
traces it back to the time of Alexander the Great, but beyond that point
2 2 Ahe is not prepared to commit himself. As to its purpose, however, he 
has no doubts:
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(E)mbassies of this class are sent not only by 
those who offer congratulations on the good for­
tune, or condolences on the misfortune, of oth­
ers, but also by^nersons whom good or bad fortune 
has befallen ...
Hence, the
but, as he „ 226
embassy of courtesy does not owe its existence to necessity, 
points out, "just resentment results from (its) omission
(c) The "free embassy", Gentili is certain, is of more recent ori­
gen than the embassy for the transaction of business, and perhaps it is
younger than the embassy of courtesy, although it, too, can be shown to
227have existed at the time of Alexander the Great. Gentili explains
228that it is called "free" because it is not "limited by time or place".
Its purpose is not public but private, or, as he puts it:
By this (the free embassy) is meant the embassy 
of one who, although endorsed and honored by the 
public title of ambassador, has ^^lly gone 
abroad on some private business.
An embassy of this kind may have for its object the fulfilment of a vow,
230the acceptance of an inheritance or the collection of a debt. It is 
granted for reasons of honour or prestige or influence - necessity is 
not its parent.
(d) The most recent of all embassies, according to Gentili, is the 
"time or resident embassy". He defines it thus:
By a time embassy or time ambassadors, I mean 
those who are sent on no specific or definite 
business but for a period of time sometimes pre­
scribed, sometimes not, with the understanding 
that while they are on the embassy they shall be 
responsible for the negotiation and performance 
of everything which during the whole period may 
happen in interest of the person send­
ing them.
It is Gentilifs opinion - and this may be of interest to many a twenti-
232eth-century author - that the institution of time or resident embas­
sy goes back, not to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but to Ro­
man times. According to his source, Philip Sidney, Rome accommodated 
"embassies of the provincials and the allied nations" for a period of 
time; and the custom became more widespread under the popes, "for on
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their manifesting a tendency to have their own ambassadors everywhere,
233other princes imitated the practice".
The time or resident embassy owes its existence, not to necessity, 
but to a "good reason":
(0) ccasions for negotiation arise so frequently 
between princes that it would be more inconven­
ient to keep sending ambassadors th^^to maintain 
them always at one another’s court.
And at times, as he sees it, courtesy rather than volume of business is
the reason which makes for the establishment of a time or resident em-
, 235bassy.
(e) Lastly, and least prominent in Gentili's thought, is the "sa­
cred embassy". By it he means messengers "sent by a God or to a God or
236on some sacred mission". History, he points out, has known many such
messengers, for example, apostles, angels, Iris, Mercury, or the oracle
of Delphi; demons, birds or dreams, or today’s envoys dispatched by or
to the pope. The sacred embassy, in his view, is of "very great antiq-
237uity". Whether it is as old as, or perhaps older than, the embassy 
for the transaction of business, he does not say. At its origin: neces­
sity? He does not say either.
Gentili seems to mention the sacred embassy mainly for the sake of
completeness, for as soon as he has introduced it, he abandons it. His
238reason: "It is not of it ... that we have undertaken to speak".
The age of the various kinds of embassies, and the reasons for
239them, point to the existence of a law relating to embassies which 
Gentili is concerned to make as visible as possible, for:
(1) f all antiquity, if Greece and Rome in so many 
ways ... attest that embassies enjoyed the high­
est honor among them, are we not justified in 
claiming a like distinction for them among our^Q 
selves and among all nations, now and forever?
Of the various ideas which he ascribes to the law relating to embassies 
- a law which in turn is a part of the law of nature and of nations - 
it is instructive, for the purpose of this chapter, to note the follow­
ing three:
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(a) The right to send embassies is enjoyed by all public citizens, 
that is, independent princes or states, and "ought not to be disturbed
2 L 1
on account of religious differences". Dependent princes or states
may have this right in matters which do not involve "the rights of their242 243state" , that is, in "private affairs". Rebels, pirates and brig-
244ands never have this right , but it may be conceded in a situation 
like civil war, when "each faction lays claim ... to the whole organiza­
tion of the state".
(b) To the right to send embassies corresponds the duty to receive 
them. The exceptions which Gentili grants to this "eternal law" are of 
two kinds:
(i) A state may refuse to admit embassies if they mean interference 
with the "transaction of business", slighting of the "dignity of the240
state", or "danger of any kind". These are what he calls "adequate 
reasons". Their justification:
(U)nless one had the privilege of forbidding the 
coming of embassies, considerable confusion would 
be in^£<^duced by this alone into the law of na­
tions , which insists and orders that control 
over own affairs shall be final and invio­
lable .
(ii) "Intrinsic reasons" constitute the other kind of exception. A
state may refuse to admit those embassies which are not necessary for
the "intercourse of nations", that is, the free embassy, the embassy of
249courtesy, and the resident embassy.
(c) Ambassadors are inviolable. This, according to Gentili, is the
most majestic and prestigious principle of all. It holds irrespective of
whether ambassadors find themselves "under the laws of allies" or "amid
250the weapons of the enemy". Its disregard invites disaster. He cites 
from the records of history to make the point:
(T)he sacrilegious treatment of ambassadors was 
either punished with the utmost severity, or was 
given such unfavorable publicity that the loss of 
prestige which resulted may be regarded |^more 
serious than all the rest of the damage.
This reaction, he submits, is proof of the strict enforcement of the 
principle’s observance. And inviolable are not only the ambassadors, but
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252all those who accompany them, and the ambassadors’s effects.
Gentili raises a number of specific questions in order to show how 
far the principle of inviolability extends. For example, it is his view 
that:
- The principle of inviolability holds even if an ambassador is 
suspected of having been sent for the purpose of spying. The country to 
which he goes may refuse to admit him or, if it has admitted him, may
25expel him, but it may not do harm to him. Suspicion is not sufficient.
- The principle of inviolability holds even if an ambassador is 
found to be planning to commit an offence. The case which he discusses 
in detail is the ambassador who conspires against the life of the prince 
to whom he has been dispatched. "(D)ismissal is the proper treatment", 
he rules, for "the mere consideration of plans" is not sufficient to 
justify doing violence to the ambassador.
- The principle of inviolability ceases to hold if an ambassador
is found to have committed an offence. In discussing this point Gentili
distinguishes between an offence which constitutes a violation of the
255"legal obligations in the country of his embassy" and an offence
against the law of nations. While in both cases the law according to
256which the ambassador is to be judged is the law of nations , in the
former case - Gentili mentions business and law suits - the measure of
the punishment is provided by the principle "like for like", and the
judge of the ambassador, the magistrate of the law of nations, is the
257prince of the country of his embassy. In the case of an offence
against the law of nations - he refers to the ambassador who injures the
prince of the country of his embassy by word or deed - the ambassador
must be surrendered or punished "with great severity by (his) own na-
tion". "I hold", he writes, "that an ambassador ... should be put to
death or be surrendered, if he has inflicted even the slightest injury
259upon the sovereign".
- Lastly, it is his view that a prince who does violence to an am-
260bassador should not hope for the safety of his own ambassador.
As the above examples indicate, the principle of inviolability ex­
tends far, but no so far as to protect those who themselves violate it.
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To summarize the argument: In the world as Gentili constructs it, 
embassies constitute a necessary and/or desirable "interchange" which 
enjoys great age, prestige, universality, and inviolability.
8. The Question of War
2 ö XWar, which Gentili defines as "a just and public contest of arms" ,
has a remote origin. "(W)ho doubts", he says in De Legationibus, "that
,262wars occurred soon after the separation of the nations"?' 
Belli he identifies its origin as necessity:
In De Jure
(W)ar has its origin in necessity; and this ne­
cessity arises because there cannot be judicial 
processes between supreme sovereigns or free peo­
ples unless they themselves conse^^ since they 
acknowledge no judge or superior.
The necessity must be "real" and "actual", which means that unless an
attempt is made first to resolve the conflict by the use of argument -
Gentili points to the many cases of arbitration that every age is known
to have submitted to in preference to war - war cannot be said to be 
264necessary.
The fact that the necessity of war is admitted into his lofty 
structure does not mean that every war is so admitted. War as the arbi­
ter of last resort must be just, that is, "lawful" and "perfect in all 
„265its parts , or, as he also says:
(W)e hold the form belief that questions of war 
ought to be settled in accordance wi^ji^the law of 
nations, which is the law of nature.
And necessity is no more, and no less, than one of the elements which 
go into demarcating a just war from an unjust war.
In presenting his idea of the war which is "perfect in all its 
parts", Gentili distinguishes four causes which, borrowing from Aris­
totle, he calls (a) the efficient cause, (b) the material cause, (c) the 
formal cause, and (d) the final cause.
(a) The efficient cause is the princeps. For a war to have a claim
to justice, it must be undertaken by a "free prince" or "free people",
268that is, a public citizen. "(P)rivate individuals, subject peoples,
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and petty sovereigns" have no right to resort to war as "they can ob-
269tain their legal rights before their superiors' tribunal".
(b) As for the material cause of war, Gentili distinguishes be­
tween (i) divine causes, (ii) natural causes, and (iii) human causes.
(i) Divine causes are treated with scepticism. Men claim, he says, 
that they fight a war on the command of their god, but, he suggests,
"we must go to the root of things and consider whether their religious 
feeling in these instances is correct"."Religious feeling" in its 
turn is dismissed as a just cause for war: "(N)o man's rights are vio­
lated by a difference in religion, nor is it lawful to make war because 
271of religion". And he adds:
(I)f men in another state live in a manner differ­
ent from that which we foll^v^i-11 our own state, 
they surely do us no wrong.
(ii) Regarding natural causes of war, his basic position is that 
273"no war is natural" , for "by nature" men are all akin:
If man's desires are boundless and there is not 
sufficient glory and power to satisfy2^em, that 
is not a law of nature, but a defect.
While rejecting the idea that any war can be natural, Gentili admits, as
275just, wars undertaken "under Nature's guidance". This category in­
cludes defensive war and offensive war.
Defensive war:
- "Necessary defence", which he defines as "the repelling of force
276by force" , is the most obvious of all rights. "War is just for those
277for whom it is necessary ...".
- "Defence on grounds of expediency", which he identifies as a war
278made "through fear that we may ourselves be attacked". The cause of 
fear must be justified, that is, suspicion is not enough - a condition 
which, he admits, is not always easily determinable, but he offers a 
guideline - powerful and ambitious princes should be opposed:
Do not all men with complete justice oppose on 
one side the Turks and on the other the Spaniards^yg 
who are planning and plotting universal dominion?
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- "Defence for the sake of honour" 
war undertaken for "the sake of others"
which, in his language, is a 
280 #
"The other" may be a prince and help may justly be offered on the
281principle that "nature has established among men kinship The
tie of natural kinship is at times reinforced by an alliance, a treaty, 
a common religion, a common border or the fear that if the "other’s" en­
emy is a great power, it may become even greater if it succeeds in con­
quering the "other".
"The other" may be a people which suffers from its unjust and cruel
283prince. Help may justly be rendered on the same principle as above:
"(T)he subjects of others do not seem to me to be outside of that kin-
284ship of nature ...". Sometimes, necessity and expediency add support
285to honour as the reason for helping "to ward off injury". As he ob­
serves in the case of English help to the Dutch against their Spanish
rulers: "(I)f that bulwark of Europe ... should be broken down by the
286Spaniards, nothing would be left as a bar against their violence". 
Offensive war:
- Offensive war for reasons of "necessity". It is Gentili’s view 
that necessity may force a people and its prince to make war if, for ex­
ample, they cannot otherwise maintain their existence, or an emergency
287compels them to leave their country and find a place somewhere else.
Such a war is just.
- Offensive war for reasons of "expediency". Here he has in mind
the right of a state to undertake a war in response to a wrong received.
It is "perfectly clear", he writes, that a state may avenge a wrong
suffered at the hand of another state if the latter fails to right the
288wrong itself, for example, by returning wrongfully seized property.
- Offensive war for "natural reasons", by which he means the right 
to go to war if a "privilege of nature" is refused, for example, the 
right of way, access to harbours, or the right to engage in commerce 
and trade.
- Offensive war for "honourable reasons", that is, "in behalf of 
others". If a people sins against the laws of nature - one of his exam­
ples refers to the Indians being punished by war by the Spaniards for
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killing innocent human beings for the purpose of eating them - it is
. „ „ , . „ 2 9 0just to make war on it.
(iii) Human reasons form Gentili's third and last category of materi­
al causes of war. It is his contention that the violation of a "man-
291made" law may constitute a just cause of war. Amongst other examples
he mentions the breaking of a treaty and, more prominently, rape, a
crime which he considers to have been responsible, for example, for the
292"undying enmity between the Greeks and Barbarians ...".
Gentili thus concedes a just material cause of war not only to the 
princeps who fights a war of defence; he also grants it to the prince or 
people who undertakes an offensive war, provided the latter is fought in 
defence of a right which accords with natural or human law.
In addition, he is prepared to consider that a just material cause 
may be present on both sides. In support of his view he advances three 
reasons:
- Princes not being "cognizant of that purest and truest form of 
justice" - divine justice - can aim at no more than justice as man un­
derstands it, and if they think they act in pursuit of this justice,
293they cannot be called unjust.
- The prince being obliged to help "allies, friends, kindred (and) 
neighbours", thereby "justly rouses against himself the arms of the ad­
versary whom he is attacking".
-  Justice, like other virtues, is not "limited to a point". One
side may have a just cause, for example, defending its right to engage
in commerce, and the other may have a still more just cause, such as
295securing the country’s safety.
(c) Both the requirement that a war be just in all its parts and
the possibility that a just material cause may be present on both sides
make it essential that the formal cause of war - the conduct of war -
be just. As Gentili variously puts it: "Of all our laws ... that one
seems to me the clearest which grants the rights of war to both contes- 
296tants ..." ; or, with Cicero: "In war an enemy retains his religion
and his rights
The whole of the second book of De Jure Belli is devoted to the
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question of justice in war. For the purposes of this chapter, a few ex­
amples will suffice to document the general theme:
- It is Gentili?s view that the prince who has decided to make war 
must inform of his intention the prince against whom the war is to be 
made:
This is the voice of God. This is natural law, 
that before you take hostile steps, you first ut­
terly renounce the friendship or c^^gon tie which 
you have with the men in question.
- Poisoning is a weapon not to be used against the enemy. His nine­
teenth, and last reason in a long argument is that "war ought to be lim-
299ited to things which it is within human power to resist".
- "(T)he rights of humanity and the laws of war" require that those 
who have surrendered be spared.
- Farmers and religious men are safe, for "there can be no war with
unarmed men"; traders, travellers and other people who happen to sojourn
301with the enemy are safe, for they are not the enemy. Only if they
help the enemy, do these people become the enemy and are treated as
. 302 such.
- It is the law of nations and of humanity "to bury the dead or to
303turn them over to their countrymen when they ask for them".
(d) The fourth ingredient of Gentili’s idea of the just war is the 
just conclusion of war - the final cause or end of war: peace.
Peace, as was pointed out earlier in this chapter, is defined by
Gentili in a general way as "ordered harmony", "the proper distribution
30 Aof things", "justice" ; when he applies it to the conclusion of war, 
it becomes "the orderly settlement of war" - a definition to which he 
adds the following explanation:
(0)ur defintion ... has the provision about jus­
tice, which is what we seek in this cessation of 
war, along with c^ g^ ier and the assignment of his 
own to each man.
Gentili distinguishes between a situation where, at the end of war, 
there is a victor and a vanquished, in which case the establishment of
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peace is the responsibility of the victor alone; and a situation where 
arms are laid down by agreement and war is settled by both sides.
In the first situation, the victor assumes the role of judge and
should, if the peace which he makes is to be lasting, take into account
306not only his own rights, but also those of the vanquished. The pun­
ishment which he decides and which is intended to achieve "solace for
307injury and security for the future should depend, not on what he is 
308"able" to do , but on "the character of the persons concerned, the na-
309ture of the offence, the time, the age, the sex ...". Too much sever­
ity may not be in the interests of peace;
For one who has been injured beyond his deserts 
will not be tranquil, but will continually desire 
revenge; and one who is forced to accept pitiless 
conditions will carry the burden only sc^^ong as 
he is under the necessity of obedience.
Too little severity may, at times, not be conducive to a lasting peace 
either. A vanquished enemy who has done evil in the past and would do e- 
vil in the future because of his "inclination" must not be given the op­
portunity to do so. Gentili quotes a source from history: "Since we can-
311not put an end to your perfidy, we will above all break your power".
The third book of De Jure Belli reveals the many questions which 
may come up for consideration and judgment by the victor when he makes 
peace: the payment of expenses and losses of war; the imposition of 
tributes; the acquisition of territory; the removal of treasures and 
ornaments; the sacking of cities; the punishment of the enemy’s leaders 
and soldiers; the internal organization of the state; and particular as­
pects of it such as religion, language, and customs. When making peace, 
Gentili writes:
(T)he victor may, without violating the laws of 
nature, do anything which tends to make his vic­
tory firm and ensure a peace wt^^h is just to 
himself and to the vanquished.
The idea of justice is of equal importance in the other situation: 
the settlement of war by mutual agreement. Whatever the decisions which 
enter the agreement - Gentili discusses questions relating to the laws 
of each party; territories; towns and buildings; prisoners; arms and 
armies; friendship and alliance - they need to be based on the principle
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of "right and justice" in order to achieve a peace which is "perpetual 
and assured".
It is an elaborate argument which Gentili submits in the attempt 
to reconcile war with the idea of society or, to remain within the lan­
guage adopted by this chapter, to accommodate war within his lofty 
structure. Its quintessence: Given the structure of the world, there is 
a need for an arbiter of last resort. On the condition that war be just 
in all its aspects, it may assume the role of that arbiter.
9. Moderation
The idea of moderation is easily traceable in Gentili's work. Sometimes, 
it appears as openly as in the following statement, noteworthy besides 
for the link which it establishes with the idea of the via media:
The unique power and inmost marrow of all the vir­
tues is moderation. Hold to the mean, if you do 
not wish to lose moderation; a middle course is ^  
the seat of moderation and moderation is virtue.
At other times, it is embedded in the argument and remains unnamed, for 
example, in the discussion of "The Ambassador Who Is a Spy and a Trai­
tor" where Gentili says:
(I)f, on the mere suspicion that one had come not 
as an ambassador but as a spy, it should be law­
ful to deprive him of the title of ambassador ... 
the door would be flung wide open to the ui^^rupu- 
lous for outrages against all ambassadors.
And there are occasions where it appears in the guise of a different
name such as "temperance", to which, as was noted above, he refers as
316"the quality which is seen to impose a seemly limit on things" ; or 
"discretion", of which he says, following St Bernard:
Discretion ... is the mistress of zeal and mercy. 
When they are blind in the eye of discretion, men 
are wont to seize upon one c^^the other of these 
and to occupy the extremes.
Whatever the form or name given to the idea of moderation, its general
meaning, as the above examples indicate, corresponds to what Gentili
318identifies as observing "the proper limit".
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The proper limit, as one discovers when one looks carefully at the 
particular instances to which he applies the general idea, may be drawn 
at more than one level. In fact, it is possible to distinguish three 
situations.
(a) To be moderate means to refrain from the use of force altogeth­
er. For example, in Book One of De Jure Belli Gentili argues for arbi­
tration in place of war, and submits examples drawn from all periods of 
history in order that:
(T)hose who avoid this kind of contest by arbi­
tration and resort at once to ... force, may 
understand that they are setting their faces ^ 9  
against justice, humanity, and good precedent ...
In Book Two of the same work he insists that a justly conducted war
demands that children, women, farmers, religious people, traders and
320travellers be spared. They are innocent. He also is of the opinion 
that "it is mad and utterly raving" if the enemy’s temples, colonades,
and statues are destroyed, for these things "yield no profit in them-
321selves and (their) destruction does no damage to the enemy". He fur­
ther condemns it as "a mark of extreme hatred" if crops are destroyed,
322farm-houses set on fire and other such "outrages" committed. To give
a last example: it is his view that it is improper to be angry with the
323dead. "Indignation which is moderate ends with the man".
(b) To be moderate means not to go as far as what would be lawful 
and just. For example, Gentili concludes his chapter "Of Cruelty toward 
Prisoners" in Book Two of De Jure Belli by saying:
But surely it is fitting to restrain the violence 
of war as much as possible ... (E)ven if it is al­
lowed you to do harm, the permission must yet be 
used with moderation. Also if it has been allowed 
you as an arbiter to impair our rights, you must^^ 
do so with moderation and to a slight degree ...
In his chapter "Of the Vengeance of the Victor" in Book Three of 
De Jure Belli he argues that there is a limit to punishment and the 
question ought to be, not what the vanquished deserve, but what befits 
the victor. Quoting the Greek historian Polybius, he writes:
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(T)hose who are endowed with minds, when they de­
cide to punish the enemy, do not first consider 
what he may suffer in accordance with his deserts, 
but rather what they themselves may do with pro­
priety.
For example, it is not against the law to pillage churches and take sa­
cred objects, but, as he notes: "I should prefer to show respect to mod­
eration and honour, and to refrain from doing what is permitted by the 
laws".326
(c) To be moderate means not to go beyond what is lawful and just. 
For example, the punishment of an ambassador who is discovered to con­
spire against the life of the prince to whom he has been sent must be 
expulsion and not death. As noted above, this is the position which Gen- 
tili takes up in De Legationibus, and he offers the following reason for 
it:
We conjB^t a grave offense against the law of na­
tions , if in our efforts to repel violence we 
go beyond the proper limit. To put to death such 
an ambassador would be to show cruelty^gr tran­
scending the requirements of the case.
In De Jure Belli he argues that to kill the captured leaders of the
enemy, unless there is a just reason, amounts to "severity" which "ought
329not to be shown". If there is such a reason, death may be "approved"
330but torture must not be applied : "Who will defend the Spaniards when 
they inflicted a wretched death upon some great kings of the New World
Hispanicae Advocationis contains the case of "An English Ship Sail-
332ing to Turkey with a Quantity of Powder and Other Merchandise". It 
is captured by the Sardinians and Maltese, who accuse the English of 
violating the laws by "carrying forbidden articles to the Turks", the 
enemies of the Spaniards and therefore the enemies of the Sardinians and 
Maltese; the English complain, and Gentili pleads in defence of the Eng­
lish and moderation. One of his main arguments concludes thus:
333From these sources they (Gentili's opponents) 
can prove only that the Maltese and others may ob­
struct this trade, not that they may punish either 
in person or in property those who seem willing to 
act in violation of this law of nations, for the 
law of nations punishes offenses^gly when they 
have been brought to completion.
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Gentili thus measures the idea of moderation in terms of what is 
lawful and just, and this in turn depends on the particular instance 
under consideration.
Some Reflections in Conclusion
It was not a task of this inquiry into Gentili's ideas to search for an 
explanation why his writings have failed to attract much scholarly ana­
lysis; yet a reason offered itself in the course of the investigation: 
Gentili presents his ideas in a way which is rather unpalatable. Wheth­
er one takes De Legationibus, De Jure Belli or Hispanicae Advocationis, 
references to the pronouncements of other men and other ages are so nu­
merous - for a quick appreciation of this fact it suffices to consult
335the indices compiled by his editors of the authors cited by him 
that it proves difficult to discern his argument and to see the whole 
for the parts, "the wood for the trees".
Apart from the difficulty of keeping in touch with the main argu­
ment, Gentili's method generates other problems. It makes for obscuri­
ties: Gierke's quotation cited at the beginning of this chapter is a
case in point. Inconsistencies easily slip in. There is, for example, no
336doubt that Gentili prefers the use of argument to the use of force ;
yet his writings contain the small sentence: "(T)o war with words is 
337folly". There is, to give a second example, also no doubt that for
him the distinction between "planning to do something" and "actually do-
338ing it" is important ; yet his writings include the phrase: "One who
339is prepared to do a deed differs but little from one who does it". 
Another problem connected with his method is that it tends to corrupt 
the language. Gentili does not, for example, hesitate to refer to both 
"the state" and "the world" as respublica, civitas, or societas, to men­
tion the most frequently used words only; yet it is clear from his writ­
ings that "the state" and "the world" are two entities which represent 
quite different things.
Given these difficulties, it is important to observe the context 
within which he places words and sentences, and to link the latter care­
fully to the former in order to minimize misunderstandings.
Before moving to the next point, it is, however, worth noting that 
Gentili's method has its positive aspects: apart from demonstrating his
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erudition, and independence of argumentation, it establishes continuity 
where many a nineteenth- and twentieth-century author has seen discon­
tinuity, to wit, the well-known dissection of history into three neat 
compartments commonly referred to as Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and 
the Modern Age.
Gierke's decision to claim Gentili for the universalists has been 
proved wrong by the findings of this investigation. Why it occurred in 
the first place is difficult to see, except if one assumes that Gierke 
disregarded both the immediate context of the passage in question and 
the wider context of Gentilifs work on the law of nations as a whole. 
Gentili's lofty structure, expressing as it does the idea of a plurali­
ty of formally equal states, is incompatible with a world government,340
Gierke’s criterion for universalism.
The inclusion, on the other hand, of what has been called in this 
study the three cohesive materials - the idea of human society, the law 
of nature and of nations, and the principle of good faith - excludes 
Gentili from realism. Yet there is a voice which calls him, not indeed 
a Machiavellian, but "a man who ... partially ... succumbed to the34 ^
Machiavellian doctrine”. Midgley’s main reason for this assertion is 
the presence in Gentili’s thought of the idea of ”a war of expediency
34 2
undertaken to maintain the balance of power”. If Gentili had isolated
this idea from all other considerations, one might have agreed with
Midgley; as it is, however, Gentili links the causa utilis firmly to the 
343idea of justice.
Midgley is equally hostile to Gentili’s idea that a war can be just
3  4 4
(objectively) on both sides ; and to this disagreement there is no an­
swer, except to suggest that it arises between one who represents the 
universalist way of thinking about the world, and one who does not. As 
this chapter has shown, Gentili has the ideas of plurality and equality, 
and he joins to them the idea of that which links and circumscribes - 
a combination which identifies him as a representative of the via media.
Gentili is the first of the three thinkers examined in this study 
who does not have an ’’earthly” function for religion. Absent from his lof­
ty structure are Erasmus’ perfect spiritual Christian prince to uphold
3 4 3
’’the justice of Christ” , and Vitoria’s perfect spiritual community34ß
”to direct men to a supernatural end” , and no equivalent entities are
158
put in their place. For him, religion is a relationship between God and
man, and no religion is more excellent than any other. "(A) thing which
34-7has its own standard should not be measured by that of another".
When Gentili refers to non-Christian states, he usually applies to
them the name which they have as peoples. Thus he speaks of the Chinese,
the Turks, the Indians, and so on. Only when making a general point,
for example in relation to the question whether or not to conclude a
treaty "with men of a different religion", does he refer to all non-
348Christians as "infidels" , and the latter are not subdivided into in­
fidels of the Old World and all other infidels. Non-Christian states 
have the same rights and duties as Christian states, and they partici­
pate in activities such as commerce, diplomacy and war in the same way. 
The only barrier which he erects between the two concerns a treaty of 
friendship or alliance: it is excluded as unlawful.
Gentili does not call the totality of states societas gentium nor 
does he make explicit a theory regarding it. But the ideas found in his 
three writings on the law of nations and reflected in this chapter may 
be translated into a theory of international society which consists of 
two levels of description, although one of these is so poorly illumi­
nated that it becomes only imperfectly visible.
349Difficult to see, for reasons suggested above , is the less gen­
eral of the two levels, Level One. It contains the state or community 
which is represented by a "free prince" or is constituted by a "free
people". Its members are individuals and sometimes also dependent corn-
350munities. The laws which bind them are the laws of their state or 
community, and these are different from the laws of the other states or 
communities existing at this level.
The plane of discourse which receives nearly all of Gentili’s at­
tention is the second level of description, the world. It, too, is iden­
tified as a "state" or "community", but characteristic of it is the ab­
sence of a princeps. The states, described at Level One, form the pub­
lic parts of the world at Level Two, and the "free princes" and "free 
peoples" of Level One become public citizens at Level Two. The members 
of the "state" or "community" called the world are linked to one anoth­
er by the idea of human society, the law of nature and of nations, and 
the principle of good faith, and their rights and duties in dealing with
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one another - exemplified in the activities commerce, diplomacy and war 
- derive from that threefold bond.
Ideas of what is right and just generated at the level of the
351state, Level One, are transmitted to the world , Level Two, and vice
versa, ideas of what is right and just present at the level of the
352world pass to the states. This two-way traffic constitutes the link 
between the two levels of description.
CHAPTER VI
HUGO GROTIUS
Hugo Grotius (1583 - 1645) elicits a unanimous response on the part of 
Otto von Gierke, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull: they not only accord him 
a place on their respective lists of thinkers but also assign him to the 
same tradition of thought - the tradition which Gierke refers to as "the 
dominant theory, decisive for the future of the law of nations", Wight 
as "the constitutional tradition" and Bull as "the Grotian or interna­
tionalist tradition", and which, in the context of this investigation, 
is called the via media. The reasons, however, which they adduce in sup­
port of their decision and the methods for establishing them vary.
Gierke limits himself to a footnote which he attaches to his propo­
sition noted above that:
... Beginning with the sixteenth century, it be­
came customary to base the binding force of the 
jus gentium on a societas gentium in which the 
original and indestructible unity of mankind was 
held to continue to exist, while ^sovereignty had 
passed to the individual nations.
The footnote gives six references to Book Two of Grotius’ De Jure Belli 
2ac Pacis. As one follows these references and examines their contents, 
one finds that there is one idea only which is common to all but one of 
them and which links them to the proposition in support of which they 
are cited, and this is the idea of human society:
Reference one admonishes the reader to distinguish "the laws common 
to many peoples separately from those which contain the bond of human 
society". Reference two contains the idea that "by nature there is a 
kind of relationship between men".^ Reference three is the exception. It 
is limited to Christians, reminding them that "they are members of one 
body".“* In reference four the idea of human society recurs a number of 
times, for example, in the statements "kings, in addition to the partic­
ular care of their own state, are also burdened with a general responsi- 
bility for human society" or "those who first begin to abolish these 
ideas (that there is a God and that he cares for the affairs of men) may 
be restrained in the name of human society".^ Reference five speaks of
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"crimes which in some way affect human society" ; and reference six in­
cludes the sentence that "the law of nations introduced the provision 
that both infants and insane persons should be able to acquire and re­
tain ownership - the human race, as it were, meanwhile representing 
them".^
Thus, in making his case for Grotius as an exponent of the via me­
dia , Gierke stresses the presence of the idea of human society in the 
work of the seventeenth-century author.
Wight's reasons for appropriating Grotius for the via media are not 
contained in a footnote. They appear as one follows his argument pre­
sented in "Western Values".
In the context of his observation that the tradition of thought 
which is representative of Western values has "the quality of a via me­
dia" , Wight cites Grotius for the first time. It is the latter's dictum 
that:
A remedy must be found for those that believe that 
in war nothing is lawful, and/or those for whom 
all things are lawful in war.
Next, when outlining this tradition's conception of the nature of 
international society, characterizing it as "complex", lacking in intel­
lectual conciseness" and employing a language "full of qualifications"^, 
Wight says:
In Grotius' description of international society 
there is a fruitful imprecision. Communis societas 
generis humani, communis ilia ex humano genere 
constans societas, humana societas, magna ilia 
communitas, magna ilia Universitas, magna ilia 
gentium societas, mutua gentium int^ gr se societas, 
ilia mundi civitas^societas orbis - such is his 
range of language.
He does not identify the above enumeration by references to Grotius' 
writings.
The third occasion to meet Grotius arises in the context of Wight's 
investigation of the question of order in international society. In sup­
port of his point that "(t)he notion that there could be a lawless or 
delinquent state has been integral to this conception of international
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society"^, Wight reports the incident which led to Grotius' composi­
tion of De Jure Praedae and quotes its opening paragraph.^ Equally es­
sential to this understanding of international society, Wight argues, 
is the idea that the delinquent state deserves punishment. He refers 
the reader to De Jure Praedae and, more emphatically, to De Jure Belli 
ac Pacis, without, however, disclosing the location of this idea in ei­
ther of the two sources.^
Looking at the question of intervention Wight notes that "(be­
tween the opposing positions of non-intervention and intervention, 
there is a central doctrine of what might be called the moral interde­
pendence of peoples"^, and he quotes Grotius: "Kings ... in addition to
the particular care of their own state, are also burdened with a gene-
18ral responsibility for human society". Wight also identifies Grotius 
as supporting intervention on "humanitarian grounds". As he writes and 
documents, "(Grotius) refused to allow oppressed subjects to take up 
arms in their own behalf, but permitted a foreign Power to intervene for 
them".^
In concluding his argument Wight addresses the question of inter­
national morality, but he does not refer to Grotius until he is ready to 
suggest that perhaps the very development of a theory concerned with re­
lations between states is a characteristically Western experience:
(T)he Greeks never developed the theory of a so­
ciety of states mutually bound by legal lights and 
obligations. There was no Greek Grotius.
The reference to Grotius is not reinforced by a reference to his wri­
tings.
According to "Western Values", then, Wight claims Grotius for the 
via media because he approves of wars which are fought in accordance 
with law; he does not limit the membership of international society to 
states but includes individuals; he has the conception of the "delin­
quent" state whose punishment he prescribes; he supports intervention 
on moral and humanitarian grounds; he has a theory of international so­
ciety .
Wight’s account of the three traditions of thought in Systems of 
States mentions Grotius only once, and then in a non-committal way:
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when referring to "those who accept the states-system as constituting a
valid society of mutual right (sic) and obligations", Wight says: " ...
21of these Grotius is usually taken as the great exemplar". Reservation 
also characterizes his attitude when he declares in "Why Is there no 
International Theory?":
Grotius has to be read at large to be understood; 
the only possible extract is the Prolegomena, 
which gives a pallid not^n of whether or why he 
deserves his reputation.
The perusal of Bull's writings for reasons which may have induced
him to link Grotius to the tradition which "views international politics
23as taking place within an international society" leads one to conclude 
that, with one exception, the establishment of such reasons is not one 
of Bull's concerns; rather that he takes Grotius' membership of this 
tradition as something given, and applies it to questions that are his 
concern.
To demonstrate this briefly:
In The Anarchical Society he offers a detailed account of the tra­
dition of thought in question. He speaks of it as "the Grotian tradi-
2 Ation" and calls its adherents "the Grotians" , but he does not speak of
Grotius nor does he refer to his writings. There is a footnote in which
he gives the two meanings in which he uses the word "Grotian" - the idea
25that there is a "society of states" and "the solidarist form" of it 
but he does not tell the reader where to find these two ideas in the 
writings of Grotius.
In the section immediately following his account of the Grotian 
tradition, Bull discusses "the metamorphoses" which, in his view, this 
tradition has undergone in the course of its existence. He identifies 
Grotius, together with some other thinkers, with its first phase which 
he depicts as covering the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centu­
ries, and to which he ascribes five characteristics: its values are 
Christian; it lacks a principle by which to determine the membership of 
international society; it places natural law above "positive interna­
tional law" as the source of obligation for "princes and communities"; 
it superimposes universalist ideas upon its "rules of co-existence"; it 
lacks a "set of institutions" which derive from "the co-operation of
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26states”. Shall one take these characteristics as reasons why Bull a~ 
ligns Grotius with the tradition that has been given his name? They em­
phasize differences rather than similarities with its later phases.
They could also be descriptive of a phase of the universalist tradition. 
There are no references to Grotius' writings.
Perhaps Bull's references a little later in The Anarchical Society
to some of Grotius' ideas on war, such as his condemnation of wars with-
27out any cause as "wars of savages" or the approval of only those wars
28which "remedy an injury received" , can be taken as reasons why Grotius 
is seen to fit the via media.
"The Grotian Conception of International Society" looks at the dis­
agreement between two members of the via media, Grotius and Lassa Oppen­
heim, in relation to three questions - the place of war in international 
society, the sources of the law which binds "the member states of inter­
national society" and the place of the individual in "the society of
states" - and evaluates the appropriateness of their ideas to the func-
29tioning of international society in the twentieth century. In spite of 
its promising title, this investigation reveals little about its au­
thor's reasons for appropriating Grotius for the via media. It contains 
the statement that:
Both assert the existence of an international so­
ciety and of laws which are binding on its timber 
states in their relations with one another.
But he does not identify this idea in Grotius' writings, in spite of the
fact that, a couple of pages earlier, he describes the De Jure Belli ac
Pacis "as containing the classical presentation of (the Grotian concep-
tion of international society)". He also points out that both Grotius
and Oppenheim reject "(t)he pacifist and militarist positions ... (as)
inimical to the idea of international society" and approve of certain
32wars as being legitimate. On this occasion Bull offers a source. It is 
Grotius' idea in the "Prolegomena" mentioned also by Wight: "For both
extremes, then, a remedy must be found ... .„ 33
"Society and Anarchy in International Relations" does not advance 
the quest for reasons for including Grotius in this tradition of 
thought.^
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More helpful, and hence the exception, is "The Importance of Gro- 
tius in the Study of International Relations". Grotius' work is "cardi­
nal", Bull writes, because it formulates one of the "classic paradigms"
in terms of which international relations have been thought about in
35modern times, and this is the idea of international society. He goes 
on to identify five characteristics: it accords a central place to natu­
ral law; its extent is world-wide; it accommodates not only states but
also individuals and non-state groups; it is marked by "solidarism"; it
36accords little or no place to international institutions - character­
istics, it may be noted, which are not identical with those given earli- 
37er ; and he offers numerous references to Grotius' writings. As one 
pursues these references, often to whole chapters, one meets with many 
of Grotius* ideas, but that of international society remains elusive.
Thus, while the information supplied by Gierke, Wight and Bull pro­
vides much food for thought, it does not answer the question: And what 
is Grotius* idea of international society? Grotius thence becomes the 
fourth thinker to be included in this study.
The other three thinkers - Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili - are no 
strangers to Grotius.
Grotius knows Erasmus well, but this is not obvious from his books. 
De Jure Praedae does not mention him at all, and De Jure Belli ac Pacis 
does not go beyond referring to him as "my fellow-country man** and group­
ing him with those who show "the utmost devotion to peace"; that is,
those who "have come to the point of forbidding all use of arms to the 
38Christian**. Of Erasmus* writings, only The Praise of Folly receives a 
39mention. It is Grotius* correspondence which reveals his closeness to 
Erasmus. Here, Grotius portrays him as the example, the "greatest man**, 
the man who has done so much toward showing the way to a "legitimate re­
formation** and whom "we Hollanders" cannot thank sufficiently, the man
40who is on his side in his struggle for religious peace.
Vitoria does not figure in Grotius* correspondence, but he is given 
a great deal of attention in De Jure Praedae: references to the Span­
iard *s works are numerous, and Grotius offers them in support of his own 
arguments.^ He credits him with "irrefutable logic" and ''thoroughly
sound" conclusions.^ In De Jure Belli ac Pacis he speaks of Vitoria's
/ ^"sound judgement" only once. He often refers to his writings, although
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44less extensively than in De Jure Praedae , and not always in order to 
express agreement with him. In fact, the "Prolegomena" contains the fol­
lowing view:
I have seen ... special books on the law of war, 
some by theologians, as Franciscus de Victoria 
... others by doctors of law ... All of these ... 
have said ngjct to nothing upon a most fertile 
subject ...
Gentili also is well known to Grotius - a point established by both 
his correspondence and books. In a letter of 1615, for example, Grotius 
refers to Gentili as an "eminent" jurisconsult - eminent because of his 
writings on the law of nations and on public law; and in letters of 
1622/23 from Paris to his brother Willem in Holland Grotius urgently re­
quests among other works Gentili*s De Jure Belli and Hispanicae Advoca­
tionis as he needs them for a "commentary'* . ^  In his books De Jure Prae-
dae and De Jure Belli ac Pacis the references to Gentili are numerous. 47
In the former work the emphasis is on agreement, and Gentili finds him­
self amongst the "jurisconsults of the greatest renown".^ In the latter
work disagreement is observable, Grotius rejecting some of Gentili*s
49views as "untenable", "unacceptable' and erroneous. Where agreement 
holds, no particular praise in favour of the Italian jurist is added.
The "Prolegomena" contains the following acknowledgement:
Knowing that others can derive profit from Genti­
li *s painstaking, as I acknowledge that I have, I 
leave it to his readers to p^gs judgement on the 
shortcomings of his work ...
Grotius, then, is familiar with all three thinkers, and in relation 
to two of them, Vitoria and Gentili, he reveals a change in attitude - 
a change for which the reason is not readily available.
Who is Hugo Grotius or, as he is also called, Huig(h) de Groot?"^
The existing literature is likely to identify him as an extraordi­
narily gifted personality, "one of the greatest men of Europe", as
52Pierre Bayle put it in 1697 , "the miracle of Holland" as is still be—
ing echoed to this day. Yet few scholars seem to have felt inclined to
record and examine this greatness closely. Only a few biographies "worth
54notice" have appeared in the course of time. Of these the most recent 
and widely quoted - W.S.M. Knight's The Life and Works of Hugo Grotius 
- goes back to 1925, has no claim to completeness"^, and does not always
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escape the weakness, which Knight attributes to others, of failing to
56apply a critical mind to the facts at hand. Not only is there no "ful­
ly documented" modern biography of Grotius, there also is no modern crit­
ical edition of his works. ^  Comprehensive studies of his thought are 
58all but absent. Specialized studies, of which this century has pro­
duced a good number, especially in relation to his legal writings, often
-J ydo not distinguish themselves by a searching approach. Criticisms for­
mulated in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have
60been given little attention by this century’s scholarship.
It is the uneven nature of the existing literature, together with 
contradictory statements embedded therein, the occasional dismantling of 
an "established truth", and laconic statements such as:
In fact De Groot the man of history and Grotius 
the geg^us of legend are almost two different 
people -
which suggest that Grotius has yet to be discovered. A welcome step in
this direction is the Oxford publication in 1990 of Hugo Grotius and In-
62ternational Relations.
The following details about his life and writings are offered as a 
way of introducing him.
Grotius was born in 1583 at Delft, Holland, into a family of influ­
ence and ambition. He attended the university of Leyden from 1594 to
641597, following "primarily" an arts course. In 1598 he accompanied a
diplomatic mission led by Admiral Count Justin of Nassau, a member of
65the house of Orange, and the Landsadvocaat Johan van Oldenbarneveldt
to Henry IV, King of France. While in France he received a doctorate in
66law from the university of Orleans.
Toward the end of 1599 Grotius was admitted to the bar at the Hof
~7 ovan Holland and the Hooge Raad at The Hague. In 1601 the States of
Holland and West Friesland appointed him official historian. During
1604/1605 he wrote De Jure Praedae. In 1607 Grotius became Advocaat-Fis- 
69caal of Holland, Zeeland, and West Friesland. A year later he married 
Maria van Reigersberch, the daughter of an influential family in Zee- 
land .
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The year 1613 saw his appointment as Pensionary^  of Rotterdam.
This gave him a seat in the States of Holland and West Friesland and, 
later, a seat in the States-General of the United Provinces. The year 
1613 also witnessed his participation, as its spokesman, in a diplomat­
ic mission to England to review the longstanding maritime rivalry be­
tween the English and the Dutch. In 1615 a second Anglo-Dutch conference 
took place, this time at The Hague, Grotius again being the spokesman 
for the Dutch.
In 1616 he became a member of the College van Gecommitteerde Raa- 
den, a committee which, with its chief member Oldenbarneveldt, was in 
charge of the day to day matters of the province of Holland and West 
Friesland. In 1618 the Stadhouder^  Maurits, Prince of Orange, had Ol­
denbarneveldt, Grotius and some others arrested and put on trial the
72following year. The charge: treason. The outcome: the Landsadvocaat 
was executed in 1619, Grotius was sentenced to lifelong imprisonment and 
forfeiture of all his property, and the Stadhouder took over the reigns 
of government. As Grotius put it in a letter to the Prince:
If the Chief-Counsellor of Holland (Oldenbarne­
veldt) had remained with your Excellency on the 
same terms and in the_^ame favor, how happy I 
... should have been.
74Grotius escaped to France in 1621 , and stayed there, mainly in 
Paris, for the next ten years. In 1625 he published De Jure Belli ac 
Pacis. Late in 1631 he returned to Holland for a few months and, as he 
was refused permission to return to public life, left again to spend 
about three years at or near Hamburg.^ From 1635 to 1645 he was again 
in Paris, this time as Sweden's ambassador to the Court of France.
The year 1645 saw the termination of his ambassadorship, his voyage 
via Holland to Sweden, and his death at Rostock in Pomerania - three 
years before the Peace of Westphalia and five years before the house of 
Orange was to hand back political power to Holland's oligarchs.
Grotius' writings are numerous and diverse, ranging from the poeti­
cal to the theological, from the philological to the political and juri-
76dical. Various people at various times assisted in their composition.
A fair number of them were published only posthumously.^ Their original 
language is mainly Latin, sometimes Dutch. Most of his writings have
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been translated into other languages; a significant exception is his 
voluminous correspondence.
This inquiry into GrotiusT idea of international society is based 
mainly, but not exclusively, on his two juridical works De Jure Praedae 
and De Jure Belli ac Pacis. It follows an order of presentation which 
is similar to that adopted in the three preceding chapters, and consists 
of ten sections. Nine of these have counterparts, under sometimes dif­
ferently worded headings, in the foregoing chapters and need no further 
justification. They are: Section One, Grotius and the Events of His
Time; Two, Grotius and the Three Traditions of Thought; Four, The State 
and the Ruler; Five, Human Society - Another Kind of Commonwealth; Six,
A Plurality rather than a Society of States and Rulers? Seven, Commerce; 
Eight, Diplomacy; Nine, The Question of War; and Ten, Moderation. Sec­
tion Three, The Fatherland, occurs for the first time. It captures an 
idea which, while not suggested by the initial hypothesis, offers a way 
to understanding some of the other ideas found in his writings and pre­
sented in this chapter.
1. Grotius and the Events of His Time
Historical records relating to the years which spanned Grotius’ life
present an extraordinarily complex picture of political life, both with-
78in and beyond the Netherlands. Conflict, the condition which, for ana­
lytical purposes, is of interest here, is discernible at a number of 
levels:
There is conflict within Holland amongst its oligarchs over politi­
cal, economic, military, and religious issues; conflict between Holland 
and the other six ’’provinces” of the northern Netherlands, linked to­
gether in what is variously called the United Provinces, the Rebel Pro­
vinces, or the Dutch Republic, over essentially the same questions, but 
argued in terms of the principle of provincial sovereignty; conflict be­
tween the United Provinces and the Spanish South Netherlands, hence 
Spain, over the question of freedom from Spain - a struggle which en­
gages its protagonists not only on Dutch soil, but also in other parts 
of Europe and outside Europe; conflict between the United Provinces and 
other European powers, within Europe and beyond, in Africa, Asia, and 
America, over questions of commerce and/or colonies; and there is con­
flict between the successive Grand Pensionaries and Princes of Orange
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over all of these points.
These conflicts and the wider context within which they take place 
are very much a part of Grotius’ experience, first in Holland and later 
abroad; but it is not from his books that one learns the extent of his 
knowledge regarding them or the way he views them, and this for a num­
ber of reasons.
His most famous work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, published in Paris
in 1625, is not a response to the conflicts of his time, except in a
very general sense. In the "Prolegomena" he gives as one of the reasons
for writing the book "the lack of restraint" which he notices "through-
79out the Christian world". And the conflicts of his time do not consti­
tute its subject-matter. As he informs the reader:
If any one thinks that I have in view any contro­
versies of our own times, either those that have 
arisen or those which can be foresgßn as likely to 
arise, he will do me an injustice.
The Jurisprudence of Holland, a textbook on Holland's civil law,
published in Grotius’ mother-tongue in 1631 at The Hague, is similarly
81divorced from the conflicts of the times. The year of its publication 
may be seen as significant: 1631 is the year when Grotius attempts to 
return to Holland; it is the year which witnesses an intensification of 
the struggle for power between Holland’s oligarchs and the Prince of 
Orange; but if one chooses to see it that way, shall one equate Grotius’
lack of success in resuming his residence in Holland with a lack of a-
bility on his part to see things realistically?
De Jure Praedae appears to be an exception. Written in the years 
1604 to 1605 it owes its existence to the war fought between the Dutch
and the Portuguese (and Spaniards) in the East Indies. The particular
event responsible for it is described by Grotius in the following words;
In the year 1602, after several manifestations of 
hostility on both sides, it so happened that Jacob 
Heemskerck ... forced a Portuguese vessel to sur­
render and, disbanding its crew, sailed it j^me*
This vessel ... was laden with merchandise.
The book is devoted to the argument that "this particular instance" and 
"all such captures" are "right", "praiseworthy" and "beneficial for the
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83future" , and concludes with the plea: "I beg ... everyone of our gov­
ernmental assemblies ... that they will continue to promote and protect
... this enterprise".^  Events in the East Indies are not neglected, in
85fact, a whole chapter is devoted to them , but, as the nineteenth-cen­
tury historian Robert Fruin observes:
(The Historica) are ... a protracted indictment 
of the Portuguese, a defence of the East India 
Company. Whatever does not serve this purpose is 
left unrecorded by the barrister. Whatever would 
bear witness against his clients is concealed by 
him ... De Groot ... cannot be acquittedggf wil­
ful partiality in writing his narrative.
De Jure Praedae was not published until 1868, but its twelfth chap­
ter, "Wherein It Is Shown that even if the War Were a Private War, It 
Would Be Just, and the Prize Would Be Justly Acquired by the Dutch East
India Company ...", now subdivided into thirteen chapters, was released
87anonymously under the title Mare Liberum in 1609 - the year which, af­
ter many years of negotiations, saw the conclusion of the twelve-year 
truce between the Dutch and the Spanish. Addressed to the rulers and 
free peoples of Christendom, it presents its case for the right of navi­
gation and the freedom of commerce, and insists that "(t)he delays to
88peace can no more be laid to our charge than the causes of war".
Events are not discussed in the course of the argument, only principles.
In 1613 the Englishman William Welwood attacked the fifth chapter 
of Grotius’ Mare Liberum, entitled "Neither the Indian Ocean nor the 
Right of Navigation thereon Belongs to the Portuguese by Title of Occu­
pation", in the twenty-seventh chapter of his treatise An Abridgement of 
89all Sea Lawes , under the heading "Of the Communitie and Proprietie of 
the Seas". Grotius' response, not published until 1868, is contained in 
his Defensio. The discussion is about "the ownership of the seas and 
the prohibition of fishing", Grotius arguing that "in every age the Ba­
tavian fishermen have fished freely under the very shores of England and 
91Scotland ...". As far as events are concerned, he mentions the treaty
of 1594 which "the greatest of rulers, James, then King of Scotland, now
of all Britain and Ireland, made with the United Estates of our na- 
92tions" , and which supports his argument, but omits other, contrary 
events such as the Edict of 1609 by the same ruler, which forbids all 
foreigners to fish off the coasts of Great Britain.
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A Treatise of the Antiquity of the Commonwealth of the Battavers,
93which is now the Hollanders is a response to the conflict which sepa­
rated Holland and its Landsadvocaat from the other six provinces of the 
United Provinces and the Prince of Orange over the question of who is 
or ought to be in control of affairs, and, in turn, was intended to in­
fluence the course of events. Published in 1610, the year after the 
truce with Spain, when it became possible to focus on the internal situ­
ation, and republished in 1631, when the conflict went through another 
intense phase, the treatise is a long argument in favour of Holland’s
sovereignty. The evidence on which it rests is taken from history; con-
94temporary events, with one exception , are not recorded; and, as Fruin 
notes, later in life Grotius conceded that:
(I)t contained assertions which ... proceeded 
rather from his love of freedom and^is native 
country than from earnest research.
’’The Colonial Conferences between England and the Netherlands in 
961613 and 1615" includes a great number of documents on both sides over 
the question of trade in the East Indies. Grotius, who is credited with 
the formulation and presentation of the argument on the Dutch side, sub­
mits principles rather than events in the attempt to justify the exclu­
sion of the English from commerce in the East Indies. As Knight com­
ments: And "(s)o did Grotius ... conveniently forget his rhetoric of the 
Mare Liberum".^
Events inspire but do not enter into Grotius’ treatise True Reli­
gion Explained, And Defended against the Arch-enemies thereof in these 
98Times published in Latin in 1627. Its "Preface" states "the occasion 
of this worke" which first appeared in Dutch verse as follows:
For my purpose was to benefit all my Countrey-men 
... I exhorted them to use that art (of naviga­
tion), not onely for their owne proper gaine and 
commodity, but also for the propagation of true 
Christian Religion. For neither is there wanting 
matter for such their endevou^ ... Neither are 
there wanting ... wicked men.
True Religion is concerned with refuting "as repugnant" to Christianity 
"Paganisme", "Judaisme" and "Mahumetanisme".
Annales et Histoires des Troubles du Pays-Bas^^, begun by Grotius 
when appointed official historian of Holland in 1601, but not published
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until 1657, is the story of the war with Spain up to and including the 
year of the truce in 1609. Events are its very ingredients, but it is 
descriptive rather than interpretative, and in that quality, it is not 
a faithful reflection of reality: M(T)he extremes on either side" in 
the course of this war, as Knight observes, "receive little considera­
tion, being, as often as not, entirely ignored".
Thus a number of reasons combine - events are simply absent, events 
inspire but do not enter the writings, events are present but subjected 
to "wilful partiality" - to make Grotius’ books an unfruitful source in 
relation to the question of realism on the part of their author vis-ä- 
vis the events of his time.
The same cannot be said of Grotius1 correspondence. The many
102weighty volumes published by Martinus Nijhoff show Grotius as he par­
ticipates in a far-flung communications-network, informing and being in­
formed, on the events of the times - great and small, good and bad, 
nearby and distant, expressing his views and seeking those of others, 
intent on seeing things as they are.
In order to give an impression of the nature of his observations, 
a few excerpts from letters written from France are presented here:
23/11/1626 ... Here we have ten days to the beginning of the 
Assembly of Notables ... Cardinal Rochefocaud will preside, 
which is not to the liking of many as he is very much in the 
service of the Pope ... We understand here that the Persian 
and the Turc are about to conclude peace, which will make it 
possible for the Turc to display his strength against Hunga­
ry which, in turn, will enable France to advance against the
r 103German emperor ...
4/2/1628 ... I have seen the proposal by the Spaniards and 
Imperials, Poland and Danzig included, to Luebeck ... It aims 
at greatly reducing the traffic into our country and rein­
forcing the other side at sea ... Cardinal Bernulle has writ­
ten to Richelieu’s people ... including a proposal for an 
agreement between Spain and the United Provinces mediated by
France ... I am afraid that the accord will come to nothing
104... From England no help is to be expected ...
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3/7/1631 ... England, so I hear, is up in arms on account of 
the question of fisheries ... The letters from Spain of 18 
June say that the Cardinal of Spain will visit the Nether­
lands, also that a fleet of thirty ships, of which fifteen 
are warships, is to go to Fernambuco or the Baye ...^ ^
16/10/1636 ... The good news regarding Poland pleases me all
the more as the truce with Sweden is so long that few peace
agreements between powerful neighbours have lasted as long.
At sea, in Burgundy, and Picardy things are "in balance" ...
The English and the Dutch are in conflict over the question
of a tax on the herring, and the free entry of the English
into Flanders ... Meanwhile both desire to enrich themselves
106with the help of the wealth of the Orient ...
3/3/1640 ... I cannot believe that those who govern France de­
sire to conclude peace. What Sweden's mood is, we shall see 
when the rijcxdagh, which is now taking place, comes to an end
... Many at the Court of England are trying to persuade the
King of Great Britain to make some concessions to the Scots 
... In Italy there is fear of the Turk and of internal sedi­
tion ... The Turk is also feared in Poland, as one does not
know what the purpose of his massive preparations on land and 
107sea is ...
20/10/1640 ... We hear that the King of Spain tries to estab­
lish peace with the Sultan, and that he is likely to succeed; 
the former now has many things on his hands, and the latter 
wants to take revenge on the Polish cossacks and, as I believe, 
on Moscow, and with Persia the situation is uncertain ... The 
agreement between Sweden and the United Provinces is said to 
be of no great importance. Sweden, I don't think, has much to 
fear from Denmark ... ^ ^
It is not only the twentieth-century reader of Grotius' correspond­
ence who is prepared to issue him with a certificate of competence as 
a well-informed and discerning observer. Grotius' contemporaries are 
quite ready to do the same. As the Spanish King Philip IV writes to Fran­
cisco de Moncada, Marquis de Aytona, Governor of the Spanish South Neth­
erlands, to whom he communicates "conditions to attract Hugo Grotius ...
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109 "Of all those who live to-to the services of His Majesty", in 1634' 
day Hugo Grotius has the most perfect insight into the situation of the 
d  k  i " 1 10Rebels ... .
2. Grotius and the Three Traditions of Thought
In the preceding chapters it was found that Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili 
see themselves as taking up a position which differentiates them from 
the realists on the one hand, and the universalists on the other. This 
section attempts to ascertain whether Grotius does likewise, submitting 
the following observations:
(a) Grotius, as De Jure Belli ac Pacis reveals, likes to think of 
himself as representing no particular pattern of thought, proceeding 
like the early Christians who thought that there was "no philosophic 
sect whose vision had encompassed all truth, and none which had not per­
ceived some aspect of truth", and who believed that by assembling "the 
truth that was scattered" they created "a body of teaching truly Chris-
(b) Grotius does not devote much time or space to the idea of uni- 
versalism, and when he mentions it, it is in order to reject it. Thus, 
in De Jure Belli ac Pacis he lists as an unjust cause of war "the title 
to universal empire", whether advanced by the Roman emperor or the pope. 
The emperor's claim, he argues, is "absurd, as if he had the right of 
ruling over even the most distant and hitherto unknown peoples". It is 
not only contrary to reason, but, no matter what Dante thinks, it also 
is disadvantageous to mankind, for like "a ship" it "may attain to such 
a size that it cannot be steered". Even if the advantages outweighed the 
disadvantages, "the right to rule by no means follows", for such a right 
has its origin in consent or punishment, and neither of these applies. 
The Roman emperor is no longer entitled even to all that the Roman peo­
ple once possessed, for changes have occurred due to war, treaties,
112abandonment, and internal developments. And, as far as the papal
claim is concerned, the Church has no rights over peoples "outside the
bounds of Christendom", and within these bounds, it is not entitled "to
113rule over men in the manner of this world".
De Jure Praedae exhibits the same negative attitude towards univer 
salism. Chapter Twelve, the later Mare Liberum, contains the statement
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that "no person is the master of all mankind"; hence nobody is entitled 
to grant the exclusive use of the sea to "any particular man or na­
tion". The same chapter borrows Vitoria's ideas against the pope’s 
temporal rule of the world^^ in order to divest the Portuguese of any 
rights over the East Indian peoples as a result of the papal donation. 
"(T)here is no person who has the power to bestow by grant that which 
is not his own".^^
Apologeticus or The Defense of the Lawful Government of Holland^ ^  
is another work in which Grotius expresses himself against universalism. 
As Edward Dumbauld formulates Grotius’ idea on the subject:
There are those who believe that it would be de­
sirable if the whole world, especially Christen­
dom, were governed by a single authorityjgbut such 
proposals seem laughably impracticable.
Grotius thus is constant in his rejection of universalism: reason, 
practicability and law all speak against it.
(c) Less readily assessable is Grotius’ attitude towards the real­
ist tradition of thought.
At one level, and this is easily discernible, Grotius gives the im­
pression of being distant or negative in regard to it: he never mentions
Machiavelli’s name, nor is there any sign that he is familiar with his 
119writings. Thomas Hobbes, a near-contemporary of Grotius, gets a men­
tion in Grotius’ correspondence. In 1643 he writes to his brother Willem 
that he has seen De Cive, that he approves of its views concerning 
kings, but that he disagrees with the foundations upon which its propo­
sitions rest, in particular, the idea that war between all men is natu-
, 120 ral.
Scholarship has not yet established the existence of a link from 
Machiavelli to earlier "Machiavellians", but Grotius singles out one 
thinker - Carneades, the Greek philosopher and founder of the New Aca­
demy, who lived from 215 to 129 B.C. - in order to attack in him all 
those "who view this branch of law (the whole law of war and peace) with 
contempt as having no reality outside of an empty name"; who declare 
that "nothing is unjust which is expedient"; and who say that "might 
makes right".
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The "Academics", Grotius argues in De Jure Praedae, are wrong to
negate justice properly so-called. It is not true, he holds, that the
justice which is based on nature has regard only for the self, and that
civil justice is no more than a matter of opinion, for they overlook
that "justice which is characteristic of humankind" - outward-looking
122justice expressing regard for the other. In De Jure Belli ac Pacis
he formulates his disagreement with this way of thinking along the same 
123lines , adding that Carneades is wrong to divide "all law into the 
law of nature and the law of particular countries", for there is also 
the law of nations.
At this level, then, Grotius' disapproval of the realist tradition 
of thought is obvious. At another level his attitude towards this set of 
ideas becomes visible only after a careful examination of his writings.
It is an enterprise which takes one well beyond the "Prolegomena" of De 
Jure Praedae and that of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, and its results are 
best presented in the relevant subsequent sections of this chapter.
3. The Fatherland
The idea which inspires Grotius is not Erasmus* perfect temporal Chris­
tian prince; nor is it Vitoria's perfect temporal community or Gentili's 
perfect ambassador. Grotius is moved by the idea of the fatherland.
Many of the titles of his writings contain a reference to his na­
tive country, for example, A Treatise of the Antiquity of the Common­
wealth of the Battavers, which is now the Hollanders, Ordinum Hollandiae
125ac Westfrisiae pietas ... vindicata and The Jurisprudence of Holland; 
and his country, or an aspect of it, provides their subject-matter. In 
other cases, the title does not mention his native country, nor does the 
subject-matter deal with it, but Grotius uses the introduction to estab­
lish a link between the one and the other, for example, in True Religion
which, he says, is meant "to benefit all my Countrey-men, but specially
126Sea-faring-men ... in farre-distant-forren Countries" when meeting 
with the enemies of Christianity. There are also cases where the title 
does not refer to his country, although the work itself is concerned 
with it. An example is De Jure Praedae.
Grotius never makes a secret of the close link between his writings 
and his country. In 1618, following his arrest at The Hague, he puts it
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this way: My inclination to serve the Country is shown in my Writings
127... and also in my deeds ...". In 1632, after approximately ten years 
in France, he writes:
During all the time that I have been in France, I 
have not only seized upon all occasions but also 
searched for them ... to serve my fatherland ...
Several writings which I have published __ are my
witnesses before all the world of my constant af­
fection for this land ...
And after his death, on the occasion of the publication of Annales et
Histoires des Troubles du Pays-Bas by his children, the latter write in
their dedication to the States of Holland and West Friesland: "(Y)ou
will see that, until the last moment of his life, this author has pre-
129served a perpetual love for his fatherland ...".
The country which is close to Grotius' heart and mind is not the
whole of the Netherlands, nor its northern part, the United Provinces,
but one of the provinces, the most powerful province - Holland. "Grotius
... preferred to think of himself as a Hollander, ... and to treat the
130other provinces as mere allies ... of Holland". These words stem from
the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, and his colleague Peter Geyl puts it
this way: "This Hollander ... identified without a qualm the Respublica
131Battava with the fatherland".
Grotius* many efforts to serve his fatherland include an image which 
he creates of it. It displays the following features:
(a) Great age. Holland is a very old "true commonwealth". In De
132Jure Praedae he gives as its age "seven centuries*' ; in A Treatise on
the Antiquity ... he traces its birth back to "before the time of Julius
133Caesar, yea, peradventure some hundred years before ...".
(b) Love of independence. Holland has always been an independent
commonwealth. It was "established by a people of a free originall begin-
13 Aning in a free Land" , and it retained its independence, even during
"the flourishing time" of the Romans. Holland "never was subject neither
135to the Lawes nor Customes of the Emperour, nor of the Empire ...".
When there were attempts at subjugation - and there were two, towards 
the end of the Roman empire and during the reign of Philip II - the Bat- 
tavers, now the Hollanders, took up arms and defended their liberty,
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such that "the principall Soveraignty over the Hollanders hath been
136among themselves, and never depended upon any forraigne Authority".
(c) A moderate government. Holland has always had the same form of
137government - a government of the nobles, "the principall best men"
distinguished by their birth or wealth or understanding, "the Fathers of
138 139the Fatherland" , with a "principality annexed thereunto". Such a
government shares the advantages of "Regall Authority" - majesty and 
dignity - and of "the Authority of the Common People" - equal liberty - 
and avoids the disadvantages of both of them - the rule of one man, 
which is subject "to many errours", and the rule of "the Common People 
who are ignorant". Such a government is not only good in itself. As 
the experience of many centuries shows, it "well agrees" with the Hol­
landers’ "nature and manner of life"3 ^  Hence: it ought to be pre­
served .
(d) A virtuous people. The people of Holland distinguish themselves
1A2by their "undaunted courage and fidelity" , their "extraordinary for­
titude" and "inviolable good faith", their "candour and foresight", 
their "justice", their gentleness and compassion, their "modesty and 
goodwill"'*'^, their "aptnesse for all sorts of warre" , their skill as 
navigators 3 ^ “* Even God approves of them: "(I)t has been His pleasure to 
reveal the glory of our race to the farthest regions of the world cre­
ated by Him ...”3 ^
(e) Valued as an ally. Holland, because of its government and be­
cause of its people, has always been a sought-after ally - both in war, 
as a "confederate" of many a people, and in peace, as a partner in mar­
riage alliances 3 ^
A country displaying such traits is surely worthy of support. 148
4. The State and the Ruler
For Grotius the idea of the state does not possess the same inspiration­
al force as the fatherland - he does not create an image of it. He only 
mentions aspects of it, and he does this when discussing other things, 
for example, law or war. But these aspects, when placed together, sug­
gest some conception of the state. They may be presented as follows:
(a) the origin and purpose of the state; (b) definitions of the state; 
(c) civil or sovereign power; and (d) the citizen or subject.
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(a) Grotius ascribes the origin of the state neither to a natural 
disposition on the part of man, nor to God, although there is a passage 
where he places the state’s origin "in God" , but to the free will of 
man^^; and he offers various reasons for man’s decision to establish 
the state. In De Jure Praedae he invokes the lawlessness of the pre­
state condition. "(M)any persons", he writes, "either failed to meet 
their obligations or even assailed the fortunes and the very lives of 
others", getting away, for the most part, without punishment. To 
which he adds a practical consideration: the increasing number of human 
beings. The latter reason figures exclusively in The Jurisprudence of 
Holland. "(M)en had so increased in number", he submits, "that they 
could not conveniently be subject to one common government" and for this 
reason "divide(d) themselves into several civil communities". In De 
Jure Belli ac Pacis he gives expression to the idea that "that kind of
association of which we have spoken (the state), and subjection to au-
153thority, have their roots in expediency". Human beings, he writes, 
"leagued themselves together" that "as a united whole they might prevail 
against those with whom as individuals they could not cope’’.^^
Regarding the origin of the state, then, Grotius does not subscribe
to the idea attributed by Gierke to the natural law thinkers before the
mid-seventeenth century that man changed from natural society to civil
society in accord with "unchangeable natural laws", "eternal norms"^^,
but, as E.B.F. Midgley formulates it, sees "the state as a voluntary in-
156stitution founded upon contract".
The origin of the state goes back in time; how far exactly, he does 
not say.
Grotius portrays the purpose of the state by ideas such as "self- 
protection through mutual aid" and the "equal acquisition of the neces­
sities of life"^^, "peace and order"^^, "mutual advantage"thereby 
tying it to the reasons which made for its establishment. There is one 
occasion, however, where he identifies a purpose which links the state 
to an entity larger than itself - human society. The state was founded, 
he submits in De Jure Praedae, not for the purpose of destroying "the 
society which links all men as a whole", but rather in order "to fortify 
that universal society by a more dependable means of protection ...’’.160
(b) Grotius offers various definitions of the state. Sometimes the
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idea of community is emphasized:
The state is a complete association of free men, 
joined together for th<=?^njoyment of rights and 
their common interest.
At other times the accent is on self-sufficiency, as in the following 
example which he credits to the accounts of Thucydides, Cajetan, and Vi­
toria:
(A) state must be conceived of as something ... 
self-sufficient, which in itself constitutes a 
whole entity; something ... possessed of its own 
laws, courts, revenue, and magistrates; something 
endowed^^th its own council and its own author­
ity .. .
Occasionally a definition of the state contains the concept of civil 
power, as illustrated by the following example borrowed from Vitoria:
(A)ll civil power resides in the state, which is 
by its very nature competent to govern itself, 
administer its own affairs order all its fac­
ulties for the common good.
And there is one instance, singled out by Gierke'*'^, where the concept 
of sovereign power appears in a definition of the state. It is a defi­
nition, the ingredients of which Grotius attributes to Plutarch, Paul, 
Seneca, Aristotle and Alfenus, which does not distinguish between state 
and people:
(A) people ... (has) a single essential character 
... a single spirit ... (T)hat spirit or essen­
tial character in a people is the full and per­
fect union of civic life, the first product of 
which is sovereign power; that is the bond which 
binds the state together, that is the br^g^h of 
life which so many thousands breathe ...
Grotius himself nowhere indicates a preference for any one of the 
definitions mentioned by him, nor does he discuss or compare them. And 
he does not offer a definition of the state which places the civil or
sovereign power apart from the community or people, such as Louis XIV’s
166 167"l'etat c ’est moi" , although the idea is present in his works. In
fact, Grotius is not so much interested in the statel68 as in civil or 
sovereign power.
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(c) Tracing the idea of civil or sovereign power in Grotius' writ­
ings, one meets with difficulties in the attempt to decide whether Gro- 
tius wishes to distinguish between civil and sovereign power or whether 
he regards them as one and the same thing, merely emphasizing different 
aspects of it.
(i) He defines civil power as "(t)he moral faculty of governing a 
169state" , although his writings, especially De Jure Praedae, impart to 
it a second meaning - civil power is the power which inheres in the 
state and makes it "self-sufficient" or "perfect". As he puts it in 
answer to the question: What is the difference between individuals and 
the state? "Undoubtedly, that factor is civil power" . The aspect 
which concerns him in relation to civil power is not so much to whom, 
apart from the community itself, it may belong, but rather in what it 
consists.
Invoking Aristotle he distinguishes three parts or manifestations: 
"the architectural" to which he assigns the task of "framing and abro­
gating laws respecting religious matters ... as well as secular"; "the 
political" under which he subsumes "the making of peace, of war, and of 
treaties", "taxes, and other things of a like nature" including "the
right of eminent domain"; and "the judicial" which is responsible for
172the termination of "controversies between individuals".
This tripartite division of civil power does not recur in his writ- 
173ings nor does he use it as the starting point for a more elaborate 
discussion of the ideas contained therein.
(ii) Leaving the concept of civil power and turning to sovereign 
power, Grotius presents a definition, less than two pages after the def­
inition of civil power, which reads as follows:
That power is called sovereign whose actions are 
not subject to the legal control of another, so 
that they cannot be reiji^red void by the operation 
of another human will.
Unlike civil power, the concept of sovereign power does not prompt
him to discuss in what it consists, although he attributes to it, in
statements scattered through his writings, some of the same rights as to 
176civil power but rather to look at questions such as: - In whom does 
sovereign power reside? - What constitutes an abuse of sovereign power
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and does it confer the right of rebellion? - What may terminate sover­
eign power?
- Sovereign power may reside in the community - a case considered
exclusively in De Jure Praedae^^ - but, as Grotius argues in De Jure
178Belli ac Pacis, it is wrong to assume that it always does. Depending
on its needs or inclinations, a community may transfer its sovereign
power in its entirety to one person or to several persons. A ruler may
also receive sovereign power not from "the will of the people" but from
179God or through a victorious war. It also may be the case that a com­
munity retains part of its sovereign power, transferring the other part
180to one person or to several persons. Whatever a community's form of
181government - and he mentions some further possible forms - it should 
not, he holds:
(B)e measured by the superior excellence of this 
or that form ..., in regard to which different 
men hold different views, but by its free choice.
- According to Grotius there is one kind of abuse of sovereign pow­
er which entails no right of rebellion on the part of the citizen or 
subject, and there is another kind which does confer such a right. The 
principle underlying this idea is not made clear, but it is possible to 
interpret him as meaning that the unjust exercise of sovereign power by 
its rightful "owner" - be it the state and/or the ruler(s) - confers no 
right, whereas rebellion is justified when the ruler tampers with the 
sovereign power.
It is unjust, Grotius argues, on the part of him who holds sover­
eign power to show disrespect for the law of nature, divine law, and the
law of nations; to disregard the law of the country; to violate a 
183pledge ; and the subject is free not to carry out any order(s) result­
ing from such wrongful use of sovereign power, but:
(I)f from any such cause, or under other condi­
tions as a result of caprice on the part of him 
who holds the sovereign power, unjust treatment 
be inflicted on us, w^g^ught to endure it rather 
than resist by force.
Even if the treatment is such, he reiterates in a later passage, "as no
185one is warranted in inflicting" , subjects have no right to take up
186arms. "Others" may do it on their behalf. That is, he permits inter-
184
vention from the outside or what he calls "the exercise of the right 
vested in human society" as a response to injustice on the part of the 
sovereign power.
The "law of non-resistance", as Grotius presents it, derives its
strength not only from the purpose which underlies the state - the main-
187tenance of tranquillity, peace and order ; it also is upheld by the
188Hebraic law, the Gospel, and the practice of the early Christians.
And, although he stipulates elsewhere that "(h)uman laws ... go further
189than nature ... but never ... contrary to nature" , the law of non- 
resistance is an example of a human law which indeed goes "contrary to 
nature", for "by nature" every one has the right to resist a wrong.
It is a law which supports order rather than justice.
Regarding the second case Grotius gives seven instances of what he 
identifies as an abuse of sovereign power that may be resisted by force:
The ruler who rules by mandate only (the community having re­
tained the sovereign power) oversteps the "bounds defining his 
191office". This case figures exclusively in De Jure Praedae,
and consequently makes Grotius, in that context, appear the
192advocate par excellence of the right of resistance.
The ruler "renounces" or "abandons" the sovereign power.
The ruler proceeds to transfer the people to some other ruler.
The ruler intends to destroy the people.
The ruler violates a clause the very observance of which was 
the condition on which the sovereign power was "granted" to 
him.
The ruler attempts to gain for himself a part of the sover­
eign power which does not belong to him.
The right to resist "in a particular case" was agreed upon when
193the people transferred the sovereign power to the ruler.
Grotius does not subsume the above seven instances under a "law of 
resistance", but they may be taken to express the view that a violation 
of "the constituted order" on the part of the ruler entails the right of
185
resistance on the part of the ruled.
- Notwithstanding its human origin, the state, unlike the individ­
ual, is immortal. Grotius' authorities are Alfenus and Plutarch, Seneca, 
Aristotle, and the Scriptures: "(W)heresoever the course and order of 
ruling and obeying is once admitted, the same alwaies continues 
there". But a particular state may perish, either in its "body" or in
its "form or spirit"; and when this happens, sovereign power perishes 
195with it. As destructive causes of the body Grotius mentions the sea;
earthquakes; voluntary destruction; pestilence; rebellion, that is, when
"the citizens withdraw from the association of their own accord"; and
war which disperses a people such that "it cannot unite again". The form
or spirit of a state is destroyed when, as a result of war, "its entire
196or full enjoyment of common rights has been taken away".
Factors which, however, do not extinguish the body or spirit of a
state are: migration, sharing a ruler with another state; uniting in a
"confederation" with one or more states, that is, and he borrows the
idea from Strabo, "forming a system"; concluding an unequal alliance;
197paying tribute; and feudal tenure.
(iii) Grotius does not attempt to distinguish between civil power 
and sovereign power when he applies the two concepts to the external 
context. Here they mean the same: the absence of subjection to another 
state or ruler, or, to put it positively, the possession of independ­
ence. In De Jure Praedae he formulates this idea in the following way:
Truly, there is no greater sovereign power set 
over the power of the state and superior to it, ^ g  
since the state is a self-sufficient aggregation.
In De Jure Belli ac Pacis a number of pages are devoted to the idea
that, in the external context, sovereignty is synonymous with independ- 
199ence. To give just one example:
(P)atronage in the case of a state does not take 
away independence; and indgggndence without sov­
ereignty is inconceivable.
Being independent or being subject to none means having the right to 
make war, to conclude peace, to enter into treaties and to act as "the
186
guardian and vindicator of the divine law, the natural law and the law
c „ 201of nations .
To turn to the point initially raised: Grotius does not explain 
the presence in his work of the two concepts civil power and sovereign
power, and perhaps there is no other explanation than the way in which
• 202 he uses sources.
(d) In contrast to the sovereign power, the citizen or subject is,
as Grotius puts it, "under the rule of another", that is, under the rule
203of another human will - the sovereign power. Being "truly subject"
204 205and as such "part of the state" or "part of the ruler" entails 
the duty to obey. This duty appears equally strong in De Jure Praedae 
where Grotius says: "The gods have assigned to the prince the supreme 
power of judgement; to the subjects, the glory of obedience has been
left„206 ; and in De Jure Belli ac Pacis where he reminds the reader of
Seneca’s dictum: "The rule of a king, just and unjust, you must en-
, „ 207 u .dure . His reason:
Now beyond doubt the most important element in 
public affairs is the constituted or^gg of bear­
ing rule and rendering obedience .. .
The citizen or subject may refuse to obey an order which involves
209injustice, such as fighting an unjust war ; he may withdraw from the
210ruler, that is, go into exile ; but he may not, except for the cases 
noted above, use force against the sovereign power.
Grotius’ ideas about sovereignty portray those in whom it is vested 
- the state and/or the ruler(s) - as having no superior above them and 
as being supreme in relation to those whom they rule - the citizens or 
subjects. The origin of the state and its purpose make, on the part of 
those who rule, for a concern with order rather than justice in relation 
to those whom they rule.
5. Human Society - Another Kind of Commonwealth
The idea of human society appears in a number of Grotius’ writings; 
Gierke makes it the sole reason for appropriating their author for the 
via media; and Wight gives it as one of his reasons. What is this idea
and what is its place in Grotius’ thinking?
187
An answer may be attempted under the following four headings: (a) 
the origin of human society; (b) the members of human society; (c) the 
law of human society; and (d) human society from the point of view of 
states and rulers.
(a) Human society, according to Grotius, owes its existence to a
211"natural disposition" on the part of man or, as he puts it in De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis:
But among the traits characteristic of man is an 
impelling desire for society, that is, for the 
social life 2i20t °f any an(* everT  sort, but 
peaceful ...
The existence in man of a "strong bent towards social life" does not
mean that man is not "regardful of self". On the contrary. As Grotius
assures the reader: "(I)n human affairs the first principle of a man's
213duty relates to himself".
214Human society existed before states were founded , and it contin­
ues to exist, together with them.
(b) Grotius has many names for it: apart from human society, pos­
sibly the most frequently used term, he speaks of mankind; the brother­
hood of man; the world state; commonwealth; that society which embraces
215all mankind; that great society : "(T)he human race is like a great
216people, and hence some philosophers call this world a city ...".
The members of human society, as the above names suggest and the 
texts at large confirm, are human beings. In fact, all human beings are 
included, even pirates and tyrants. Human society knows of no outsid-
(c) The law which is proper to human society is the law of nature 
or primary law of nations. Grotius identifies it by offering an answer 
to the following two questions: (i) What is the law of nature or prima­
ry law of nations? and (ii) What is the subject-matter of this law?
(i) The answer to the first question may be presented in five 
parts:
- In De Jure Praedae Grotius distinguishes between the law of na­
ture and the primary law of nations, although, in the text at large, he
188
usually omits the word "primary" and simply speaks of the law of na­
tions .
The law of nature is inherent in all living creatures or, as he 
formulates it, it is "the law instilled by God into the heart of cre­
ated things, from the first moment of their creation, for their own 
conservation The primary law of nations, on the other hand, is
specific to man - for man, in contrast with all other beings, is en­
dowed by God "with the sovereign attribute of reason" - and reveals it- 
self in "the mutual accord of nations". "(T)he consensus of all na­
tions" on any matter, he says in agreement with Cicero and forgetting
the distinction just made between the two laws, "should be regarded as
220a precept of the natural law".
The primary law of nations, like the law of nature, "takes it be­
ing" from the will of God.^^
In De Jure Belli ac Pacis Grotius rejects the distinction between 
the law of nature and the primary law of nations as of "hardly any val­
ue": "For, strictly speaking, only a being that applies general princi-
222pies is capable of law".“ “ Consequently, he offers no definition of 
the primary law of nations - even though the notion, on the whole with- 
out the qualifying word "primary", is present in the text at large - 
but only one of the law of nature, and it has little in common with what 
he says about either law in De Jure Praedae:
The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, 
which points out that an act, according as it is 
or is not in conformity with rational nature, has 
in it a quality of moral baseness or moral neces­
sity; and that, in consequence, such an act is 
either forbidden or enjoined by the author of na­
ture, God.
A further variation appears in The Jurisprudence of Holland. Here, 
he does not mention the primary law of nations, but speaks of the "na­
tural law in man" and identifies it as "an intuitive judgement" which
indicates "what things from their own nature are honourable or dishon-
225ourable, involving a duty to follow the same imposed by God".
- Regarding the "immutable and eternal" character of the law of na­
ture of primary law of nations Grotius seems firm in De Jure Praedae: it
226is law "for all times and all places" ; although there also is the
189
statement that:
(T)he negative dispositions of the law of nations 
are subject to change, wher^^ its affirmative 
dispositions are immutable.
In De Jure Belli ac Pacis Grotius states that the law of nature
cannot be changed, not even by God; but he also informs the reader that
"the thing, in regard to which the law of nature has ordained", can 
228change. And he adds the further point that some things belong to the
law of nature by "a combination of circumstances", that is, if "no pro-
229vision has otherwise been made" ; but provisions in relation to those
things which the law of nature permits can be made, and have been made,
230 231by both the will of God and the will of man.
In The Jurisprudence of Holland the law of nature is presented as 
unchangeable in the sense that:
That which is forbidden by the law of nature may 
not be enjoined by positive law, nor that which 
is enjoined by the first forbidden2^ the second 
circumstances remaining unchanged.
In addition to the qualification "circumstances remaining unchanged", 
there is the further thought:
(A)nd things may be so changed by another law, 
or by the voluntary act of man, that the obliga­
tion of the la^^f nature ceases to apply in the 
circumstances.
The idea of immutability, then, one of the distinctions between na­
tural and volitional law - Gierke might consider it the most important 
234distinction - does not seem to be inseparable from the law of nature 
or primary law of nations as Grotius presents it.
- The existence of this law, Grotius holds, can be proved by refer­
ring to reason itself - there are "certain fundamental conceptions which
235... no one can deny ... without doing violence to himself" - and to 
the statements of philosophers, historians, poets, orators, and other 
"men of wisdom" such as those "inspired by God", for:
(W)hen many at different times, and in different 
places, affirm the same thing as certain, tha^^ 
ought to be referred to a universal cause ...
190
Yet he also provides evidence that "reason" does not necessarily pro­
duce the same conclusion in every reasonable being and that there are 
different opinions as to whether or not something is according to the 
law of nature. Francois de Connan, to give just one example, is, in 
Grotius' eyes, "a man of exceptional learning", but he is wrong to 
hold that:
(A)ccording to the law of nature, as well as the 
law of nations, no obligation is created by those 
agreements which d ^ ^ ot contain an exchange of 
considerations ...
posite.
Grotius may well say: "(T)he law of nature is not what opinion but
nat(
239
238what in e force supplies to us" ; but he also demonstrates the op-
- There are statements in his writings in which he equates the law
of nature or primary law of nations with custom, such as the following:
"(T)he law of nature has been used to designate that which is every-240where the accepted custom". And there are other statements in which 
he does not treat them as the same, for example, when he says: "(I)t 
has resulted from established practice rather than from natural reason241
that the sea was not occupied". Such "contrariety" raises the ques­
tion whether Grotius wants customs or practices to be seen as manifes­
tations of the law of nature or primary law of nations - or as something
different; and, as the next section will note, there is also no aver-
242sion on his part to equate custom with positive law.
- At the definitional level Grotius identifies a primary law of na­
tions and, as will be discussed in the next section, a secondary law of 
nations; yet, in the texts at large, he mainly uses the term law of na­
tions, making it difficult at times for the reader to know which law he 
has in mind. Uncertainty is especially likely to arise in the case of
Mare Liberum which, as a separate publication, lacks the defining con-
243text of the larger work whence it originated.
As Grotius presents it, the law of nature or primary law of na­
tions is law in the "proper sense" and law in the "extended meaning"; 
it is law which commands or forbids, law which permits, and law which 
declares what is honourable; it is unchangeable, and it can be changed; 
it is evident, and not so evident - it is a law which can be strength­
ened or weakened as a bond among human beings, depending on the use to
which it is put.
(ii) In response to the second question Grotius may be seen as 
presenting the subject-matter of the law of nature or primary law of 
nations at two different levels:
The first is general and abstract. In De Jure Praedae he ascribes 
six laws to it:
191
It shall be permissible to defend (one's own) life 
and to shun that which threatens to prove injuri­
ous ... It shall be permissible to acquire for one­
self, and to retain, those things which are useful 
for life ... Let no one inflict injury upon his 
fellow ... Let no one seize possession of that 
which has been taken into the possession of another 
... Evil deeds must ^^corrected ... Good deeds 
must be recompensed.
And, he adds, in case "the laws appear to conflict with one another",
the first two, being the laws of the first order, take precedence over
245those that follow. In De Jure Belli ac Pacis he identifies a collec­
tion of items assembled in a paragraph of the "Prolegomena" as belong­
ing to the law of nature "properly so-called":
(T)he abstaining from that which is another's, the 
restoration to another of anything of his which we 
may have, together with any gain we may have re­
ceived from it; the obligation to fulfill promises, 
the making good of a loss incurred through our 
fault, and the inflicting2$?^ penalties upon men ac­
cording to their deserts.
Items such as "self-defence" and "self-assistance" occur elsewhere in 
247the work. In The Jurisprudence of Holland he again chooses the form 
of a "list" including:
(T)o do to others as you would they should do to 
you, to maintain faith; and furthe^gobedience, 
gratitude, and every moral virtue.
The above three statements permit the conclusion that, as Grotius 
presents it, there is nothing necessary about the subject-matter of the 
law of nature or primary law of nations - even at this level.
At the second level the law of nature or primary law of nations 
displays a less general and more concrete subject-matter; it also re­
veals a less secure existence in relation to "the will of man".
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Three kinds of situation may be noted:
- There are principles of law which, because of the general con­
text in which they appear and of statements elsewhere in the texts, the 
reader is inclined to see as manifestations of the law of nature or 
primary law of nations but which Grotius fails to identify as such. To 
take the following series of principles as an example:
The right of innocent use. To this he attributes "the right 
to the use of running water" or, as he also puts it: "(A) 
river ... is the property of the people through whose terri­
tory it flows, or of (its) ruler"; but "any one may drink 
... from it". He also ascribes to it "the right of pas­
sage over land and rivers". These should be "open to those
250who, for legitimate reasons, have need to cross over them".
The right of temporary sojourn: "To those who pass through a
country ... it ought to be permissible to sojourn for a time
251... for any ... good reason".
The right of permanent residence: To foreigners "expelled 
from their homes" a permanent residence "ought not to be de- 
nied".252
The right of possession over certain areas. If a people owns
territory which is "deserted or unproductive", it ought to
253grant it to foreigners "if they ask for it".
These principles are contained in the chapter "Of Things which Be­
long to Men in Common", the initial proposition of which is that "(s)ome
25 Athings belong to us by a right common to mankind" ; they are clearly 
supportive of human society; but Grotius relates them to "the old com­
munity of property" rather than to the law of nature or primary law of
nations, perhaps, because the latter, at least as he defines it, seems
255little relevant to that "old community".
- There are other principles which Grotius does relate to the law 
of nature or primary law of nations, but which he is prepared to sacri­
fice without ado to positive law. For example:
By the law of nature, a man has the right to hunt wild ani­
mals, fish, and birds. This is true, he says, "so long as mu-
193
256nicipal law does not intervene”.
From "the force of natural liberty” a man derives the right 
to buy things which he needs for life at a fair price; to re­
fuse to sell what belongs to him; to seek marriage abroad; 
and, if in a foreign country, to demand equal treatment with 
all other foreigners in relation to such things as the right 
"to hunt, fish, snare birds, or gather pearls, to inherit by 
will, to sell property All this, Grotius holds, is per­
mitted by the law of nature, unless "annulled by any statute 
law".257
By the law of nature a king is bound by contracts which he
concludes with his subjects. However, this does not mean that
"it is ... permissible for subjects to compel the one to whom 
.,i 258they are subject .
Nature confers upon all men the right to resist in order to 
avoid injury, but "the state ..., in the interest of public
259peace and order, can limit that common right of resistance".
- Finally, there are principles which Grotius treats differently in 
different contexts. For example:
The freedom of commerce is securely tied to the law of nature 
or primary law of nations in De Jure Praedae where he says of 
this principle: "Freedom of trade ... springs from the prima­
ry law of nations, which has a natural and permanent cause,
260so that it cannot be abrogated" - even though one also
meets with the statement that "under the primary law of na-
261tions there were "no commercial transactions". In "The Co­
lonial Conferences between England and the Netherlands in 
1613 and 1615" he negates the principle of the freedom of com­
merce by confronting it with another principle of "the law of
262nations" - the principle that agreements are to be kept.
Excluded from individual ownership is the sea, for the sea is
263"common to all under natural law". Grotius presents this 
principle in De Jure Praedae and Mare Liberum, adding in the 
Defensio that not even parts of the sea are exempted from this
rule, for "if parts of the sea could become property, the en-
194
2 ^tirety which consists only of its parts could also”. In De 
Jure Belli ac Pacis he is not averse to granting the right to 
acquire ”a part of the sea”: ”(T)he law of nature presents no 
obstacle to such procedure".
Good faith must not be violated. This principle of the law of
nature or primary law of nations occupies a secure position in 
266his writings until one comes to the nineteenth chapter of
Book Three of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, ”0n Good Faith between
Enemies", where he mentions five situations in which good
267faith need not be observed. The first of these is identi­
fied as: "if the condition changes".
The principle of just war is linked in De Jure Praedae and De
Jure Belli ac Pacis to both the law of nature or primary law
268of nations and the secondary or volitional law of nations.
Yet, as both works show, the two laws provide a different an­
swer to what constitutes just war, and when the secondary or
volitional law of nations presents its case, the law of nature
269or primary law of nations is placed at a disadvantage.
As the above examples indicate, the emphasis, at the less general 
and more concrete level, is on those things which the law of nature or 
primary law of nations neither enjoins nor forbids.
The answers to both questions: What is the law of nature or primary 
law of nations? and What is its subject-matter? combine to give human 
society an uncertain and changing appearance.
(d) Nature, it is Grotius’ view, rejects as a man-made fiction the 
distinction between "people grouped as a whole and private individu­
als". 270 States and rulers, however, do not do likewise. From their
point of view, there is a difference, and this difference is "civil pow-
271 Civil or sovereign power entitles states and rulers to act in
accordance with their interests, and these interests may or may not be 
those of human society - which means:
(i) In the internal context, states and rulers may enact laws which
are in harmony with the law of nature or primary law of nations, but
they also may, "in the interest of peace and order", pass legislation
272which goes against it ; they may act in accordance with contracts con-
195
eluded with their subjects, but if they choose not to do so, the latter
273have no right to compel them.
(ii) In the external context, states and rulers may establish
2 "I Lrules which support the law of nature or primary law of nations^ , but
they also may adopt laws which are contrary to it, such as the rules
275governing formal war ; they may act as the "guardians and vindicators"
of the law of nature or primary law of nations and, for example, uphold
276the freedom of commerce or punish wrongdoing anywhere in the
277world , but they also may decide not to - their interests may be bet-
278ter served by contravening the freedom of commerce or by disregard­
ing the right to punish. As Grotius holds: One people is not bound to
279defend another people from wrong.
The observance of the law of nature or primary law of nations is
"binding upon all kings", according to a statement in De Jure Belli ac
280Pacis , but, as the texts at large reveal, much of what Grotius is
concerned with relates to that which is not obligatory according to this
281law, which means, states and rulers have a choice.
As Grotius presents it, human society cannot be certain of support 
by states and rulers.
To conclude: In De Jure Praedae Grotius speaks of human society as
"commended to us so frequently and so enthusiastically by the ancient
282philosophers" and in De Jure Belli ac Pacis he notes that "the force
of the relationship which nature has wished to prevail among men" is be-
283ing restored , but his own treatment of the matter does not amount to 
a statement on behalf of human society.
6. A Plurality rather than a Society of States and Rulers?
There are sentences in Grotius' writings which attract the eye and mind
of those interested in the idea of international society. For example,
De Jure Belli ac Pacis speaks on page one of its "Prolegomena" of the
neglect which "that body of law ... which is concerned with the mutual
relations among states or rulers of states" has "up to the present" ex-
284perienced, and the necessity to remedy the situation ; a few pages la­
ter, reference is made to "certain laws ... between all states, or a
great many states" having "in view the advantage, not of particular
285states, but of the great society of states" ; Book Two identifies "in-
196
ternational law" as affecting "the mutual society of nations in rela-
286tion to one another" ; the concluding chapter of Book Three draws at­
tention to the importance of keeping good faith, "(f)or not only is ev­
ery state sustained by good faith ... but also that greater society of 
states" ; and De Jure Praedae is in no way outdistanced by De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis, for, in its "Prolegomena", it presents the idea that:
(O)wing to the existence of a common good of an 
international nature, the various peoples who had 
established states for themselves entered into^gg 
agreements concerning that international good.
However, the expectations which these utterances raise remain
largely unfulfilled. Their wording, it is- true, is more suggestive in
the English language in The Classics of International Law than in the
Latin original - the latter does not speak of "the advantage ... of
that great society of states" but of "the advantage ... of that great 
289society" ; it does not identify the law affecting "the mutual society
290of nations" as "international law" but as "the law of nations" ; it
does not present good faith as sustaining "that greater society of
291states" but "that greater society of nations" ; and it does not talk
of "the common good of an international nature" or "the international
292good" but of "the common good of states" - but the Latin text is sug- 
293gestive enough , even if one makes allowance for the often non-politi-
294cal meaning of the word gens or "nation". Expectations remain unful­
filled because Grotius does not provide the ingredients necessary to put 
substance into the statements referred to above. Like fata morgana they 
lure the searcher into traversing the many pages of his writings without 
leading to what they promise. The findings gathered together in the 
course of this exploration are presented in this and the following sec­
tions. They amount to a picture of international relations which is 
fragmented, indeed.
Let us see how it takes shape.
(a) There is first of all and readily discernible the idea of a 
plurality of independent states and rulers. Grotius attests to their 
presence everywhere when he says:
(I)n every part of the world we find a division 
into just such united groups, with the result that 
persons who hold themselves aloof from this estab-
197
lished practic^r-seem hardly worthy to be called 
human beings.
Although he qualifies the above statement when he declares that states
are absent "on the sea, in a wilderness, or on vacant islands", and
where "men live in family groups and not in states" or, as he also for-
mulates it, "in any region where the people have no government" , he
is firm in his insistence that states are immortal. The permanence of
states, he holds, is immediately attributable to man, for "mans wisdome
and policy have some stroke in point of government", but ultimately
"the preservation of Commonwealths" is imputable to "an all-guiding 
297providence". As noted above, claims to universal rule by pope and/or 
emperor have no room in this scheme of things.
(b) Also clearly visible is the idea that states and rulers are 
formally equal, although Grotius does not devote much time to its delin­
eation. It appears in De Jure Praedae when he says: "One state ... is
298not in subjection but in contraposition ... to another state". And
it manifests itself in De Jure Belli ac Pacis when he speaks of "the
299equal rights" of those who "are subject to no one" , or when he re­
minds his audience that among the Greeks, according to Thucydides, "col­
onies in respect to legal independence were on the same plane as the 
mother cities".States and rulers may differ in a number of ways, 
for example, in power or prestige, civilization or religion, but these 
factors do not affect their formal standing.
(c) The next component is problematic. It is the law which "Carne-
ades passed over altogether", the law which holds between states and 
301rulers , the law which Grotius variously calls the law of nations, 
the law of nations properly so-called, the volitional law of nations, 
or the secondary law of nations, and which, in the context of this in­
quiry, is called the secondary or volitional law of nations. Its prob­
lematic nature is not immediately obvious but appears as one follows 
Grotius* answers to the two closely related questions: (i) What is the 
secondary or volitional law of nations? and (ii) What is its subject- 
matter? These answers are presented at some length, as they concern an 
important aspect of the idea of international society.
(i) In response to the first question Grotius defines the secondary 
or volitional law of nations in De Jure Praedae as "a species of mixed
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O Q Olaw, compounded of the (primary) law of nations and municipal law" -
although on a later page he identifies its origin simply as "civil „303
- which comprises the agreements reached between "the various peoples
who had established states for themselves" regarding their common
, 304 good.
In De Jure Belli ac Pacis he not only places the human will at the
origin of this body of law, but he also makes it the product of time and
custom; he substitutes the less clear-cut term "nations" for "peoples"
or "states" and designates it as law "common to" nations rather than
"existing between" them, in spite of the fact that in the "Prolegomena"
305he identifies it as "law between states" ; and he allows for a less 
than universal applicability. To use his own words:
(The volitional law of nations) is broader in scope 
than municipal law ... (it) has received its oblig­
atory force from the will of all nations, or of many 
nations ... of many nations, for ... outside of the 
sphere of the law of nature^^.. there is hardly any 
law common to all nations.
The law of nations , he adds, citing the ancient Greek rhetorician Dion
307Chrysostomus, "is the creation of time and custom".
In The Jurisprudence of Holland he offers a different answer again. 
Here he defines the law under consideration as "(h)uman positive law ... 
common to all nations" which, "though not an absolutely essential conse­
quence of the law of nature, closely resembles it"; he postulates an
origin in time preceding the formation of states; and he identifies its
308purpose as serving "the community of mankind".
The above three definitions of the secondary or volitional law of
nations do not impress by their congruence - although one can agree with
Gierke that Grotius' jus gentium is "the concordant positive law of all 
309or many peoples" - but before evaluating them further, it seems best 
to look at what Grotius says about the subject-matter of this law.
(ii) Grotius presents the subject-matter of the secondary or voli­
tional law of nations in the "Prolegomena" to De Jure Praedae by means 
of a two-fold division which he attaches to his definition of this law.
The first category has "the force of an international pact"~)iU ~ al~
311though this does not mean that it is not "susceptible to change"
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and includes the inviolability of ambassadors, the burial of the dead, 
and judicial procedure. The second category lacks "the force of a 
pact": it is not law but rather "accepted custom" and contains "provi­
sions relative to servitude, to certain kinds of contract, and to order 
313of succession". These provisions, Grotius holds, may be abrogated by 
individual states, because they do not owe their existence to a common 
agreement but to a chance accord. As he formulates it:
(They) have been adopted in identical form - ei­
ther imitatively or as a coincidence - by all or 
... a majority of nations, in accordance^y^th 
their separate and individual interests.
De Jure Belli ac Pacis does not give this twofold division, even
though it has room for the idea that there is a law of nations "proper-
315ly so-called" and one which only "simulates" that law ; but at the 
end of the nineteenth chapter of Book Two Grotius offers a list of items 
which he subsumes under the volitional law of nations. Apart from "the 
right of legation" and "the right of sepulchre" they include:
(T)he right to things possessed for a long time 
(prescription), the right of succession ..., and 
the rights whic^gre created by a contract no mat­
ter how unfair.
All these rights, he submits, impose an "obligation by virtue of the
317volitional law of nations" , which may be interpreted to mean that he 
accords them the same status, and the wording which he chooses suggests 
the status of "pact" or "law" rather than that of "custom". How diffi­
cult or easy it may be to abrogate them he does not say.
The Jurisprudence of Holland mentions "the law relating to the 
safe-conduct of ambassadors and many other rules concerning peace and 
war" as belonging to the subject-matter of the volitional law of na­
tions, and it notes that this law, because of its resemblance to the law
318of nature, its age and "extensive" use, is not "readily altered".
Comparing the three "lists of items" which Grotius offers in re­
sponse to the question: What is the subject-matter of the secondary or 
volitional law of nations? one notices the absence of commerce - an item 
which figures prominently in a number of his writings. In fact, as the 
latter reveal, he sometimes assigns it to the law of nature or primary 
law of nations and, at other times, makes it the subject-matter of con-
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tracts or treaties 319
- Diplomacy, or rather aspects appertaining to it, appears as an 
item in all three lists. In his works as a whole, however, Grotius de­
votes only one chapter to diplomatic matters, and here, as one finds,
320he displays some ambivalence towards the law underlying them.
- Except for the indirect reference in the first list, and the
fleeting mention in the third, war is absent from Grotius’ lists of
items belonging to the secondary or volitional law of nations. Yet war
plays a prominent role in De Jure Praedae and De Jure Belli ac Pacis.
In the former work the law governing war is presented as "a phase of the
321law of nature” , although two of its aspects - judicial procedure and
the seizure of booty by the subjects of both belligerents - are appro-
322priated for the secondary or volitional law of nations ; in De Jure
Belli ac Pacis Grotius equates the law of war sometimes with the law of
323 324nature and at other times with the law of nations , presenting the
latter, especially in Book Three, as a law which distinguishes itself
325by its severity.
- "The right of sepulchre" appears in two of the three lists. How­
ever, in the chapter which Grotius devotes to it in De Jure Belli ac Pa­
cis , he associates this right with the law of nature and custom rather 
than with the secondary or volitional law of nations, the two main ques­
tions which he raises being: "Whether the right of burial is obligatory
in the case of notorious criminals?" and "Whether the right of burial is
326obligatory in the case of those who kill themselves?"
- "The right of prescription", included in one of the three lists, 
is treated inconsistently in the texts at large. Rejecting prescription 
in De Jure Praedae as having no "force in the relations between free na- 
tions or between the rulers of different peoples" , he admits it in
De Jure Belli ac Pacis.
- "Provisions relating to servitude" or "the right over prisoners
of war" are mentioned in the first of the three lists, under the heading
of custom, but when Grotius discusses them, which he does in De Jure
329Belli ac Pacis, he presents them in one context as a severe law , sug­
gesting to the reader the absence rather than the presence of society
330amongst those who agreed to it , and notes that they no longer apply
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to "Christians ... among themselves" and to "Mohammedans among them-
In
332
331selves".  another context, he makes them subject to the idea of
moderation.
- "Provisions relative to certain kinds of contract" or "the rights
created by a contract no matter how unfair" appear in two of the three
lists - in De Jure Praedae, in the category of custom, and, in De Jure
Belli ac Pacis, under the heading of law. Only the latter work, however,
discusses contracts, or treaties as Grotius also calls "the public
333agreements" between states and rulers. Yet, while it presents a clas­
sification of treaties, raises the question whether treaties may be con­
cluded with "strangers to the true religion" and answers it from the 
point of view of natural law, Hebraic law, and the law of the Gospel, 
and also looks at the termination of treaties, it never mentions what 
states and rulers may have agreed to in relation to treaties under the 
secondary or volitional law of nations - except for the provision, and 
this is given separately from the main discussion, that "an inequality 
in terms is considered an equality as regards external acts". Towards 
the end of De Jure Belli ac Pacis Grotius devotes some space to peace 
treaties, but again there is no mention of the secondary or volitional
law of nations, only an occasional reference to a "strict law of na-
„ 335tions .
- The "order of succession" figures in two of the three lists - in 
De Jure Praedae, under custom, and, in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, under 
law. The first text does not discuss it; the second does so in terms of 
"the laws or customs" of individual states, and where such laws or cus­
toms do not exist, natural law, nature, natural justice are called upon
_ ., 336to provide an answer.
- Not included in the three lists but occurring in both De Jure 
Praedae and De Jure Belli ac Pacis is the "law of reprisals". The lat­
ter work identifies it as falling within the secondary or volitional law 
337of nations. De Jure Praedae, on the other hand, gives it no clearer 
label than "the law of nations", and the context suggests the primary
law of nations rather than the secondary or volitional law of nations. 338
- Not inscribed in the lists, and not linked to the secondary or 
volitional law of nations in the texts at large, is the idea that states 
and rulers have the right - sometimes it also appears as "responsibili-
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tyM, but never as an obligation - to "protect human society from vio­
lence" by punishing anybody anywhere for "crimes against God" and "the
339law of nature or of nations". While the existence of this right is 
posited on a number of occasions, mainly in the chapter "On Punish­
ments", it is never made the result of an agreement between states and 
rulers.
Looking back over the answers provided by Grotius to the two ques­
tions - What is the secondary or volitional law of nations? and What is 
its subject-matter? - one finds little that adds to his initial state­
ment that there is such a law:
The definitions, diverse, as they are, fail to promote a particu­
lar conception of the secondary or volitional law of nations. As he pre­
sents it, it is law between states and law common to nations; it is law 
between all states and law common to all or many nations; it is law 
which the will of states or nations establishes, and law which has cus­
tom at its origin; it is law which has natural law as one of its sour-
340ces, law which is quite distinct from the law of nature , and law 
which closely resembles the law of nature; it is law which is suscepti­
ble to change, and law which is not readily altered.
Vagueness at the definitional level is not helped by the use, in
the texts at large, of the less descriptive term "law of nations" in
preference to the terms "primary" and "secondary law of nations"; there
are even indications that Grotius has the idea of yet another law of
341nations not covered by any of his definitions. Also, the presence in342
the texts at large of terms such as "universal customary law" , "uni-
3 4 3
versal common law" , "the customary law of nations" , "the strict
3 4 3
law of nations" - terms which are never explained - does not make for 
a clearer vision. Equally, there is no definition of "custom", Grotius34£
presenting it sometimes as something different from "law" and, at 
other times, equating it not only with the secondary or volitional law 
of nations^^, but also, as the previous section noted, with the law of 
nature or primary law of nations.
The subject-matter of the secondary or volitional law of nations 
is limited, and becomes more so, as one assembles Grotius1 ideas about 
it: in the case of the right of burial, treaties and the order of suc­
cession, the link to the secondary or volitional law of nations is not
«344
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made clear; in the case of war, Grotius establishes a link to the law 
of nature or primary law of nations as well as to the secondary or vo­
litional law of nations; prescription, servitude and reprisals are giv­
en a different status in different contexts; only diplomacy is consist­
ently linked to the secondary or volitional law of nations, but even 
it is not quite firmly anchored in "this law of nations, whatever it
The idea of the common good of states and rulers or nations is 
linked to the secondary or volitional law of nations in such a way that 
the former should be deducible from the latter, but, given the way in 
which the latter is treated, the former fails to materialize, and Gro­
tius does not give it any further attention. Thus, judging from what he 
says about it in De Jure Praedae, it is possible to see it as a good 
specific to states and rulers; in De Jure Belli ac Pacis it becomes 
"the advantage" of human society; and in The Jurisprudence of Holland
350it is identified with "the preservation of the community of mankind".
(d) Continuing the search for ingredients which may give substance
to the idea of international society, one meets with the principle of
good faith. In the context of human society, Grotius clearly sees it as
a bond, for he says: "(I)f good faith has been taken away, all inter-
351course among men ceases to exist" - even though, as was pointed out
in the preceding section, he renders it vulnerable by the exceptions
352which he attaches to this principle. In connection with the state, he
also ascribes to it the quality of a bond, for "every state", as he
353notes, "(is) sustained by good faith". But when he applies the prin­
ciple to the relations between states and "the supreme rulers of men",
he makes no such claim. He presents the principle in relation to allies
354and enemies , he asserts its importance - good faith must not be vio-
355 355lated - and he mentions breaches of good faith ; but he seems re­
luctant to expose his reasons for insisting that good faith should be 
357observed. In De Jure Praedae there is the idea that good faith im-
358poses "a restriction for warfare" ; the same idea - enriched by the 
remark that this is in "the interest of mankind" - occurs in De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis ; and the conclusion of the latter work contains the 
admonition to rulers that they should keep good faith "more earnestly 
than others" because "they violate it with greater impunity".^60 For the 
sake of their conscience, they should "cherish good faith", and in the
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interest of their reputation as it supports "the authority of the royal„ 361 power .
Good faith - conducive to society among states and rulers? Grotius 
does not present it as such.
(e) Searching for further possible links between states and rulers,
one encounters the idea of religion. Within the state, Grotius plays
down its importance as a unifying force: here "the laws and the easy ex-
362ecution of the laws" take the place of religon. At the level of human 
society, however, things are different: here, the laws are few and their 
enforcement is difficult, hence religion - which in the form of piety is 
of universal extent - is of great consequence:
If piety is removed ... with it go good faith and 
the friendly association of man^^d, and the one 
most excellent virtue, justice.
When Grotius places religion in the context of states and rulers, 
he becomes more specific: religion in its general form of piety makes 
room for the Christian religion; he also shows himself, at least at 
times, in a less disinterested light: the Christian religion must be de­
fended; but when all is put together, it is difficult to see what fol­
lows for the relations among states and rulers.
To demonstrate this briefly:
According to De Jure Praedae Christian states may justly conclude 
alliances and treaties with non-Christians against Christians. Such al­
liances may not only be "encouraged to persist"; they may also be "ex­
panded".
In De Jure Belli ac Pacis treaties with non-Christians are presen­
ted as being permissible according to the law of nature, the Hebraic
law and the law of Christ, but caution is advised - "the power of the
365heathen" may greatly increase by such alliances. In the same work
Christian "peoples and kings" are encouraged to form an alliance "while
an impious enemy is raging in arms", for in this way they will be able
366to serve Christ with the power that is theirs.
In True Religion Grotius exhorts his country-men to take the Chris­
tian religion to non-Christian countries, to:
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Pagans, such as live in China, Arabia, and Guinea; 
... Mahumetans, as those under the dominion of the 
Turks, the Persian, and Moores of Barbarie; or ... 
the Iewes themselves, at^ Jityis day the professed 
enemies of Christianity.
His reason: the Christian religion "excells" all other religions. 368
The religious differences within Christianity are discounted. Does
not disagreement happen in "all kinde of Arts and Sciences"? Is not this
369variety "contained within certain bounds"? And the wars within Chris­
tendom are not attributed to religious differences. Nevertheless, Gro-
tius would like to see them disappear: "(T)hat there bee no sects or
370divisions among them".
The idea of a "Christian world" is invoked in a number of his writ­
ings. For example, Mare Liberum is addressed to "The Rulers and Free
371Peoples of the Christian World" ; and De Jure Belli ac Pacis concludes
with the words: "May God ... inscribe these teachings on the hearts of
372those who hold sway over the Christian world". But the wars fought
by Christian states and rulers - within Christendom and beyond - are de-
373scribed as "ruthless" , and the law regulating formal war is presented
as severe and applicable to both Christian and non-Christian states and
374rulers.
Thus, while religion in the form of the Christian religion appears 
at times as a link among Christian states and rulers, it is a link which 
seems to be of little consequence for the relations among said states 
and rulers.
(f) While searching for further possible ties between states and 
rulers, one notes the idea that there are "civilized nations", "nations
more advanced in civilization", "more civilized peoples", "nations of
373 376the better sort" as against "uncivilized peoples". On the whole,
Grotius identifies the former only indirectly as European - by mention-
377ing a particular aspect of their laws, practices, or customs. Only 
once does he establish a direct link between "civilized" and "European" 
when he says:
But this also (to poison weapons or water) is con­
trary to the law of nations, not indeed of all na­
tions, but of European nations, and of such^^hers 
as attain to the higher standard of Europe.
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Grotius does not dwell on this idea. He mentions it so-to-say in 
passing.
With this, the search for ingredients to put substance into the 
idea of international society may be concluded. Its findings: there is 
the idea of a plurality of independent states and rulers; there also is 
the idea of formal equality between states and rulers; the secondary or 
volitional law of nations is poorly developed as a link between states 
and rulers; and the principle of good faith, as also the ideas of reli­
gion and civilization, do little to strengthen that link. These find­
ings will be submitted to further scrutiny in the next three sections: 
Commerce, Diplomacy and The Question of War.
7. Commerce
Grotius’ ideas on commerce are adapted to the occasion on which he pro­
nounces them.
(a) Within the framework of De Jure Praedae two lines of argument 
are developed:
(i) Free Commerce between private individuals in the interest of 
human society
Under the heading "Wherein It Is Shown that even if the War Were a
Private War, It Would Be Just ..." Grotius invites the reader to assume
for the duration of the chapter, that the United East India Company is
a group of private individuals who represent no particular state and
whose war against the Portuguese and Spaniards in the East Indies is a
379private war fought in the defence of the freedom of commerce.
To engage freely in commerce, Grotius argues, is a right conferred
by the law of nature or primary law of nations on all human beings, and
380no one is entitled to deprive anybody of this right. The reason he 
submits is this: God distributed the goods of the earth unevenly and en 
dowed different people with different skills, because He wanted "human 
friendship" to be "fostered by mutual needs and resources": individuals 
might become "unsociable" if they thought themselves to be "self-suffi­
cient ".381 Hence: "(A)nyone who abolishes this system of exchange, abol
382ishes also the ... fellowship in which humanity is united".
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Given this, the individuals in question would be entitled to trade 
with the East Indians even if the Portuguese were "the owners" of those 
regions. But - and Grotius borrows Vitoria's reasoning and that of oth­
er Spanish thinkers such as Cajetan and Vasquez - the Portuguese "lack 
possession" because those regions have their own rulers, and they lack 
all "title to possession" because theirs is not the right of discovery
nor the right of war, nor do they derive the right to take possession
383from the papal donation.
Equally, the Portuguese have no exclusive possession of the sea nor
of the right of navigation. Not only is the sea "too vast" to be taken
into possession by any one; it also is "suited" for the use by all -
whether for purposes of navigation or fishing. In Grotius' words: "(N)a-
384ture ... commands ... that the sea shall be held in common". And the
pope cannot donate what is the property of no one in particular. Nor
does prescription or custom apply, for, besides being "rooted in civ:
38'law", it also can have no force when opposed to the law of nature.
Lastly, the Portuguese have no exclusive possession of the right 
to engage in commerce with the East Indians. The right of commerce is 
not "susceptible of seizure"; nor does it fall within the jurisdiction 
of the pope; prescription or custom does not apply, for the reasons men­
tioned before; and equity demands that the profits from commerce be not 
reaped by any one alone, but be to the advantage of all. Commerce, Gro­
tius insists, is not an activity "devised for the benefit of a few per­
sons" only:
(T)he ... practice (of monopoly) ... is regarded 
as gravely pernicious when carried on within a 
single state ... (S)hould (it) be tolerated with­
in that great community made up of the human race, 
thus enabling the Iberian natiggg to establish a 
monopoly over the whole earth?
Clearly, the freedom of commerce must be defended against those who ob­
struct it.
This, then, is Grotius' case for free commerce between private in­
dividuals in the interest of human society. And it does not violate the 
interests of that part of human society which is under the care of Dutch 
rulers.
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(ii) Free commerce in the interest of the state
But commerce is not really a private activity. As Grotius points
387out in the beginning of De Jure Praedae and, again, in its concluding
chapter to which he gives the title "Discussion as to What Is Benefi-
388cial" , there is a close link between commerce and the well-being of 
the state. "(W)ho is so ignorant of the affairs of the Dutch", he asks, 
as not to know that "the sole source of support, renown, and protection
for those affairs lies in navigation and trade? „389 In particular, the
commerce with Asia is the main, if not the whole, source of "the wealth
c . . f. 390of our state .
The importance which rulers attach to commerce, Grotius pursues
his argument, is obvious from the fact that "in all lands the management
of shipping falls within the sphere of supreme governmental power", so
that anybody who returns with supplies from abroad is considered as hav-
391ing been away "practically on state business" ; and when the Dutch
rulers founded the United East India Company, nobody doubted that with
it, "the surest possible foundations of public prosperity had been
392laid". Look at the Spaniards and Portuguese, he invites the reader: 
from what poverty to what wealth have they risen! Regarding the cause 
of this phenomenon, there can be no doubt:
(T)he very foundations of that Iberian power lie, 
not in the Low Countries nor in Spain, but in 
transoceanic regions from which the said peoples 
derive their wealth and the means to^^intain 
their public largess and their wars.
Hence, and Grotius turns again to his own country, an activity as bene­
ficial and as necessary for the state as commerce should not be aban­
doned .
As a matter of fact, the war which the Dutch fight in the East In-
394dies is not a private war, but a public war. Under the chapter head­
ing "Wherein It Is Shown that the War Is Just ... in the Public Cause
of the Fatherland" Grotius presents a number of reasons why, in this war,
395Holland and its allies have justice on their side. One such reason 
which figures, not among the general causes, but among the special cau­
ses of the war, is the interference by the Portuguese and Spaniards with 
the principle of free commerce, and it figures, not as a direct, but as 
an indirect cause. The Dutch don’t fight the Portuguese and Spaniards
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because they obstruct commerce; they fight because such obstruction 
constitutes an injury to "the welfare of the state" and the state has
the right to defend itself against such injury. 396
Grotius' second argument for free commerce does not refer to human 
society nor does it imply the existence of international society. It 
centres on the state, and a particular state at that, Holland.
(b) Mare Liberum may be seen as an argument for free commerce be­
tween states in the interest of human society:
397Grotius* next statement on commerce appears anonymously in 1609.
It is addressed to the rulers and free peoples of Christendom and re­
quests their opinion on a case which it wishes to draw to their atten­
tion. As Grotius puts it; To the "double tribunal" of "conscience" and
398''public opinion" we submit a new case.
The case concerns "practically the entire expanse of the high seas,
399the right of navigation, the treedom of trade" , and involves the 
Dutch, on the one side, and the Spaniards and Portuguese, on the other. 
Grotius argues it along the same lines as his first case in De Jure 
Praedae but, by giving it a different wrapping or, to use the language of 
this investigation, a different context, he makes it appear different, 
and hence it can be interpreted differently.
The old title "Wherein It Is Shown that even if the War Were a Pri­
vate War, It Would Be Just ..." has been removed and, in its place, a 
new title has been put: Mare Liberum.
The original proposition that the Dutch fighting in the East Indies 
be considered private individuals representing no particular country 
has disappeared, and Grotius now introduces the Dutch as "the subjects 
of the United Netherlands".^*“^
There are no longer definitions of both the law of nature or pri­
mary law of nations and the secondary or volitional law of nations. Only 
one law now applies, and Grotius presents it in the following way:
The law by which our case must be decided is ... 
the same among all nations ... it is innate in 
every individual ... (I)t is a law derijrgtjl from 
nature, the common mother of us all ...
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As a result of these new "facts", the case which Grotius submits
to the rulers and free peoples of Christendom may be seen as the case
of the United Provinces whose right of commerce - a right conferred by
the law of nature or nations - is interfered with by the Spaniards and
Portuguese who, on their side, are unable to claim any right in support 
402of their action. And the Dutch "are to maintain at all hazards that403freedom which is (theirs) by nature ..." , even if it means continu­
ing the war:
Therefore, if it be necessary, arise, 0 nation un­
conquered on the sea, and fight boldly, not only 
for ygy£ own liberty, but for that of the human 
race.
The obstruction of commerce appears as a direct cause of a public
war.
In Mare Liberum, then, Grotius may be seen as arguing for free com­
merce between states, but he still cannot be seen as arguing for inter­
national society. His reference, in the last quotation above, is to hu­
man society, and so it is on numerous other occasions, as in the follow­
ing passage:
If king act unjustly and violently against king, 
and nation against nation, such action involves a 
disturbance of the peace of that universal state, 
and constitutes a trespass against the supreme 
Ruler ...
As Grotius presents it, it is human society rather than international 
society which suffers as a result of the violation of the principle of 
free commerce.
Dutch interests and the interests of human society are again in 
harmony.
(c) "The Colonial Conferences between England and the Netherlands 
in 1613 and 1615" submits the Dutch case for monopolized commerce in 
the interest of the state:
In 1613 Grotius "by order from the States of Holland"^^ heads a
delegation of three commissioners of the United East India Company to
London, and he is again the spokesman for his country’s interests when,
407two years later, an English delegation comes to The Hague. The main
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item on the agenda is the commerce with the East Indies: the English 
demand "free Trade into the East Indies and every part thereof", to 
which they are entitled "as well by the Law of the Nations, as by the 
admittance of the Kings and Princes there  the Dutch find rea­
sons why this should be denied to them.
As the documents exchanged between the two sides show, the argu­
ment presented by Grotius centres on the following three points:
(i) The question of law. The "laws of nature and nations", indefi­
nite in themselves - no definition of these laws is offered by Grotius 
409in this context - are limited and defined by the laws and institu­
tions of peoples, such that, for example, there is not one realm where 
it is lawful "for every man to buy every commodity of every person, in 
every place, and at all times".^ The rulers and peoples of the East 
Indies have chosen to agree to sell their spices to the Dutch alone, 
and nothing accords more with the laws of nature and nations than that 
these agreements be kept.^^
The Dutch do not generally deny that the English, as a result of 
the liberty of the law of nations, are entitled to trade with the East 
Indies, but they maintain that the English have no right to buy that 
which is contracted by its owners to someone else:
(I)f (the English) claim is based on the rule of 
the law of nations which says that it is lawful 
to trade everywhere, our defence is based on the 
rule of the s^ iji^  law which says that agreements 
must be kept.
The liberty of the law of nations does not prevent anyone from selling 
what is his.
Above all, the Dutch insist on the very just cause of these con­
tracts, which is the continuous defence on their part of those with 
whom they have entered the contracts, the rulers and peoples of the 
East Indies, against the Spaniards and Portuguese. Who wants to deny
that it is a man’s right to contract his products, present and future,
413in order to save his life?
(ii) The question of equity. The commerce with the East Indies, 
Grotius argues, is impossible unless those regions are defended against 
the Spaniards and Portuguese. This defence has been and continues to be
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undertaken by the Dutch at great cost. But the English want to partake 
in the profits derived from that commerce without partaking in the ex­
penses necessary to arrive at these profits. This is not equitable.
The English, while not denying this, question the necessary nature 
of the link between the expenses and the profits, in response to which 
the Dutch can only say that there is no doubt about it, for the Span­
iards and Portuguese have shown that, wherever they have succeeded in
making themselves masters, they have excluded all other nations from 
414commerce.
(iii) The question of common utility. Because of the war which the 
Dutch have made on the Spaniards and Portuguese in the East Indies, the 
English have been able to trade there. But the cost of the war has 
eaten into Dutch profits. If the Dutch have to share the profits with 
the English, but may not share the expenses, it will not be possible 
for the Dutch to continue paying for the war. But the war is necessary. 
Without it, neither the Dutch nor the English can have any hope of re­
taining the trade, for the Spaniards and Portuguese would take over.
Show us how the Dutch can have commerce there without defence; defence
415without expenditure; and expenditure without profits.
(I)f free trade is granted to everybody, the 
French, the English, ourselves, and whoever else 
might be interested, where would you find ... the 
order and^ ijigney necessary to push back the force 
of Spain.
As the English observe, the Hollanders do not "declare themselves 
in the behalf of free Trade, and to all nations, with as much liberty 
and freedom as (in) mare liberum".
The argument of 1613/1615 does not depict commerce as a link be­
tween states nor as a link between individuals. The idea of internation­
al society is absent, and so is the idea of human society. The case it 
makes is for the monopolization of commerce by one state - the state on 
whose behalf the argument is put forward.
Towards the end of the (inconclusive) negotiations of 1613/1615, 
only one of the three points presented above is retained - the question 
of common utility. Given that the concern is with working out what is 
to be done rather than what is just and right, the Dutch suggest, the
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English should look at the problem in such a way as might result in a 
satisfactory solution, in which case the question of law could, by mu­
tual consent, be dropped without having been decided.
(d) De Jure Belli ac Pacis does not manifest much interest in the 
question of commerce, and the little it says does not come together to 
form an argument:
(i) Free commerce in the interest of human society
The chapter "Of Things which Belong to Men in Common" contains the
idea of the freedom of commerce. Grotius presents it in the context of
his discussion of the right of passage over "lands, rivers, and any
part of the sea that has become subject to the ownership of a peo- 
419pie". The right of passage, he argues, without identifying the law
420on which he bases this right , should be granted, not only to persons, 
but also to merchandise:
No one, in fact, has the right to hinder any na­
tion from carrying ^^commerce with any other na­
tion at a distance.
The reason he gives is this: commerce is "in the interest of human so- 
/ 22ciety". His evidence is drawn from Antiquity: "If you destroy com-
4-23merce, you sunder the alliance which binds together the human race".
(ii) Monopolized commerce in the interest of the state
The same chapter also contains the idea of the monopolization of 
commerce. In fact, the half page devoted to it is reminiscent of the 
argument of 1613/1615:
(I)t is permissible for a people to make an agree­
ment with another people to sell to it alone pro­
ducts of a certain kind, which do not grow else­
where ... especially ... if the people which has 
obtained the conce^^on has taken the other under 
its protection ...
Such an agreement, Grotius holds, is not "at variance with the law of
nature" provided that "the people which buys is prepared to sell to oth-
. r  . ir 425ers at a fair price .
The chapter concludes without any suggestion that there may be a
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conflict between the idea of free commerce in the interest of human so­
ciety and the idea of the monopolization of commerce.
(iii) Commerce as the subject-matter of bilateral treaties
Commerce is mentioned once more in a later chapter, when Grotius
- offering a classification of treaties - distinguishes between those
which establish "the same rights as the law of nature" and those, equal
and unequal, which "add something beyond the rights based on the law of 
2 6nature". Commerce may be the subject-matter of all three kinds of 
treaty:
To the first category belong treaties which say that there shall
427be rights of commerce on both sides. Treaties which, for example,
stipulate that no import duties are to be paid on either side or that
such duties remain the same as at present, belong to the group of equal
428treaties of the second category. Unequal treaties of the second cate-
429gory are not illustrated by any examples. The significance of these 
distinctions remains unclear.
Grotius' reasoning on behalf of commerce displays:
- Variety. He argues for commerce between private individuals in 
the interest of human society; free commerce between states in the in­
terest of human society; free commerce in the interest of the state; 
and monopolized commerce in the interest of the state.
- Contradiction. Grotius1 case for free commerce, whether between 
private individuals or states, in the interest of human society runs 
counter to his case for the monopolization of commerce by one state, 
and he does not attempt to resolve the contradiction.
- Constancy. Firstly, whatever Grotius' argument for commerce, it 
is always in support of his country’s interests; secondly, whatever his 
argument for commerce, the idea of international society is always ab­
sent .
8. Diplomacy
Grotius’ definition of ambassador identifies diplomacy as a link between 
rulers. Ambassadors, he writes, "are those representatives whom rulers
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430with sovereign powers send to one another". That this extends also
to states or peoples is clear from the context within which he places
431the definition. But the context is no more informative about the na­
ture of this link between states and rulers than the definition.
In fact, Grotius says little about diplomacy. Apart from a few re-432
marks which he includes in De Jure Praedae , his ideas on the subject 
are contained in one chapter in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, entitled: "On
4 3 3
the Right of Legation". And it is a short chapter.
Its main points are:
(a) The law relating to embassies belongs to the secondary or voli­
tional law of nations.
Though he displays some reluctance at the beginning of the chapter 
to commit himself regarding the nature of this law, when commenting a 
few pages later on the different views that exist in relation to the in­
violability of ambassadors, he is prepared to be definite:
(T)his law does not certainly arise from definite 
reasons, as the law of nature does, bu^^akes its 
form according to the will of nations.
That is, the law relating to embassies is positive law.
(b) Two rights derive from the law relating to embassies: (i) the 
right to be admitted; and (ii) the right to be free from violence.
(i) As Grotius sees it, the law relating to embassies does not com­
mand the admission of ambassadors, but "it does forbid the rejection of
4 3 3
ambassadors without cause" ; and he mentions three causes which justi­
fy the refusal to receive an ambassador:
- The one who dispatches the ambassador may the the cause. He is 
"an enemy in arms" or is "planning war".
- The ambassador may be the cause. He has an objectionable belief 
system, such as being "an atheist"; or he is unacceptable for reasons 
of "personal hatred".
- The embassy or mission may be the cause. It is suspected of 
"stirring up the people"; its rank is not "proper"; it arrives at an
"inopportune time"; or it is permanent. Grotius formulates the last 
point in the following way:
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But permanent legations, such as are now custom­
ary, can be rejected with the best of right; for 
ancient custom, to which they wer^^nknown> 
teaches how unnecessary they are.
The above three causes and the way he illustrates them make it 
clear that he favours a right of admission which can be easily inacti­
vated .
(ii) The right of the ambassador to be free from violence, Grotius 
points out, has been and continues to be subject to different interpre­
tations. Livy, the Roman historian, for example, was of the opinion 
that ambassadors should be safe even if "they commit hostile acts"; 
whereas Sallust, also a Roman historian, took up the position that
"equity and justice" permit the punishment of ambassadors who are found
438to have committed a wrong. Grotius’ own view is not slow to crystal­
lize: "(I)t is contrary to the law of nations that ambassadors should
439be brought to trial". The reasons which he gives are the following:
- There is nothing "great" or "outstanding" about a law which pro­
tects ambassadors "only from unjust violence".
- Any advantage which may be derived from punishment is outweighed 
by the disadvantage of jeopardizing the security of ambassadors. Punish­
ment can be exacted by the one who sends the ambassador or, if he is 
unwilling, by means of a war.
- If ambassadors are required to explain their behaviour to any 
person other than the one who sends them, their safety rests on an "ex­
tremely precarious footing", for the one who sends the ambassador and 
the one who receives him "generally" differ in their views, and "often" 
hold "directly opposed" views.
Grotius offers his "unqualified conclusion" when he says:
(T)he rule has been accepted by the nations that 
the common custom, which makes a person who lives 
in foreign territory subject to that country, ad­
mits of an exception in the case of ambassadors.
Ambassadors as if by a kind of fiction are consid­
ered to represent those who sent them ... (B)y a
Ill
similar fiction, ambassadors (are) held to be 
outside of the li^^s of the country to which they 
(are) accredited.
Hence a wrong committed by an ambassador should be overlooked, if "it
can be treated lightly", or the ambassador should be ordered to leave.
If the wrong is "particularly atrocious", the ambassador should be sent
442back with the demand that he be punished or surrendered. Two excep­
tions only are admitted by Grotius. "(D)ire necessity" such as "guard­
ing against serious hurt, especially to the state", permits the deten­
tion and questioning of an ambassador; and "natural defence" allows the
443killing of an ambassador if he attempts armed force. For the rest, 
an ambassador, once admitted, is "under the protection of the law of na-
ft 4-1\ l\tions even among public enemies . The same is true of his suite and 
his effects.
Grotius declares this law, which extends full security to ambassa-
445dors, to be binding on the state or ruler who admits the ambassador.
He exempts from it any state or ruler through the territory of whom the 
ambassador passes without a safe-conduct in order to get to his destina­
tion. Indeed, if the ambassador is going to or returning from the 
enemy of that state or ruler, or if he is planning hostile action, he 
may, according to Grotius, be killed. In the absence of such reasons, 
he may still be mistreated, and such conduct does not constitute a vio­
lation of the law relating to embassies. It merely violates the "digni­
ty" or "friendship" of the one who sends him or the one who receives
, . 447him.
What do these ideas reveal about the nature of the link which di­
plomacy forms between states and rulers?
(a) They say little about the reason(s) why states and rulers en­
gage in diplomacy. In fact, there are only two references to its "final
cause"; one speaks of "the usefulness of embassies" without saying why 
448they are useful ; the other puts some substance into the idea of use­
fulness, to wit;
(I)n war (many matters) cannot be handled except 
through ambassadors, but also peace itself is hard­
ly to be made by any other means.
Diplomacy, then, is useful or necessary in war and to end war. A third
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reference which appears in the chapter "On Doubtful Causes of War" men­
tions "a conference" as "a method" of preventing a dispute from develop- 
450ing into a war. In his other works, too, diplomacy is placed in the 
context of conflict and war rather than peace. In De Jure Praedae, for 
example, the purpose of the embassies sent by the East Indian states and 
rulers to The Hague is identified as seeking "a general combination of 
forces" to attack the Portuguese4 ; and the negotiations of 1613/1615 
aim not so much at resolving a commercial conflict as winning the English
/ c 2
for an offensive alliance against the Portuguese.
(b) When Grotius identifies the law relating to embassies as be­
longing to the secondary or volitional law of nations, one is ready to 
take this as an indication that, in his opinion, there exists a law or 
body of rules expressing the will or agreement of states and rulers in 
relation to diplomatic matters. It is changeable, but it exists. In De 
Jure Praedae, too, he speaks of "the pact" entered into by all states, 
which accords "equal sanctity" to ambassadors. However, when he pre­
sents his ideas on the law relating to embassies in terms of the right 
to be admitted and the right to be free from violence, it appears that, 
in his view, there exists no such law or agreement; there only exist the
different opinions of "the wise men" of each age, expressing what they
454think this law or agreement is. Diplomacy may be a universal institu­
tion, but the juridical basis on which he places it is uncertain, in­
deed .
(c) Grotius' formulation of the reasons which, in his view, justify 
a refusal to admit ambassadors is such that it invites a wide interpre­
tation. Such a stance means that he is not averse to making it easy for 
states and rulers to find a legitimate reason for not receiving an em­
bassy, hence, to interrupt diplomatic activity. His proposition not to 
admit permanent embassies points in the same direction: there is no in­
tention on his part to weld diplomacy into a strong link between states 
and rulers. Its operation on an ad hoc basis is quite sufficient.
(d) Equating the inviolability of ambassadors with full security, 
irrespective of what they do, means being prepared to sacrifice justice, 
and Grotius affirms this choice:
(0)n the one side lies the advantageousness of 
punishment of grave offenders; on the other is the 
usefulness of embassies, and the ease in sending
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embassies is best prom^^d by making their safety 
as secure as possible.
It is a choice for order at the cost of justice. Its victim is that part 
of human society which belongs to the state or ruler to whom the offend­
ing ambassador has been sent.
(e) By making a safe passage through a country dependent on a safe-
conduct, Grotius not only limits the right to be free from violence to
the country to which the ambassador is sent, but also gives to the right
of passage a restricted meaning. In fact, the question of embassies is
456not part of his discussion of the right of passage. Furthermore, by 
linking a safe passage to a safe-conduct, he places states and rulers in 
a position to render a passage unsafe or to interrupt the link that con­
stitutes diplomacy, whenever it suits them to refuse to grant a safe- 
conduct .
Grotius depicts diplomacy as a link which operates between mainly 
suspicious or hostile states and rulers. Its juridical basis is uncer­
tain, and it is easy for states and rulers to interfere with it. Inter­
national society is not the idea which inspires it, and human society is 
its potential victim.
9. The Question of War
When Grotius defines war, he does not distinguish between private and 
public war. Thus, in De Jure Praedae he writes: "Armed execution against 
an armed adversary is designated by the term war"^~^, and in De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis he puts it this way: "(W)ar is the condition of those 
contending by force . In the former work he comments on his def­
inition but does not justify it:
To be sure, in the majority of cases where writers 
employ the term war, they are referring not to 
private but to public war, wh:j.^ is more frequent­
ly the subject of discussion.
In De Jure Belli ac Pacis there is a comment and a justification:
And usage does not reject this broader meaning of 
the word. If, to be sure, the term war is at times 
limited to public war, that implies no objection 
to our view, since it is perfectly certain that the 
name of a genus is often applied in a particular
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way to a specie^^especially a species that is 
more prominent.
Of two further reasons which appear in De Jure Belli ac Pacis - private 
war "is more ancient than public war" and private war "has, incontesta­
bly, the same nature as public war’’^ ^  - only the first survives intact. 
The second reason is contradicted not only by statements such as "pri­
vate wars ... differ from public wars with respect to their efficient 
agents and their form" , but also by the whole train of his thought 
regarding war - a point which will become clear as the discussion pro­
ceeds .
463For Grotius the question of war is: Can any war be just? His re-
464ply: Some wars are just. To the question: What wars are just? he of­
fers an answer which, after careful scrutinizing of his writings, may 
be read to mean that he has room for four kinds of just war.^^
4-66(a) There is the just private war in De Jure Praedae. Grotius 
explains it by making Aristotle’s idea of the four causes its constitu­
ent principle: for a private war to be just, its four causes - the ef­
ficient cause, the material cause, the formal cause, and the final cause 
- need to be just. ^
Regarding the efficient cause, Grotius stipulates that "any person
4-68whatsoever" may justly resort to war. An individual may wage it on 
his own behalf or on behalf of "allies", and these may be relatives, 
neighbours, fellow-citizens or simply fellow-men, for: "It is ... natu­
ral for us to do good to one another, and to lend each other aid".^^
An individual may be helped by allies, and by those who are under his
authority, that is, his children, slaves, servants and so on. These, in
470Grotius’ language, are subjects or instruments , whereas those in
, 471authority, and their allies, are voluntary agents.
In relation to voluntary agents, Grotius admits as just four kinds
of material cause of war: self-defence; the defence of one's property;
exacting payment of that which is one's due; and the inflicting of pun- 
472ishment - these are just because they correspond to rights conferred
473by the law of nature or primary law of nations. The enemy is the one 
who causes the injury or wrong. It may be an individual or individuals; 
it may be a state or ruler; and any allies and subjects are "included 
under the head of enemies"
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In relation to subjects or instruments, there is only one just ma­
terial cause of war: the order of the one in authority. It is just, pro­
vided "the reason of the subjects is not opposed thereto after weigh­
ing the probabilities".
The question whether a just material cause can exist on both sides 
is answered by Grotius in two ways. As far as voluntary agents are con­
cerned, his answer is "no": "(T)here can be no war that is just for 
both parties". Regarding subjects or instruments, his answer is "yes": 
"(T)here is nothing to preclude the possibility of a war that is just 
on both s i d e s " . H i s  reason: to subjects or instruments there applies
what Carneades applies to all people - the idea that "justice is a mat-
_ *  . . „ 477ter of opinion .
The just formal cause of war consists of "just form in undertaking 
war" and "just form in waging war". The former condition is met "when 
judicial means for the attainment of our rights are defective".This 
may happen for brief periods, when things do not permit of a delay, as 
is the case when life or property is threatened; when the debtor ab­
sconds; or when the transgressor looks like escaping from punishment. It 
also may happen on a continuous basis when, for example, "there is no 
one possessing jurisdiction" or when the one who possesses it is "disre- 
garded" or has no time. Just form in waging war is observed when "the 
requisite of moderation" is fulfilled. For voluntary agents, this 
means that they must remain within the limits of the right for which
they wage war; for subjects or instruments, it means that they must re-
481main within the limits of the order given by their superior(s).
Regarding the purpose or final cause of war, Grotius is brief: vol­
untary agents wage war in order to attain their right(s); and subjects
482or instruments wage it "in order to render obedience to a superior".
The just private war as presented by Grotius in De Jure Praedae -
at the more concrete level a fictitious argument, as he himself points 
483out - is in agreement with human society because it attempts to se­
cure the justice which is embodied in its law - the law of nature or 
primary law of nations.
(b) De Jure Praedae contains a second kind of just war - the just 
public war. Its constituent principle is the same as for the just pri­
vate war: a public war, in order to be just, must derive "entirely from
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• _ „  484just causes .
As Grotius portrays it, the just public war has the same material
and final cause - at the more general and less concrete level - as the 
485just private war ; the former differs from the latter merely with re-
486spect to its efficient and formal cause.
The just efficient cause is the state or ruler, or, as Grotius
calls the latter in De Jure Praedae, "the supreme magistrate". Also
admitted as a just efficient cause is "the magistrate next in rank",
for the supreme magistrate may be "absent or negligent" - a provision
to which he attaches the condition: "when no law exists expressly pro-
488hibiting this alternative course". The ally in a just public war is 
another state or magistrate or other states and magistrates. The one
who is "bound by the laws of (the) state" - the citizen - is the subject
. . 489or instrument.
When discussing the just formal cause, Grotius does not engage in
admonitions not to rush into war. He raises this point briefly in an
earlier chapter as "a matter not so much of right as of discretion"^^,
and limits it to the advice that "comparatively trifling injuries"
491should not cause us "rashly ... to be aroused". Nor does he dwell for 
long on the question of arbitration, offering the following reason for 
such neglect:
Certainly resort to arbitration is an honourable 
procedure, but arbitration is a voluntary, not a 
necessary measure; ... no one is compell^^t0 en~ 
trust his rights to this or that person.
Just form in undertaking a public war, the first aspect of the just
formal cause of war, consists in its conformity with the secondary or
volitional law of nations. States and rulers, Grotius argues, because
they are equal and have no "superior" who might act as a judge, and also
because it is impossible for those who are not a party to a dispute "to
reach an agreement providing for an inquiry by them into the case of 
493each disputant" , have agreed that the injured state should do two 
things. It should offer the transgressing state the opportunity to pre­
sent its case and, if the latter fails to discharge its "judicial duty", 
pass judgment itself^^; and it should issue the declaration of war.^^ 
Neither of these procedures is required when things do not permit of a
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delay, for example, when an unjust war has been commenced against the 
state.496
Just form in waging a public war, on the other hand, the second as­
pect of the just formal cause of war, is related to the law of nature or 
primary law of nations and, with one exception, is the same as for pri­
vate war, that is, "the requisite of moderation" must be observed.
For example, while it is lawful to attack enemy subjects who resist, 
subjects who do not interfere with the execution of the right in ques­
tion - women, children, farmers, prisoners and so on - should be spared; 
or, while it is lawful to despoil all enemy subjects, nothing should be
taken which is in excess of what is due; and faith should be kept with
. I 498the enemy.
The exception is introduced towards the end of the discussion when, 
in connection with the question of war being just for subjects on both 
sides, Grotius posits the existence of the rule that "by the law of na­
tions, not in its natural but in its positive phase", subjects on both
499sides in war rightfully acquire spoils. To which, in a later chapter, 
he adds the further rule that "whatever is acquired through the citizens 
by the command and in the interests of the state is acquired for the 
state".500
Grotius does not express any concern about the implications of his 
argument, but it undermines his case for the just public war, and this 
for two reasons:
- It eliminates the just material cause as an essential ingredient 
of the just public war, because spoils are rightfully acquired by both 
the state which wages war for a just material cause and the state which 
does not have a just material cause.
- It violates "the requisite of moderation" as embodied in the just 
formal cause, because the state which does not have a just material 
cause may rightfully acquire spoils.
Grotius' case in De Jure Praedae for the just public war is not 
supportive of human society. And it does not suggest the existence of 
international society, for there is no indication that this is the war 
which states and rulers have agreed to regard as just.
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(c) De Jure Belli ac Pacis presents the reader with what may be 
called the formally or externally just public war and which Grotius va­
riously calls the "complete war", the "formal public war", the "just or 
formal war" or simply the "formal war".~^ It is just because it ac­
cords with the secondary or volitional law of nations, and this is be­
cause it meets two requirements: firstly, it is waged by the state or
502ruler on each side; and, secondly, it is publicly declared.
A just material cause is not a requisite of Grotius’ third kind of
just war: "(T)o harm an enemy ... is permissible ... for either side
503indiscriminately. Moreover:
(I)n a public'^ war ... anyone at all becomes 
owner, without limit or r^g^riction, of what he 
has taken from the enemy.
Nor does the final cause of war come into the discussion. The important 
point is that a war waged by sovereigns on both sides, and publicly de­
clared, has particular effects, and these effects are just. In Grotius’ 
language:
If we interpret the word just in relation to cer­
tain legal effects, in this sense surely it may 
be admitted that a war may^gg just from the point 
of view of either side ...
The formally or externally just public war is "extremely fre­
quent" , and Grotius devotes six chapters to an exposition of its ef- 
508fects. They distinguish themselves by their severity. To give a few 
examples:
- The right of killing, which is a right of war, "extends not only 
to those who actually bear arms, or are subjects ... but ... to all per­
sons who are in the enemy’s territory". Foreigners who have failed to 
depart are regarded as enemies. Subjects may be killed in "any place 
whatsoever": in their own country, in the country of an enemy, in terri­
tory which is "under the jurisdiction of no one"; on the sea. Children
509and women may be killed, also prisoners, suppliants or hostages.
- Whole cities may be destroyed; walls may be levelled to the
ground; and fields devastated. Sacred things are not exempt from destruc-
510tion.
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- The property of the enemy may be acquired "without limit or re-
„ . „  511stnction .
- Not only do prisoners become slaves, but "(t)here is no suffer-
512ing which may not be inflicted with impunity upon such slaves
513- The conquerors may rule the conquered "just as they please".
Grotius mentions only a few exceptions to his dictum that accord­
ing to the "law of nations ... anything is permissible as against an 
e n e m y " . F o r  example, it is not permissible to kill the enemy by poi­
son, to poison weapons or water, to use assassins or to rape women.
And there is the rule that faith must be kept with the enemy, for other-
516wise there would be "no limit nor termination" to such wars.
To the question: Why did states and rulers agree to such a law of 
war? Grotius provides an answer which does not amount to a statement on 
behalf of the idea of international society:
To undertake to decide regarding the justice of a 
war between two peoples had been dangerous for 
other peoples, who were on this account involved 
in ^^oreign war ... Furthermore, even in a law­
ful war, from external indications it can hard­
ly be adequately known what is the just limit of 
self-defence, of recovering what is one’s own, or 
of inflicting punishments; in consequence it has 
seemed altogether preferable to leave decisions in 
regard to sucj^gatters to the scruples of the bel­
ligerents ...
Not only did the law of war result because states and rulers did not see 
themselves as forming a society, but the idea of "a greater whole" is 
also not a part of "the scruples of the belligerents". As Grotius does 
not fail to point out, they have regard only for what is advantageous 
for themselves.
Grotius* formally or externally just public war in De Jure Belli 
ac Pacis is an expression of a plurality of states and rulers, negating 
both international society and human society.
(d) De Jure Belli ac Pacis also contains the idea of what may be 
called the materially or morally just public war. Grotius refers to it
sometimes as the "just war" or the "less formal war", at other times
i it K1 . if 520 simply as public war .
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Its efficient cause may be the state or ruler, but it need not be. 
As he puts it:
In war the principal efficient cause is generally 
the person whose interest is at stake ... in pub­
lic war the^gyblic power, in most cases the sover­
eign power.
The enemy may be a state or ruler, but it also may be a private person
522or private persons.
There may be a public declaration of war, but there need not be. 523
Its claim to justice derives from the nature of its material cause: 
this needs to be just or, as he also formulates it:
(I)f the cause of a war should be unjust, even i£, 
the war should have been undertaken in a lawful 
way, all acts which arise therefrom are unjust ...
They are unjust, not from the point of view of any law "properly so- 
called", but, as he puts it in this context, from the point of view of 
"moral injustice".
Grotius sometimes calls the just cause "just cause", but at other
times, and at the more formal level, he refers to it as "justifiable 
527cause" , pointing out that many a thinker before him has equated the
528latter with "pretext" or "nominal cause". But whatever the choice of
529words, he means that which is "free from reproach and just". In oppo­
sition to the just or justifiable cause he places the unjust cause
which, in agreement with said thinkers, he also identifies as "persua-
530sive cause" or "real cause". This language suggests, and Grotius 
leaves it as a suggestion, that the real cause of war is not also a just
cause or, to put it the other way round, the material cause of war,
which is just, is the apparent and not the real cause.
The unjust or real cause of war receives only a few pages' cover­
age. Its main instances are: "the fear of something uncertain"; "advan­
tage apart from necessity"; "the refusal of marriage"; "the desire for 
richer land"; "the discovery" of what is held by another; "the desire to 
rule others against their will on the pretext that it is for their 
good"; the claim to universal empire by emperor or pope; "the desire to 
fulfil prophecies, without the command of God"; and the desire to force
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the Christian religion on those who are unwilling to accept it. 531
The just or justifiable cause of war, on the other hand, occupies
most of Book Two of De Jure Belli ac Pacis - or this, at least, is what
the opening paragraph of its first chapter suggests: "Let us proceed to
532the causes of war - I mean the justifiable causes". Yet much of what
Grotius covers in Book Two is not about just causes of war but about
533rights and, occasionally, about an obligation - a fact communicated
by the opening words of many a chapter. For example, one finds the fol-
5 3 Alowing beginnings: "From the point of view of individual right ..."
- "A serious difficulty arises at this point in regard to the right of
535usucaption" - "A right is acquired not only over things but also 
over p e r s o n s ". A nd  as the chapter begins, so it continues.
It is, of course, possible to see each of these chapters as con­
taining the unwritten invitation to identify the violation of a right 
discussed, or the neglect of an obligation mentioned, as a just cause of
war, but to do so would mean to say something which - a very few excep-
537tions apart - Grotius himself chooses not to say. To offer a few ex­
amples :
- The chapter "On Secondary Acquisition ..." states that owners of 
property have the right to transfer ownership; that sovereignty can be 
transferred; that sovereignty over a part of the people cannot be trans­
ferred by the people against the will of the part; that sovereignty over
a place can be transferred; that the public domain cannot be transferred;
538that a will is a form of transfer. A just cause of war is not speci­
fied by Grotius.
- The chapter "On Promises" investigates what constitutes a "per-
539feet promise" , but does not identify a just cause of war.
- The chapter "On Treaties and Sponsions" discusses different types 
of treaties and asks whether they are permissible; it also asks whether 
one side may be freed by "the perfidy" of the other. The answer is 
"yes It does not ask whether this constitutes a just cause of war.
Furthermore, the rights presented in Book Two are mainly rights 
"for which we are endebted to the law of n a t u r e " . As such they do not 
belong to those things which this law enjoins or forbids, but relate to
(-/ o
that which it permits - and this, as Section Five above found, is ac-
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companied by uncertainty.
Thus, much of what Book Two is concerned with may be seen as being 
about causes of war, rather than just causes, and this is what Grotius 
himself indicates in the '’Prolegomena": "The second book", he writes, 
"having for its object to set forth all the causes from which war can
arise . . ." 543
The generous-looking coverage of the just or justifiable causes of 
war does not, then, provide much information on the main ingredient of 
Grotius' materially or morally just public war - the just material 
cause. So, what is the little that it does provide?
At the general and abstract level Grotius identifies four just cau­
ses: "defence, the obtaining of that which belongs to us or is our due, 
and ... punishment"“* ^ , pointing out that the first of these, defence, 
is a right which "does not arise from another's wrong".“*^ “* At the less 
general and more concrete level he distinguishes between what may be re­
ferred to as "just causes concerning self" and "just causes concerning 
another":
(i) Concerning self. It is just for states and rulers to resort to 
war in order:
- To defend themselves against a "threatened" injury:
(I)t is permissible (for public powers) to fore­
stall an act of violence which is not immediate, 
but which^g seen to be threatening from a dis­
tance ...
This, however, does not mean that a state or ruler is entitled to "weak­
en a growing power which, if it become too great, may be a source of
danger". “*^
- To seek reparation for an injury received. States and rulers may,
for example, exercise "the right of reprisals" and authorize their sub­
jects to seize the goods of subjects of another state or ruler in order
to recover the debt of that state or ruler.
- To inflict punishment for an injury received. The injury may, for
example, consist in the ill-treatment of their ambassadors, the denial
549of burial to their dead, or the help extended to their enemies.
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(ii) Concerning another. It is just for states and rulers to re­
sort to war in order:
- To assist their subjects. As Grotius puts it: A "particularly 
necessary concern is for subjects", and he mentions the Romans who "of­
ten waged wars because their traders and sailors had been wrongfully 
treated".
- To help allies or friends. As Grotius knows: "The Romans ... fre­
quently waged wars ... not only on behalf of their allies ... but also 
on behalf of their friends". 551
interests of human society through punishments„ 553
552- To help "any persons whatsoever" , for "liberty to serve the
. is in the hands of
the highest authorities The examples which Grotius gives relate
to the punishment of those who "oppress" their own people, that is ty­
rants; those who show "impiety towards their parents"; those who feed on 
human flesh; or those who engage in piracy.
- To defend God. In Grotius’ words: "(T)hose who ... abolish (reli­
gion) may be restrained in the name of human society
The right to assist another, it is worth noting, is accompanied by
qualifications 556 and the right to intervene, where punishment would 
require intervention, is often withheld.
The above examples represent Grotius’ main instances, at the more 
concrete level, of just material causes of war; yet even they do not al­
ways reveal the nature of the wrong - whether not yet committed or al­
ready done - which justifies the resort to arms.
To leave the just material cause of war and to turn to its just
formal cause: according to Grotius just form in waging the materially or
morally just public war consists in observing moderation. He devotes
558seven chapters to the exposition of this idea , submitting precepts 
such as:
- Innocent persons such as women, children, and old men should not 
be killed; religious men or men of letters, farmers or merchants should 
not be injured; prisoners of war or hostages should not be deprived of 
life.559
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- Devastation of that which belongs to the enemy should be re­
frained from, and sacred and consecrated things should be preserved. 560
- The enemy’s property should not be retained beyond the amount of 
his debt.'^ '*'
- A slave, that is, a prisoner of war, should suffer no more than
562is permitted by "the nature of justice and goodness”.
563- Sovereignty over the vanquished should not be acquired.
These precepts resemble those presented in De Jure Praedae, but,
564in constrast with what he says in the earlier work , in De Jure Belli
ac Pacis he does not portray them as being imposed by the law of nature
"properly so-called", but ascribes them to moral justice, goodness,
highmindedness, what is right from the point of view of religion and
morals, a sense of shame, mercy, clemency, humaneness, rules of love,
565fairness, kindness, prudence, generosity - things which reason de-
566dares to be honourable and praiseworthy, but not obligatory.
The end and aim of war, its final cause, is scarcely mentioned in
CT fi ~J
De Jure Belli ac Pacis. The chapter "On the Good Faith of States by
Which War Is Ended" discusses questions such as: Who has the right to
make peace? - How to interpret peace treaties - How a peace treaty may
568be broken - How war may be ended by lot, set combat and arbitration , 
noting that "the parties" do not usually "arrive at peace by a confes­
sion of wrong", whencefore treaties should be given that interpretation
which "puts the parties on an equality with regard to the justice of„ 569 war .
The materially or morally just public war in De Jure Belli ac Pa­
cis neither strengthens the idea of human society nor points to the ex­
istence of international society, mainly because its essential ingredi­
ent - the just material cause - is poorly developed and rests on inse­
cure ground. And Grotius himself does not make any claims for it other 
than this: If rulers fight for an unjust cause, they "cannot reach the 
Kingdom of Heaven without repentance".
None of Grotius’ four kinds of just war suggests that there is an 
international society with which it must not come into conflict if it 
wants to retain the quality of being just: the just private war in Ite
231
Jure Praedae is concerned with human society and not with international 
society; the just public war in De Jure Praedae, which may be seen as 
combining the two just public wars of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, is not 
identified as the war which states and rulers have agreed to regard as 
just; the formally or externally just public war in De Jure Belli ac Pa­
cis reflects the idea of a plurality rather than a society of states 
and rulers; and the materially or morally just public war in De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis fails as an argument.
Of Grotius’ four kinds of just war only one - the private war in 
De Jure Praedae - supports the idea of human society; the just public 
war in De Jure Praedae and the formally or externally just public war 
in De Jure Belli ac Pacis are in conflict with human society, because 
they violate the idea of justice as it inheres in its law, the law of 
nature or primary law of nations; and the materially or morally just 
public war in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, because of the weakness of its ar­
gument, is no more supportive of the idea of human society than of in­
ternational society.
10. Moderation
Grotius’ writings contain the idea of moderation and also that of its 
opposite, immoderation. Various instances of both have appeared at dif­
ferent times in the course of this chapter, and it will be the task of 
this section to bring them together and to evaluate them.
(a) The idea of moderation occurs in four variants:
(i) It presents itself as the idea of the "middle ground". Grotius 
identifies as the medium or modus or mediocritas "that which lies be­
tween extremes" and, on numerous occasions, expresses himself in favour 
of it. For example, in A Treatise on the Antiquity ... he "most com­
mends" the government of the Hollanders, that is, a "Government of the 
Nobles", because it is "placed between the Regall Authority, and the 
Authority of the Common People", and hence "avoideth the evils of both 
of them, and draweth unto it seife from them all which is good after 
it" Or, in De Jure Praedae, he declares:
Justice consists in taking a middle course. It is 
wrong to infli^2inJury * but it is als° wrong to 
endure injury.
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Or, in De Jure Belli ac P a d s , when speaking of those who endorse all 
war, no matter how unjust, and those who are against all war, he expres­
ses the opinion that "(f)or both extremes ... a remedy must be found 
573. ..". On other occasions, however, he sacrifices the "middle ground" 
to the idea of the extreme: "(T)here are some things of which the ex­
tent is limited by no boundaries". The example he submits: "We cannot 
... worship God too much .
(ii) The idea of using words rather than force is a second form of 
moderation present in his writings. In both De Jure Praedae and De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis Grotius mentions numerous thinkers of Antiquity, men such 
as Herodotus, Euripides, Thucydides, Terence, Livy and Tacitus, as hav­
ing expressed themselves in favour of settling disputes by "discussion"
rather than "violence"~^~*, and, in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, he adds in-
576stances of arbitration. Yet in neither work does he portray himself
as an advocate of the use of words in place of the use of force. In De
Jure Praedae he identifies it as an "honourable" but not a "necessary
m e a s u r e " ^ a n d  in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, while presenting it as a
possible method, in case of doubt, of avoiding war, even declaring that
"(e)specially ... Christian kings and states are bound to pursue this 
578method ..." , he undermines it when finding that, in such matters,
states and rulers prefer not "to have recourse to the judgements of oth- 
579ers .
(iii) Moderate is that which accords with the law of nature or pri­
mary law of nations. Grotius makes this point "forcefully" in De Jure 
Praedae when discussing just form in waging war, private and public, 
identifying any act which is committed in excess of that which the law 
of nature or primary law of nations prescribes as transgressing the 
"requisite of moderation". Does not "that most sacred of natural pre­
cepts" decree that "man must not be prodigally misused by his fellow
580man"? In De Jure Belli ac Pacis, however, he does not reaffirm this
link between moderation and the law of nature or primary law of na- 
581tions.
(iv) When, in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius links the idea of
moderation - and this may be taken as its fourth manifestation - to just
form in waging the materially or morally just public war, he invokes
"higher grounds", reasons less "forceful" than law - moral justice,
highmindedness, a sense of shame, mercy, goodness, kindness, and so 
582on. Moderation also has "its advantages", he points out, and should
be "valued" on that account: it takes away from the enemy "a great weap­
on, despair"; it gives the impression of "great assurance of victory";
it is likely to win the minds of men, be they the enemy or someone else;
583and it identifies him who wages war as a Christian.
Grotius’ four variants of the idea of moderation suggest that his 
commitment to this idea is limited - an impression which is reinforced 
by the existence in his writings of the idea of immoderation.
(b) Apart from acting as a competitor of the "middle ground", the 
idea of immoderation occurs mainly in connection with volitional law - 
law within the state and law between states.
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(i) Grotius admits the idea of immoderation into the state when he 
discusses "a human law ... approved by God": the law of non-resistance. 
It says that a ruler may resort to injustice, arbitrariness, violence, 
oppression, and the subject has no right to resist. Immoderation goes 
with impunity because:
(B)eyond doubt the most important element in pub­
lic affairs is the constituted order of bearing 
rule and rendering obedience ... This truly can­
not coexi^g^with individual licence to offer re­
sistance .
(ii) Grotius finds a place for the idea of immoderation between 
states and rulers when he attaches it to that part of the secondary or 
volitional law of nations which concerns itself with what is permitted 
in the formally or externally just public war.
In De Jure Praedae he ascribes to the secondary or volitional law
of nations the rule which makes it permissible for the just and unjust
586belligerent alike to irrevocably acquire the enemy’s property - a
rule which contravenes the "requisite of moderation", as it grants the
unjust party a right for which there is no corresponding claim. In De_
Jure Belli ac Pacis he depicts a severe "law of war" as part of the sec-
587ondary or volitional law of nations , offering as an explanation the
following thought: "For his own advantage, therefore, each one resorts
588to so extreme severity in cases in which it seems expedient ... .
Moderation and immoderation exist side by side in Grotius’ writings, 
and there is no attempt on his part to reconcile the one with the other 
except to declare the former to be "right" and the latter to be "permis-
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589sible". And, as this section has shown, he does not give the former 
a clear endorsement.
Grotius links the idea of moderation to the law of nature or pri­
mary law of nations but attaches it to different "phases”, which may be 
interpreted to mean that he does not regard it as an essential ingredi­
ent of the idea of human society. He never establishes a link between 
moderation and the secondary or volitional law of nations. Its exercise 
in accordance with moral justice and its many variants may be seen as 
benefitting states and rulers in their relations with one another, but 
he rarely portrays it that way. On the other hand, he does not hesitate 
to associate the secondary or volitional law of nations with the idea 
of immoderation - a view which goes against the idea of international 
society.
Conclusion
Why, it may be asked, present this chapter - longer than the preceding 
three - when what it shows is not what is the case but what is not the 
case? Not to include it, it may be replied, would only prompt the ques­
tion: Why not? Gierke, Wight and Bull are at one in attributing the 
idea of international society to Grotius, and this study is concerned 
with thinkers whom they regard as early exponents of this idea. Further­
more, they are not only unanimous in crediting Grotius with the idea of 
international society, but Wight and Bull are also prepared to name the 
tradition of thought to which this idea is central the "Grotian tradi­
tion" and to refer to its adherents as the "Grotians", for they see Gro­
tius as "cardinal" in the advancement of this way of thinking about in­
ternational relations. There is an additional reason: the findings of 
this chapter, negative though they are, may help to advance the knowl­
edge of Grotius the man of history, for knowledge grows not only be af­
firmation.
In support of their decision to appropriate Grotius for the via me­
dia, Gierke, Wight and Bull offer some references to his writings, and 
the ideas thus identified exist, but they are not sufficient to permit 
the inference, which all three scholars draw, that Grotius has the idea 
of international society; furthermore, and this is equally important, 
there are other ideas in his writings which do not reinforce or comple­
ment the former, but qualify them, changing their meaning and signifi­
cance.
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Grotius, to present the main findings of this inquiry, does not 
view "international politics as taking place within an international 
society" nor does he say that they should, even though he has the term 
societas gentium. The feature which stands out in the picture that has 
been taking shape in the course of this chapter is the absence of a 
bond among the independent and formally equal states and rulers that 
are universally present. There is the law of nature or primary law of 
nations, but the accent is on those "phases" which are not obligatory; 
there also is the secondary or volitional law of nations, but it is ill 
defined, and its limited subject-matter reinforces rather than bridges 
the separateness that goes with plurality; other potential links such 
as good faith, religion, and civilization are not developed; commerce, 
diplomacy and war - activities which, as the preceding chapters found, 
help to establish whether a thinker has the idea of international soci­
ety - do not, in this case, make of the plurality of states and rulers 
a society of states and rulers. Moderation is present, but so is its op­
posite, immoderation.
Grotius does not fit the via media, but nor is he a representative 
of the universalist tradition of thought. On this point there is agree­
ment between the findings of this study and the accounts of Gierke,
Wight and Bull. Grotius is not in favour of a world government (Gier- 
590ke) , nor does he argue for the replacement, by peaceful or violent
means, of states and rulers by the universal society of mankind (Wight 
591and Bull). Section Two of this chapter identifies Grotius as reject­
ing universalism, and subsequent sections do not modify this initial po­
sition. Grotius accords a good deal of space to the idea of human soci­
ety, but he does not give it a position of primacy. Human society, as 
he presents it, depends for its well-being on the support of states and 
rulers, and this may or may not be forthcoming. It thus even lacks the
quality of being potentially destructive of states and rulers, which
592Bull ascribes to this idea.
Grotius* lack of rapport with both the via media and the univer­
salist tradition of thought raises the question whether he should, in 
spite of his condemnation of Carneades, be more appropriately placed 
among the realists as defined by Gierke, Wight, and Bull.
These three scholars require a member of this tradition of thought 
to reject "the idea of a natural community binding together the states"
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593(Gierke) , to assert the doctrine that there is no "wider society to
594embrace states" (Wight) or to hold that there is no society of 
595states (Bull). Grotius does not do this - he simply fails to estab­
lish the existence of such a society.
However, his poorly developed secondary or volitional law of na­
tions may be seen as representing no more than "the principles and
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rules which states ... have agreed to regard as obligatory" (Wight) 
or "rules of prudence and expediency" (Bull).“*^ More specifically, Gro­
tius ’ lines of reasoning, as present in De Jure Praedae, Mare Liberum,
A Treatise on the Antiquity ..., "The Colonial Conferences between Eng­
land and the Netherlands in 1613 and 1615" and, at times, in De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis, correspond rather neatly to one of Bull's criteria of 
the realist tradition of thought, to wit:
If any moral or legal goals are to be pursued in 
international politics, these can only ^gthe mor­
al or legal goals of the state itself.
Consideration of the interests of other states and rulers: this idea 
finds no more support in Grotius than in Carneades.
On the other hand, the presence of ideas such as human society and 
its law, the law of nature or primary law of nations, and moderation 
militates against Grotius' appropriation for the third tradition of 
thought.
Elements of all three traditions are present in Grotius' writings, 
and they cannot be built into one general theory of international rela­
tions, be it the universalist, the realist, or the via media.
To conclude on a more constructive note:
It is possible to find a positive explanation for the vaguenesses, 
inconsistencies and disconnections which characterize Grotius' writings, 
if one abandons the assumption of Grotius the thinker being their 
author, and replaces it by another assumption, that of Grotius the pol­
itician.
Grotius the politician, who identifies the cause of his fatherland 
with his own, does not choose ideas for their truth-value or explanato­
ry power, nor does he aim at moulding them into a general theory or sys-
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tem of thought. For him ideas are tools to be employed where and when 
his cause requires it. To him it does not matter how well defined they 
are, or how or whether they interrelate. He is ready to desert them 
where and when his cause demands it. Ideas are there to satisfy the 
needs of the moment and to satisfy them well.
Grotius the politician is a hypothesis derived from the many
sources consulted for the purposes of this chapter. It is, as Roelofsen 
599confirms , a hypothesis worth exploring, holding the promise of tak­
ing knowledge further in the direction of Grotius the man of history.
PART THREE
AN EVALUATION
CHAPTER VII
A PATTERN OF IDEAS
The search for the idea of international society, presented in Part Two 
of this study, has met with the unexpected no less than with the hoped 
for.
Chapter Two finds evidence, dispersed through numerous writings, 
for the existence of the idea of international society well before 1500. 
Chapters Three, Four and Five identify Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili as 
thinkers of the via media - Erasmus, writing in the first third of the 
sixteenth century, offers the idea of a society of Christian princes; 
Vitoria, his near-contemporary, puts forward the idea of a community of 
perfect communities; and Gentili, towards the end of the sixteenth/ear- 
ly seventeenth century, chooses the image of the ’’lofty structure’’ to 
present his idea of a society of free princes and free peoples. Chapter 
Six, however, discovers that Grotius, writing his works in the first 
half of the seventeenth century, offers reflections about the relations 
among states and rulers which are not inspired by the idea of interna­
tional society.
This third and final part of the study compares the findings of 
the search, and relates them to the initial hypothesis presented in 
Chapter One. It comprises two chapters, Chapter Eight, which addresses 
itself to the thinkers, and this chapter, which is concerned with the 
idea.
The initial hypothesis suggests, and the findings confirm, that 
the idea of international society is a composite idea. Its ingredients 
or components are numerous other ideas. Some of these, as the chapters 
on Erasmus, Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius show, recur with each thinker; 
others are less constant. Those which reappear do not necessarily pre­
sent themselves in the same language or have precisely the same mean­
ing, nor are they always associated in the same way. This variety, 
which finds visual expression in the four chapters in the changing num­
ber of sections, under sometimes differently worded headings, may for 
the purposes of this evaluation be contained within the following four 
sections: One, The Members of International Society; Two, That Which
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Links and Circumscribes; Three, The Origin, Extent and Termination of 
International Society; and Four, That Which Is Desirable.
1. The Members of International Society
One of the ideas which recurs with unfailing regularity in all four 
thinkers is the idea of a plurality of political entities.
In some respects, they present differing images of these entities:
(a) Erasmus refers to them as Christian princes; Vitoria as per­
fect communities; Gentili as free princes and free peoples; and Grotius 
as states and rulers.
(b) Erasmus clothes them in the Christian religion; Vitoria, Gen­
tili and Grotius do not insist on the same religion.
(c) Erasmus does not reveal in whom sovereignty resides; Vitoria
places it almost invariably in the community^; Gentili is prepared to
2ascribe it to prince or people ; and the same is true of Grotius, al-
3though he uses different language to formulate this idea.
(d) Erasmus emphasizes the wisdom and goodness of the Christian 
prince”^; Vitoria stresses that the perfect community has "its own laws 
and its own council and its own magistrates” ;^ the feature which Genti­
li singles out in the prince or people is their freedom from a superi-
6 7or ; and Grotius is concerned with civil or sovereign power.
In other important respects, the four images resemble one another.
(a) Erasmus’ Christian prince, Vitoria's perfect community, Genti­
li 's free prince or people, and Grotius’ state or ruler share the char­
acteristic of not being subject to another prince, community, people, 
state or ruler - they are independent or sovereign. The Christian g
prince, as Erasmus formulates it, is "the supreme ruler" of his realm ; 
the perfect community, as Vitoria reasons, is "complete in itself" or 
"self-sufficing" ; Gentili’s free prince or people has no "earthly 
judge"^; and Grotius’ state or ruler is "complete" or "self-suffi­
cient" or, as he also puts it, is not "under the rule of another human 
will". I-*- And in this respect they are equal - prince with prince; com­
munity with community; people with people; state with state; and ruler 
with ruler.
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(b) Erasmus, Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius are also at one in at­
taching to this attribute of being independent or sovereign the rights 
and obligations with which they invest princes, communities, peoples, 
states and rulers in relation to one another, although they differ to 
some extent in the way in which they distribute these rights and obli­
gations: Erasmus emphasizes obligations; Vitoria and Gentili very near­
ly balance rights and obligations; Grotius, on the other hand, puts the 
emphasis on rights. These points receive further attention in Section 
Two below.
(c) A third point of correspondence: All four leave their princes,
communities, peoples, states and rulers free to choose the form of
government that they wish to have. Erasmus, who gives the same religion
to his princes, does not prescribe the same form of government for 
12them ; Vitoria intimates that the perfect community adopts the form of
13government "it desires, even if this be not the best form" ; Gentili
makes it clear that he does not have a "best" form: his princes and
peoples have whatever form of government they have, and he sees no rea-
14son why they should not change from one form to another ; and Grotius 
puts it this way: because there is no agreement on what constitutes 
"superior excellence of this or that form", the important point is that 
there be free choice.^
The question, then, of who exercises sovereignty is not a major 
concern for them, and it may be answered differently from prince to 
prince, community to community, people to people, state to state, and 
ruler to ruler. What matters - at least to Erasmus, Vitoria and Genti­
li - is that sovereignty, irrespective of who exercises it, is exer­
cised justly: power is not for purposes of tyranny, but for purposes of 
administration. This idea recurs like a refrain from Erasmus to Vitoria, 
and from Vitoria to Gentili. The wise and good prince, Erasmus holds,
respects the laws, and the laws embody "the fundamental principles of
16equity and honesty". The ruler who is entrusted with the administra­
tion of the perfect community, Vitoria sets forth, considers what is
lawful and what creates and conserves felicity.^ However "absolute"
18power may be, Gentili submits, "nothing unseemly is admitted". Gro­
tius, while agreeing that it is unjust to show disrespect for the laws, 
condones it in the one who exercises the sovereign power that he 
rightfully possesses: more important than justice is the "constituted 
order". Of the four thinkers Vitoria is the only one to grant the
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right of resistance. Erasmus does not refer to it, and Gentili and
21Grotius withhold it , except that the latter concedes it where the
22ruler tampers with the "constituted order".
(d) There is a further point of correspondence between the images 
which the four thinkers present of their princes, communities, peoples, 
states and rulers. They all contain the idea - although it does not al­
ways appear in the same garb - that what happens within one realm is of 
significance to the rest of the world. Erasmus puts it this way: If 
each prince strives to beautify his own country, "then all will be
flourishing everywhere"; if one of them does wrong, it will be to the
23detriment of all. A right of intervention, if the latter is accorded,
24is no more than hinted at. Vitoria presents it as follows: If a per­
fect community is faced by a tyrannical ruler or adheres to tyrannical
laws, other perfect communities are entitled to intervene ; however, 
the latter do not necessarily have the right of intervention if all
that is "at fault" is that the administration of the former is not "up
26to the standard required by human and civil claims". Gentili gives it
the following expression: In case of internal injustice, and this may
take the form of an unjust or cruel ruler, or it may express itself in
a violation of the law of nature, the outside has the right to inter-
27vene. Grotius echoes Gentili in what he says about injustice inter-
28nally and intervention from the outside ; but in his case, the idea 
coexists uncomfortably with his other idea that the "constituted order" 
is more important than justice - a coexistence which perhaps explains
the numerous qualifications which he attaches to the right of interven-
. . 29tion.
(e) Another, and final, point of correspondence is that the polit­
ical entities portrayed by Erasmus, Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius are 
not necessarily collectivities but may be individuals. In the case of 
Erasmus, the emphasis is entirely on individuals, although it is quite 
possible that the sovereign power with which he endows them resides, in 
fact, in the communities of which they are the rulers, rather than in 
themselves. Vitoria depicts communities rather than individuals, al­
though, when he comes to the perfect spiritual community, he is pre- 
pared to place its sovereign power "in certain persons". Gentili's 
principes are peoples or individuals; and the same is true of Grotius' 
political entities. Individuals or collectivities - by virtue of their 
sovereignty they are the same, having the same rights and the same ob-
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ligations in relation to one another.
To be distinguished from the sovereign individual is the subject 
or citizen. Any rights and obligations which he may have in the exter­
nal context belong to him - and Erasmus, Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius 
are in agreement on this point - as a member of a particular community 
or "a part of a particular ruler", and are defined by the laws or rules
that exist among the sovereign entities - the princes, communities,
31peoples, states and rulers. Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius are further
agreed on what may be called the idea of mutual liability, that is,
they hold that for a wrong which the subject or citizen commits abroad,
his community or ruler may be held responsible, and, vice versa, a
wrong committed by the latter may be avenged on the former; and if the
subject or citizen suffers a wrong, his community or ruler is entitled
32to seek redress. Erasmus does not go into these details. Grotius, in
addition, elaborates the idea of the private individual who is entitled
to enforce his rights under the law of nature or primary law of nations
by means of the private war, but he places it in a context where there
33are no states and rulers or where these are not functioning , hence 
outside any society that may exist among states and rulers. In the in­
ternal context, the subject or citizen - this, at least, is the view of
34Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili - is entitled to just rule ; but, if such 
rule is not forthcoming, he has no entitlement to help from the outside, 
even though the outside may be entitled to help him.
The subject or citizen may, then, not be given a higher status 
than "indirect member" of international society - a position for which 
the pirate and at times the rebel do not qualify.
Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili, to summarize this section, present 
the entities which constitute political plurality - princes, communi­
ties or peoples - as sovereign and, in this respect, equal; free to 
choose the form of government which they desire; concerned with the pur­
suit of justice internally; open to intervention from the outside, in 
case such pursuit is neglected, but not unreservedly so; and endowed 
with rights and obligations in relation to one another. They appear as 
collectivities and/or individuals. Grotius offers an image of these en­
tities which differs mainly in two respects: internally, he depicts 
them as being concerned with the maintenance of the "constituted order" 
rather than with the pursuit of justice; and, in the external context,
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he endows them with rights rather than obligations.
2. That Which Links and Circumscribes
The idea of that which links political entity to political entity re­
curs in all four thinkers, and they all depict it as consisting of sets 
of ideas, although they do not all opt for the same ones. They also are 
at one in deriving from these sets of ideas the rights and obligations 
with which they invest their princes, communities, peoples, states and 
rulers in relation to one another, but they differ, not only in respect 
to particular rights and obligations which they present, but also in 
the way in which they present them. Lastly, three of the four thinkers 
include a word of advice which reinforces that which links and circum­
scribes; the fourth does not have such advice.
(a) In the case of Erasmus, that which links encloses three sets 
of ideas which reinforce and complement one another.
First among these is the Christian religion or, as he prefers to 
call it, the philosophy of Christ. To be Christian is as much an attri­
bute of his princes as is being supreme; and to be a Christian prince 
means to be bound to all other Christian princes. "Among all Christian
princes", Erasmus notes, "there is at once a very firm and holy bond
35because of the very fact that they are Christian". Supplementing the
Christian religion are all those ideas which lie embedded in "the noble
old systems of thought" of Antiquity - perhaps, also, inspired by
Christ. Sharing these ideas means to be linked by what Erasmus calls
"learning". Complementing religion and learning are legal ideas -
those ideas which are contained in a just positive law of nations, that
37is, a law which Christian princes impose upon themselves.
Religion, learning and law provide Christian princes with a code 
of conduct which tells them, on the one hand, to respect one another’s 
separateness and sovereignty. The temporal Christian prince, as Erasmus 
puts it, should not inflict harm on another prince - he should not at­
tack him, he should not take his riches, he should not subject him to
38his rule or religion, and he should not break a promise made to him.
The temporal Christian prince is entitled to go to war, but only if it
39is a question of defending his country or religion. On the other 
hand, the Christian princes' code of conduct prescribes co-operation.
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The temporal Christian prince, as Erasmus formulates it, should act in 
common with other Christian princes in achieving peace when war has 
broken out; in strengthening and beautifying their respective realms; 
and in helping a Christian people in distress.^ The spiritual Chris­
tian prince is subject to the same two kinds of precept. On the one 
hand, he should not, as Erasmus points out, become involved in "worldly 
things" but should uphold the rule of Christ; on the other hand, he 
should use the authority of his office to arbitrate and mediate in con­
flicts among temporal Christian princes.^
Erasmus’ way of seeing that which links, although formulated in 
terms of obligations rather than rights, supports both the idea of sep­
arateness and sovereignty and that of society.
His word of advice amounts to this: Whatever it may be right to do
according to religion, learning and law, it is wise to be moderate. Mod-
42eration tempers power, and tempered power is conducive to harmony.
(b) Vitoria presents two sets of ideas, the first of which com­
prises the law of nations. It links Christian and non-Christian perfect 
temporal communities. At times, it appears as positive law, its author 
being the world as a whole. As Vitoria formulates it, "(t)he world as a 
whole ... has the power to create laws that are just and fitting for 
all ...". At other times, it takes the form of natural law. "What na­
tural reason has established among all nations", he writes, "is called
44the law of nations". At its origin is God.
The Christian religion forms the second set of ideas. It makes for
a bond among those perfect communities which have adopted it - the
Christian community, the Christian church, the Christian state, as Vi-
45toria variously refers to it.
Law and religion complement one another where they coexist, but 
they do not necessarily reinformce one another.
The law of nations in both its forms is the source of the rights 
and obligations which perfect temporal communities have in relation to 
one another. Some of these rights are negative. As Vitoria presents it, 
the perfect temporal community does not have the right to deprive an­
other perfect temporal community of what belongs to it, nor does it 
have the right to claim discovery in relation to territory which al-
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ready has legitimate owners, nor the right to force another perfect tem­
poral community to accept its religion. These negative rights corres­
pond to the obligation to respect the separateness and sovereignty of
46other perfect temporal communities. Other rights are positive. Thus, 
the perfect temporal community has the right to trade with another per­
fect temporal community, and the members of the former are entitled to 
travel to, and sojourn among the latter. The obligation attached to 
these rights is "not to do harm" to the other temporal community. The 
latter, in turn, is under the obligation to respect the rights of the 
former. Both the positive rights and the obligations which accompany 
them correspond to what Vitoria calls "natural society and fellow­
ship".^ The right to go to war is another positive right held by the 
perfect temporal community. It is circumscribed by the obligation not 
to go to war, unless it is just; and a war is just, according to Vito­
ria, only if it is fought in defence of either separateness and sover­
eignty or of natural society and fellowship.^
The bond which constitutes the Christian religion creates a spe­
cial relationship between what Vitoria calls Christian spiritual power 
and Christian temporal power. As he sees it, the latter is under the 
obligation to further and, if necessary, to serve the interests of the 
former, and the former is under the obligation to respect the separate­
ness of the latter and to limit interference with it to cases of neces- 
49sity.
Vitoria’s law of nations, as a link between perfect temporal com­
munities, emphasizes obligations and rights, whereas the Christian re­
ligion, as an additional link between Christian perfect communities, 
places the emphasis on obligations rather than rights. Yet, both uphold 
the idea of separateness and sovereignty, on the one hand, and that of 
society, on the other.
His word of advice is this: Whatever it may be lawful to do, it is 
important to consider what is advisable. Often, though not always, it 
is advisable to exercise moderation rather than to insist on what is 
lawful. Moderation is conducive to peace and security. Only in case of 
persistent enmity is it advisable not to put moderation ahead of what
is lawful.50
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(c) In the case of Gentili, that which links consists of two sets 
of ideas which reinforce and complement one another.
The first of these centres on the concept of human society. As Gen­
tili depicts it, the "great association of the human race", that "great 
society", owes its existence to nature. Nature, he says, has created 
human beings akin; it has given them love for one another; it has made 
them "inclined to union"; and, as he notes, through this common bond of 
nature, through this human society, "the nations of the earth are 
united".
The other set comprises those ideas which constitute the law of na­
tions. It presents itself as natural law, natural reason, natural in­
stinct, agreement, custom or, as Gentili puts it, the law of nations is 
that which is "in use among all the nations of men, which native reason 
has established among all human beings"; it contains "certain unwritten 
laws given to (men) by God ... gained, not by training, but by in­
stinct"; it is that which "natural reason has established among all
peoples"; it is natural law. Its essence, he declares, is the prin-
53ciple of good faith.
This twofold link formed by the ideas of human society and a natu­
ral law of nations generates the rights and obligations with which Gen­
tili endows his free princes and free peoples in relation to one an­
other. As he presents it, princes and peoples have the right to partic­
ipate in commerce, and they are under the obligation to do so. Commerce 
is necessary, not only for a more even distribution of the products of 
the earth, but also in order "to bring men together". Only if partic­
ipation causes "harm", may it be refused, for a limited time and/or to 
a limited extent.Princes and peoples have the right to send ambassa­
dors to one another, and they are obliged to receive them. Diplomacy is 
necessary, for where there is "such reciprocity of rights", there "in­
evitably" is a need for negotiations. Only if admission means "suffer­
ing harm", may it be refused. Ambassadors have the right to be free from 
violence, provided that they themselves refrain from committing an of­
fence. ^  Princes and peoples have the right to go to war, but only if it 
is necessary - if the conflict cannot be resolved "by words", and if it 
has a just cause - a requirement which is not met unless the war is 
fought in defence of "self" and the rights which attach thereto, or for 
"the sake of others".Princes and peoples have the right to conclude
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peace; their obligation is to conclude a just peace. ^  And finally,
princes and peoples are under the obligation to observe the principle
of good faith in their dealings with one another, in times of peace and 
58in war. All of which, as Gentili sees it, amounts to the right, and
59obligation, of princes and peoples to maintain the law of nations. It 
safeguards both separateness and sovereignty, on the one hand, and "na­
tural kinship", on the other.
Gentili, like Vitoria when treating of the law of nations, empha­
sizes both obligations and rights.
The word of advice which he offers is this: Be moderate. Observe 
the proper limit. Depending on circumstances, it may be fitting to use 
no force at all, or it may be proper to use less severity than the laws 
permit; but, whatever the circumstances, never go beyond what is lawful 
and just. Moderation is virtue. It serves "justice, humanity and good 
precedent".^
(d) Grotius is the third thinker to present two sets of ideas.
They both belong to the realm of law, but they do not necessarily rein­
force or complement one another.
The first of these is the law of nature or primary law of nations.
It is the law which is "innate in every individual", "the same among
all nations"; it is "a dictate of right reason which points out that an
act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature,
has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in
consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the author
61of nature, God". What Grotius emphasizes, however, when he discusses
this law, is not what it forbids or enjoins, but what it permits, and
this, as he shows, is changeable. By the law of nature, a man has the
right to hunt wild animals, fish, and birds, "so long as municipal law
does not intervene"; nature confers upon all men the right to resist
in order to avoid injury, but "the state ..., in the interest of public
peace and order, can limit that common right of resistance". Under the
primary law of nations "all things were common property" and there were
"no commercial transactions"; yet "(f)reedom of trade ... springs from
the primary law of nations, which has a natural and permanent cause, so
that it cannot be abrogated"; but states and rulers have the right to
62conclude treaties which exclude others from commerce. With the empha-
sis on rights, and changeable rights, Grotius' law of nature or primary- 
law of nations is likely to make for division rather than agreement.
The other set of ideas comprises the secondary or volitional law
of nations. It is, as Gierke summarizes Grotius’ various definitions of
63it, "the concordant positive law of all or many nations". It formu­
lates the will or agreement of states and rulers in relation to diplo­
matic matters. As Grotius presents it, there is no right of states and 
rulers to send ambassadors, rather, there is the right of ambassadors 
to be admitted. The right of admission does not entail the obligation 
to admit, or, as he puts it, "it does not command the admission of am­
bassadors". When admission is granted, ambassadors are entitled to full 
security, that is, they have the right to be free from violence even if 
they commit grave offences. Third states and rulers are not under the 
obligation to respect the inviolability of ambassadors, and the latter
have no "right of passage". A safe passage is tied to a safe-conduct,
64and third states and rulers have the right to withhold it.
The same law also formulates that which states and rulers have 
agreed to in relation to war. As Grotius depicts the formally or exter­
nally just public war, states and rulers have the right to go to war 
without being under the obligation to have a just material cause of 
war. The proviso is that they declare it publicly.^ The idea of a just 
material cause appears in the context of another public war, the moral­
ly or materially just public war, but Grotius gives this idea neither a 
definite content nor standing.^
The secondary or volitional law of nations includes the further 
agreement that states and rulers have the right to enter into treaties 
"no matter how unfair". That is to say, there is no obligation that 
treaties be just. And there is no mention of an obligation that trea­
ties be kept: one side may be freed by "the perfidy" of the other. As 
he presents it, the secondary or volitional law of nations reinforces 
rather than bridges the separateness that goes with plurality. Other
potential links such as the principle of good faith, the Christian re-
68ligion, and the idea of civilization are not developed.
\JyGrotius argues in terms of rights, and changeable rights , rather 
than obligations. His way of depicting that which links supports the 
idea of separateness and sovereignty, but not that of society. He is 
not against offering a word of advice, but it usually lacks the quality
249
of that which circumscribes, as when he submits that "(t)hat which be­
fits the circumstances in which the state is situated, is especially 
beneficial".^ At times, while displaying the idea of restraint, it 
lacks the quality of that which links. For example, when he admonishes 
rulers to keep good faith, he appeals to their conscience and reputa­
tion. Or it meets with that which contradicts it. Grotius has the
72idea of moderation, but also that of immoderation. He offers no ad­
vice which both links and circumscribes.
All four thinkers have the idea of that which links, although it 
never recurs in exactly the same form, but while Erasmus, Vitoria and 
Gentili present it as circumscribing the separateness and sovereignty 
of their princes, communities and peoples, and thus supporting the idea 
of society, Grotius does not do so in the case of his states and rulers.
3. The Origin, Extent and Termination of International Society
Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili do not treat directly of these aspects of 
international society, but their thinking about them may be captured by 
looking at the idea of the authority of that which links and circum­
scribes. All three thinkers, and also Grotius, have the idea of the 
authority of that which links, but Grotius, it should be remembered, 
does not extend the meaning of that which links to include that which 
circumscribes. For the purposes of this section, four questions may use­
fully be asked.
(a) Authoritative - on what grounds?
As Erasmus sees it, the Christian religion or philosophy of Christ
is the law of Christ. As it is divine, it "neither ought to be judged
nor can it be abolished", but all human action is to be judged in ac- 
73cordance with it. The old systems of thought inherited from Antiquity 
are not as "basic an authority" as "Sacred Scripture", but they are 
"noble", providing "the best principles of conduct". Their authors were 
not divine, but they were "sage", inspired in all likelihood by some 
divine power, perhaps also by Christ.^ The law of nations is of human 
origin. Wise and good Christian princes devise it and agree to abide by 
it. It accords with the idea of justice as it inheres in religion and 
learning.^5
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The law of nations as natural law, Vitoria teaches, is "necessary" 
law. God is its author; hence it is just and binding. As positive law, 
it is of human origin and "only relatively good", but as "the world as 
a whole" is its author, it is just and fitting for all. It cannot be ab­
rogated, as it is "impossible" that "the consensus of the whole world" 
could be secured for its abrogation.^ The Christian religion, it is Vi­
toria’s conviction, is "the true religion". All other religions are 
"sects".78
The idea of human society, Gentili writes, is "true" and "a funda­
mental principle". Wise and good men have affirmed and reaffirmed it
all along the ages, and such men speak according to "the promptings of 
79nature". The law of nations, Gentili has no doubt, comes from God. He
gave it to men when they needed it. He gave it to them in the form of
natural law, natural reason, natural instinct, and it has "successively
seemed acceptable to all". The law of nations established itself like a
80custom, and, like a custom, it is binding on all.
Grotius’ answer is firm only in relation to law which is the pro-
81duct of the human will. The secondary or volitional law of nations,
he declares, has "obligatory force". It represents "the will of all na-
82tions, or of many nations". Usefulness, rather than justice, is its 
concern.
All four thinkers present that which links their princes, communi­
ties, peoples, states and rulers as authoritative. They give it, or its 
main ingredient, the form of law, although they do not all choose the 
same law, nor do they, when it is the same law, endow it with exactly 
the same characteristics, but while Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili depict 
its source as existing independently of princes, communities and peo­
ples, Grotius places his states and rulers at its origin.
(b) Authoritative - to what extent?
There are two aspects to this question, reflecting two meanings of 
the word "extent": "Authoritative for whom?" and "Authoritative to what 
degree?"
Erasmus makes it clear that the authority of that which links is 
of less than universal extent. It limits itself to Christian princes 
and their peoples, leaving outside its reach all those who do not share
83the philosophy of Christ - non-Christian princes and their peoples. 
However, and Erasmus makes this point equally clearly, not all Chris­
tian princes observe at all times that which they ought to observe.
There may be spiritual Christian princes who lack wisdom and goodness 
and get "immersed" in worldly things^, and there may be temporal Chris­
tian princes who lack the same two qualities and neither exercise jus-
85tice nor do they co-operate. In order to make such princes do what
they ought to do it is necessary to make them wiser and better, and the
way to achieve this is not by punishment - wars should not be fought un-
86less they are for purposes of defence - but by greater learning. As
87he puts it: "Arm them with the best principles of conduct".
The law of nations in both its forms, Vitoria is certain, is
authoritative for all perfect temporal communities that exist in the
world. "The law of nations", he says, is that which "natural reason has
established among all nations". It is that which "the world as a whole"
88has created, and no country may refuse to be bound by it. But Vitoria
also knows, and here he is in agreement with Erasmus, that that which
is authoritative is not always treated as such - there may be ignorance
of the law in question, or unwillingness to comply with it, and the lat-
89ter may happen occasionally or persistently. The response, he sug­
gests, should be mindful of circumstances. Sometimes, it may be best to
limit it to "teaching and instruction", "persuasion" and "demonstra-
90tion" ; at other times, it may be advisable to resort to punishment. 
"The avoidance of disorder in the world", he says, "may require a more 
effective means than defensive war". Punishment in war may also be a 
way of deterring wrongdoing. But when the answer is punishment, there 
should be a regard for "moderation and proportion"; only where there is
no hope for "amends" ever to be made, is there no requirement for re~
_ . . 92straint.
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Of less than universal extent, Vitoria is equally certain, is the
authority of the Christian religion - it does not reach beyond Chris-
93tian perfect communities. Whether or not it is always faithfully ob­
served, he does not say. He simply posits the right of punishment in
94case of non-observance.
Gentili does not mention the idea of human society in this con­
text, but the law of nations, he agrees with Vitoria, is endowed with 
universal authority. All free princes and free peoples are subject to
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it or, as he also formulates it, "the law of nations is that which is
95in use among all the nations of men". But, like Erasmus and Vitoria
before him, he acknowledges that that which is authoritative is not al-
96ways "equally observed by all" ; and, like them, he thinks about ways 
of encouraging compliance. History, he points out, teaches that disre­
gard was punished, sometimes severely, and the right to punish a viola-
97tion of the law of nations is still a just cause of war. Earlier ages, 
he adds, also made use of "unfavourable publicity" such that the re­
sulting "loss of prestige" was "more serious than the rest of the dam- 
98age". Who or what is to prevent the present or future ages from re­
sponding in like fashion?
The secondary or volitional law of nations, Grotius states, is 
authoritative for states and rulers, but he leaves it open whether this 
includes "all" states and rulers, or only "many". He also does not in­
dicate whether he regards observance of this law amongst those for whom 
it is authoritative as satisfactory or something less than that, nor 
does he formulate ideas on how to encourage observance.'*'^ He identifies 
the right to punish "wrongdoing" as a just cause of war, but it is not 
always clear what constitutes wrongdoing'*'*"*'*', and the formally or exter­
nally just public war, as he presents it, does not require a materially
102just cause in order to qualify as just.
Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili agree that that which links is author­
itative for all their princes, communities and peoples, which means that 
it is of universal extent in the case of Vitoria's perfect temporal com­
munities and Gentili's free princes and free peoples. They further agree 
that it does not follow that all their princes, communities and peoples 
will also always comply with it; and they present ideas to counter non- 
compliance. Grotius does not commit himself on the first point, and ab­
stains from discussing the other two.
(c) Authoritative - since when?
Erasmus is not explicit on this point, but it is clear from what 
he says about the why of the authority of that which links, and its ex­
tent, that he regards the philosophy of Christ as having been authori­
tative for many centuries. As he presents it, this law is authoritative 
by definition, hence since its beginning, and it came into existence 
with the life and teaching of Christ. It is, and has been, authorita-
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tive for Christian princes, and their history is part of the history of 
the beginning and expansion of Christendom. The noble old systems of 
thought, by contrast, have only more recently become authoritative for 
Christian princes, and a just positive law of nations has yet to be es­
tablished. Whether earlier times knew of one, he does not say.
Vitoria offers no more explicit an answer than Erasmus, but what 
he says about the authority of that which links permits the conclusion 
that its history is long. As he depicts the law of nations in both its 
forms, it is, and always has been, authoritative, its author being God 
and "the world as a whole" respectively. It is, and has been, authori­
tative for perfect temporal communities, and these have a distant ori­
gen. "Through the descendants of Noah", Vitoria says, "sovereignty and
103lordship began in the world". Being authoritative is equally an at­
tribute of the Christian religion. As he presents it, it is, and has 
been, the norm for Christian perfect communities, and these came into 
existence, not as early as perfect temporal communities, but some time 
after Christ.
Gentili is prepared to make the historical dimension of the author­
ity of that which links more clearly visible than either Erasmus or Vi­
toria. He presents the law of nations as inherently authoritative - and 
to this extent he resembles Vitoria - but, unlike him, he goes on to 
say that God gave it to men when they needed it, and this was early in 
their history or, as he puts it, "after our sin".^^ Men needed it when 
"the differentiation of peoples", "the separation of dominions" took 
place, and they further needed it for what happened afterwards, for 
"from that separation of dominions have followed wars, treaties, 
etc. ". The authority of the law of nations, Gentili is in no doubt,
goes back to a remote past - certainly to well before the time of Be-
106lus, the founder of Babylon in 4000 B.C. He says less about the idea 
of human society, limiting himself to the observation that it had expo­
nents as far back as the fourth century B.C.^^
Grotius does not indicate when it was, or might have been, that 
states and rulers agreed to devise laws for themselves, nor does he say 
when it was, or might have been, that states began to form. However, 
his reliance on the "old authorities" for support of his ideas may be 
interpreted to mean that he would not object to attributing both of 
these phenomena to the ancient world.
254
All four thinkers, it may be concluded, see the authority of that 
which links, or of its main ingredient, beginning in the distant past, 
and, in the case of Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili, having existed for as 
long as Christian princes, perfect communities, and free princes and 
peoples have existed.
(d) Authoritative - until when?
Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili have room for the idea that not all 
their princes, communities and peoples may at all times observe that 
which they ought to observe, but they do not say how many of them would 
have to ignore it before it could no longer be regarded as authorita­
tive. They also do not reveal whether they consider it possible that all 
their princes, communities and peoples might one day disregard it. It is 
clear how they would depict such a world: Erasmus would empty it of jus­
tice and co-operation and put tyranny and conflict in their place; Vito­
ria would remove justice and friendship, and fill it with disorder and 
enmity; and Gentili would present inequality, insecurity and isolation 
where there had been justice and participation. It is equally clear that 
at least two of them do not think it likely that such a world will come 
into existence. Wise and good Christian princes, Erasmus holds, have ex­
isted in the past, hence it is likely that they will exist in the fu­
ture; and Christian princes who lack these two qualities can be made 
wiser and better, if not wholly wise and good. Free princes and free 
peoples, Gentili points out, have the material need and the natural de­
sire to communicate with one another, and the law of nations makes this 
possible. Vitoria may have a corresponding view, but, unless one is pre­
pared to accept his conception of human nature as evidence to the con­
trary, he does not disclose it. Human beings, he says, are "frail, weak
108and needy", but they also have "reason and virtue".
Grotius is silent on these questions. He does not reveal how many 
of his states and rulers would have to show disrespect for the law of 
nations before its authority would have to be regarded as no longer ex­
istent, but then he does not specify for how many it is meant to be 
authoritative - for all or only for many? He does not indicate whether 
he considers general non-observance a possibility, but then he does 
not insist that observance should be as complete as possible. And he 
says nothing about the likelihood of general non-observance, but then, 
how significant a difference would it make to his world? Free commerce
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and monopolized commerce, admitting ambassadors and not admitting them, 
granting a safe-conduct and withholding one, war with a just material 
cause and war without such a cause - all this would be compatible with 
the law of nations being observed.
None of the four thinkers answers the question "Authoritative - 
until when?" Three of them make it clear that they would consider the 
demise of the authority of that which links undesirable, and of these 
Erasmus and Gentili make it equally clear that they think it unlikely. 
Grotius offers no answer to these questions.
To sum up: Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili place the origin of inter­
national society at the same time as the origin of the political enti­
ties which compose it. For Erasmus, its extent is the world of Chris­
tian princes, for Vitoria and Gentili, the world as a whole. All three 
would find its termination undesirable, and Erasmus and Gentili consid­
er it unlikely. Grotius gives no beginning to his law of nations except 
by implication, is not specific about its extent, and offers no reflec­
tions about its termination.
4. That Which Is Desirable
Last but not least, there is the idea of that which is desirable. It re­
curs from thinker to thinker and comprises those abstract, general and 
pervasive ideas which identify what is regarded as worth having and pre­
serving - ideas which, for the purpose of this section, may be called 
values.
Numerous are these values in the case of Erasmus, Vitoria and Gen­
tili, and the patterns which they form are complex, changing with each 
thinker, but a valid abstract capturing their essential character may 
be obtained by focusing on five ideas: independence, co-operation, jus­
tice, peace and moderation. Grotius shares only the first of these: in­
dependence .
(a) Independence
All four thinkers are agreed that princes, communities, peoples,
states and rulers are free to make decisions and act accordingly.
"(T)he decision is with the king", says Erasmus, "who cannot be corn-
109pelled or passed over by any one". The state, Vitoria teaches, "does
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not conduct its affairs in conjunction with any other state whatso­
ever".'*’^  Gentili points out that the law of nations "insists and or­
ders that control over one’s own affairs shall be final And
Grotius puts it this way: because "the actions" of states and rulers
"are not subject to the legal control of another ... they cannot be
112rendered void by the operation of another human will". Not to be in­
dependent seems unacceptable, if not intolerable.
Their opposition to political universalism confirms their attach­
ment to independence. It also points to some other values which they 
see as being supported by independence. Erasmus links it to security 
and prosperity, Vitoria to that which is just and pleasing to God, Gen­
tili to justice, and Grotius to usefulness.
Independence, they agree, is worth preserving, and they all make
113its defence against unjust attack a just cause of war. Only if such
a war risks destroying prince, community, people, state or ruler, must
114it not be fought. Survival is more important than independence.
(b) Co-operation
Co-operation is dear to three of the four thinkers, although it 
does not have exactly the same meaning for them. Erasmus sees it as col­
laboration or acting in common. For Vitoria and Gentili, it sometimes 
has the same meaning; at other times, the one depicts it as openness or 
non-exclusion, and the other as participation or sharing. Wise and good 
Christian princes, Erasmus submits, co-operate in maintaining peace; 
they make joint efforts to restore peace when war has broken out; they 
work together to strengthen and beautify their respective countries; 
and they help when one of them is in distress. Perfect temporal com­
munities, Vitoria argues, are not closed to one another, but receive 
one another’s traders and travellers, and those who wish to stay for a 
while; they defend not only friends and allies, but anybody who "suf­
fers unjustly"; and Christian perfect temporal communities, in addi­
tion, help Christian spiritual power "to preserve and protect it- 
116self". Free princes and free peoples, Gentili insists, do not ex­
clude themselves from commerce and diplomacy, nor do they exclude oth­
ers. They all participate, and when it is a question of defending an­
other prince or people against unjust attack, they are prepared to do 
117so.
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Co-operation is not only satisfying in itself, it also promotes 
other values. Erasmus connects it with peace, prosperity, justice and 
independence, Vitoria with justice, happiness, peace, security and in­
dependence; and Gentili sees it as contributing to material equality, 
friendship, justice, peace and independence.
Clearly, co-operation is worth preserving. Yet, the refusal to co­
operate is not necessarily a just cause of war. When co-operation means 
acting in common, none of the three thinkers makes non-co-operation 
punishable in war. Erasmus perceives it as a lack of wisdom and good­
ness, and prescribes greater learning as a means to counteract it. Vi­
toria permits various forms of punishment short of war, but places
these in the context of Christian temporal power refusing to co-operate
118with Christian spiritual power. Gentili does not suggest any counter­
measures. When co-operation means openness and participation, both Vi-
119toria and Gentili identify non-co-operation as a just cause of war , 
but neither of them regards war as the only possible answer. If co-op­
eration means "suffering harm", and Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili are at 
one again, it may be refused without inviting any remedial action.
Grotius does not reveal a concern for co-operation, but only men­
tions, as a matter of right, that states and rulers may defend subjects,
allies, friends and "any person whatsoever" against wrongful treat- 
120ment.
(c) Justice
Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili present justice as equity, fairness,
121reasonableness or appropriateness. Justice, they are agreed, inheres
in that which links prince to prince, community to community and people
to people, and often, though not always, it is indistinguishable from
moderation; it is also present in conduct which accords with that which
links. The just prince, Erasmus holds, does not attack another prince,
take his riches, subject him to his rule or religion, nor does he break
122a promise made to him. Vitoria and Gentili concur, although they
formulate it differently, and they go beyond Erasmus by including co-
123operation in that which is just. For the latter, co-operation is an
aspect of goodness rather than justice, although like justice, it in-
124heres in that which links. The just prince, Erasmus adds, only goes
125to war if he has a just cause. Vitoria and Gentili agree. Communi-
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X 2 6ties and peoples abstain from war, unless they have a just cause.
The question which they answer differently is: What constitutes a just 
cause?
Justice is a value in itself, and it is important in relation to 
other values. It protects independence and, through it, plurality and 
diversity. In the case of Vitoria and Gentili, it also safeguards co­
operation and, through it, "natural society and fellowship" and "human 
kinship". Justice promotes peace and, in the case of Erasmus, it works, 
together with co-operation, for prosperity and the well-being of Chris­
tendom; in the case of Vitoria and Gentili, it adds security to peace 
and makes for a "condition of happiness" and "friendship" in the world 
at large.
Erasmus’, Vitoria's and Gentili’s commitment to justice finds ex­
pression in the way in which they present it; in their unwavering oppo­
sition to those who deny the existence of that which is just or who re­
fuse to be bound by it - those whom Wight and Bull identify as the re­
alists; and in the fact that they make a violation of justice a just 
cause of war. Only if such a war risks producing injustices greater 
than the one to be remedied, must it not be undertaken.
Grotius distinguishes between what is just and what is lawful or
"not unjust", and attaches the latter to that which links his states
and rulers. The law of nations, as he presents it, reflects a concern
with usefulness rather than justice, and is compatible with the idea
127that that which is "most lawful is most unjust". Adherence to it ad­
vances order, but the order which Grotius endorses is not always that 
which is acceptable to all; at times, it appears as that which suits 
only the stronger.
(d) Peace
Peace, as Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili depict it, has a positive
meaning. "But what is peace except friendship among many?" asks Eras-
128mus, and equates it with concord, harmony and tranquillity. Vitoria
129uses the same ideas to give expression to his understanding of peace.
And Gentili is not against citing St Augustine: "Peace", he says, "is
ordered harmony", adding that "order is the proper distribution of
130things, which ... is the nature of justice".
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Peace, as they perceive it, is order joined by justice, and their 
choice of words reveals that they regard it as a pleasing state of af­
fairs. For Erasmus, it opens the way to the prosperity and well-being 
of Christendom. Vitoria sees it as a precondition for "natural felici­
ty" and "the happiness of the world". And Gentili takes it as an indi­
cation that things are as they ought to be according to nature, for, by 
nature, he is convinced, men are friends, and not enemies, of one an­
other .
Peace, the three agree, is such a good that it must not be aban­
doned lightly. Erasmus never tires of portraying the physical and moral 
devastations that result from war. Vitoria and Gentili do not use the 
same method of dissuasion, but they join Erasmus in requiring princes, 
communities and peoples to go to war only if it is in defence of jus­
tice, and then only if all attempts at peaceful settlement have 
131failed. And Erasmus and Vitoria make it clear that, at times, peace
without justice may be preferable to the "justest" of wars. Such is the
case, they hold, when the choice is not between justice and injustice,
132but between more and less injustice.
Grotius says little about peace, and what he says does not permit
the conclusion that he regards it as desirable or preferable to war. He
defines peace as an "act of the state on behalf of the whole body and
on behalf of its parts", and raises some questions which concern the
133"when" and "how" of such acts rather than the "why".
(e) Moderation
Erasmus never defines moderation, but his attachment to it is such
134that it has been called a passion. Vitoria presents it as "temper-
135ance" or that which "has regard for proportion". And Gentili puts it 
this way: "The unique power and inmost marrow of all the virtues is mod­
eration ... (A) middle-course is the seat of moderation and moderation 
136is virtue". Whatever their attempts at defining it, moderation ac­
companies many of their ideas and qualifies them.
To focus on the preceding four values:
Moderation tempers independence. Princes, communities and peoples, 
while free to make decisions and act accordingly, are not free to make 
any decisions whatsoever. They must not violate that which links.
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Moderation imposes limits on co-operation. Prince co-operates with 
prince, community with community, and people with people, but not at 
the cost of "suffering harm".^'7
Moderation inheres in their idea of justice, and it is there to 
modify conduct which, while just, may, in particular circumstances, not 
be "wise" or "advisable" or "proper".
And the peace which they endorse is not peace at any price, but 
peace based on justice; and if justice is violated, peace may be aban­
doned. War itself, as they agree, is not beyond the reach of moderation: 
its conduct must accord with it.
Moderation is the value which makes it possible for independence, 
co-operation, justice and peace to coexist, and all three thinkers dis­
play a firm commitment to it. Only if moderation ceases to be "advi-
138sable" or "proper" - a possibility which Vitoria and Gentili concede 
- may it be disregarded.
Grotius, like Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili, has the idea of moder­
ation, but he does not present it as qualifying the value which he 
shares with them: independence. He also has the idea of immoderation, 
but he does not attempt to reconcile the one with the other, nor does 
he give a clear endorsement of the former.
To conclude this section: independence, at a more concrete and 
less general level, becomes sovereignty, co-operation translates into 
commerce, diplomacy and other activities that bridge separateness, jus­
tice finds expression in law and other authoritative systems of thought, 
and concern with peace is responsible for the idea of the just war. Mod­
eration does not take the form of another idea, but affects all - the 
regulative principle operative within the idea of international society.
At yet another level, more concrete again and less general than 
the preceding one, that which is common to all becomes, through the in­
clusion of further values, that which is specific to each: Erasmus* 
perfect Christian prince, Vitoria's perfect community and Gentili's 
perfect ambassador. Grotius does not share their pattern of values, and 
they do not share his idea of that which is perfect: the fatherland.
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Conclusion
The hypothesis presented in Chapter One delineates a pattern of ideas 
which the findings of Chapters Three, Four and Five confirm and extend.
Firstly, the members of international society, according to the hy­
pothesis, are sovereign states.
The findings identify them as Christian princes, perfect communi­
ties, and free princes and free peoples - collectivities and/or individ­
uals. The characteristic which they share, in respect to which they are 
equal, and which qualifies them for membership, is their sovereignty.
The findings also include ideas about the internal context, establish a 
link between it and the external context, and permit a statement about 
the subject or citizen in international society.
Secondly, according to the hypothesis, there is a tie that binds 
the sovereign states. Gierke gives it the form of a natural law of na­
tions; Wight describes it as international social consciousness or a 
feeling of belonging together; and Bull depicts it as common rules and 
common institutions.
The findings present the idea of that which links and circum­
scribes. It consists of various sets of ideas - the Christian religion, 
the noble old systems of thought, a positive law of nations, a natural 
law of nations and the idea of human society - which formulate the 
rights and obligations of princes, communities and peoples in relation 
to one another.
Thirdly, the hypothesis identifies the diplomatic system, the main­
tenance of the balance of power, the regular working of international 
law, the great powers, and economic, social and technical co-operation 
as the manifestations of international society, and presents them as its 
institutions.
The findings depict commerce, diplomacy and war - Gentili also has 
the idea of the maintenance of the balance of power, but does not give 
it prominence - as activities, rather than institutions, that take place 
among princes, communities and peoples.
Fourthly, the extent of international society, according to Gierke,
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is universal. Wight and Bull, for the period under consideration, see 
it limited to Christendom, Wight even only to the Christendom of Wes­
tern Europe.
The findings show Erasmus to be in agreement with Wight and Bull, 
although he extends it to the whole of Christendom, and Vitoria and Gen- 
tili to concur with Gierke. The findings also offer reflections about 
the degree of compliance within international society and how to encour­
age it, the origin of international society, and its termination.
Lastly, the hypothesis does not specify any values, but their pres­
ence is implied.
The findings generate the idea of that which is desirable. Charac­
teristic of its complex pattern is the presence of five values: inde­
pendence, co-operation, justice, peace and moderation.
The idea of international society found in Erasmus, Vitoria and 
Gentili contains all the elements of the hypothesis of Gierke, Wight and 
Bull, but, contrary to the original expectation, it does not recur in 
Grotius. This finding does not falsify their claim that there is such an 
idea, but it does affect the hypothesis in another respect which will be 
taken up in the concluding chapter.
CHAPTER VIII
A WAY OF THINKING
There remain the findings relating to the thinkers, and they may be pre­
sented in two sections: One, Observation and Thought; and Two, The via 
media - a Tradition of Thought rather than a Way of Thinking?
1. Observation and Thought
Erasmus, Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius did not formulate their ideas in 
isolation from the events of their time. As the findings of this study 
indicate, they knew and communicated with well-informed, often politi­
cally important figures, and were themselves well-informed. Events of 
their time were not only at the origin of many of their writings, but 
references to events also became part of the contents of their writ­
ings.'*' The image of the ivory tower man does not fit any one of them.
They were well-informed and realistic observers - realistic in the 
sense of discerning and sober - neither omitting nor glossing over the 
conflicts of their time. This finding is most readily available in the 
case of Erasmus, whose observations have been compared by historians
2with those of his contemporaries and found to be shrewd and reliable.
In the case of Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius, studies of this kind do not 
exist, but there are the views of contemporaries. Vitoria would not 
have been consulted by "theologians, jurists, knights, merchants, and 
royal councillors", it is fair to assume, if he had been regarded as ig­
norant and lacking in understanding of the problems which led them to 
3seek his advice ; and the Spanish King Philip IV would not have been in­
terested in attracting Grotius "to the services of His Majesty", had he 
not held him to have "(o)f all those who live today" "the most perfect 
insight into the situation of the Rebels".^ The fact that Grotius has 
also been found to show "wilful partiality" and lack of "reliability" 
when reporting on events is not necessarily incompatible with the abili­
ty to see things realistically.^ In the case of Gentili, the evidence 
permitted no more certain a conclusion than that "sometimes he saw the 
events of his time realistically, and that, at other times, it cannot 
be ruled out that he did" , the only contemporary view which has been 
found being that of the Oxford historian Wood who describes him as "the
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most noted and famous civilian and the ornament of the university of 
his time" J  Gentili, however, was not only professor of civil law at 
Oxford, but also a forensic practitioner in London, a member of Gray's 
Inn, and Spanish advocate in the Court of Admiralty.
The word "realistic" used to describe the observations of Erasmus, 
Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius may not be the best one - in fact, studiesg
such as R.N. Berki's intimate just how difficult a word it is - but it 
establishes a linguistic link to "realists" - those who claim that they 
alone are realistic observers.
The findings, then, suggest that thinkers other than realists may 
be accomplished observers of events - what distinguishes them is the 
way in which they react to what they observe.
Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili, in responding to their observations, 
do not propose that the existing political plurality be abolished and a 
universal state or ruler be established in its place. They reject uni- 
versalism and what they regard as leading in its direction - territori­
al expansionism or, to use a later word, imperialism. "Most of us dread 
the name of World Empire", Erasmus writes in 1530. "(M)en being what
they are", he suggests, "there is more safety in kingdoms of moderate9power united in a Christian League". There is no universal ruler now, 
nor was there in the past, Vitoria argues about the same time against 
imperialists and theocrats who claim that the Spaniards "took with them 
a right" to occupy the lands of the Indians. There is no law, divine or 
human, he explains, to support such a claim. A plurality of states is a 
fact, and a pleasing one at that.^ Is it not "right and just", Gentili 
asks towards the end of the sixteenth century, that we oppose those 
"who are planning and plotting universal dominion?" "No one's sover­
eignty must ever on any account be allowed to grow so great", he sub­
mits in reply, that "his manifest injustice" cannot be called in ques­
tion.^ Grotius is at one with Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili in opposing
12universalism - reason, practicability and law speak against it - but 
he is not equally insistent when it comes to policies of agrandissement. 
In fact, if pursued by his fatherland, they may be defended as "bene­
ficial". "(W)ho knows", he writes early in the seventeenth century,
"but that success in the East Indies might presently give us confidence
13to undertake some bold enterprise in the American sphere?"
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Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili reject universalism, but they also 
oppose those who regard the violent conflicts of their time as a neces­
sary, if not desirable accompaniment of political plurality, suggest­
ing no other choice but to accept them and to get the best out of them. 
They do not use the word "realism" or any other abstract general term 
when referring to this way of thinking, nor do they identify Machiavel- 
li as being representative of it. Erasmus chooses Pope Julius II as the 
target of his disagreement, charging him with preferring war to peace; 
expanding conflict rather than keeping it within bounds; preferring 
others to be at war rather than being linked through agreements; being 
intent on increasing his power and influence; having regard for what is 
expedient rather than what is right; using people and situations for
his own purposes; and being concerned with his personal advantage rath-
14er than with what is good for the community entrusted to his care. Vi­
toria does not supply any evidence that an explicit rejection or dis­
section of realist thinking is one of his concerns, except that he re­
jects as an unjust cause of war "the prince’s personal glory" or some 
other "advantage" to him.^ Gentili, unlike Erasmus, does not single 
out an individual but speaks of "the unscrupulous" - the unscrupulous 
deny the existence of the law of nature and of nations - or of "Greek
cunning and Punic craft" - the "treacherous envoy" belongs to this cate-
16gory, and so does he who deceives the enemy. Grotius is ambiguous. On
the one hand, he voices a clear disagreement with realist thinking when
he attacks in Carneades all those who see "the whole law of war and
peace as having no existence outside of an empty name"; who declare
that nothing is unjust which is expedient; and who say that might makes
right.^ On the other hand, he presents a law of nations which may be
quite acceptable to realists; and so may be the lines of reasoning with
18which one meets in many of his writings.
In opposition to both realism and universalism, Erasmus, Vitoria 
and Gentili formulate a third way, central to which is the idea of soci­
ety among the entities which constitute political plurality - society 
among princes, communities and peoples.
2. The via media - a Tradition of Thought rather than a Way of Thinking?
Wight and Bull use the term "tradition of thought" to refer to that
19which links thinkers across time , inviting the question whether the
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thinkers thus linked see themselves in this way. The findings of this 
study are that Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili did not.
20Erasmus knew of Vitoria , but there is no indication in his writ­
ings that he had read his lectiones and relectiones. Vitoria was famil­
iar with Erasmus' writings, as one learns from secondary sources, but
these sources do not indicate with which ones, and are divided on how he
21reacted to them. His own writings contain hardly a reference to them.
Gentili refers to both Erasmus and Vitoria, using them as sources and
22expressing disapproval in the one case, and admiration in the other , 
but they are two among many, if not innumerable thinkers to whom he re­
fers, according them no particular place or role in the arguments which 
he presents.
In the case of Grotius, the findings are less clear. In one of his 
works he states that he was motivated to write it, not because he found 
the work of earlier investigators wanting, but because he felt he was
able to contribute to "the doctrines handed down" by these earlier in-
23 24vestigators , even though he also speaks of its "novelty". In another
work, however, he presents himself as not belonging to any particular
"sect of philosophers", but as "gathering up" the truth wherever it can
25be found. What is clear is that he knows the writings of Erasmus, Vi-
26toria and Gentili and refers to them extensively , but not more so than 
to other authors.
Shall the twentieth-century reader, in spite of these findings, re­
gard these thinkers as forming a tradition of thought? There are some 
further findings which suggest that the answer should be "no".
Looking at the writings of Erasmus, Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius 
from a distance in time, one witnesses a process not so much of "hand­
ing down" to those who came later - "tradition" in one sense - as of 
borrowing from those who came earlier; a process furthermore which does 
not entail respect - "tradition" in a second, possibly predominant
sense - but which is characterized by selectivity and unpredictabili-
27ty. Vitoria borrows from Erasmus, Gentili from Erasmus and Vitoria, 
and Grotius from Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili, at the same time as they 
borrow from innumerable other thinkers, not necessarily from the same 
ones, and, if from the same, not necessarily the same ideas, Erasmus 
preferring those of classical and Christian Antiquity, Vitoria, Gentili
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and Grotius including the intervening ages as well. They borrow for the 
purpose of strengthening their own arguments, or because they want to 
formulate disagreement - all the while weaving their own patterns of 
ideas, which, when complete, impress, delight, or antagonize those who 
study them, not because of the borrowings from other, perhaps authori­
tative thinkers, which they contain, but because of the distinctiveness 
or independence of the arguments which they present - arguments which 
their authors formulate in response to their particular concerns or 
those of the times. As Gentili’s contemporary Jean Hotman put it:
From century to century, from hand to hand, we learn 
from each other. Few writers have done otherwise, es­
pecially in serious discussion and matters of impor­
tance. Such a work without aid and counsel would be 
both too defective and too sterile ... (T)hey all bor­
row from each other, aJ^hough each one of them has 
labored independently.
What links Vitoria to Erasmus, and Gentili to both, and places Gro­
tius apart, is a way of thinking about relations between princes, com­
munities, peoples, states and rulers which is informed by the idea of 
international society, according equal importance to political plurali­
ty and that which links and circumscribes - not necessarily the same 
plurality or the same links and constraints, as the pattern of ideas 
presented in the previous chapter shows - a way of thinking which re­
gards "the other" as no less important than "the self".
Which name to give to it? It proves a question difficult to answer.
"Rationalist", as Wight suggests? Apart from being a word which re-
29quires definition rather than defines , "rationalist" belongs to a 
group of words which are very much a part of the realist vocabulary, for 
example, "rational" in "the rational actor"; "rationality" in "ration­
ality in foreign policy"; and "reason of state" - a term which identi-
30fies an idea long associated with realist thinking.
"Constitutional", as Wight also proposes? Having been used and con­
tinuing to be used, in the realm of politics, to refer to that which is
"in harmony with, authorized by, or supporting" the political constitu-
31tion of a country - usages which align it with the idea of government, 
even central government - "constitutional" seems to be a word more con­
genial to universalist thinking than to that of the via media.
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"Internationalist1', as Bull suggests, is a word which - according 
to its history - has been used to identify not only those who acknowl­
edge the existence of a plurality of states, and endorse it, but also 
those who regard it as "insubstantial" and "transient". "International­
ists" include, for example, international lawyers and members and sym-
32pathizers of the International Working Men's Association.
"Grotian", as Wight, Bull, and others propose? The findings of 
this study speak against this name, mainly because the way of thinking 
which links Vitoria to Erasmus, and Gentili to both, is not Grotius’ way.
The literature mentions other attempts at finding a name. There is, 
for example, John Herz who initially called the way of thinking which 
he positions between "political realism" and "political idealism" "real- 
ist liberalism" , to suggest later that "realistic idealism" or "ide­
alistic realism" might have been better terms, as they lack the connota­
tions of the first, namely nineteenth-century free-trade and constitu- 
34tional liberalism. And, to mention another example, nearly four hun­
dred years ago £meric Cruce entitled his "Discourse of the Occasions 
and Means to Establish a General Peace, and the Liberty of Commerce
throughout the World" Le Nouveau Cynee, which he addressed "To the Mon-
35archs and Sovereign Princes of the Present Time" , seeing himself in 
the role of the ancient Cyneas, who advised his king, Pyrrhus of Epirus, 
to observe moderation in his relations with other rulers.
To come to the term via media which has been used throughout this
study: As a spatial description of the relationship between the three
ways of thinking it is not, the findings suggest, a perfect fit - for,
while it is true that Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili see themselves as
delineating a position which places them in opposition to realism and
universalism, it is also true that they do not, except in some specific
36contexts , see their position as being "between" the other two. Fur-
37thermore, there are indications in their writings , and in the litera-
38ture more generally , that realists are not averse to establishing a 
direct line from "statism", to use a sixteenth-century word, to univer­
salism via imperialism, by-passing the via media - a finding which may 
be read to mean that the spatial relationship between the three ways of 
thinking may be more fittingly described in terms of an equilateral 
triangle. As a qualitative description, however, the term via media 
captures the "unique power and inmost marrow" of this way of thinking,
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permeated as it is by the idea of moderation, which enables it to re­
spond without sacrificing that which is essential to it - political plu­
rality and that which links and circumscribes. In this sense, Erasmus, 
Vitoria and Gentili understand themselves, and may be understood by 
those who study them.
The via media, the findings suggest, is a way of thinking which is 
not exclusive to Erasmus, Vitoria and Gentili, but may be met with again 
and again - earlier in time, and later. Its exploration, the study fur­
ther suggests, holds the promise of enriching the theoretical and his­
torical understanding of international relations - hence of capturing 
the imagination of those today to whom the care of peoples is entrusted 
- statesmen and women.
APPENDIX; A WORD ABOUT WORDS
Words are the means by which thinkers give expression to their ideas, 
and "discontinuity" is perhaps the word which best describes the rela­
tionship that holds between the words chosen by Gierke, Wight, and Bull 
to present the idea of international society, using the English lan­
guage, and those employed by the four earlier thinkers in their Latin 
writings, or, to put the same idea more descriptively, there are few 
direct lines connecting the vocabularies of the two groups of thinkers 
separated by centuries - and this despite the "Latinate reaches"1 of 
the English language. Words used as a matter of course by one group are 
not available to the other; words that are at the disposal of both have 
different meanings; words that differ between the two groups have the 
same meaning; and words that survive the passage of time unchanged are 
given a different currency.
This Appendix offers a comparison of words used by Gierke, Wight
and Bull with those employed by one of the early thinkers - Vitoria has
been chosen, as his writings are less extensive than those of the other 
2three thinkers. The comparison consists of four sections, and the em­
phasis is on key words - those words which denote important ideas with­
in the idea of international society.
1. International, Society, Community
(a) To begin with the word "international", one of the constituents of 
the term "international society":
Wight and Bull use the word, a creation of the late eighteenth cen-
3tury , in the sense of that which appertains to relations among states. 
Both its formative elements, "inter" and "national", go back to the Lat­
in language, the former directly, as it is the Latin for "between", "a- 
mong", "amidst", while the latter, along with the older word "nation", 
is derived by adaptation from natio, "nation", "people", "race".
The Latin language does not have an adjective corresponding to "in­
ternational", but it has the word inter, and Vitoria uses it in conjunc­
tion with nouns which denote the specific entities with which he is con­
cerned. Thus he speaks of the peace which is to be conserved "among
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princes”, pax inter principes, of the victor who sits as judge "between 
the states" who went to war, iudex inter respublicas; and of the law 
that reason has established "among all nations", ius inter omnes gentes. 
He also makes use of the genitive plural, for example, when he speaks 
of "the mutual accord of nations", consensus mutuus gentium; of "the in­
tention of nations", intentio gentium; and of "the law of nations", ius 
gentium - a way of expressing himself which Gierke, writing nearly four 
hundred years later, also chooses, for he speaks of the society "of 
states" rather than "international" society.
(b) The word "society", the other constituent of the term "interna­
tional society" or "society of states", is used by Gierke, Wight and 
Bull interchangeably with "community" to describe the nature of the re­
lationship held to exist among states - a usage which dictionaries have 
not yet added to the lists of meanings and changes of meanings attribu­
ted to the two words since they appeared in the fourteenth century. At 
their origin are the Latin words societas and communitas respectively.
The word societas is part of Vitoria's vocabulary, but when he uses 
it, he does not tie it to other nouns denoting political entities. Soci­
etas gentium, to mention just one possibility, is not among his expres­
sions. When he uses the word societas, he gives it other companions.
Thus it appears together with the adjective naturalis. Societas natural- 
is, "natural society", is inclusive of all human beings. Or it is accom­
panied by the words humanus or homines. Societas humana, "human socie­
ty", or societas hominum, "society of human beings", is exclusive of all 
who live "in solitude", in "the manner of wild beasts". Or, thirdly, it
is joined by the word civilis. Societas civilis, "civil society", is "of
, M 4all societies that which best provides for the needs of men .
(c) The word communitas occurs in Vitoria's vocabulary in mainly 
one sense: communitas perfecta, "the perfect community", communitas quae 
habet proprias leges, proprium consilium et proprios magistratus, "the 
community which has its own laws, its own council and its own magis­
trates"^ - which is his definition of the state.
As used by Vitoria, societas and communitas may relate to the same 
entity, but if they do, they emphasize different aspects of it.
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2. World, Christendom
Gierke, Wight and Bull make little use of two words which are prominent 
in the vocabulary of Vitoria: "the world" and "Christendom".
(a) Vitoria uses the word orbis, which he prefers to mundus, when 
he speaks of "the beginning of the world", principium orbis, when he 
contrasts "the New World", Novus Orbis, with "our world", noster orbis, 
or when he refutes claims by emperor and pope to universal empire. Im­
perator non est dominus totius orbis, "the Emperor is not lord of theg '
whole world". Papa non est dominus civilis aut temporalis totius orbis,
"the Pope is not civil or temporal lord of the whole world".^ He also
uses the word orbis as a metonym for "mankind". Una respublica (est)
8pars totius orbis, "a state is a part of the world as a whole". Totus
orbis ... aliquo modo est una respublica, "the world as a whole is in a
g
way a state". He speaks of its "authority", auctoritas totius orbis, 
and of its "end and good", finis et bonum totius orbis.
(b) Ecclesia, "the Church", respublica Christiana, "the Christian
state", respublica spiritualis, "the spiritual state", christianitas,
"Christianity" - these are the words which Vitoria uses when he refers
to Christians collectively or to the Christian domain. Tota Ecclesia est
quodammodo una respublica, "the Church as a whole is in a certain way a
state".^ Provincia Christiana (est) pars reipublicae (christianae), "a
Christian province is a part of the Christian state".^ Respublica spi-
12ritualis debet esse perfecta, "the spiritual state must be perfect".
And the word christianitas appears in expressions such as invadere 
christianitatem, "invading Christianity", or cum damno christianitatis, 
"to the detriment of Christianity".
3. State, Sovereignty
(a) The word "state", in the sense of "body politic" used since the six­
teenth century, is employed by Gierke, Wight and Bull to identify the 
members of international society. It is derived from the Latin word sta­
tus.
Status is part of Vitoria’s vocabulary, but for him, contrary to 
the expectations raised by Heydte^, it only means "standing", ’posi­
tion", "condition". Thus one meets with formulations such as status rei­
publicae , "the position of the state", or status felix, "a happy condi-
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tion".
When Vitoria refers to those public entities which he endows with 
rights and obligations in relation to one another, he uses a number of 
words other than status.
Foremost amongst these is the word respublica. Quid est respublica?
"What is a state?"^ he asks. Respublica proprie vocatur perfecta com-
munitas. "A state is properly called a perfect community".^ Quaelibet
respublica habet auctoritatem indicendi et inferendi bellum. "Every
16state has the authority to declare and to make war". Apart from using 
it in this general sense, he also applies it to particular states, for 
example, when he identifies "the French" and "the English" as "two dis­
tinct and separate states", duae respublicae disparatae et differentes, 
ut gallorum et anglorum.^
Nearly as prevalent as respublica is the word civitas. It appears
in general statements such as nihil est illi principi Deo ... acceptius
quam concilia coetusque ... quae civitates appellantur, "nothing is more
acceptable in the sight of God our King than are those associations 
18called states" , or civis (est) qui natus est in civitate, "a citizen
19is he who is born in a state". And it occurs in reference to specific 
states, for example, when he speaks of "free states such as Venice and 
Florence", liberae civitates ut sunt Venetiae et Florentiae.
Less frequently than respublica and civitas appear the two words 
gens and populus, but both of these, especially gens, enjoy a greater 
currency than natio, which is used only infrequently. Gens, which Vito­
ria defines as "the assocation based on the consent of the law and the
20community of interest" , is placed alongside civitas when he points
out that gens vel civitas, "a people or state", may justly be punished
21if it fails to make amends for a wrong committed by its citizens ; and
it is the turn of populus when he discusses the case of "a Christian
22people", populus christianus, which chooses a non-Christian ruler.
References to particular peoples are numerous. Non liceret Gallis pro~
hibere Hispanos a peregrinatione Galliae, vel etiam habitatione, aut e
contrario, "it would not be lawful for the French to prevent the Span-
23ish from travelling or even from living in France, or vice versa".
Respublica, civitas, gens, populus, and the proper names of na
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tions - these are the main words used by Vitoria when Gierke, Wight and 
Bull speak of "states".
(b) The states which Gierke, Wight and Bull identify as members of
international society are "sovereign". This word, which goes back to 
24Middle English , has at its origin the popular Latin superanus, from 
super "above".
Vitoria does not have the word superanus, nor does he have another, 
specific word to take its place. His way of giving expression to this 
Janus-faced idea comprises a number of words and expressions.
(i) When he speaks of the state, people, or nation, which does not 
have another "above" itself, he describes it as liber, "free", sui 
iuris, "independent", per se totum, "complete in itself", perfectus, 
"perfect", sibi sufficiens, "self-sufficient"; non esse pars alterius 
reipublicae, "not being a part of another state", non esse subiectus 
alicui extra se, "not being subject to any one outside itself"; habere 
potestatem gubernandi se, "having the power to govern itself", and by 
power he means facultas, auctoritas, sive ius, "ability, authority, or 
right".
(ii) When he refers to the prince or ruler who does not have an­
other "above" himself and who is "above" every one else in the communi­
ty, he mainly makes use of the word princeps. Principes ... non habent
25superiores, "princes do not have superiors" ; praesunt reipublicae, 
"they are at the head of the state". King, emperor, and pope are princi­
pes .
Interchangeably with but less frequently than princeps occurs the 
word dominus. King, emperor, and pope are domini.
His main words for "supreme rule", the rule of princeps or domi­
nus , are principatus, dominium, regnum and imperium, and of these 
dominium and principatus occur far more often than regnum and imperium.
(iii) And when Vitoria treats of the state, people or nation which 
is deprived by another of its status of being "sovereign", he uses ex­
pressions such as venire in potestatem aliorum, "to come under the pow­
er of others", venire in dicionem aliorum, "to come under the sway of 
others" ; and he uses further expressions such as occupare principatum,
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27"seizing supreme rule" , dominos priores deponere et novos constituere,
28"deposing former lords and setting up new ones" - combinations which 
intimate that he sees sovereignty as having two faces: an external and 
an internal.
4. International Law, Commerce, Diplomacy, Balance of Power, Great Pow- 
ers and War
The terms included under this heading are used by Gierke, Wight and Bull 
to denote the common rules and institutions ascribed to international 
society. A comparative glance across the centuries identifies only one 
of these readily - commercium - while the others are found to have ei­
ther quite different corresponding words or none at all.
(a) International Law
"International", as mentioned above, is a creation of the eight­
eenth century. "Law", on the other hand, goes back to a distant past, at
29its origin being the Old English word lagu, plural laga. "Internation­
al law", like its component "international", is an eighteenth-century 
invention. Older than it are the expressions "the public law of Europe" 
and "the law of nations".
Ius gentium is the corresponding term in Vitoria’s vocabulary.
Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes gentes constituit, vocatur ius gentium,
"what natural reason has established among all nations is called the law 
30of nations". He uses the word ius in other expressions such as ius 
divinum, "divine law", ius humanum, "human law", ius canonicum, "canon 
law", ius civile, "civil law", and ius belli, "the law of war". But he 
employs the word lex when he refers to that body of law that constitutes 
the Christian religion. This is lex Christiana, "the Christian law", or 
lex Evangelica, "the Evangelical law". In the case of "the law of na­
ture" or "natural law" one meets with both ius naturae or ius naturale 
and lex naturae or lex naturale. Ius gentium, however, never becomes lex
gentium, but ius gentium, as Vitoria puts it, habet vim legis, that is,
31it "has the force of law".
(b) Commerce
The word "commerce", in the sense of exchange of merchandise, es­
pecially on a large scale between countries, has been in use since the
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sixteenth century. It is derived from the Latin commercium.
Vitoria's vocabulary includes the word commercium, and he gives it 
the same meaning as his twentieth-century counterparts to its deriva­
tive. Et Lusitani magnum commercium habent cum similibus gentibus, quas
non subiecerunt, "and the Portuguese maintain a huge commerce with simi-
32lar nations (as the Spaniards), without reducing them to subjection".
(c) Diplomacy
The English language acquired the word "diplomacy", from French di­
plomatic , in the late eighteenth century. Older than it and its cognates 
"diplomatic" and "diplomat" are "ambassy", "ambassade", "ambassador" and 
"legation", "legate". Both of these groups of words are of Latin origin, 
the respective etymons being ambactus and legatus.
Vitoria uses the word legatus, and the point that matters to him is
that legati jure gentium sunt inviolabiles, that is, "ambassadors are by
33the law of nations inviolable".
(d) Balance of Power
The first usage of the term "balance of power" has not yet been as­
certained by scholarship. David Hume, writing in the 1740s, credits
"these later ages" with the invention of the "phrase", which he distin-
34guishes from the idea to which he assigns a long history ; Parkinson 
identifies it in the Treaty of Utrecht which was concluded in 1713 to 
end the War of the Spanish Succession - hints that the term "balance 
of power" may not have originated before the eighteenth century.
Vitoria does not give expression to the idea of the balance of pow­
er .
(e) Great Powers
Not much is known about the beginnings of the term "great powers".
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary mentions that the word "power" in
the sense of a state or nation having international authority or influ-
36ence was not used before the early eighteenth century. It offers no
information on the term "great powers". In his essay of 1833, entitled
"The Great Powers", Leopold von Ranke expresses the view that it is "our
37century" that "called the great powers into being" , but he says noth­
ing about the term which he uses to give expression to that phenomenon.
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The essay seems to have been first translated into English in 1950.
Vitoria's vocabulary does not include a word or combination of 
words corresponding to "great powers".
(f) War
"War", like "law", does not have a Latin origin. It is a native 
word going back to the late Old English werre.
Vitoria's word for "war" is bellum. He speaks of "defensive war", 
bellum defensivum, and of "offensive war", bellum offensivum; of "the 
law of war", ius belli, and of "the rules of war", regulae belli; of 
"the just war", bellum iustum, and of "the justice of war", iustitia 
belli. He does not use the words privatus, "private", and publicus, 
"public", in conjunction with bellum, but his concern is with the lat­
ter, public war.
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media is Vitoria. See also Wight, International Theory, pp. 162, 
260. "In the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when 
the universal political organisation of Western Christendom was 
still in process of disintegration, and modern states in process of 
articulation, the three patterns of thought purporting to describe 
the new international politics, and to prescribe conduct within it, 
first took shape". See Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 27.
2. A perfect presentation of this view can be found in J. Ter Meulen, 
Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisation 1300 - 1800 (The Idea 
of International Organization 1300 - 1800), Martinus Nijhoff, The 
Hague, 1968 (first published in 1917), pp. 3 - 9 ;  it reappeared, 
almost unchanged, in the course of a lively seminar given by R.J. 
Vincent in the Department of International Relations, at The Aus-
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tralian National University, in 1983; and a trace of it survived 
in the published version. See R.J. Vincent, "Edmund Burke and the 
Theory of International Relations", Review of International Stud­
ies , vol. 10, 1984, p. 212.
3. J. Hashagen, Europa im Mittelalter: Alte Tatsachen und neue Ge­
sichtspunkte: Eine Einfuehrung mit besonderer Beruecksichtigung der 
nichtdeutschen Staaten (Europe in the Middle Ages: Old Facts and 
New Points of View: An Introduction with Particular Consideration 
of the non-German States), F. Bruckmann, Muenchen, 1951, p. 334.
4. W. Kienast, Deutschland und Frankreich in der Kaiserzeit (900 - 
1270): Weltkaiser und Einzelkoenige (Germany and France During the 
Time of the Emperors (900 - 1270): Universal Emperor and Individual 
Kings), vol. 2, Anton Hiersemann, Stuttgart, 1975 (first published 
in 1943), p. 255.
5. 0. Hintze, "Staatenbildung und Verfassungsentwicklung" (The Forma­
tion of States and Constitutional Development, first published in 
1902), in G. Oestreich (ed.), Staat und Verfassung: Gesammelte Ab­
handlungen zur Allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte (State and Consti­
tution: Collected Papers in General Constitutional History), Van- 
denhoeck & Ruprecht, Goettingen, 1970 (first published in 1962), p. 
42.
6. G. Barraclough, History in a Changing World, Basil Blackwell, Ox­
ford, 1955, p. 102.
7. Cited by J. Moreau-Reibel, "Le Droit de Societe Interhumaine et le 
’Jus Gentium’: Essai sur les Origines et le Developpement des No­
tions jusqu’ä Grotius" (The Law of Interhuman Society and the ’Jus 
Gentium': An Essay on the Origins and Development of Concepts Up To 
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8. A.B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History, Prince­
ton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1960, p. 499.
9. L.R. Loomis (tr.), J.H. Mundy and K.M. Woody (eds.), The Council of 
Constance: The Unification of the Church, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1961, p. 209.
10. Ibid., pp. 84 - 531. The three Chronicles are: (a) Richental's 
Chronicle of the Council of Constance (The Council as seen by a 
Townsman), pp. 84 - 199; (b) Fillastre’s Diary of the Council of 
Constance (The Council as seen by a Cardinal), pp. 200 - 465; and 
(c) Cerretano's Journal (The Council as seen by a Papal Notary), 
pp. 466 - 531.
II
11. Ibid., pp. 212 - 213.
12. Ibid., pp. 213 - 214.
13. Ibid., p. 214.
14. Ibid., p. 316.
15. Ibid., pp. 343 - 344.
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16. Ibid., pp. 344 - 345.
17. Ibid., pp. 347 - 349.
18. E. Nys, Les Origines du Droit International (The Origins of Inter­
national Law), Castaigne, Brussels, and Thorin & Fils, Paris, 1894, 
pp. 149 - 150.
19. Loomis, Mundy and Woody, The Council of Constance, p. 139.
20. Ibid., pp. 142 - 143.
21. Ibid., p. 444.
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26. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 394 - 399.
27. Ibid., p. 399.
28. C.L. Lange, Histoire de 1 1Internationalisme: I. Jusqu’a la Paix de 
Westphalie - 1648 (History of Internationalism: I. To the Peace of 
Westphalia - 1648), Publications de l fInstitut Nobel Norvegien, 
vol. 4, Aschehoug (W. Nygaard), Kristiania, 1919, p. 125.
29. H. Bonet, The Tree of Battles, translated with an introduction by 
G.W. Coopland, University Press, Liverpool, 1949, p. 19.
30. Ibid., p. 126.
31. Ibid.
32. F.H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, Cambridge Universi­
ty Press, Cambridge, 1977 (first published in 1975), pp. 3 - 15.
33. Bonet, The Tree of Battles, p. 191.
34. Ibid.
35. N. Oresme, "Traictie de la Premiere Invention des Monnoies" (Trea­
tise on the First Invention of Money), in A.E. Monroe (ed.), Early 
Economic Thought: Selections from Economic Literature Prior to 
Adam Smith, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1930, p. 
81.
36. M.L. de Mas Latrie, Traites de Paix et de Commerce et Documents 
Divers Concernant les Relations des Chretiens avec les Arabes de 
l'Afrique Septentrionale au Moyen Age (Peace Treaties and Commer­
cial Treaties and Various Documents Concerning the Relations of
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Christians with the Arabs of North Africa During the Middle Ages), 
vol. 2, Burt Franklin, New York, 1963 (first published in 1866), 
for example, pp. 29, 45, 46, 47, 90, 94, 123, 161, 188, 194, 196, 
197, 302 and 318.
37. According to its editor, "(t)his is the very earliest representa­
tion of the flags of all the nations". See Sir Clements Markham 
(tr. and ed.), Book of the Knowledge of all the Kingdoms, Lands, 
and Lordships That Are in the World, and the Arms and Devices of 
Each Land and Lordship, or of the Kings and Lords Who Possess Them, 
The Hakluyt Society, London, 1912 (first published in 1877), p. 
xii.
38. Sir William Rattigan, "Bartolus", in Sir John Macdonell and E. Man- 
son (eds.), Great Jurists of the World, John Murray, London, 1913, 
p. 51.
II
39. 0. v. Gierke, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, vol. 2, Akademi­
sche Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, Graz, 1954 (first published in 
1873), p. 720.
40. Translated: of the law of nations. Regarding the difficulty of 
translating this word into English, see also above, Ch. I, n. 18.
41. Gierke, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, vol. 2, p. 727.
42. C.N.S. Woolf, Bartolus of Sassoferrato: His Position in the History 
of Medieval Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cam­
bridge, 1913, pp. 112 - 207. See also Q. Skinner, The Foundations 
of Modern Political Thought: I. The Renaissance, Cambridge Univer­
sity Press, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 9 - 12.
43. This is Gierke's introduction to John Quidort of Paris. See Das 
Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, vol. 3, p. 544.
44. Translated: On Royal and Papal Power.
45. John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, translated with an intro­
duction by A.P. Monahan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1974, 
pp. 13 - 15. See also Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte,
Die Geburtsstunde des souveraenen Staates: Ein Beitrag zur Ge­
schichte des Voelkerrechts, der allgemeinen Staatslehre und des po­
litischen Denkens (The Hour of Birth of the Sovereign State: A Con­
tribution to the History of the Law of Nations, of the General The­
ory of the State and of Political Thought), Josef Habbel, Regens­
burg, 1952, pp. 103 - 104.
46. John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, p. 43.
47. Translated: law of nature.
48. Engelbert of Volkersdorf, De Ortu et Fine Romani Imperii (On the 
Beginning and End of the Roman Empire), cited by Heydte, Die Ge­
burtsstunde des souveraenen Staates, p. 155.
49. Ramon Lull, Arbre de Sciencia, Del Arbre Imperial (The Tree of 
Knowledge, Of the Imperial Tree), cited in Ibid.. pp. 97 - 98.
287
50. Translated: the prince or supreme ruler.
51. Kienast, Deutschland und Frankreich in der Kaiserzeit, pp. 473 - 
474.
52. Marino da Caramanico, Glosse zu den Konstitutionen Friedrich II 
(Comments on the Constitutions of Frederick II), cited in Ibid., 
p. 474.
53. Ibid., pp. 474 - 475.
54. Translated: On the Laws and Customs of England.
55. Kienast, Deutschland und Frankreich in der Kaiserzeit, pp. 466 - 
467.
56. See, for example, F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 2, 
Part II, Image/Doubleday, New York, 1962 (first published in 1950), 
pp. 55 - 143.
57. Ibid., p. 141.
58. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (The Whole of Theology), cited by 
Heydte, Die Geburtsstunde des souveraenen Staates, pp. 257 - 258.
59. The Decretals are collections of papal decrees forming part of can­
on law.
60. Innocent IV, Apparatus ... Super Quinque Libris Decretalium (Com­
ments ... on Five Books of the Decretals), cited by Heydte, Die Ge­
burtsstunde des souveraenen Staates, p. 260.
61. Raymond of Penafort, Summa Casuum (All Cases), cited in Ibid., pp. 
260 - 261.
62. Cited by Kienast, Deutschland und Frankreich in der Kaiserzeit, pp. 
456 - 457.
63. This is the beginning of the text of the Bull, hence difficult to 
translate. Venerabilis means revered.
64. Translated: common place.
65. Cited by Kienast, Deutschland und Frankreich in der Kaiserzeit, p. 
435.
66. A view forcefully presented by Barraclough, History in a Changing 
World, p. 99.
67. Onions, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Prin­
ciples , vol. 2, p. 2005.
68. Heydte, Die Geburtsstunde des souveraenen Staates, pp. 41 - 43.
69. H. Mitteis, Der Staat des Hohen Mittelalters: Grundlinien einer 
vergleichenden Verfassungsgeschichte des Lehnszeitalters (The State
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288
II/III
of the High Middle Ages: Foundations of a Comparative Constitution­
al History of the Feudal Age), Herrn. Boehlaus Nachfolger, Weimar, 
1940, p. 3.
70. Onions, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Princi­
ples , vol. 2, p. 1311.
71. Loomis, Mundy and Woody, The Council of Constance, pp. 84 - 85.
CNl Ibid., P. 107.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid. , P- 344.
75. Ibid. , P. 9.
76. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History, pp. 434 - 
435.
77. Heydte, Die Geburtsstunde des souveraenen Staates, pp. 209 - 210.
78. Bonet, The Tree of Battles, for example, pp. 115, 128, 164, 165 and 
191.
79. According to Heydte, the Middle Ages distinguish between gens - (a) 
people linked by common descent - and populus - a people at the or­
igin of which is an act of the will. See Die Geburtsstunde des sou­
veraenen Staates, p. 209.
80. D. Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, Harper & Row, New York, 
1966 (first published in 1957), p. 51.
CHAPTER III
1. Gierke mentions Omphalus (1500 - 1567), Connanus (1508 - 1551), 
Gregorius (1540 - 1591), Suarez (1548 - 1617), Winkler (1579 - 
1648) and Gryphiander (publ. 1618). See Das Deutsche Genossen­
schaftsrecht , vol. 4, p. 361n. Wight: Vitoria (1480? - 1546), Sua­
rez and Gentili (1552 - 1608). See "Why Is there no International 
Theory?", p. 22; "Western Values", pp. 95 - 102; and Systems of 
States, pp. 52, 125 - 126, 148, 164. And Bull, like Wight: Vitoria, 
Suarez and Gentili. See The Anarchical Society, p. 28.
2. See, for example, J.R. Hale, Renaissance Europe: 1480 - 1520, Fon­
tana/Collins, London, 1979, p. 12 and passim; and G.R. Elton, Re­
formation Europe: 1517 - 1559, Fontana/Collins, Glasgow, 1977 
(first published in 1963), p. 24 and passim.
3. See, for example, Meulen, Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisa­
tion, pp. 124 - 127; F.M. Stawell, The Growth of International 
Thought, Thornton Butterworth, London, 1936 (first published in 
1929), pp. 76, 87 - 91, 96, 135; F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pur­
suit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations be­
tween States, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1963, pp. 16,
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18, 22; H. Gollwitzer, Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens: I.
Vom Zeitalter der Entdeckungen bis zum Beginn des Imperialismus 
(History of World-Political Thought: I. From the Age of Discover­
ies to the Beginning of Imperialism), Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Goet­
tingen, 1972, p. 72; F. Parkinson, The Philosophy of International 
Relations: A Study in the History of Thought, Sage Publications, 
London, 1977, p. 21; M. Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience, 
Temple Smith, London, 1978, pp. 13 - 16, 27, 130, 132; and R. Mey­
ers, Weltpolitik in Grundbegriffen: I. Ein lehr- und ideenge­
schichtlicher Grundriss (World Politics in Basic Concepts: I. A 
Historical Outline of Theories and Ideas), Droste, Duesseldorf,
1979, pp. 36, 39.
4. J. Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco 
de Vitoria and His Law of Nations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, and 
Humphrey Milford, London, 1934, pp. 33 - 47.
5. See, for example, his two references (to The Tales of Arthur and 
Lancelot and to St Bernard (1090 - 1153) in The Education of a 
Christian Prince, translated with an introduction by L.K. Born, Co­
lumbia University Press, New York, 1936, pp. 200, 251; or his crit­
icism in his letter of 14/8/1518 to Paul Volz, in J.C. Olin (ed.), 
Christian Humanism and the Reformation: Selected Writings of Eras­
mus, with the Life of Erasmus by Beatus Rhenanus, Fordham Universi­
ty Press, New York, 1980 (first published in 1965), p. 112. Eras­
mus' negative attitude towards authors of the Middle Ages has been 
noted by many scholars. See, for example, J. Huizinga, Erasmus of 
Rotterdam, Phaidon Press, London, 1952 (first published in 1924), 
p. 24; F. Geldner, Die Staatsauffassung und Fuerstenlehre des Eras­
mus von Rotterdam (Erasmus of Rotterdam: His Conception of the 
State and Theory of the Prince), Emil Ebering, Berlin, 1930, pp.
137, 140; Olin, Christian Humanism and the Reformation, pp. 68n,
107; C.R. Thompson, "Erasmus and Tudor England", and C. Reedijk, 
"Erasmus' Final Modesty", both in Academie Royale Nee/landaise des 
Sciences et des Sciences Humaines, Actes du Congres Erasme: Rotter­
dam 27-29 Octobre 1969 (Records of the Erasmus Conference of 27-29 
October 1969, Rotterdam), North Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam/ 
London, 1971, pp. 32, 183.
6. See, for example, J. Vernau (ed.), The British Library General Cat­
alogue of Printed Books to 1975, vol. 102, K.G. Saur, London/Muen- 
chen, 1981, pp. 7 - 62; R.H. Bainton, Erasmus of Christendom, Fon­
tana/Collins, Glasgow, 1977 (first published in 1969), pp. 371 - 
388; J.C. Margolin, Douze Annees de Bibliographie Erasmienne: 1950
- 1961 (An Erasmus Bibliography Covering Twelve Years: 1950 - 1961), 
J. Vrin, J ’aris, 1963, pp. 23 - 177;---, Quatorze Annees de Biblio­
graphie Erasmienne: 1936 - 1949 (An Erasmus Bibliography Covering 
Fourteen Years: 1936 - 1949), J. Vrin, Paris, 1969, pp. 13 - 384;
---, Neuf Annees de Bibliographie Erasmienne: 1962 - 1970 (An Eras­
mus Bibliography Covering Nine Years: 1962 - 1970), J. Vrin, Paris, 
and University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1977, pp. 11 - 712; Geld­
ner , Die Staatsauffassung und Fuerstenlehre des Erasmus von Rotter- 
dam, pp. 181 - 189.
III
7. For accounts of Erasmus' life and publications see, for example, 
"The Compendium Vitae of Erasmus of Rotterdam" (1524) and "The Life
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of Erasmus by Beatus Rhenanus" (1540), both in Olin, Christian Hu­
manism and the Reformation, pp. 22 - 30 and 31 - 54; J.A. Froude, 
Life and Letters of Erasmus; Lectures Delivered at Oxford 1893-4, 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1927 (first published in 1894), 
Huizinga, Erasmus of Rotterdam; A. Hyma, The Youth of Erasmus, Rus­
sell & Russell, New York, 1968 (first published in 1931); S. Zweig, 
Triumph und Tragik des Erasmus von Rotterdam (Triumph and Tragedy 
of Erasmus of Rotterdam), Herbert Reichner, Wien, 1935; Bainton, 
Erasmus of Christendom; and Historisches Museum Basel, Erasmus von 
Rotterdam: Vorkaempfer fuer Frieden und Toleranz; 26. April - 7. 
September 1986 (Erasmus of Rotterdam: An Early Champion of Peace 
and Tolerance: 26 April - 7 September 1986), Werner Druck, Basel, 
1986.
8. Bainton, Erasmus of Christendom, p. 20.
9. Hale, Renaissance Europe, p. 55.
III
10. Ibid., PP . 320
11. Ibid., P. 321.
12. Ibid., P- 322.
13. S. Dresden, "Presence d ’Erasme" (Presence of Erasmus), in Academie 
Royale Neerlandaise des Sciences et des Sciences Humaines, Actes 
du Congres Erasme, p. 11.
14. Erasmus to Servatius Rogerus, 16/11/1506, in Collected Works of 
Erasmus, vol. 2, translated by R.A.B. Mynors and D.F.S. Thomson, 
annotated by W.K. Ferguson, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 
1975, p. 125.
15. Erasmus to Andrea Ammonio, 26/11/1511, in Ibid., pp. 204 - 205.
16. Erasmus to Antoon van Bergen, 14/3/1514, in Ibid., p. 279.
17. Erasmus to Thomas Wolsey, 9/9/1517, in F.M. Nichols, The Epistles 
of Erasmus: From His Earliest Letters to His Fifty-First Year, vol. 
3, Longmans/Green & Co., London, 1918, p. 51. The same page con­
tains the following note by the editor: "Erasmus certainly cannot 
be said to have been mistaken, but it is not easy to say how far 
the revolution in affairs of state and religion, which actually 
took place, was in accordance with his gloomy forebodings". E. Krie­
ger seems to be able to provide part of the answer, as he mentions 
that, late in 1516, Erasmus received a letter from Spalatin, secre­
tary to Frederick the Wise, Duke of Saxony, on the suggestion of 
Martin Luther. It raised the question of justification by faith 
alone, an important point in their respective positions. Grosse Eu- 
ropaeer heute: Erasmus von Rotterdam, Carl J. Burckhardt, Richard 
Graf Coudenhove-Kalengi, Albert Camus, Verlag das Viergespann, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1964, p. 37.
18. The original version (1526) of this sentence was: "Charles wants a 
new monarchy comprising the whole world" (Carolus molitur nouam 
totius orbis monarchiam), but the word "new", as Erasmus writes to
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Alfonso Valdes, the Imperial Chancellor’s secretary, produced a 
"chicanery” against him on the part of those who upheld the impe­
rial cause. See Erasmus to Alphonse Valdes, 21/3/1529, in A. Gerlo 
(ed.), La Correspondence d ’Erasme (The Correspondence of Erasmus), 
vol. 8, University Press, Brussels, 1979, p. 121. For the original 
Latin text, see A.G. Weiler, "Einleitung" (Introduction), "Vtilis- 
sima Consvltatio de Bello Tvrcis Inferendo ..." (A Valued Discus­
sion of War against the Turks . ..), Opera Omnia Desiderii Erasmi 
Roterodami (The Complete Works of Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam), 
V-III, vol. 15, North Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1986, p.
9. There are two earlier editions of the Opera Omnia: Basel 1538 - 
1540 and Leyden 1703 - 1707.
19. "The New Mother", 1526, in C.R. Thompson (tr.), The Colloquies of 
Erasmus, University of Chicago Press, Chicago/London, 1965, pp. 269 
- 270.
20. Erasmus to Jacobus Sadoletus, 1/10/1528, in J.C. Margolin, Guerre 
et Paix dans la Pensee d ’Erasme (War and Peace in the Thought of 
Erasmus), Aubier Montaigne, Paris, 1973, p. 309. Subsequent ages 
have identified this event as the end of the Italian renaissance.
21. Erasmus to Bartholomeus Latomus, 24/8/1535, in R.L. DeMolen (ed.), 
Erasmus, Edward Arnold, London, 1973, p. 182.
22. Froude, Life and Letters of Erasmus, p. 420; see also "Preface", 
Ibid.
23. J.D. Tracy, The Politics of Erasmus: A Pacifist Intellectual and 
His Political Milieu, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1978, 
pp. 103, 105, 125, 129. See also R.W. Scribner, "The Social Thought 
of Erasmus", Journal of Religious History, vol. 6, 1970, pp. 25,
26; C.R. Thompson, "Foreword", Olin, Christian Humanism and the Re­
formation , p. ix; and M.P. Gilmore, Humanists and Jurists; Six 
Studies in the Renaissance, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, pp. 92 - 93.
24. Erasmus to Dukes Frederick and George of Saxony, 5/6/1517, in Col­
lected Works of Erasmus, vol. 4, translated by R.A.B. Mynors and 
D.F.S. Thomson, annotated by J.K. McConica, 1977, p. 375.
25. Machiavelli's The Prince existed in manuscript form from 1513; it 
was printed in 1532. There is no mention in Erasmus’ works that he 
saw either version. This, however, does not necessarily mean that 
he did not see it or that, as C.R. Thompson suggests, he would not 
have understood it if he had seen it. "Erasmus as Internationalist 
and Cosmopolitan", Archiv fuer Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 46, 
1955, p. 194. Machiavelli’s name, as Thompson mentions on the same 
page, appears in a letter by John Angelus Odonus of March 1535 to 
Erasmus. See P.S. Allen and H.M. Allen (eds.), Opus Epistolarum 
Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami (The Letters of Desiderius Erasmus of 
Rotterdam), vol. 11, Clarendon Press, 1947, p. 93.
26. "But the majority of his contemporaries and most modern scholars 
attribute the dialogue to the pen of Erasmus", M.J. Heath writes in 
his "Introductory Note", "Julius Excluded from Heaven: A Dialogue", 
Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 27, edited by A.H.T. Levi, 1986, 
p. 156, adding that "external circumstances" as well as "the con-
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tents of the dialogue point very clearly towards Erasmus as its au­
thor", p. 157. Earlier scholars to attribute the work to Erasmus 
include, for example, Nichols, The Epistles of Erasmus, vol. 2, 
1904, pp. 448 - 449; Allen, Opus Epistolarum, vol. 2, 1910, pp. 418 
- 420; Huizinga, Erasmus of Rotterdam, p. 85; Geldner, Die Staats­
auffassung und Fuerstenlehre des Erasmus, pp. 70- 7 1 ;  P. Mesnard, 
Lessor de la Philosophie Politique au XVIe Siede (The Development 
of Political Philosophy in the Sixteenth Century), J. Vrin, Paris, 
1951, pp. 103, 113; P. Pascal (tr.) and J.K. Sowards (introduction 
and critical notes), The Julius Exclusus of Erasmus (hereafter Ju­
lius Exclusus), Indiana University Press, Bloomington/London, 1968, 
pp. 14 - 23, 97 - 98; and Historisches Museum Basel, Erasmus von 
Rotterdam, p. 174.
III
27. Julius Exclusus, p. 53.
28. Ibid. , p. 52
29. Ibid., p. 58.
30. Ibid., pp. 58 - 59.
31. Ibid., p. 59.
32. That is, people born outside Italy.
33. Julius Exclusus, pp. 71 - 72.
34. Ibid., p. 76.
35. Ibid., p. 77.
36. The reference is to the League of Cambrai. See above, Section One, 
p. 41.
37. This passage suggests that Erasmus might include "balance of power 
politics" in the realist approach to international politics.
38. The reference is to the Holy League. See above, Section One, p. 41.
39. Julius Exclusus, pp. 77 - 78.
40. Ibid., p. 60.
41. Ibid., p. 61.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 64.
44. Ibid., pp. 64 - 65.
45. Ibid., p. 65.
46. See the comparison "Erasmus und Machiavelli", H. Muenkler, Im Namen 
des Staates: Die Begruendung der Staatsraison in der Fruehen Neu­
zeit (In the Name of the State: Origins of Reason of State in Early
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Modern Times), Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1987, pp. 46 - 
64.
47. Erasmus was not alone among his contemporaries in perceiving a con­
nection between expansionism and universalism. See, for example, R. 
Menendez Pidal, "Formacion del Fundamental Pensamiento Politico de 
Carlos V" (Formation of the Basic Political Ideas of Charles V), in 
P. Rassow and F. Schalk (eds.), Karl V; Per Kaiser und seine Zeit 
(Charles V: The Emperor and His Times), Boehlau Verlag, Koeln/Graz, 
1960, pp. 144 - 166, esp. p. 158.
48. Erasmus to Robert Gaguin, 7/10/1495, in Collected Works of Erasmus, 
vol. 1, translated by R.A.B. Mynors and D.F.S. Thomson, annotated 
by W.K. Ferguson, 1974, p. 91.
49. J.M. Headley, "Gattinara, Erasmus and the Imperial Configurations 
of Humanism", Archiv fuer Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 71, 1980, p. 
83n.
50. Tracy, The Politics of Erasmus, p. 17.
51. "Le Panegyrique de Philippe Le Beau" (The Panegyric of Philip the 
Fair), 1504, in Margolin, Guerre et Paix dans la Pensee d'Erasme, 
p. 43.
52. See above, Section One, pp. 41 - 42.
53. Erasmus to Antoon van Bergen, 14/3/1514, in Collected Works of 
Erasmus, vol. 2, p. 281.
54. Erasmus to Dukes Frederick and George of Saxony, 5/6/1517, in Ibid., 
vol. 4, p. 378.
55. Ibid., pp. 381 - 382. The view which Erasmus expresses here is in­
teresting, as it supports the findings presented above, Ch. II.
56. Erasmus to Dukes Frederick and George of Saxony, 5/6/1517, in Col­
lected Works of Erasmus, vol. 4, p. 382.
57. Erasmus to Duke Ernest of Bavaria, 4/11/1517, in Nichols, The Epis­
tles of Erasmus, vol. 3, p. 130.
58. Translated: On Monarchy.
59. The Latin text reads: "Nactus sum his diebus libellum Dantis, cui 
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Erasmus, vol. 2, p. 282; "War Is Sweet to Those Who Do not Know 
It", in Mann Phillips, The Adages of Erasmus, p. 348; "The Com­
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The Essential Erasmus, pp. 132 and 179; and The Education of a 
Christian Prince, pp. 239 - 240.
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tern Values", p. 96; and ---, Systems of States, p. 125.
3. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 28.
4. Translated: state or community.
5. Gierke, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, p. 362.
6. Translated: re-readings. According to Beltran de Heredia, a relec- 
tio was a dissertation on a topic or point treated in the ordinary 
lectures. "Personalidad del Maestro Francisco de Vitoria y Trans- 
cendencia de su Obra Doctrinal" (Personality of Master Francisco 
de Vitoria and Transcendency of His Doctrine), in L. Perena and 
J.M. Perez Prendes (eds.), Francisco de Vitoria: Relectio de Indis 
o Libertad de los Indios (Francisco de Vitoria: Relectio on the 
Indians or the Liberty of the Indians), Consejo Superior de Inves- 
tigaciones Cientlficas, Madrid, 1967, pp. xxiii - xxiv. J. Soder 
throws some light on the significance of these "re-readings" when 
he says that their raison d'etre was the obligation, on the part
of professors, to give special lectures on "current, real problems" 
and further, when he quotes the Spanish historiographer E. de Hino­
josa, who wrote towards the end of the last century: "I do not know 
anybody who would have chosen as the topic of his lectures such 
delicate and burning questions of the day as did the famous Domin­
ican ... Usually only the typical 'school questions’ were dis­
cussed. Die Idee der Voelkergemeinschaft: Francisco de Vitoria und 
die philosophischen Grundlagen des Voelkerrechts (The Idea of the 
Community of Nations: Francisco de Vitoria and the Philosophical 
Bases of the Law of Nations), Alfred Metzner, Frankfurt am Main/ 
Berlin, 1955, pp. 22, 19.
7. E. Nys (edited with an introduction), Francisci de Victoria De In­
dis et De lure Belli Relectiones (Relectiones on the Indians and 
the Law of War by Franciscus de Victoria), The Classics of Interna­
tional Law, Carnegie Institution, Washington, D.C., 1917, reprint­
ed by Oceana Publications, New York, 1964, p. 104.
8. T. Urdanoz (edited with introductions), Obras de Francisco de Vito­
ria: Relecciones Teologicas (Works by Francisco de Vitoria: Theo­
logical Relectiones), Autores Cristianos, Madrid, 1960.
9. Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, pp. 68 - 172, 195
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for example, J. Brown Scott, Law, the State and the International 
Community, vol. 1, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1970 
(reprint of the original publication of 1939, Columbia University 
Press, New York), pp. 310 - 323; ---, The Spanish Conception of In­
ternational Law and of Sanctions, Carnegie Endowment for Interna­
tional Peace, Washington, D.C., 1934, pp. 1 - 48. For other authors 
see, for example, M. Barbier (introduction, translation and notes), 
Francisco de Vitoria: Lemons sur les Indiens et sur le Droit de 
Guerre (Francisco de Vitoria: Lessons on the Indians and the Law of 
War), Droz, Geneva, 1966, pp. vii - lxxxii; L. Perena (ed.), Fran­
cisco de Vitoria: Escritos Politicos (Francisco de Vitoria: Politi­
cal Writings), Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1967, pp. ix - 
xxiii; and R. Hernandez, Un Espa'nol en La O.N.U.: Francisco de Vi­
toria , Autores Cristianos, Madrid, 1977. One of Scott’s most severe 
critics is A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, 
rev. ed., Macmillan, New York, 1954 (first published in 1947), esp. 
pp. 296 - 300.
10. A proponent of the year 1480 is, for example, C. Phillipson, "Fran- 
ciscus A Vitoria (1480 - 1546): International Law and War”, Journal 
of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series, vol. 15,
1915, p. 176. The year 1483 is favoured by Scott, The Spanish Ori­
gin of International Law, pp. 70, 77; Beltran de Heredia, "Persona- 
lidad del Maestro Francisco de Vitoria", p. xiii, and many follow­
ing him are committed to the year 1492; a particular advocate for 
the year 1486 has not been found, but Urdanoz mentions it as one 
given by some scholars. "Introduccion Biografica" (Biographical In­
troduction), Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, p. 5.
11. Those who have opted for the earlier years tend to assert that he 
was born in Vitoria in the Basque province of Alava; whereas those 
who have decided in favour of 1492 claim Burgos as his place of 
birth. Uncertainties over dates and places are also noted in "Prin­
cipal Events in Vitoria’s Life", in A. Pagden and J. Lawrance 
(eds.), Francisco de Vitoria: Political Writings, Cambridge Univer­
sity Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. xxix - xxx. Published in late 
1991, this book was received too late to be used as a primary 
source in this study.
12. Regarding Burgos, all that seems to be established is the year when 
Vitoria made his profession: 1506. See Beltran de Heredia, "Per- 
sonalidad del Maestro Francisco de Vitoria", p. xv. Concerning his 
time in Paris, sources suggest any year from 1506 to 1510 as the 
year of arrival and the years 1521 to 1523 as possible years of de­
parture. Regarding his doctorate, the sources give two precise 
dates: 24/3/1521 and 21/6/1522. See Nys, "Introduction", Francisci 
de Victoria, p. 66, and Urdanoz, "Introduccion Biografica", Obras 
de Francisco de Vitoria, p. 17, respectively.
IV
13. Translated: master.
14. Meaning "first" (lectures starting at 6 a.m.).
15. For the "agreed" facts, see Urdanoz, "Introduccion Biografica", 
Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, pp. 18 - 22.
16. Translated: lectures.
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17. Parts of these lectiones were published by Beltran de Heredia in 
six volumes between 1932 and 1952 under the title Comentarios a la 
Secunda Secundae de Santo Tomas (Commentary on the Secunda Secun- 
dae of St Thomas) at Biblioteca de Teologos Espanbles, Salamanca. 
See Soder, Die Idee der Voelkergemeinschaft, pp. 17 - 18. Of the 
fifteen relectiones which Vitoria is said to have given, thirteen 
have been preserved. Urdanoz, "Indice General" (General Index), 
Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, pp. vii - viii. Approximately ten 
letters and a few opinions have survived. See "Introduccion Biogra- 
fica, Ibid., p. 82. Nys mentions two further writings: Summa Sacra- 
mentorum Ecclesiae (The Sum of the Sacraments of the Church) and 
Confesionario, a manuel in Spanish for confessors, which appeared 
at Valladolid in 1566 and at Salamanca in 1562 respectively. See 
"Introduction", Francisci de Victoria, p. 83.
18. Beltran de Heredia is regarded as the authority on the "facts" of 
Vitoria’s life. See Urdanoz, "Introduccion Biografica", Obras de 
Francisco de Vitoria, pp. 1 - 107.
19. The approximately seventeen pages are: Ibid., pp. 108, 196, 328, 
410, 491 - 492, 727 - 728, 859 - 861, 937, 995, 1070 - 1071, 1131, 
1223, 1292 - 1293. The changes which he suggests concern Vitoria’s 
letter to M. Arcos, Ibid., pp. 57 and 505 - 506n, and Vitoria’s 
relectio "Del Homicidio" (On Homicide), Ibid., pp. 1070 - 1071.
20. There is one entry by Urdanoz which may be interpreted as meaning 
that Vitoria died in 1548. See Ibid., p. 66.
21. Nys, "Introduction", Francisci de Victoria, p. 81.
22. Urdanoz, "Introduccion Biografica", Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, 
p. 38.
23. Vitoria wrote prologues to: Peter Crockaert’s Comments on the Se­
cunda Secundae of the Summa of St Thomas, Paris, 1512; The Sermons 
of Pedro de Covarrubias, Paris, 1520; The Sum of Moral Theology of 
St Antonio of Florence, Paris, 1521; and Dictionary or Moral Rep­
ertory of Pedro Bersuine, Paris, 1521 - 1522.
24. Urdanoz reports that the university of Salamanca called a meeting 
with the members of the Convent of San Esteban in 1548, in order 
to talk about the writings left by Vitoria. In the course of this 
meeting a committee was appointed, which was to examine the writ­
ings and to select those which were to be printed. But the members 
of the committee, "distracted by other things", turned out to be 
little concerned with giving effect to the resolution of the uni­
versity. See Urdanoz, "Introduccidn Biografica", Obras de Francis­
co de Vitoria, p. 75.
IV
25. See Ibid., p. 102.
26. Ibid., p. 88.
27. The story of the editions is told in Ibid., pp. 75 - 96. It seems 
to be unknown to Skinner, for he writes: "(Vitoria’s) views are 
only known directly from a series of manuscript relectiones which 
happen to have survived". The Foundations of Modern Political
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Thought, vol. 2, p. 136.
28. H.F. Wright, ''Prefatory Remarks Concerning the Text", in Nys, Fran- 
cisci de Victoria, p. 194.
29. Ibid., p. 195.
30. Ibid., p. 199.
31. Urdanoz, "Introduccion Biografica", Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, 
p. 105. For a different response to the question of authenticity
of Vitoria's writings, see "Critical Note on Texts and Translation" 
in Pagden and Lawrance, Francisco de Vitoria: Political Writings, 
pp. xxxiii - xxxviii.
32. A point made by Urdanoz, Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, p. 1225. To 
give an example: in his relectio "On the Indians Lately Discovered" 
Vitoria proposes to deal with three questions; the relectio, how­
ever, contains the treatment of only the first. See "On the Indians 
Lately Discovered", translated by J. Pawley Bate, in Scott, The 
Spanish Origin of International Law, Appendix A, p. ii.
33. Urdanoz, Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, pp. 1294 - 1295.
34. Reported in Ibid., pp. 89 and 93. Getino's main evidence seems to be 
a letter said to be written by Charles I (V) to the Prior of San 
Esteban on 10/11/1539. See Perena and Perez Prendes, Francisco de 
Vitoria: Relectio de Indis o Libertad de los Indios, pp. 152 - 153
35. The records, in this case, consist of the few letters by Vitoria 
that have survived. See Perena and Perez Prendes, Francisco de Vi­
toria: Relectio de Indis o Libertad de los Indios, pp. 137 - 139 
and 152 - 156; Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, pp. 
7 8 - 8 7 .
36. Urdanoz mentions his brother Diego a few times. For example, on p. 
6, "Introduccion Biografica", Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, he 
writes: "Later to become a famous preacher, he was Prior of the con 
vent of Burgos in 1527, having become well-known from 1526 onward 
for his campaigns against Erasmianism in Spain".
37. Translated: meeting, committee of inquiry. According to J.H. Parry, 
the j unta "was a familiar device for settling points of theological 
difference". The Spanish Theory of Empire in the Sixteenth Century, 
Octagon Books, New York, 1974, p. 32.
38. Erasmus' letter of 29/11/1527 to Vitoria is contained in Allen,
Opus Epistolarum, vol. 7, 1928, pp. 254 - 261.
39. Nys, "Introduction", Francisci de Victoria, p. 79. Mesnard calls 
Vitoria "a friend and disciple of Erasmus", L'Essor de la Philoso­
phie Politique au XVIe S i e d e , p. 455.
40. Urdanoz, "Introduccion Biografica", Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, 
p. 15.
41. Barbier, "Introduction", Francisco de Vitoria: Lemons sur les In-
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diens et sur le Droit de Guerre, p. xii.
42. Urdanoz, "Introducciön Biogrdfica", Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, 
p. 34.
43. "Si se puede obligar a los infieles a convertirse" (Whether One Can 
Force the Infidels to Convert (to Christianity)), in Perena and 
Perez Prendes, Francisco de Vitoria: Relectio de Indis o Libertad 
de los Indios, p. 124. Urdänoz mentions another reference by Vito­
ria to Erasmus. It is said to date from his lectiones of 1539 - 
1540 in which he refutes "the errors of the humanist". "Introduc- 
cion Biografica", Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, p. 34.
44. J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain; 1469 - 1716, Edward Arnold, London, 
1963, Chs. I - VI, especially III.3, VI.1 and VI.2. Urdanoz men­
tions in passing that after the death of the Archbishop of Toledo, 
Alfonso de Fonseca, in 1528, and the banishment from the Court of 
the Inquisitor Manrique (both of whom were prominent Erasmians), 
the Inquisitional trials against the Erasmians began. "Introduccion 
Biografica", Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, p. 34. Vitoria's "ill­
ness" which scholars refer to as gout is said to have begun in 1529. 
See Ibid., p. 36.
45. Hernandez, Un Espanol en la O.N.U., p. 126.
46. Translated: reconquest. The last Moslem kingdom on Spanish soil - 
Granada - fell in 1492.
47. One of the rare occasions during this period when Spaniards and 
French were allies rather than adversaries.
48. One of the famous pirates of this period was Caccia Diabolo.
49. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 43.
50. R.T. Davies, The Golden Century of Spain: 1501 - 1621, Macmillan, 
London, 1961, p. 92.
51. Phillipson, "Franciscus A Vitoria (1480 - 1546): International Law 
and War", p. 176.
52. According to Elton, "(p)apal decrees are called Bulls after the 
lead seal (bulla) attached to them, and are named after their ini­
tial words". Reformation Europe: 1517 - 1559, p. 22n. For a mean­
ingful translation one would need more than the two words inter 
cetera with which the Bull begins.
53. L. Hanke, Bartolome de Las Casas: An Interpretation of His Life and 
Writings, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1951, p. 36. According to 
Urdanoz, the Spanish kings asked for this Bull in order to resolve 
differences with and protests from the Portuguese. By the Treaty of 
Tordesillas of 1494, the two powers agreed to demarcate a line 370 
miles to the east of the Azores. Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, p. 
528.
IV
54. B.M. Biermann, "Bartolome de Las Casas and Verapaz", in J. Friede
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and B. Keen (eds.), Bartolome de Las Casas in History: Toward an 
Understanding of the Man and His Work, Northern Illinois Press, 
DeKalb, Illinois, 1971, p. 443.
55. L. Hanke, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of Amer­
ica , Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1965, p. 25.
56. Ibid. , p. 26.
57. Hanke, Bartolome de Las Casas, p. 17.
58. According to Hanke, the laws of Burgos form "the first comprehen­
sive code of legislation. It represents the Court's conception at 
that time of the ideal relationship between the Indians and their 
Spanish masters". It covers aspects ranging from "the diet of the 
Indians" to "the Holy Sacraments". The Spanish Struggle for Jus­
tice , pp. 2 4 - 2 5 .
59. Ibid., pp. 27 - 30.
60. Ibid., p. 33. Requerimiento means requirement.
61. M.M. Martinez, "Las Casas on the Conquest of America", in Friede 
and Keen, Bartolome de Las Casas in History, p. 335.
62. The Council of the Indies was the principal governing body resident 
in Spain to advise the monarch on matters relating to the New World. 
It consisted of a president and eight councillors. Elliott, Imperi­
al Spain, p. 161.
63. Reports from the New World in the 1530s read like this: "This whole 
land is in turmoil and the Indians greatly aroused because of the 
cruelties and maltreatment of the Christians. Wherever they go 
their feet scorch the grass and the ground over which they pass. 
Their hands are bloody with slaying ...". See J. Comas, "Historical 
Reality and the Detractors of Father Las Casas", in Friede and 
Keen, Bartolom^ de Las Casas in History, p. 491.
64. Translated: Sublime God.
65. Martinez, "Las Casas on the Conquest of America", p. 316.
66. The New Laws were an attempt to revoke or limit "the right of Span­
iards to service and tributes from Indians, who would ultimately be 
put under the crown ...". See Hanke, The Spanish Struggle for Jus­
tice , pp. 83 - 105.
67. A letter of 1550 reads: "One could not believe that such cruel and 
savage inhumanity could dwell in a Christian heart ... Some Indi­
ans they burned alive; they cut off the hands, noses, tongues ...; 
they threw others to the dogs ...". See Comas, "Historical Reality 
and the Detractors of Father Las Casas", p. 494.
68. M. Gimenez Fernandez, "Fray Bartolome^ de Las Casas", in Friede and 
Keen, Bartolome de Las Casas in History, p. 109.
IV
69. Juan Gines de Sepulveda: the imperial chronicler and learned Latin-
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ist who, as far as his political views were concerned, would qual­
ify as a universalist.
70. "Concerning the Power of the Church" (One), translated by G.L. Wil­
liams, in Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, Appendix 
D, p. ci.
71. "Concerning Civil Power", translated by G.L. Williams, in Ibid., 
Appendix C, p. lxxxii. See also "On the Indians, Or on the Law of 
War Made by the Spaniards on the Barbarians" (hereafter "On the 
Law of War"), translated by J. Pawley Bate, in Ibid., Appendix B, 
p. lxi.
72. "On the Indians", in Ibid., p. xliii; see also p. xliv.
73. Translated: justification.
74. A point interesting to note, for it suggests that the original re~ 
lectio consisted of no more than two parts, whereas today it is 
presented in three parts.
75. The Spanish word for the Latin relectio: re-reading.
76. A. Losada, "The Controversy between Sepulveda and Las Casas in the 
Junta of Valladolid", in Friede and Keen, Bartolome" de Las Casas 
in History, p. 304.
77. "On the Indians", in Scott, The Spanish Origin of International 
Law, p. xiii. The word "politics" rather than "polities" in Scott's 
text seems to be a misprint, as the Latin is civitates. See "De 
Indis", in Nys, Francisci de Victoria, p. 231.
78. "On the Indians", in Scott, The Spanish Origin of International 
Law, p. xxx.
IV
79. Vitoria to the Constable of Castile (1539), in Ibid., p. 82.
80. Antonio Leiva, the Spanish general. See above, p. 82.
81. Vitoria to the Constable of Castile (1536), in Scott, The Spanish
Origin of International Law, p. 82.
82. Ibid., p. 83.
83. Ibid., pp. 83 - 84.
84. Vitoria to Arcos (8/11/1534), in Perena and Perez Prendes, Francis­
co de Vitoria: Relectio de Indis o Libertad de los Indios, pp. 137
- 138. There does not seem to exist a complete translation of this 
letter in the English language. Scott discusses it at some length 
without mentioning sentences such as "And although the Emperor may 
have just titles to conquer them, the Indians do not know it nor 
can they know it". The Spanish Origin of International Law, pp. 78
- 82. The point in question is important. See below, Sections Five 
and Six of this chapter, pp. 97 - 108.
85. See above, introduction to this chapter, p. 76.
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86. "On the Indians", in Scott, The Spanish Origin of International 
Law, pp. xvi - xxiv.
87. "Concerning the Power of the Church" (One), in Ibid., pp. xciv - 
xcvi.
88. "On the Indians", in Ibid., p. xvii.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., p. xviii.
91. Ibid., p. xx.
92. Ibid.
93. "Concerning the Power of the Church" (One), in Ibid., p. xcv.
94. Ibid.
95. Hugo, according to Urdanoz, was the Canonist Huguccio de Pisa (d.
1210) .
96. "Concerning the Power of the Church" (One), in Scott, The Spanish 
Origin of International Law, p. xcv.
97. Ibid., p. xcvi.
98. Ibid. Innocent’s pronouncement was mentioned in Chapter II. See 
above, p. 32.
99. "On the Indians", in Scott, The Spanish Origin of International 
Law, p. xxii.
IV
100. Ibid.; see also p. xxiii.
101. The Latin word is respublica and, as the quotation indicates, Vito­
ria uses it in the sense of communitas (community). He also defines 
the word "people" as "the association based on the consent of the 
law and the community of interest". "De la Sedicidn o de la Guerra 
Civil" (On Sedition or Civil War), in Perena, Francisco de Vitoria: 
Escritos Politicos, p. 290.
102. "On the Law of War", in Scott, The Spanish Origin of International 
Law, p. liii.
103. Ibid.
104. "On War", translated by G.L. Williams, in Ibid., Appendix F, p. 
cxvii.
105. Ibid. Vitoria never explains his concept of "the superior lord", 
perhaps, because he thinks that there is no need to do so. Thus he 
speaks of "the well-worn distinction drawn by the jurists between 
dominion high and low, dominion direct and available, dominion 
pure and mixed" ("On the Indians", in Ibid., p. xvi). And he does 
not use it often. When he does, it usually is in relation to the
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emperor, for example, when he says that "some kings have the empe­
ror over them" (Ibid.), or that "the Emperor is superior to cer­
tain kings" ("Concerning the Power of the Church" (One), in Ibid., 
p. xcvii). The superior lord has certain rights, but rather than 
discussing these, he speaks of those which he does not have, as 
when he states that the perfect temporal community "can make war of 
itself" without "the authorization of its superior lord" ("On the 
Law of War", in Ibid., p. liii), or that the superior lord is not 
entitled to convert lands to "his own use" or to give towns away 
"at his own pleasure" ("On the Indians", in Ibid., p. xx). See also 
the requirement to rule in accordance with existing laws, mentioned 
in this section, p. 92. The superior lord is not from within the 
perfect temporal community, that is, he does not belong to that 
which it regards as its own ("On the Indians", in Scott, The Span­
ish Origin of International Law, p. xvii). The perfect temporal 
community is self-sufficient, that is, "nothing is wanting from it" 
("On the Law of War", in Ibid., p. liii). The superior lord appears 
as an entity which is compatible with Vitoria’s idea of political 
plurality.
106. "On War", in Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, p. 
cxvii.
107. For Vitoria, it is a way of arriving at a definition of civil power, 
following Aristotle’s assumption that one knows a thing if one knows 
its causes.
108. Urdämoz adds Almain and Occam as sources used but not mentioned by 
Vitoria. Obras de Francisco de Vitoria, p. 112.
109. "Concerning Civil Power", in Scott, The Spanish Origin of Interna­
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29. The Old English period: before the middle of the twelfth century.
30. "De Indis", p. 257.
31. "De Potestate Civili", p. 191.
32. "De Indis", p. 268.
33. Ibid., p. 262.
34. D. Hume, "Of the Balance of Power", in P. Seabury (ed.), Balance of 
Power, Chandler Publishing Co., San Francisco, 1965, p. 32.
35. Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations, p. 45.
36. "Power", Onions, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Histori­
cal Principles, vol. 2, p. 1559.
37. L. v. Ranke, "The Great Powers", in G.G. Iggers and K. v. Moltke 
(eds.), The Theory and Practice of History by Leopold von Ranke, 
Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis/New York, 1973, p. 99.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. PRIMARY SOURCES - SOURCE COLLECTIONS
(a) Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam
Allen, P.S., Allen, H.M., and others (eds.), Opus Epistolarum Erasmi Ro~ 
terodami, vols. 2, 3, 6, 7, 11 and 12, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1910 - 1958.
DeMolen, R.L. (ed.), Erasmus, Edward Arnold, London, 1973.
Dolan, J.P., The Essential Erasmus: Selected and Translated with Intro­
duction and Commentary, Meridian/The New American Library, New 
York/Scarborough, Ontario, 1964.
Froude, J.A., Life and Letters of Erasmus: Lectures Delivered at Oxford 
1893-4, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1927.
Gerlo, A. (ed.), La Correspondence d ’Erasme, vols. 5, 6 and 8, Univer­
sity Press, Brussels, 1976 - 1979.
Hillerbrand, J. (ed.), Erasmus and His Age: Selected Letters of Deside­
rius Erasmus, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
Margolin, J.C., Guerre et Paix dans la Pensee d ’^ rasme, Aubier Mon­
taigne, Paris, 1973.
Mynors, R.A.B., Thomson, D.F.S., Ferguson, W.K., and McConica, J.K.
(eds.), The Correspondence of Erasmus: Collected Works, vols. 1 - 
4, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1974 - 1977.
Nichols, F.M., The Epistles of Erasmus: From His Earliest Letters to
His Fifty-First Year, vols. 2 and 3, Longmans/Green & Co., London, 
1904 - 1918. Vol. 3 extends to "His Fifty-Third Year".
Olin, J.C. (ed.), Christian Humanism and the Reformation: Selected Writ­
ings of Erasmus, with the Life of Erasmus by Beatus Rhenanus, Ford- 
ham University Press, New York, 1980.
Phillips, M. Mann, The Adages of Erasmus: A Study with Translations, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1964.
Rupp, E.G., and Watson, P.S. (eds.), Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and 
Salvation, SCM Press, London, 1969.
Thompson, C.R. (tr.), The Colloquies of Erasmus, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago/London, 1965.
(b) Francisco de Vitoria
Barbier, M. (ed.), Francisco de Vitoria; Lemons sur les Indiens et sur
381
382
le Droit de Guerre, Droz, Geneva, 1966.
Getino, L. (tr.), Francisco de Vitoria: Derecho Natural y de Gentes,
With an Introduction by E. de Hinojosa, Ernece Editores, Buenos 
Aires, 1946.
Nys, E. (ed.), Francisci de Victoria De Indis et De lure Belli Relec- 
tiones, The Classics of International Law, Carnegie Institution, 
Washington, D.C., 1917, reprinted by Oceana Publications, New York, 
1964.
Pagden, A., and Lawrance, J. (eds.), Francisco de Vitoria: Political 
Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.
Perena, L. (ed.), Francisco de Vitoria: Escritos Politicos, Ediciones 
Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1967.
Perena, L. , and Prendez, J.M. P^rez (eds.), Francisco de Vitoria; Relec- 
tio de Indis o Libertad de los Indios, Consejo Superior de Inves- 
tigaciones Cientificas, Madrid, 1967.
Scott, J. Brown, The Spanish Origin of International Law; Francisco de 
Vitoria and His Law of Nations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, and Hum­
phrey Milford, London, 1934.
UrdAnoz, T. (ed.), Obras de Francisco de Vitoria: Relecciones Teologicas, 
Autores Cristianos, Madrid, 1960.
(c) Alberico Gentili
Forsyth, M.G., Keens-Soper, H.M.A., and Savigear, P. (eds.), The Theory
of International Relations: Selected Texts from Gentili to Treitsch- 
ke, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1970.
Markowicz, L. (tr.), "Latin Correspondence by Alberico Gentili and John 
Rainolds on Academic Drama", in J. Hogg (ed.), Elizabethan and Ren­
aissance Studies, no. 68, Institut fuer Englische Sprache und Lite­
ratur, Salzburg, 1977, pp. 1 - 141.
Rainolds, J., The Overthrow of Stage-Plays by the Way of Controversy be­
tween D. Gager and D. Rainolds, 1599, Johnson Reprint, New York/ 
London, 1972.
(d) Hugo Grotius
Clark, G.N., and Eysinga, W.J.M. van, "The Colonial Conferences between 
England and the Netherlands in 1613 and 1615", Part I, Bibliotheca 
Visseriana, vol. 15, 1940, pp. 1 - 270, and Part II, Bibliotheca 
Visseriana, vol. 17, 1951, pp. 1 - 155.
Holk, L.E. van, and Roelofsen, C.G. (eds.), Grotius Reader: A Reader for 
Students of International and Legal History, T.M.C. Asser Insti- 
tuut, The Hague, 1983.
Molhuysen, P.C., Meulenbroek, B.L., and Witkam, P.P. (eds.), Briefwisse
ling, vols. 3, 4, 5, 7 and 11, Martinus Nijhoff, 'S-Gravenhage, 
1961 - 1981.
Wright, H.F., "Some Less Known Works of Hugo Grotius", Bibliotheca Vis~ 
seriana, vol. 7, 1928, pp. 133 - 238.
383
2. PRIMARY SOURCES - INDIVIDUAL WORKS
(a) Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam
"The Antibarbarians", translated and annotated by M. Mann Phillips, in 
Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 23, edited by C.R. Thompson, Uni­
versity of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1978, pp. 1 - 122.
"Declarationes Ad Censuras Lutetiae vulgatas sub nomine Facultatis Theo- 
logiae Parisiensis", in Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami Opera Omnia, 
edited by J. Clericus, vol. 9, Leyden, 1706, reprinted by Georg 
Olms, Hildesheim, 1962, pp. 814 - 928.
The Education of a Christian Prince, translated with an Introduction by 
L.K. Born, Columbia University Press, New York, 1936.
Enchiridion: Handbuechlein eines christlichen Streiters, translated and 
edited by W. Welzig, Hermann Boehlaus Nachf., Graz/Koeln, 1961.
The Julius Exclusus of Erasmus, translated by P. Pascal, annotated with 
an Introduction by J.K. Sowards, Indiana University Press, Bloom­
ington/London, 1968.
"Vtilissima Consvltatio de Bello Tvrcis Inferendo, et Obiter Enarratus 
Psalmus XXVIII", edited by A.G. Weiler, in Opera Omnia Desiderii 
Erasmi Roterodami, V-III, vol. 15, North Holland Publishing Co., 
Amsterdam, 1986, pp. 31 - 82.
(b) Alberico Gentili
Hispanicae Advocationis Libri Duo, vol. 1, A Photographic Reproduction 
of the Edition of 1661, With an Introduction by F.F. Abbott, The 
Classics of International Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1921.
Hispanicae Advocationis Libri Duo, vol. 2, The Translation by F.F. Ab­
bott, The Classics of International Law, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1921, reprinted by Oceana Publications, New York, and 
Wildy & Sons, London, 1964.
De Jure Belli Libri Tres, vol. 1, A Photographic Reproduction of the 
Edition of 1612, The Classics of International Law, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, and Humphrey Milford, London, 1933.
De Jure Belli Libri Tres, vol. 2, The Translation by J.C. Rolfe, With 
an Introduction by C. Phillipson, The Classics of International 
Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, and Humphrey Milford, London, 1933, 
reprinted by Oceana Publications, New York, and Wildy & Sons, Lon-
384
don, 1964.
De Legationibus Libri Tres, vol. 1, A Photographic Reproduction of the 
Edition of 1594, With an Introduction by E. Nys, The Classics of 
International Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 1924.
De Legationibus Libri Tres, vol. 2, The Translation by G.J. Laing, With 
an Introduction by E. Nys, The Classics of International Law, Ox­
ford University Press, New York, 1924, reprinted by Oceana Publica­
tions, New York, and Wildy & Sons, London, 1964.
(c) Hugo Grotius
Annales et Histoires des Troubles du Pays-Bas, lean Blaev, Amsterdam, 
1662.
"Defensio", in H.F. Wright, "Some Less Known Works of Hugo Grotius", 
Bibliotheca Visseriana, vol. 7, 1928, pp. 154 - 205.
Hugonis Grotii De Jure Belli et Pacis Libri Tres, edited by W. Whewell,
3 vols., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1853.
De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, vol. 2, The Translation of the Latin 
Edition of 1646 by F.W. Kelsey, with the collaboration of others, 
The Classics of International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1913 - 
1927, reprinted by Oceana Publications, New York, and Wildy & Sons, 
London, 1964.
De Jure Praedae Commentarius, vol. 1, A Translation of the Original Ma­
nuscript of 1604 by G.L. Williams, with the collaboration of W.H. 
Zeydel, The Classics of International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
and Geoffrey Cumberlege, London, 1950, reprinted by Oceana Publica­
tions, New York, and Wildy & Sons, London, 1964.
De lure Praedae Commentarius, vol. 2, The Collotype Reproduction of the 
Original Manuscript of 1604, The Classics of International Law, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, and Geoffrey Cumberlege, London, 1950.
The Jurisprudence of Holland, translated with Brief Notes and a Commen­
tary by R.W. Lee, vol. 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1926.
Mare Liberum, Sive De lure Quod Batavis Competit Ad Indicana Commercia 
Dissertatio, translated with a revision of the Latin text of 1633 
by R. van Deman Magoffin, edited with an Introductory Note by J. 
Brown Scott, The Classics of International Law, Oxford University 
Press, New York, and Humphrey Milford, London, 1916.
"De Republica Emendanda: A Juvenile Tract by Hugo Grotius on the Emenda­
tion of the Dutch Polity", edited by A. Eyffinger, P.A.H. de Boer, 
J.T. de Smidt and L.E. van Hoik, Grotiana, New Series, vol. 5,
1984, pp. 3 - 135.
A Treatise on the Antiquity of the Commonwealth of the Battavers, Which 
Is now the Hollanders, translated by T. Woods, John Walker, London, 
1649.
385
True Religion, Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, Amsterdam, 1971.
3. OTHER PRIMARY SOURCES
Bonet, H., The Tree of Battles, translated with an Introduction by G.W. 
Coopland, University Press, Liverpool, 1949.
Comines, P. de, Memöirs, translated and annotated by Mr. Uvedale, 2nd. 
ed., vol. 1, Bettesworth & Pemberton, London, 1723.
Cruce, E., The New Cyneas, edited with an Introduction and Translation 
by T.W. Balch, Allen, Lane & Scott, Philadelphia, 1909.
John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, translated with an Introduction 
by A.P. Monahan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1974.
Loomis, L.R., Mundy, J.H. and Woody, K.M. (eds.), The Council of Con­
stance: The Unification of the Church, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1961.
Markham, Sir Clements (ed.), Book of the Knowledge of all the Kingdoms, 
Lands, and Lordships That Are in the World, and the Arms and De­
vices of each Land and Lordship, or of the Kings and Lords Who Pos­
sess Them, The Hakluyt Society, London, 1912.
Mas Latrie, M.L. de, Traites de Paix et de Commerce et Documents Divers 
Concernant les Relations des Chretiens avec les Arabes de l'Afrique 
Septentrionale au Moyen Age, 2 vols., Burt Franklin, New York,
1963.
Oresme, N., "Traictie de la Premiere Invention des Monnoies", in A.E.
Monroe (ed.), Early Economic Thought: Selections from Economic Lit­
erature Prior to Adam Smith, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1930.
Smith, Sir Thomas, De Republica Anglorum: A Discourse on the Common­
wealth of England, edited by L. Alston, with a Preface by F.W. 
Maitland, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1906.
Sommerville, J.P. (ed.), Sir Robert Filmer: Patriarcha and Other Writ­
ings , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.
Welwood, W., An Abridgement of all Sea-Lawes; Gathered Forth of all
Writings and Monuments, which are to be found among any people or 
Nation, upon the coasts of the great Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. 
And specially ordered and disposed for the use and benefit of all 
benevolent Sea-farers, within his Majesties Dominions of Great 
Britanne, Ireland, and the adjacent Isles thereof, Theatrum Orbis 
Terrarum, Amsterdam, 1972.
4. SECONDARY SOURCES
Abbott, F.F., "Alberico Gentili and His Advocatio Hispanica", American
386
Journal of International Law, vol. 10, 1916, pp. 737 - 748.
------, "Introduction", A. Gentili, Hispanicae Advocationis Libri Duo,
vol. 1, A Photographie Reproduction of the Edition of 1661, The 
Classics of International Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1921, pp. 11a - 44a.
Aston, T. (ed.), Crisis in Europe 1560 - 1660; Essays from Past and Pres­
ent , Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1965.
Bainton, R.H., Erasmus of Christendom, Fontana/Collins, Glasgow, 1977.
Balch, T.W., "Albericus Gentilis", American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 5, 1911, pp. 665 - 679.
Barbier, M., "Introduction", Francisco de Vitoria: Leqons sur les Indiens 
et sur le Droit de Guerre, Droz, Geneva, 1966, pp. vii - lxxxii.
Barker, E., "Introduction", 0. von Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of 
Society 1500 - 1800, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1934, pp. ix - xci.
Barraclough, G., History in a Changing World, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1955.
Basdevant, J. , "Preface", Institut Ne'erlandais, La Vie et 1'Oeuvre de
Grotius (1583 - 1645): Exposition 15 Mars - 15 Avril, Institut Neer­
landais, Paris, 1965, pp. 9 - 14.
Bayle, P., "Gentilis (Alberic)", Dictionnaire Historique et Critique,
11th ed., vol. 7, Desoer, Paris, 1820, pp. 65 - 67.
------, "Grotius (Hugo)", Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, 11th ed.,
vol. 7, Desoer, Paris, 1820, pp. 270 - 287.
Belch, S.F., Paulus Vladimiri and His Doctrine Concerning International 
Law and Politics, 2 vols., Mouton & Co., London/The Hague, 1965.
Beltran de Heredia, V. , "Personalidad del Maestro Francisco de Vitoria y 
Transcendencia de su Obra Doctrinal", in L. Perena and J.M. Perez 
Prendes (eds.), Francisco de Vitoria: Relectio de Indis o Libertad 
de los Indios, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 
Madrid, 1967, pp. xiii - xxix.
Berki, R.N., On Political Realism, Dent & Son, London, 1981.
Berridge, G. , "The Political Theory and Institutional History of States 
Systems", British Journal of International Studies, vol. 6, 1980, 
pp. 82 - 92.
Beumer, J., Erasmus der Europaeer: Die Beziehungen des Rotterdamers zu 
den Humanisten seiner Zeit unter den verschiedenen Nationen Euro­
pas , Dietrich Coelde, Werl/Westf., 1969.
Biermann, B.M., "Bartolome de Las Casas and Verapaz", in J. Friede and
B. Keen (eds.), Bartolome de Las Casas in History: Toward an Under­
standing of the Man and His Work, Northern Illinois University 
Press, DeKalb, Illinois, 1971, pp. 443 - 484.
387
Binns, J.W., "Alberico Gentili in Defense of Poetry and Acting", Stud­
ies in the Renaissance, vol. 19, 1972, pp. 224 - 272.
Born, L.K., "Introduction", Desiderius Erasmus, The Education of a
Christian Prince, Columbia University Press, New York, 1936, pp. 1 
- 132.
Bozeman, A.B., Politics and Culture in International History, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1960.
Bull, H., "Society and Anarchy in International Relations", in H. But­
terfield and M. Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in 
the Theory of International Politics, George Allen & Unwin, London, 
1969, pp. 3 5 - 5 0 .
------, "The Grotian Conception of International Society", in H. Butter­
field and M. Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the 
Theory of International Politics, George Allen & Unwin, London,
1969, pp. 51 - 73.
------, "Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations: The
Second Martin Wight Memorial Lecture", British Journal of Interna­
tional Studies, vol. 2, 1976, pp. 101 - 116.
------, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Mac­
millan, London, 1977.
------, "Introduction", M. Wight, Systems of States, Leicester Universi­
ty Press, Leicester/London, 1977, pp. 1 - 20.
------, "The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Rela­
tions", in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury and A. Roberts (eds.), Hugo Gro­
tius and International Relations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, 
pp. 65 - 93.
Bull, H., and Watson, A. (eds.), The Expansion of International Society, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984.
Comas, J., "Historical Reality and the Detractors of Father Las Casas", 
in J. Friede and B. Keen (eds.), Bartolome de Las Casas in History: 
Toward an Understanding of the Man and His Work, Northern Illinois 
University Press, DeKalb, Illinois, 1971, pp. 487 - 537.
Copleston, F., A History of Philosophy, vol. 2, Part II, Image/Double­
day, New York, 1962.
Davies, R.T., The Golden Century of Spain: 1501 - 1621, Macmillan, Lon­
don, 1961.
Donelan, M., "Grotius and the Image of War", Millennium: Journal of In­
ternational Studies, vol. 12, 1983, pp. 233 - 243.
Dresden, S., "Presence d ’Erasme", in Academie Royale Neerlandaise des
Sciences et des Sciences Humaines, Actes du Congr&s £rasme: Rotter­
dam 27 - 29 Octobre 1969, North Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam/ 
London, 1971, pp. 1 - 13.
Dumbauld, E., The Life and Legal Writings of Hugo Grotius, University
388
of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla., 1969.
Dunning, W.A., A History of Political Theories: From Luther to Montes­
quieu , Macmillan, New York/London, 1949.
Edwards, C.S., Hugo Grotius: The Miracle of Holland: A Study in Politi­
cal and Legal Thought, With an Introduction by R.A. Falk, Nelson- 
Hall, Chicago, 1981.
Ehrlich, L., "L'Interpretation des Traites", Recueil des Cours, vol. 24, 
IV, 1928, pp. 5 - 145.
------, "The Development of International Law as a Science", Recueil des
Cours, vol. 105, I, 1962, pp. 177 - 265.
Elliott, J.H., Imperial Spain: 1469 - 1716, Edward Arnold, London, 1963.
------, Europe Divided; 1559 - 1598, Fontana/Collins, Glasgow, 1977.
Elton, G.R., England under the Tudors, Methuen, London, 1956.
------, Reformation Europe; 1517 - 1559, Fontana/Collins, Glasgow, 1977.
Eyffinger, A., "Some Marginal Notes to Wolfgang Fikentscher: De Fide et 
Perfidia - Der Treuegedanke in den ’Staatsparallelen' des Hugo Gro­
tius aus heutiger Sicht", Grotiana, New Series, vol. 2, 1981, pp. 
116 - 122.
------, "In Quest of Synthesis: An Attempted Synopsis of Grotius' Works
according to their Genesis and Objective", Grotiana, New Series, 
vol. 4, 1983, pp. 76 - 88.
------, "Exemplum Pietatis: Patriotism in Grotius' Early Verse", Grotia­
na , New Series, vol. 8, 1987, pp. 99 - 119.
Eysinga, W.J.M. van, "Grotius, Hugo", in Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 
10, William Benton, Chicago/London, 1969, pp. 944 - 946.
Fernandez, J.A., "Erasmus on the Just War", Journal of the History of 
Ideas, vol. 34, 1973, pp. 209 - 226.
Figgis, J.N., Political Thought: From Gerson to Grotius: 1414 - 1625:
7 Studies, Harper Torchbooks/Harper & Bros., New York, 1960.
Fikentscher, W., "De Fide et Perfidia - Der Treuegedanke in den ’Staats­
parallelen' des Hugo Grotius aus heutiger Sicht", Sitzungsberichte 
der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 1, 1979, pp. 7 - 
160.
Friedrich, C.J., "Gierke, Otto von", in E.R.A. Seligman (ed.-in-chief), 
The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 6, Macmillan, New 
York, 1931, pp. 655 - 656.
Fruin, R., "An Unpublished Work of Hugo Grotius", translated from an 
Essay in Dutch (1868), Bibliotheca Visseriana, vol. 5, 1925, pp.
3 - 74.
Geldner, F., Die Staatsauffassung und Fuerstenlehre des Erasmus von Rot-
389
terdam, Emil Ebering, Berlin, 1930.
Geyl, P., The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century: I. 1609 - 1648, 
Ernest Benn, London, 1961.
------, The Revolt of the Netherlands; 1555 - 1609, 2nd ed., Ernest
Benn, London, and Barnes & Noble, New York, 1980.
Gierke, 0. von, Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 - 1800, trans­
lated with an Introduction by E. Barker, 2 vols. Cambridge Univer­
sity Press, Cambridge, 1934 (translation of Ch. I, Section V, §§ 14 
and 15, and of Ch. II, Section I, §§ 16, 17 and 18, vol. 4, Das 
Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht).
------, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, 4 vols., Akademische Druck-
und Verlagsanstalt, Graz, 1954.
------, Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen
Staatstheorien, 5th ed., Scientia, Aalen, 1958.
------, Political Theories of the Middle Age, translated with an Intro­
duction by F.W. Maitland, Beacon Press, Boston, 1959 (translation 
of the Section "Die Publicistischen Lehren des Mittelalters", vol.
3, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht).
Gilmore, M.P., Humanists and Jurists: Six Studies in the Renaissance,
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 
1963.
Gim£nez Fernandez, M., "Fray Bartolome de Las Casas: A Biographical
Sketch", in J. Friede and B. Keen (eds.), Bartolome de Las Casas in 
History: Toward an Understanding of the Man and His Work, Northern 
Illinois University Press, DeKalb, Illinois, 1971, pp. 67 - 125.
Gollwitzer, H., Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens: I. Vom Zeital­
ter der Entdeckungen bis zum Beginn des Imperialismus, Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, Goettingen, 1972.
Guggenheim, P., "Contribution ä l'Histoire des Sources du Droit des 
Gens", Recueil des Cours, vol. 94, II, 1958, pp. 1 - 84.
Gunnell, J.G., "The Myth of the Tradition", in P. King (ed.), The His­
tory of Ideas, Croom Helm, London/Canberra, and Barnes & Noble, 
Totowa, N.J., 1983, pp. 233 - 255.
Haggenmacher, P., Grotius et la Doctrine de la Guerre Juste, Presses 
Universitaires de France, Paris, 1983.
------, "On Assessing the Grotian Heritage", in T.M.C. Asser Instituut
(ed.), International Law and the Grotian Heritage: A Commemorative 
Colloquium Held at The Hague on 8 April 1983 on the Occasion of the 
Fourth Centenary of the Birth of Hugo Grotius, T.M.C. Asser Insti­
tuut, The Hague, 1985, pp. 150 - 160.
------, "Grotius and Gentili: A Reassessment of Thomas E. Holland’s In­
augural Lecture", in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury and A. Roberts (eds.), 
Hugo Grotius and International Relations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1990, pp. 133 - 176.
390
Hale, J.R., Renaissance Europe: 1480 - 1520, Fontana/Collins, London,
1979.
Hamilton, B., Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain: A Study of
the Political Ideas of Vitoria, De Soto, Suarez and Molina, Claren­
don Press, Oxford, 1963.
Hanke, L., Bartolome de Las Casas: An Interpretation of His Life and 
Writings, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1951,
------, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America,
Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1965.
Hart, A.C.’t, "Hugo de Groot and Giambattista Vico", Netherlands Inter­
national Law Review, vol. 30, 1983, pp. 5 - 41.
Hashagen, J., Europa im Mittelalter: Alte Tatsachen und neue Gesichts­
punkte: Eine Einfuehrung mit besonderer Beruecksichtigung der 
nichtdeutschen Staaten, F. Bruckmann, Muenchen, 1951.
Hay, D., Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, Harper & Row, New York, 1966.
Headley, J.M., "Gattinara, Erasmus and the Imperial Configurations of 
Humanism", Archiv fuer Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 71, 1980, pp.
64 - 98.
Hearnshaw, F.J.C., "Hugo Grotius", in F.J.C. Hearnshaw (ed.), The Social 
and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1949, pp. 130 - 
152.
Heath, M.J., "Introductory Note" to "Julius Excluded from Heaven: A Dia­
logue", in Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 27, edited by A.H.T. 
Levi, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1986, pp. 155 - 167.
Hernandez, R., Un Espanol en La O.N.U.: Francisco de Vitoria, Autores 
Cristianos, Madrid, 1977.
Herz, J.H., Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories 
and Realities, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951.
------, Vom Ueberleben: Wie ein Weltbild entstand, Droste, Duesseldorf,
1984.
Heydte, Friedrich August Freiherr von der, Die Geburtsstunde des sou-
veraenen Staates: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Voelkerrechts, der 
allgemeinen Staatslehre und des politischen Denkens, Josef Habbel, 
Regensburg, 1952.
Hinsley, F.H., Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in
the History of Relations between States, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1963.
Hintze, 0., "Staatenbildung und Verfassungsentwicklung", in G. Oestreich 
(ed.), Staat und Verfassung: Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Allgemei­
nen Verfassungsgeschichte, With an Introduction by F. Hartung, Van- 
denhoeck & Ruprecht, Goettingen, 1970, pp. 34 - 5 1 .
Hirsch, E. Feist, Damiao de Gois: The Life and Thought of a Portuguese
391
Humanist: 1502 - 1574, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1967.
Historisches Museum Basel, Erasmus von Rotterdam: Vorkaempfer fuer Frie­
den und Toleranz: 26. April - 7 September 1986, Werner Druck, Ba­
sel, 1986.
Holland, T.E., "Alberico Gentili", Studies in International Law, Claren­
don Press, Oxford, 1898, pp. 1 - 39.
----- , "Gentili, Alberico (1552 - 1608)", in L. Stephen and S. Lee
(eds.), The Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 7, Oxford Uni­
versity Press/Humphrey Milford, London, 1937 - 38, pp. 1003 - 1006.
Holzgrefe, J.L., "The Origins of Modern International Relations Theory", 
Review of International Studies, vol. 15, 1989, pp. 11 - 26.
Howard, M., War and the Liberal Conscience, Temple Smith, London, 1978.
Huizinga, J., Erasmus of Rotterdam, Phaidon Press, London, 1952.
----- , Dutch Civilization in the Seventeenth Century and Other Essays,
selected by P. Geyl and F.W.N. Hugenholtz, translated by A.J. 
Pomerans, Collins, London, 1968.
Hume, D., "Of the Balance of Power", in P. Seabury (ed.), Balance of 
Power, Chandler, San Francisco, 1965, pp. 32 - 36.
Hyma, A., The Youth of Erasmus, Russell & Russell, New York, 1968.
Kalkhoff, P., "Die Vermittlungspolitik des Erasmus und sein Anteil an
den Flugschriften der ersten Reformationszeit", Archiv fuer Refor­
mationsgeschichte , vol. 1-2, 1903 - 1905, pp. 1 - 83.
Kaltenborn, C. von, Die Vorlaeufer des Hugo Grotius auf dem Gebiete des 
Ius naturae et gentium sowie der Politik im Reformationszeitalter, 
Sauer & Anvermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1965.
Kennedy, D., "Primitive Legal Scholarship", Harvard International Law 
Journal, vol. 27, 1986, pp. 1 - 98.
Kienast, W. , Deutschland und Frankreich in der Kaiserzeit (900 - 1270): 
Weltkaiser und Einzelkoenige, vol. 2, Anton Hiersemann, Stuttgart, 
1975.
Kingsbury, B., and Roberts, A., "Introduction: Grotian Thought in In­
ternational Relations", in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury and A. Roberts 
(eds.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1990, pp. 1 - 64.
Kisch, G., Erasmus und die Jurisprudenz seiner Zeit, Helbing & Lichten- 
hahn, Basel, 1960.
Knight, W.S.M., The Life and Works of Hugo Grotius, The Grotius Society 
Publications No. 4, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1925.
Koenigsberger, H.G., The Habsburgs and Europe: 1516 - 1660, Cornell Uni­
versity Press, Ithaca/London, 1971.
392
Koerber, E. von, Die Staatstheorie des Erasmus von Rotterdam, Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin, 1967.
Krieger, E., Grosse Europaeer heute: Erasmus von Rotterdam, Carl J.
Burckhardt, Richard Graf Coudenhove-Kalengi, Albert Camus, Verlag 
das Viergespann, Frankfurt am Main, 1964.
Lange, C.L., Histoire de 1TInternationalisme: I.Jusqu'a la Paix de West- 
phalie (1648), Publications de lfInstitut Nobel Norvegien, vol. 4, 
Aschehoug (W. Nygaard), Kristiania, 1919.
------, "Le Droit International de Grotius", in A. Lysen (ed.), Hugo
Grotius: Essays on His Life and Works Selected for the Occasion of 
the Tercentenary of His !De Jure Belli ac Pacisf; 1625 - 1925, With 
a Preface by J. Ter Meulen, Sythoffs Publishing Co., Leyden, 1925, 
pp. 3 3 - 4 5 .
------, "Histoire de la Doctrine Pacifique et de son Influence sur le
Developpement du Droit International", Recueil des Cours, vol. 13, 
III, 1926, pp. 175 - 426.
Lauterpacht, H., "The Grotian Tradition in International Law", in E.
Lauterpacht (ed.), International Law Being the Collected Papers of 
Hersch Lauterpacht, vol. 2, Part I, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1975, pp. 307 - 365.
Lee, R.W., "Hugo Grotius: 1583 - 1645", The Law Quarterly Review, vol.
62, 1946, pp. 53 - 57.
Lewis, J.D., "Gierke, Otto von", in D.L. Sills (ed.), International En­
cyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 6, Macmillan and the Free 
Press, New York, 1968, pp. 177 - 181.
Losada, A., "The Controversy between Sepulveda and Las Casas in the Jun­
ta of Valladolid", in J. Friede and B. Keen (eds.), Bartolome de 
Las Casas in History: Toward an Understanding of the Man and His 
Work, Northern Illinois University Press, DeKalb, Illinois, 1971, 
pp. 279 - 307.
Maitland, F.W., "Introduction", 0. Gierke, Political Theories of the 
Middle Age, Beacon Press, Boston, 1959, pp. vii - xlv.
Margolin, J.C., Douze Annees de Bibliographie Erasmienne: 1950 - 1961,
J. Vrin, Paris, 1963.
------, Quatorze Annees de Bibliographie Erasmienne: 1936 - 1949, J.
Vrin, Paris, 1969.
------, Neuf Annees de Bibliographie Erasmienne: 1962 - 1970, J. Vrin,
Paris, and University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1977.
Martinez, M.M., "Las Casas on the Conquest of America", in J. Friede and 
B. Keen (eds.), Bartolome de Las Casas in History: Toward an Under­
standing of the Man and His Work, Northern Illinois University 
Press, DeKalb, Illinois, 1971, pp. 309 - 349.
**
Meinecke, F., Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its
Place in Modern History, translated from the German by D. Scott,
With a General Introduction to Friedrich Meinecke's Work by W. 
Stark, Praeger, New York/Washington, 1965.
393
Merriman, R.B., Six Contemporaneous Revolutions, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1938.
Mene”hdez Pidal, R. , "Formacion del Fundamental Pensamiento Politico de 
Carlos V”, in P. Rassow and F. Schalk (eds.), Karl V: Per Kaiser 
und seine Zeit, Boehlau Verlag, Koeln/Graz, 1960, pp. 144 - 166.
Mesnard, P., L'Essor de la Philosophie Politique au XVIe Siede, J. Vrin, 
Paris, 1951.
Meulen, J. Ter, and Diermanse, P.J.J., Bibliographie des Ecrits sur Hugo 
Grotius Imprimes au XVIIe Siede, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague,
1961.
----- , Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisation; 1300 - 1800, Mar­
tinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1968.
Meyers, R., Weltpolitik in Grundbegriffen: I, Ein lehr- und ideenge­
schichtlicher Grundriss, Droste, Duesseldorf, 1979.
Midgley, E.B.F., The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of Interna­
tional Relations, Paul Elek, London, 1975.
Mitteis, H., Der Staat des Hohen Mittelalters: Grundlinien einer ver­
gleichenden Verfassungsgeschichte des Lehnszeitalters, Herrn. Boeh- 
laus Nachfolger, Weimar, 1940.
Molen, G.H.J. van der, Alberico Gentili and the Development of Interna­
tional Law: His Life, Work and Times, 2nd rev. ed., Sijthoff, Ley­
den, 1968.
Moreau-Reibel, J., "Le Droit de Societe Interhumaine et le 'Jus Gentium' 
Essai sur les Origines et le Developpement des Notions jusqu'a Gro­
tius", Recueil des Cours, vol. 77, II, 1950, pp. 485 - 595.
Morgenthau, H.J., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, 4th ed., Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1967.
Muenkler, H., Im Namen des Staates: Die Begruendung der Staatsraison in 
der Fruehen Neuzeit, Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1987.
Murphy, Jr., C.F., The Search for World Order: A Study of Thought and 
Action, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1985.
Naef, W., "Strukturprobleme des Reichs Karls V", in P. Rassow and F.
Schalk (eds.), Karl V: Per Kaiser und seine Zeit, Boehlau Verlag, 
Koeln/Graz, 1960, pp. 167 - 172.
Nellen, H.J.M., Hugo Grotius: 1583 - 1645: Geschichte seines Lebens ba­
sierend auf seiner Korrespondenz, Presse- und Kulturabteilung der 
Kgl. Niederlaendischen Botschaft, Bonn, 1984.
Nicolson, H., Diplomacy, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, London/New 
York, 1965.
394
Nussbaum, A., A Concise History of the Law of Nations, rev. ed., Mac­
millan, New York, 1954.
Nys, E., Les Origines du Droit International, Castaigne, Brussels, and 
Thorin & Fils, Paris, 1894.
------, "Introduction", Francisci de Victoria De Indis et De lure Belli
Relectiones, The Translation by J. Pawley Bate, The Classics of In­
ternational Law, Carnegie Institution, Washington, D.C., 1917, re­
printed by Oceana Publications, New York, 1964, pp. 55 - 100.
, "Introduction", A. Gentili, De Legationibus Libri Tres, vol. 2, 
The Translation by G.J. Laing, The Classics of International Law, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1924, reprinted by Oceana Pub­
lications, New York, and Wildy & Sons, London, 1964, pp. 11a - 37a.
O'Connell, D.P., "Rationalism and Voluntarism in the Fathers of Interna­
tional Law", The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, vol.
13, Part II, 1964, pp. 3 - 32.
------, Richelieu, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1968.
Onions, C.T. (ed.), The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical 
Principles, 3rd ed., 2 vols., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967.
Parker, G., Europe in Crisis: 1598 - 1648, Fontana, Glasgow, 1979.
Parkinson, F., The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the 
History of Thought, Sage Publications, London, 1977.
Parry, J.H., The Spanish Theory of Empire in the Sixteenth Century, Oc­
tagon Books, New York, 1974.
Pauw, F. de, Grotius and the Law of the Sea, translated by P.J. Arthern, 
Editions de 1 'Institut de Sociologie, Universite de Bruxelles, 
Brussels, 1965.
Phillipson, C., "Albericus Gentilis", in Sir John Macdonell and E. Man- 
son (eds.), Great Jurists of the World, John Murray, London, 1913, 
pp. 109 - 143.
------, "Franciscus A Victoria (1480 - 1546): International Law and War",
Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series, vol. 
15, 1915, pp. 175 - 197.
------, "Introduction", A. Gentili, De Jure Belli Libri Tres, vol. 2,
The Translation by J.C. Rolfe, The Classics of International Law, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, and Humphrey Milford, London, 1933, re­
printed by Oceana Publications, New York, and Wildy & Sons, London, 
1964, pp. 9a - 51a.
Porter, B., "Patterns of Thought and Practice: Martin Wight's 'Interna­
tional Theory'", in M. Donelan (ed.), The Reason of States: A Study 
in International Political Theory, George Allen & Unwin, London, 
1978, pp. 64 - 74.
Price, J.L., Culture and Society in the Dutch Republic During the Seven­
teenth Century, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1974.
395
Ranke, L. von, "The Great Powers", in G.G. Iggers and K. von Moltke
(eds.), The Theory and Practice of History by Leopold von Ranke, 
Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis/New York, 1973, pp. 65 - 101.
Rattigan, Sir William, "Bartolus", in Sir John Macdonell and E. Manson 
(eds.), Great Jurists of the World, John Murray, London, 1913, pp. 
45-57.
Reedijk, C., "Erasmus* Final Modesty", in Academie Royale Neerlandaise 
des Sciences et des Sciences Humaines, Actes du Congres Erasme: 
Rotterdam 27-29 Octobre 1969, North Holland Publishing Co., Amster­
dam/London, 1971, pp. 174 - 192.
Reeves, J.S., "Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis: A Bibliographical Ac­
count", The American Journal of International Law, vol. 19, 1925, 
pp. 251 - 262.
Remec, P.R., The Position of the Individual in International Law accord­
ing to Grotius and Vattel, With a Preface by Q. Wright, Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960.
Renoudet, A., Etudes Erasmiennes: 1521 - 1529, E. Droz, Paris, 1939.
Roberts, M. (ed.), Sweden’s Age of Greatness: 1632 - 1718, Macmillan, 
London, 1973.
Roelofsen, C.G., "Some Remarks on the ’Sources’ of the Grotian System of 
International Law",, Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 30, 
1983, pp. 73 - 79.
----- , "Grotius and the International Politics of the Seventeenth Cen­
tury", in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury and A. Roberts (eds.), Hugo Grotius 
and International Relations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 95 
- 131.
Russell, F.H., The Just War in the Middle Ages, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1977.
Sabine, G.H., A History of Political Theory, 3rd ed., George G. Harrap, 
London, 1959.
Schalk, F., "Erasmus und die Res Publica Literaria", in Academie Royale 
Neerlandaise des Sciences et des Sciences Humaines, Actes du Con­
gres Erasme: Rotterdam 27-29 Octobre 1969, North Holland Publish­
ing Co., Amsterdam/London, 1971, pp. 14 - 28.
Scheltens, D.F., "Grotius’ Doctrine of the Social Contract", Netherlands 
International Law Review, vol. 30, 1983, pp. 43 - 60.
Schwärzenberger, G., "The Grotius Factor in International Law and Rela­
tions: A Functional Approach", in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury and A. Rob­
erts (eds.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 301 - 312.
Scott, J. Brown, The Spanish Conception of International Law and of
Sanctions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 
D.C., 1934.
396
----- , Law, the State and the International Community, vol. 1, Green­
wood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1970.
Scribner, R.W., "The Social Thought of Erasmus", Journal of Religious 
History, vol. 6, 1970, pp. 3 - 26.
Simmonds, K.R., "Alberico Gentili at the Admiralty Bar: 1605 - 1608", 
Archiv des Voelkerrechts, vol. 7, 1958/59, pp. 3 - 23.
----- , "Gentili on the Qualities of the Ideal Ambassador", The Indian
Year Book of International Affairs, vol. 13, II, 1964, pp. 47 - 58.
Skinner, Q., The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols., Cam­
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978.
Soder, J., Die Idee der Voelkergemeinschaft: Francisco de Vitoria und 
die philosophischen Grundlagen des Voelkerrechts, Alfred Metzner, 
Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 1955.
Stawell, F.M., The Growth of International Thought, Thornton Butterworth, 
London, 1936.
Tex, J. den, Oldenbarneveldt, 2 vols., translated from the Dutch by R.B. 
Powell, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973.
Thompson, C.R., "Erasmus as Internationalist and Cosmopolitan", Archiv 
fuer Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 46, 1955, pp. 167 - 195.
----- , "Erasmus and Tudor England", in Academie Royale Neerlandaise
des Sciences et des Sciences Humaines, Actes du Congres Erasme: 
Rotterdam 27-29 Octobre 1969, North Holland Publishing Co., Amster­
dam/London, 1971, pp. 29-68.
----- , "Foreword", J.C. Olin (ed.), Christian Humanism and the Reforma­
tion: Selected Writings of Erasmus, with the Life of Erasmus by 
Beatus Rhenanus, Fordham University Press, New York, 1980, pp. ix -
x.
Thomson, J.A.K., "Desiderius Erasmus", in F.J.C. Hearnshaw (ed.), The 
Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Renais­
sance and the Reformation, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1949, pp. 149 
- 170.
Thorne, J.O., and Collocott, T.C. (eds.), Chambers Biographical Diction­
ary, 2 vols., Chambers Paperback Reference Books, Edinburgh, 1975.
Tracy, J.D., The Politics of Erasmus: A Pacifist Intellectual and His 
Milieu, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1978.
Tuck, R., Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development, Cam­
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979.
----- , "Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius et la Doctrine de la Guerre Juste",
Grotiana, New Series, vol. 7, 1986, pp. 87 - 92.
Urdanoz, T., "Introduccion Biografica", Obras de Francisco de Vitoria: 
Relecciones Teologicas, Autores Cristianos, Madrid, 1960, pp. 1 - 
107.
397
Vermeulen, B.P., "Grotius' Methodology and System of International Law", 
Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 30, 1983, pp. 374 - 382.
Vernau, J. (ed.), "Erasmus, Desiderius", The British Library General 
Catalogue of Printed Books to 1975, vol. 102, K.G. Saur, London/ 
Munich, 1981, pp. 7 - 62.
----- , "Groot (Hugo de)", The British Library General Catalogue of
Printed Books to 1975, vol. 133, K.G. Saur, London/Munich, 1982, 
pp. 313 - 330.
Vincent, R.J., "Edmund Burke and the Theory of International Relations", 
Review of International Studies, vol. 10, 1984, pp. 205 - 218.
Vollenhoven, C. van, "Le Livre de 1625", in A. Lysen (ed.), Hugo Grotius: 
Essays on His Life and Works Selected for the Occasion of the Ter­
centenary of His De Jure Belli ac Pacis 1625 - 1925, With a Preface 
by J. Ter Meulen, Sythoffs Publishing Co., Leyden, 1925, pp. 1 - 9 .
----- , "Grotius and Geneva", Bibliotheca Visseriana, vol. 6, 1926, pp.
5 - 81.
----- , "The Growth of Grotius’ De lure Belli ac Pacis as It Appears
from Contemporary Correspondence", Bibliotheca Visseriana, vol. 8, 
1929, pp. 105 - 170.
----- , The Framework of Grotius’ Book De lure Belli ac Pacis (1625),
Noord-Hollandsche Uitgeversmaatschappij, Amsterdam, 1931.
----- , "Sophompaneas", Verspreide Geschriften, vol. 1, Tjeenk Willink &
Zoon, Haarlem, and Martinus Nijhoff, ’S-Gravenhage, 1934, pp. 231 - 
286.
----- , "On the Genesis of De lure Belli ac Pacis (Grotius, 1625)’’, Ver­
spreide Geschriften, vol. 1, Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, Haarlem, and 
Martinus Nijhoff, 'S-Gravenhage, 1934, pp. 352 - 368.
Vreeland, Jr., H., Hugo Grotius the Father of the Modern Science of In­
ternational Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 1917.
Walker, R.B.J., "The Prince and 'The Pauper’: Tradition, Modernity, and 
Practice in the Theory of International Relations", in J. Der Deri- 
an and M.J. Shapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual Relations: 
Postmodern Readings of World Politics, Heath & Co., Lexington,
Mass./Toronto, 1989, pp. 25-48.
Watson, A., "Hedley Bull, States Systems and International Societies", 
Review of International Studies, vol. 13, 1987, pp. 147 - 153.
Weiler, A.G., "Einleitung" to "Vtilissima Consvltatio de Bello Tvrcis
Inferendo, et Obiter Enarratvs Psalmvs XXVIII", in Opera Omnia De- 
siderii Erasmi Roterodami, V-III, vol. 15, North Holland Publishing 
Co., Amsterdam, 1986, pp. 3 - 28.
Whewell, W., "Preface", Hugonis Grotii De Jure Belli et Pacis Libri
Tres, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1853, pp. iii
xvi.
398
Wight, G., and Porter, B., "Preface", M. Wight, International Theory;
The Three Traditions, Leicester University Press, Leicester/Lon­
don, 1991, pp. vi - viii.
Wight, M., "Why Is there no International Theory?", in H. Butterfield
and M. Wight (eds.)* Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the The­
ory of International Politics, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1969, 
pp. 17 - 34.
----- , "Western Values in International Relations", in H. Butterfield
and M. Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the The­
ory of International Politics, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1969, 
pp. 89 - 131.
----- , "The Balance of Power and International Order", in A. James
(ed.), The Bases of International Order; Essays in Honour of C.A.W. 
Manning, Oxford University Press, London, 1973, pp. 85 - 115.
----- , Systems of States, edited by H. Bull, Leicester University
Press, Leicester/London, 1977.
----- , Power Politics, edited with an Introduction by H. Bull and C.
Holbraad, Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1979.
----- , "An Anatomy of International Thought", Review of International
Studies, vol. 13, 1987, pp. 221 - 227.
----- , International Theory: The Three Traditions, edited by G. Wight
and B. Porter, With a Foreword by A. Roberts, Leicester University 
Press, Leicester/London, 1991.
Willems, J.C.M., "Grotius and Grotius Research in the Netherlands",
Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 30, 1983, pp. 93 - 101.
Williams, R., Politics and Letters: Interviews with New Left Review, 
N.L.B., London, 1979.
----- , Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Flamingo/Fontana,
London, 1985.
Wilson, C., The Transformation of Europe: 1558 - 1648, Weidenfeld & Nic- 
olson, London, 1976.
Wolf, E., Grosse Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte, Mohr 
(Paul Siebeck), Tuebingen, 1963.
Woolf, C.N.S., Bartolus of Sassoferrato: His Position in the History of 
Medieval Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1913.
Wright, H.F., "Prefatory Remarks Concerning the Text", in E. Nys (ed.), 
Francisci de Victoria De Indis et De lure Belli Relectiones, The 
Classics of International Law, Carnegie Institution, Washington, 
D.C., 1917, reprinted by Oceana Publications, New York, 1964, pp. 
191 - 207.
Zweig, S., Triumph und Tragik des Erasmus von Rotterdam, Herbert Reich- 
ner, Wien, 1935.
